Movatterモバイル変換


[0]ホーム

URL:


IEICE Transactions on Information and Systems
Online ISSN : 1745-1361
Print ISSN : 0916-8532
Regular Section
Combinatorial Auction-Based Marketplace Mechanism for Cloud Service Reservation
Ikki FUJIWARAKento AIDAIsao ONO
Author information
  • Ikki FUJIWARA

    Graduate University for Advanced Studies (SOKENDAI)

  • Kento AIDA

    Graduate University for Advanced Studies (SOKENDAI)
    National Institute of Informatics

  • Isao ONO

    Tokyo Institute of Technology

Corresponding author

ORCID
Keywords:cloud computing,resource allocation,combinatorial auction,integer programming,optimization
JOURNALFREE ACCESS

2012 Volume E95.DIssue 1Pages 192-204

DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1587/transinf.E95.D.192
Details
  • Published: January 01, 2012Received: May 16, 2011Available on J-STAGE: January 01, 2012Accepted: -Advance online publication: -Revised: -
Download PDF(1897K)
Download citationRIS

(compatible with EndNote, Reference Manager, ProCite, RefWorks)

BIB TEX

(compatible with BibDesk, LaTeX)

Text
How to download citation
Contact us
Article overview
Share
Abstract
This paper proposes a combinatorial auction-based marketplace mechanism for cloud computing services, which allows users to reserve arbitrary combination of services at requested timeslots, prices and quality of service. The proposed mechanism helps enterprise users build workflow applications in a cloud computing environment, specifically on the platform-as-a-service, where the users need to compose multiple types of services at different timeslots. The proposed marketplace mechanism consists of a forward market for an advance reservation and a spot market for immediate allocation of services. Each market employs mixed integer programming to enforce a Pareto optimum allocation with maximized social economic welfare, as well as double-sided auction design to encourage both users and providers to compete for buying and selling the services. The evaluation results show that (1) the proposed forward/combinatorial mechanism outperforms other non-combinatorial and/or non-reservation (spot) mechanisms in both user-centric rationality and global efficiency, and (2) running both a forward market and a spot market improves utilization without disturbing advance reservations depending on the provider's policy.
References (54)
Related articles (0)
Figures (0)
Content from these authors
Supplementary material (0)
Result List ()
Cited by (2)
© 2012 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers
Previous articleNext article
Favorites & Alerts
Related articles

Recently viewed articles
    Announcements from publisher
    Share this page
    feedback
    Top

    Register with J-STAGE for free!

    Register

    Already have an account? Sign inhere


    [8]ページ先頭

    ©2009-2025 Movatter.jp