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Epsilon-stability in school choice.(English)Zbl 1392.91128

Summary: In many school choice practices, scores, instead of ordinal rankings, are used to indicate students’ qualification. We study school choice problems where students have ordinal preference over schools while their priorities at schools are in the form of cardinal scores. The cardinality of scores allows us to measure the intensity of priority violations and hence relax stability by proposing epsilon-stability. We also propose the epsilon-EADA mechanism to select the constrained efficient matching under epsilon-stability.

MSC:

91B68 Matching models

Cite

References:

[1]Abdulkadiroğlu A, Sönmez T (2003) School choice: A mechanism design approach. Am Econ Rev 93:729-747 ·doi:10.1257/000282803322157061
[2]Abdulkadiroğlu A, Pathak P, Roth A (2009) Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with indifferences: redesigning the NYC high-school match. Am Econ Rev 99:1954-1978 ·doi:10.1257/aer.99.5.1954
[3]Afacan MO, Aliog̃ulları ZH, Barlo M (2016) Sticky matching in school choice. Econ Theory. doi:10.1007/s00199-016-0995-y ·Zbl 1197.91153
[4]Bando K (2014) On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm. Games Econ Behav 87:269-287 ·Zbl 1302.91153 ·doi:10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.009
[5]Che Y-K, Kim J, Kojima F (2015) Stable matching in large economies, (working paper) ·Zbl 1422.91550
[6]Dubins L, Freedman D (1981) Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley algorithm. Am Math Mon 88:485-494 ·Zbl 0449.92024 ·doi:10.2307/2321753
[7]Erdil A, Ergin H (2008) What’s the matter with tie-breaking? Improving efficiency in school choice. Am Econ Rev 98:669-689 ·doi:10.1257/aer.98.3.669
[8]Ergin H (2002) Efficient resource allocation on the basis of priorities. Econometrica 70:2489-2497 ·Zbl 1141.91563 ·doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00383
[9]Gale D, Shapley L (1962) College admissions and the stability of marriage. Am Math Month 69:9-15 ·Zbl 0109.24403 ·doi:10.2307/2312726
[10]Kesten O (2010) School Choice with Consent. Quart J Econ 125:1297-1348 ·Zbl 1197.91153 ·doi:10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1297
[11]Kesten O, Kurino M (2016) Do outside options matter in matching? A new perspective on the trade-offs in student assignment, (working paper) ·Zbl 0496.90008
[12]Lien JW, Zheng J, Zhong X (2016) Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission. Games Econ Behav (accepted) ·Zbl 1393.91123
[13]Pathak PA (2016) What really matters in designing school choice mechanisms? (working paper)
[14]Roth A (1982) The economics of matching: stability and incentives. Math Oper Res 7:617-628 ·Zbl 0496.90008 ·doi:10.1287/moor.7.4.617
[15]Tang Q, Yu J (2014) A new perspective on Kesten’s school choice with consent idea. J Econ Theory 154:543-561 ·Zbl 1309.91103 ·doi:10.1016/j.jet.2014.10.002
[16]Wu B, Zhong X (2014) Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China. Games Econ Behav 84:196-215 ·Zbl 1290.91128 ·doi:10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.009
This reference list is based on information provided by the publisher or from digital mathematics libraries. Its items are heuristically matched to zbMATH identifiers and may contain data conversion errors. In some cases that data have been complemented/enhanced by data from zbMATH Open. This attempts to reflect the references listed in the original paper as accurately as possible without claiming completeness or a perfect matching.
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