| RFC 9116 | security.txt | April 2022 |
| Foudil & Shafranovich | Informational | [Page] |
When security vulnerabilities are discovered byresearchers, proper reporting channels are often lacking. As a result,vulnerabilities may be left unreported. This document defines a machine-parsable format("security.txt") to help organizations describe their vulnerability disclosure practicesto make it easier for researchers to report vulnerabilities.¶
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.¶
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are candidates for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.¶
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttps://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9116.¶
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
Many security researchers encounter situations where they are unableto report security vulnerabilities to organizations because there areno reporting channels to contact the owner of a particularresource, and no information is available about the vulnerability disclosure practicesof such owner.¶
As perSection 4 of [RFC2142], there is an existing conventionof using the <SECURITY@domain> email address for communications regardingsecurity issues. That convention provides only a single, email-basedchannel of communication per domain and does not providea way for domain owners to publish information about their security disclosurepractices.¶
There are also contact conventions prescribed for Internet Service Providers (ISPs)inSection 2 of [RFC3013], for Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs)inSection 3.2 of [RFC2350], and for site operators inSection 5.2 of [RFC2196]. As per[RFC7485], there is also contact information provided byRegional Internet Registries (RIRs) and domain registries for owners of IPaddresses, Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs), and domain names. However, none ofthese tackle the issue of how security researchers can locate contact informationand vulnerability disclosure practices for organizations in order to reportvulnerabilities.¶
In this document, we define a richer, machine-parsable, and more extensible wayfor organizations to communicate information about their security disclosurepractices and ways to contact them. Other details of vulnerability disclosureare outside the scope of this document. Readers are encouraged to consult otherdocuments such as[ISO.29147.2018] or[CERT.CVD].¶
As per[CERT.CVD], "vulnerability response" refers to reports of product vulnerabilities,which is related to but distinct from reports of network intrusions and compromisedwebsites ("incident response"). The mechanism defined in this document is intendedto be used for the former ("vulnerability response"). If implementors wantto utilize this mechanism for incident response, they should be aware of additionalsecurity considerations discussed inSection 5.1.¶
The "security.txt" file is intended to be complementary and not a substituteor replacement for other public resources maintained by organizations regardingtheir security disclosure practices.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT","SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described inBCP 14[RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
The term "researcher" correspondsto the terms "finder" and "reporter" in[ISO.29147.2018] and[CERT.CVD].The term "organization" corresponds to the term "vendor"in[ISO.29147.2018] and[CERT.CVD].¶
The term "implementors" includes all parties involved inthe vulnerability disclosure process.¶
This document defines a text file to be placed in a known locationthat provides information about vulnerability disclosure practices of a particular organization.The format of this file is machine parsable andMUST follow the ABNF grammar defined inSection 4. This file is intended to help security researchers whendisclosing security vulnerabilities.¶
By convention, the file is named "security.txt". The location and scope are describedinSection 3.¶
This text file contains multiple fields with different values. A field contains a "name", which is the first part of a field all the way upto the colon (for example: "Contact:") and follows the syntax defined for "field-name" inSection 3.6.8 of [RFC5322]. Field names are case insensitive (as perSection 2.3 of [RFC5234]).The "value" comes after the field name (for example: "mailto:security@example.com") and follows the syntaxdefined for "unstructured" inSection 3.2.5 of [RFC5322]. The fileMAY also contain blank lines.¶
A fieldMUST always consist of a name and a value(for example: "Contact: mailto:security@example.com"). A "security.txt" filecan have an unlimited number of fields. Each fieldMUST appear onits own line. Unless otherwise specified by the field definition,multiple valuesMUST NOT be chained together for a single field.Unless otherwise indicated in a definition of a particular field, a fieldMAY appearmultiple times.¶
Implementors should be aware that some of the fields maycontain URIs using percent-encoding (as perSection 2.1 of [RFC3986]).¶
Any line beginning with the "#" (%x23) symbolMUST be interpreted as a comment. The content of the comment may contain any ASCII or Unicode characters in the %x21-7E and %x80-FFFFF ranges plus the tab (%x09) and space (%x20) characters.¶
Example:¶
# This is a comment.¶
Every lineMUST end with either a carriage return and line feedcharacters (CRLF / %x0D %x0A) or just a line feed character (LF / %x0A).¶
It isRECOMMENDED that a "security.txt" file be digitally signedusing an OpenPGP cleartext signature as described inSection 7 of [RFC4880]. When digital signatures are used, it is alsoRECOMMENDED that organizations use the "Canonical" field (as perSection 2.5.2),thus allowing the digital signature to authenticate the location of the file.¶
When it comes to verifying the key used to generate the signature, it is alwaysthe security researcher's responsibility to make sure the key beingused is indeed one they trust.¶
Like many other formats and protocols, this format may need to be changedover time to fit the ever-changing landscape of the Internet. Therefore,extensibility is provided via an IANA registry for fields as definedinSection 6.2. Any fields registered via that processMUST beconsidered optional. To encourage extensibility and interoperability,researchersMUST ignore any fields they do not explicitly support.¶
In general, implementors should "be conservative in what you do,be liberal in what you accept from others" (as per[RFC0793]).¶
Unless otherwise stated, all fieldsMUST be considered optional.¶
The "Acknowledgments" field indicates a link to a page where securityresearchers are recognized for their reports. The page being referencedshould list security researchers that reported security vulnerabilitiesand collaborated to remediate them. Organizations should be carefulto limit the vulnerability information being published in orderto prevent future attacks.¶
If this field indicates a web URI, then itMUST begin with "https://"(as perSection 2.7.2 of [RFC7230]).¶
Example:¶
Acknowledgments: https://example.com/hall-of-fame.html¶
Example security acknowledgments page:¶
We would like to thank the following researchers:(2017-04-15) Frank Denis - Reflected cross-site scripting(2017-01-02) Alice Quinn - SQL injection(2016-12-24) John Buchner - Stored cross-site scripting(2016-06-10) Anna Richmond - A server configuration issue¶
The "Canonical" field indicates the canonical URIs where the "security.txt" file is located,which is usually something like "https://example.com/.well-known/security.txt".If this field indicates a web URI, then itMUST begin with "https://"(as perSection 2.7.2 of [RFC7230]).¶
While this field indicates that a "security.txt" retrieved from a given URIis intended to apply to that URI, itMUST NOT be interpreted to apply toall canonical URIs listed within the file. ResearchersSHOULD use an additionaltrust mechanism such as a digital signature (as perSection 2.3) to make thedetermination that a particular canonical URI is applicable.¶
If this field appears within a "security.txt" file and the URI used toretrieve that file is not listed within any canonical fields,then the contents of the fileSHOULD NOT be trusted.¶
Canonical: https://www.example.com/.well-known/security.txtCanonical: https://someserver.example.com/.well-known/security.txt¶
The "Contact" field indicates a method that researchersshould use for reporting securityvulnerabilities such as an email address, a phone number, and/or aweb page with contact information. This fieldMUSTalways be present in a "security.txt" file. If this field indicates a web URI,then itMUST begin with "https://" (as perSection 2.7.2 of [RFC7230]).Security email addresses should use the conventions defined inSection 4 of [RFC2142].¶
The valueMUST follow the URI syntax described inSection 3 of [RFC3986].This means that "mailto" and "tel" URI schemes must be usedwhen specifying email addresses and telephone numbers, as defined in[RFC6068]and[RFC3966]. When the value of this field is an email address, it isRECOMMENDED that encryption be used (as perSection 2.5.4).¶
TheseSHOULD be listed in order of preference, with the first occurrence being the preferredmethod of contact, the second occurrence being the second most preferred method of contact, etc. In the example below, the first email address("security@example.com") is the preferred method of contact.¶
Contact: mailto:security@example.comContact: mailto:security%2Buri%2Bencoded@example.comContact: tel:+1-201-555-0123Contact: https://example.com/security-contact.html¶
The "Encryption" field indicates an encryption key thatsecurity researchers should use for encrypted communication. KeysMUST NOTappear in this field. Instead, the value of this fieldMUST be a URI pointing to a location where the key can be retrieved.If this field indicates a web URI, then itMUST begin with "https://"(as perSection 2.7.2 of [RFC7230]).¶
When it comes to verifying the authenticity of the key, it is always the securityresearcher's responsibility to make sure the key being specified is indeed onethey trust. Researchers must not assume that this key isused to generate the digital signature referenced inSection 2.3.¶
Example of an OpenPGP key available from a web server:¶
Encryption: https://example.com/pgp-key.txt¶
Example of an OpenPGP key available from an OPENPGPKEY DNS record:¶
Encryption: dns:5d2d37ab76d47d36._openpgpkey.example.com?type=OPENPGPKEY¶
Example of an OpenPGP key being referenced by its fingerprint:¶
Encryption: openpgp4fpr:5f2de5521c63a801ab59ccb603d49de44b29100f¶
The "Expires" field indicates the date and time after which the data contained in the "security.txt"file is considered stale and should not be used (as perSection 5.3). The value of this field is formattedaccording to the Internet profiles of[ISO.8601-1] and[ISO.8601-2] as defined in[RFC3339]. It isRECOMMENDED that the valueof this field be less than a year into the future to avoid staleness.¶
This fieldMUST always be present andMUST NOT appear more than once.¶
Expires: 2021-12-31T18:37:07z¶
The "Hiring" field is used for linking to the vendor's security-related job positions.If this field indicates a web URI, then itMUST begin with "https://"(as perSection 2.7.2 of [RFC7230]).¶
Hiring: https://example.com/jobs.html¶
The "Policy" field indicates a link to where the vulnerability disclosure policy is located.This can help security researchers understandthe organization's vulnerability reporting practices.If this field indicates a web URI, then itMUST begin with "https://"(as perSection 2.7.2 of [RFC7230]).¶
Example:¶
Policy: https://example.com/disclosure-policy.html¶
The "Preferred-Languages" field can be used to indicate a set of natural languages thatare preferred when submitting security reports. This setMAY list multiplevalues, separated by commas. If this field is included, then at leastone valueMUST be listed. The values within this set are language tags(as defined in[RFC5646]). If this field is absent, security researchersmay assume that English is the language to be used (as perSection 4.5 of [RFC2277]).¶
The order in which they appear is not an indication of priority;the listed languages are intended to have equal priority.¶
This fieldMUST NOT appear more than once.¶
Example (English, Spanish and French):¶
Preferred-Languages: en, es, fr¶
# Our security addressContact: mailto:security@example.com# Our OpenPGP keyEncryption: https://example.com/pgp-key.txt# Our security policyPolicy: https://example.com/security-policy.html# Our security acknowledgments pageAcknowledgments: https://example.com/hall-of-fame.htmlExpires: 2021-12-31T18:37:07z¶
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----Hash: SHA256# Canonical URICanonical: https://example.com/.well-known/security.txt# Our security addressContact: mailto:security@example.com# Our OpenPGP keyEncryption: https://example.com/pgp-key.txt# Our security policyPolicy: https://example.com/security-policy.html# Our security acknowledgments pageAcknowledgments: https://example.com/hall-of-fame.htmlExpires: 2021-12-31T18:37:07z-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----Version: GnuPG v2.2[signature]-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----¶
For web-based services, organizationsMUST place the "security.txt" file under the "/.well-known/" path, e.g., https://example.com/.well-known/security.txtas per[RFC8615] of a domain name or IP address. For legacy compatibility, a "security.txt" file might be placed at the top-level pathor redirect (as perSection 6.4 of [RFC7231]) to the "security.txt" file under the "/.well-known/" path. If a "security.txt" fileis present in both locations, the one in the "/.well-known/" pathMUST be used.¶
The fileMUST be accessed via HTTP 1.0 or a higher version,and the file accessMUST use the "https" scheme (as perSection 2.7.2 of [RFC7230]).ItMUST have a Content-Type of "text/plain"with the default charset parameter set to "utf-8" (as perSection 4.1.3 of [RFC2046]).¶
Retrieval of "security.txt" files and resources indicated within such files may result in a redirect (as perSection 6.4 of [RFC7231]). Researchers should perform additional analysis (as perSection 5.2) to make sure these redirectsare not malicious or pointing to resources controlled by an attacker.¶
A "security.txt" fileMUST only apply to the domainor IP address in the URI used to retrieve it, not to any of its subdomains or parent domains.A "security.txt" fileMAY also apply to products and services provided by the organization publishing the file.¶
As perSection 1.1, this specification is intended for a vulnerability response.If implementors want to use this for an incident response, they should be aware of additional security considerations discussed inSection 5.1.¶
OrganizationsSHOULD use the policy directive (as perSection 2.5.7)to provide additional details regarding the scope and details of their vulnerability disclosure process.¶
Some examples appear below:¶
# The following only applies to example.com.https://example.com/.well-known/security.txt# This only applies to subdomain.example.com.https://subdomain.example.com/.well-known/security.txt# This security.txt file applies to IPv4 address of 192.0.2.0.https://192.0.2.0/.well-known/security.txt# This security.txt file applies to IPv6 address of 2001:db8:8:4::2.https://[2001:db8:8:4::2]/.well-known/security.txt¶
The file format of the "security.txt" fileMUST be plain text (MIME type "text/plain") as defined inSection 4.1.3 of [RFC2046] andMUST be encoded using UTF-8[RFC3629] in Net-Unicode form[RFC5198].¶
The format of this fileMUST follow the ABNF definition below (which incorporates the core ABNF rules from[RFC5234] and uses the case-sensitive string support from[RFC7405]).¶
body = signed / unsignedunsigned = *line (contact-field eol) ; one or more required *line (expires-field eol) ; exactly one required *line [lang-field eol] *line ; exactly one optional ; order of fields within the file is not important ; except that if contact-field appears more ; than once, the order of those indicates ; priority (see Section 3.5.3); signed is the production that should match the OpenPGP clearsigned; documentsigned = cleartext-header 1*(hash-header) CRLF cleartext signaturecleartext-header = %s"-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----" CRLFhash-header = %s"Hash: " hash-alg *("," hash-alg) CRLFhash-alg = token ; imported from RFC 2045; see RFC 4880 Section ; 10.3.3 for a pointer to the registry of ; valid values;cleartext = 1*( UTF8-octets [CR] LF) ; dash-escaped per RFC 4880 Section 7.1cleartext = *((line-dash / line-from / line-nodash) [CR] LF)line-dash = ("- ") "-" *UTF8-char-not-cr ; MUST include initial "- "line-from = ["- "] "From " *UTF8-char-not-cr ; SHOULD include initial "- "line-nodash = ["- "] *UTF8-char-not-cr ; MAY include initial "- "UTF8-char-not-dash = UTF8-1-not-dash / UTF8-2 / UTF8-3 / UTF8-4UTF8-1-not-dash = %x00-2C / %x2E-7FUTF8-char-not-cr = UTF8-1-not-cr / UTF8-2 / UTF8-3 / UTF8-4UTF8-1-not-cr = %x00-0C / %x0E-7F; UTF8 rules from RFC 3629UTF8-octets = *( UTF8-char )UTF8-char = UTF8-1 / UTF8-2 / UTF8-3 / UTF8-4UTF8-1 = %x00-7FUTF8-2 = %xC2-DF UTF8-tailUTF8-3 = %xE0 %xA0-BF UTF8-tail / %xE1-EC 2( UTF8-tail ) / %xED %x80-9F UTF8-tail / %xEE-EF 2( UTF8-tail )UTF8-4 = %xF0 %x90-BF 2( UTF8-tail ) / %xF1-F3 3( UTF8-tail ) / %xF4 %x80-8F 2( UTF8-tail )UTF8-tail = %x80-BFsignature = armor-header armor-keys CRLF signature-data armor-tailarmor-header = %s"-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----" CRLFarmor-keys = *(token ": " *( VCHAR / WSP ) CRLF) ; Armor Header Keys from RFC 4880armor-tail = %s"-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----" CRLFsignature-data = 1*(1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "=" / "+" / "/") CRLF) ; base64; see RFC 4648 ; includes RFC 4880 checksumline = [ (field / comment) ] eoleol = *WSP [CR] LFfield = ; optional fields ack-field / can-field / contact-field / ; optional repeated instances encryption-field / hiring-field / policy-field / ext-fieldfs = ":"comment = "#" *(WSP / VCHAR / %x80-FFFFF)ack-field = "Acknowledgments" fs SP urican-field = "Canonical" fs SP uricontact-field = "Contact" fs SP uriexpires-field = "Expires" fs SP date-timeencryption-field = "Encryption" fs SP urihiring-field = "Hiring" fs SP urilang-field = "Preferred-Languages" fs SP lang-valuespolicy-field = "Policy" fs SP uridate-time = < imported from Section 5.6 of [RFC3339] >lang-tag = < Language-Tag from Section 2.1 of [RFC5646] >lang-values = lang-tag *(*WSP "," *WSP lang-tag)uri = < URI as per Section 3 of [RFC3986] >ext-field = field-name fs SP unstructuredfield-name = < imported from Section 3.6.8 of [RFC5322] >unstructured = < imported from Section 3.2.5 of [RFC5322] >token = < imported from Section 5.1 of [RFC2045] >ALPHA = %x41-5A / %x61-7A ; A-Z / a-zBIT = "0" / "1"CHAR = %x01-7F ; any 7-bit US-ASCII character, ; excluding NULCR = %x0D ; carriage returnCRLF = CR LF ; Internet standard newlineCTL = %x00-1F / %x7F ; controlsDIGIT = %x30-39 ; 0-9DQUOTE = %x22 ; " (Double Quote)HEXDIG = DIGIT / "A" / "B" / "C" / "D" / "E" / "F"HTAB = %x09 ; horizontal tabLF = %x0A ; linefeedLWSP = *(WSP / CRLF WSP) ; Use of this linear-white-space rule ; permits lines containing only white ; space that are no longer legal in ; mail headers and have caused ; interoperability problems in other ; contexts. ; Do not use when defining mail ; headers and use with caution in ; other contexts.OCTET = %x00-FF ; 8 bits of dataSP = %x20VCHAR = %x21-7E ; visible (printing) charactersWSP = SP / HTAB ; white space¶"ext-field" refers to extension fields, which are discussed inSection 2.4.¶
Because of the use of URIs and well-known resources, security considerations of[RFC3986] and[RFC8615] apply here, in addition to theconsiderations outlined below.¶
An attacker that has compromised a website is able to compromisethe "security.txt" file as well or set up a redirect to their own site.This can result in security reports not being received by the organizationor being sent to the attacker.¶
To protect against this, organizations should use the "Canonical" field to indicate the locationsof the file (as perSection 2.5.2), digitally sign their "security.txt"files (as perSection 2.3), and regularly monitor the file andthe referenced resources to detect tampering.¶
Security researchers should validate the "security.txt" file, including verifyingthe digital signature and checking any available historical records before using the informationcontained in the file. If the "security.txt" file looks suspicious or compromised,it should not be used.¶
While it is not recommended, implementors may choose to use the information publishedwithin a "security.txt" file for an incident response. In such cases, extreme cautionshould be taken before trusting such information, sinceit may have been compromised by an attacker. Researchers should use additional methodsto verify such data including out-of-band verification of the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) signature, DNSSEC-based approaches, etc.¶
When retrieving the file and any resources referenced in the file, researchers should recordany redirects since they can lead to a different domain or IP address controlled by an attacker. Furtherinspection of such redirects is recommended before using the information contained within the file.¶
If information and resources referenced in a "security.txt" file are incorrector not kept up to date, this can result in security reports not being receivedby the organization or sent to incorrect contacts, thus exposing possiblesecurity issues to third parties. Not having a "security.txt" file may be preferableto having stale information in this file. Organizations must usethe "Expires" field (seeSection 2.5.5) to indicate to researchers whenthe data in the file is no longer valid.¶
Organizations should ensure that information in this file and any referencedresources such as web pages, email addresses, and telephone numbersare kept current, are accessible, are controlled by the organization,and are kept secure.¶
It is possible for compromised or malicious sites to create files that are extraordinarilylarge or otherwise malformed in an attempt to discover or exploit weaknessesin the parsing code. Researchers should make sure that any such codeis robust against large or malformed files and fields, and they may choose to have the code not parse files larger than 32 KBs, those with fields longer than 2,048 characters, or those containing more than 1,000 lines. The ABNF grammar (as defined inSection 4) can also be used as a way to verify these files.¶
The same concerns apply to any other resources referenced within "security.txt"files, as well as any security reports received as a result of publishingthis file. Such resources and reports may be hostile, malformed, or malicious.¶
The presence of a "security.txt" file might be interpreted by researchersas providing permission to do security testing against the domain or IP addresswhere it is published or against products and services provided by the organization publishingthe file.This might result in increased testing against an organization by researchers. On the other hand, a decision notto publish a "security.txt" file might be interpreted by theorganization operating that website to be a way to signal to researchersthat permission to test that particular site or project is denied. This might result in pushback againstresearchers reporting security issues to that organization.¶
Therefore, researchers shouldn't assume that the presence or absence ofa "security.txt" file grants or denies permission for security testing.Any such permission may be indicated in the company's vulnerability disclosure policy(as perSection 2.5.7) or a new field (as perSection 2.4).¶
In multi-user / multi-tenant environments, it may be possible for a user to takeover the location of the "security.txt" file. Organizations should reservethe "security.txt" namespace at the root to ensure no third party can create a page withthe "security.txt" AND "/.well-known/security.txt" names.¶
To protect a "security.txt" file from being tampered with in transit, implementorsMUST useHTTPS (as perSection 2.7.2 of [RFC7230]) when serving the file itself and for retrieval of any web URIsreferenced in it (except when otherwise noted in this specification). As part of the TLShandshake, researchers should validate the provided X.509 certificatein accordance with[RFC6125] and the following considerations:¶
The certificate may also be checked for revocation via the Online Certificate StatusProtocol (OCSP)[RFC6960], certificate revocation lists (CRLs), or similar mechanisms.¶
In cases where the "security.txt" file cannot be served via HTTPS (such as localhost) or isbeing served with an invalid certificate, additional human validation is recommended sincethe contents may have been modified while in transit.¶
As an additional layer of protection, it is also recommended thatorganizations digitally sign their "security.txt" file with OpenPGP (as perSection 2.3).Also, to protect security reports from being tampered with or observed while in transit,organizations should specify encryption keys (as perSection 2.5.4) unlessHTTPS is being used for report submission.¶
However, the determination of validity of such keys is out of scopefor this specification. Security researchers need to establish other secure means toverify them.¶
Similar to concerns in[RFC2142], denial-of-service attacks via spam reportswould become easier once a "security.txt" file is published byan organization. In addition, there is an increased likelihood of reportsbeing sent in an automated fashion and/or as a result of automated scans withouthuman analysis. Attackers can also use this file as a way to spam unrelatedthird parties by listing their resources and/or contact information.¶
Organizations need to weigh the advantages of publishing this file versusthe possible disadvantages and increased resources required to analyze security reports.¶
Security researchers should review all information within the "security.txt"file before submitting reports in an automated fashion or reports resulting from automated scans.¶
Implementors should be aware that any resources referenced withina "security.txt" fileMUST NOT point to the Well-Known URIs namespace unlessthey are registered with IANA (as per[RFC8615]).¶
IANA has updated the "Well-Known URIs" registry with the following additional values (using the template from[RFC8615]):¶
IANA has created the "security.txt Fields" registry inaccordance with[RFC8126]. This registry contains fields foruse in "security.txt" files, defined by this specification.¶
New registrations or updatesMUST be published in accordance with the"Expert Review" guidelines as described in Sections4.5 and5 of[RFC8126]. Any new field thus registered is considered optionalby this specification unless a new version of this specification is published.¶
Designated experts should determine whether a proposed registration or updateprovides value to organizations and researchers using this format and makes sense in the context of industry-accepted vulnerability disclosure processessuch as[ISO.29147.2018] and[CERT.CVD].¶
New registrations and updatesMUST contain the following information:¶
New or updated status, whichMUST be one of the following:¶
Existing registrations may be marked historic or deprecated, as appropriate, by a future update to this document.¶
The initial registry contains these values:¶
The authors would like to acknowledge the help provided during thedevelopment of this document byTom Hudson,Jobert Abma,Gerben Janssen van Doorn,Austin Heap,Stephane Bortzmeyer,Max Smith,Eduardo Vela, andKrzysztof Kotowicz.¶
The authors would also like to acknowledge the feedback provided by multiple members of the IETF'sLAST CALL, SAAG, and SECDISPATCH lists.¶
Yakov Shafranovich would like to also thank L.T.S. (for everything).¶