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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                           S. RoseRequest for Comments: 6944                                          NISTUpdates:2536,2539,3110,4034,4398,                        April 20135155,5702,5933Category: Standards TrackISSN: 2070-1721Applicability Statement: DNS Security (DNSSEC) DNSKEY AlgorithmImplementation StatusAbstract   The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) requires the use of   cryptographic algorithm suites for generating digital signatures over   DNS data.  There is currently an IANA registry for these algorithms,   but there is no record of the recommended implementation status of   each algorithm.  This document provides an applicability statement on   algorithm implementation status for DNSSEC component software.  This   document lists each algorithm's status based on the current   reference.  In the case that an algorithm is specified without an   implementation status, this document assigns one.  This document   updates RFCs 2536, 2539, 3110, 4034, 4398, 5155, 5702, and 5933.Status of This Memo   This is an Internet Standards Track document.   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has   received public review and has been approved for publication by the   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on   Internet Standards is available inSection 2 of RFC 5741.   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttp://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6944.Rose                         Standards Track                    [Page 1]

RFC 6944             DNSSEC DNSKEY Algorithm Status           April 2013Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of   publication of this document.  Please review these documents   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as   described in the Simplified BSD License.Table of Contents1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32.  The DNS Security Algorithm Implementation Status Lists  . . . .32.1.  Status Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32.2.  Algorithm Implementation Status Assignment Rationale  . . .42.3.  DNSSEC Implementation Status Table  . . . . . . . . . . . .4     2.4.  Specifying New Algorithms and Updating the Status of           Existing Entries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7Rose                         Standards Track                    [Page 2]

RFC 6944             DNSSEC DNSKEY Algorithm Status           April 20131.  Introduction   The Domain Name System (DNS) Security Extensions (DNSSEC) ([RFC4033],   [RFC4034], [RFC4035], [RFC4509], [RFC5155], and [RFC5702]) uses   digital signatures over DNS data to provide source authentication and   integrity protection.  DNSSEC uses an IANA registry to list codes for   digital signature algorithms (consisting of a cryptographic algorithm   and one-way hash function).   The original list of algorithm status is found in [RFC4034].  Other   DNSSEC RFCs have added new algorithms or changed the status of   algorithms in the registry.  However, implementers must read through   all the documents in order to discover which algorithms are   considered wise to implement, which are not, and which algorithms may   become widely used in the future.   This document defines the current implementation status for all   registered algorithms.  If the status of algorithms changes, this   document will be replaced with a new one establishing the new status;   seeSection 2.4.   This document updates the following: [RFC2536], [RFC2539], [RFC3110],   [RFC4034], [RFC4398], [RFC5155], [RFC5702], and [RFC5933].1.1.  Requirements Language   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].2.  The DNS Security Algorithm Implementation Status Lists2.1.  Status Definitions   Must Implement:  The algorithm MUST be implemented to interoperate      with other implementations of this specification.   Must Not Implement:  The algorithm MUST NOT be implemented.  An      algorithm with this status has known weaknesses.   Recommended to Implement:  The algorithm SHOULD be implemented.      Utility and interoperability with other implementations will be      improved when an algorithm with this status is implemented, though      there might be occasions where it is reasonable not to implement      the algorithm.  An implementer must understand and weigh the full      implications of choosing not to implement this particular      algorithm.Rose                         Standards Track                    [Page 3]

RFC 6944             DNSSEC DNSKEY Algorithm Status           April 2013   Optional:  The algorithm MAY be implemented, but all implementations      MUST be prepared to interoperate with implementations that do or      do not implement this algorithm.2.2.  Algorithm Implementation Status Assignment Rationale   RSASHA1 has an implementation status of Must Implement, consistent   with [RFC4034].  RSAMD5 has an implementation status of Must Not   Implement because of known weaknesses in MD5.   The status of RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 is set to Recommended to Implement   as many deployments use NSEC3.  The status of RSA/SHA-256 and RSA/   SHA-512 are also set to Recommended to Implement as major deployments   (such as the root zone) use these algorithms [ROOTDPS].  It is   believed that RSA/SHA-256 or RSA/SHA-512 algorithms will replace   older algorithms (e.g., RSA/SHA-1) that have a perceived weakness.   Likewise, ECDSA with the two identified curves (ECDSAP256SHA256 and   ECDSAP384SHA384) is an algorithm that may see widespread use due to   the perceived similar level of security offered with smaller key size   compared to the key sizes of algorithms such as RSA.  Therefore,   ECDSAP256SHA256 and ECDSAP384SHA384 are Recommended to Implement.   All other algorithms used in DNSSEC specified without an   implementation status are currently set to Optional.2.3.  DNSSEC Implementation Status Table   The DNSSEC algorithm implementation status table is listed below.   Only the algorithms already specified for use with DNSSEC at the time   of writing are listed.    +------------+------------+-------------------+-------------------+    |    Must    |  Must Not  |    Recommended    |      Optional     |    |  Implement | Implement  |   to Implement    |                   |    +------------+------------+-------------------+-------------------+    |            |            |                   |                   |    |   RSASHA1  |   RSAMD5   |   RSASHA256       |   Any             |    |            |            |   RSASHA1-NSEC3   |   registered      |    |            |            |    -SHA1          |   algorithm       |    |            |            |   RSASHA512       |   not listed in   |    |            |            |   ECDSAP256SHA256 |   this table      |    |            |            |   ECDSAP384SHA384 |                   |    +------------+------------+-------------------+-------------------+Rose                         Standards Track                    [Page 4]

RFC 6944             DNSSEC DNSKEY Algorithm Status           April 2013   This table does not list the Reserved values in the IANA registry   table or the values for INDIRECT (252), PRIVATE (253), and PRIVATEOID   (254).  These values may relate to more than one algorithm and are   therefore up to the implementer's discretion.  As noted, any   algorithm not listed in the table is Optional.  As of this writing,   the Optional algorithms are DSASHA1, DH, DSA-NSEC3-SHA1, and GOST-   ECC, but in general, anything not explicitly listed is Optional.2.4.  Specifying New Algorithms and Updating the Status of Existing      Entries   [RFC6014] establishes a parallel procedure for adding a registry   entry for a new algorithm other than a standards track document.   Because any algorithm not listed in the foregoing table is Optional,   algorithms entered into the registry using the [RFC6014] procedure   are automatically Optional.   It has turned out to be useful for implementations to refer to a   single document that specifies the implementation status of every   algorithm.  Accordingly, when a new algorithm is to be registered   with a status other than Optional, this document shall be made   obsolete by a new document that adds the new algorithm to the table   inSection 2.3.  Similarly, if the status of any algorithm in the   table inSection 2.3 changes, a new document shall make this document   obsolete; that document shall include a replacement of the table inSection 2.3.  This way, the goal of having one authoritative document   to specify all the status values is achieved.   This document cannot be updated, only made obsolete and replaced by a   successor document.3.  IANA Considerations   This document lists the implementation status of cryptographic   algorithms used with DNSSEC.  These algorithms are maintained in an   IANA registry athttp://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers.   Because this document establishes the implementation status of every   algorithm, it has been listed as a reference for the registry itself.4.  Security Considerations   This document lists, and in some cases assigns, the implementation   status of cryptographic algorithms used with DNSSEC.  It is not meant   to be a discussion on algorithm superiority.  No new security   considerations are raised in this document, though prior description   of algorithms as NOT RECOMMENDED (see [RFC4034]) has been recast as   Must Not Implement.Rose                         Standards Track                    [Page 5]

RFC 6944             DNSSEC DNSKEY Algorithm Status           April 20135.  References5.1.  Normative References   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate              Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119, March 1997.   [RFC2536]  Eastlake, D., "DSA KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name System              (DNS)",RFC 2536, March 1999.   [RFC2539]  Eastlake, D., "Storage of Diffie-Hellman Keys in the              Domain Name System (DNS)",RFC 2539, March 1999.   [RFC3110]  Eastlake, D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain              Name System (DNS)",RFC 3110, May 2001.   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",RFC 4033, March 2005.   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",RFC 4034, March 2005.   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security              Extensions",RFC 4035, March 2005.   [RFC4398]  Josefsson, S., "Storing Certificates in the Domain Name              System (DNS)",RFC 4398, March 2006.   [RFC4509]  Hardaker, W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer              (DS) Resource Records (RRs)",RFC 4509, May 2006.   [RFC5155]  Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS              Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of              Existence",RFC 5155, March 2008.   [RFC5702]  Jansen, J., "Use of SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY              and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC",RFC 5702,              October 2009.   [RFC5933]  Dolmatov, V., Chuprina, A., and I. Ustinov, "Use of GOST              Signature Algorithms in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records              for DNSSEC",RFC 5933, July 2010.   [RFC6014]  Hoffman, P., "Cryptographic Algorithm Identifier              Allocation for DNSSEC",RFC 6014, November 2010.Rose                         Standards Track                    [Page 6]

RFC 6944             DNSSEC DNSKEY Algorithm Status           April 20135.2.  Informative References   [ROOTDPS]  Ljunggren, F., Okubo, T., Lamb, R., and J. Schlyter,              "DNSSEC Practice Statement for the Root Zone KSK              Operator", DNS ROOTDPS, May 2010,              <http://www.root-dnssec.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/icann-dps-00.txt>.Author's Address   Scott Rose   NIST   100 Bureau Dr.   Gaithersburg, MD  20899   USA   Phone: +1-301-975-8439   EMail: scottr.nist@gmail.comRose                         Standards Track                    [Page 7]

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