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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                       K. MoriartyRequest for Comments: 6046                                           EMCCategory: Informational                                      B. TrammellISSN: 2070-1721                                               ETH Zurich                                                           November 2010Transport of Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) MessagesAbstract   The Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) defines a   common XML format for document exchange, and Real-time Inter-network   Defense (RID) defines extensions to IODEF intended for the   cooperative handling of security incidents within consortia of   network operators and enterprises.  This document specifies a   transport protocol for RID based upon the passing of RID messages   over HTTP/TLS (Transport Layer Security).Status of This Memo   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is   published for informational purposes.   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has   received public review and has been approved for publication by the   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents   approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet   Standard; seeSection 2 of RFC 5741.   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttp://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6046.Moriarty & Trammell           Informational                     [Page 1]

RFC 6046                      RID Transport                November 2010Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of   publication of this document.  Please review these documents   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as   described in the Simplified BSD License.1.  Introduction   The Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) [RFC5070]   describes an XML document format for the purpose of exchanging data   between Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) or those   responsible for security incident handling for network providers   (NPs).  The defined document format provides an easy way for CSIRTs   to exchange data in a way that can be easily parsed.   IODEF defines a message format, not a transport protocol, as the   sharing of messages is assumed to be out of scope in order to allow   CSIRTs to exchange and store messages in a way most suited to their   established incident handling processes.  However, Real-time   Inter-network Defense (RID) [RFC6045] does require a specification of   a transport protocol to ensure interoperability among members in a   RID consortium.  This document specifies the transport of RID   messages within HTTP [RFC2616] Request and Response messages   transported over Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246] (herein,   HTTP/TLS).  Note that any IODEF message may also be transported using   this mechanism, by sending it as a RID Report message.2.  Terminology   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].3.  Transmission of RID Messages over HTTP/TLS   This section specifies the details of the transport of RID messages   over HTTP/TLS.  In this arrangement, each RID server is both an HTTP/   TLS server and an HTTP/TLS client.  When a RID message must be sent,   the sending RID system connects to the receiving RID system and sendsMoriarty & Trammell           Informational                     [Page 2]

RFC 6046                      RID Transport                November 2010   the message, optionally receiving a message in reply.  All RID   systems MUST be prepared to accept HTTP/TLS connections from any RID   peer with which it communicates, in order to support callback for   delayed replies (see below).BCP 56 [RFC3205] contains a number of important considerations when   using HTTP for application protocols.  These include the size of the   payload for the application, whether the application will use a web   browser, whether the protocol should be defined on a port other than   80, and if the security provided through HTTP/TLS suits the needs of   the new application.   It is acknowledged within the scope of these concerns that HTTP/TLS   is not ideally suited for RID transport, as the former is a client-   server protocol and the latter a message-exchange protocol; however,   the ease of implementation of RID systems over HTTP/TLS outweighs   these concerns.  Consistent withBCP 56, RID systems will listen for   TCP connections on port 4590.  Every RID system participating in a   consortium MUST listen for HTTP/TLS connections on the assigned port.   All RID messages sent in HTTP Requests MUST be sent using the POST   with a Request-URI of "/"; additional Request-URI paths are reserved   for future use by RID.   Table 1 lists the allowable RID message types in an HTTP Response for   a given RID message type in the Request.  A RID system MUST be   prepared to handle an HTTP Response of the given type(s) when sending   the corresponding HTTP Request.  A RID system MUST NOT send an HTTP   Response containing any RID message other than the one corresponding   to the one sent in the HTTP Request.   As the queries and replies in a RID message exchange may be   significantly separated in time, the receiving RID system MAY return   202 Accepted, terminate the connection, and at a later time connect   to the requesting RID system and send the RID reply in an HTTP   Request.  This mechanism is referred to in this document as "RID   callback".  When performing RID callback, a responding system MUST   connect to the network- and transport-layer addresses from which the   original request was sent; there is no mechanism in RID for   redirected callback.   While a RID system SHOULD return the reply in an HTTP Response if it   is available immediately or within a generally accepted HTTP client   timeout (about thirty seconds), this is not mandatory, and as suchMoriarty & Trammell           Informational                     [Page 3]

RFC 6046                      RID Transport                November 2010   RID systems MUST be prepared for a query to be met with a 202   Accepted, an empty Response body, a connection termination, and a   callback.  Note that all RID messages require a response from the   receiving RID system, so a sending RID system can expect either an   immediate response or a callback.   RID systems accepting a callback message in an HTTP Request MUST   return 202 Accepted.   Table 1 lists the allowable request/response pairs for RID.    +----------------------+----------+--------+----------------------+    | Request RID type     | Callback | Result | Response RID type    |    +----------------------+----------+--------+----------------------+    | TraceRequest         |          | 200    | RequestAuthorization |    | TraceRequest         |          | 200    | Result               |    | TraceRequest         |          | 202    | [empty]              |    | RequestAuthorization |     X    | 202    | [empty]              |    | Result               |     X    | 202    | [empty]              |    | Investigation        |          | 200    | Result               |    | Investigation        |          | 202    | [empty]              |    | Report               |     X    | 202    | [empty]              |    | IncidentQuery        |          | 200    | Report               |    | IncidentQuery        |          | 202    | [empty]              |    +----------------------+----------+--------+----------------------+                                  Table 1   For security purposes, RID systems SHOULD NOT return 3xx Redirection   response codes, and MUST NOT follow any 3xx Redirection.  When a RID   system's address changes, contact point information within the   consortium must be updated out of band.   If a RID system receives an improper RID message in an HTTP Request,   it MUST return an appropriate 4xx Client Error result code to the   requesting RID system.  If a RID system cannot process a RID message   received in an HTTP Request due to an error on its own side, it MUST   return an appropriate 5xx Server Error result code to the requesting   RID system.   Note that HTTP provides no mechanism for signaling to a server that a   response body is not a valid RID message.  If a RID system receives   an improper RID message in an HTTP Response, or cannot process a RID   message received in an HTTP Response due to an error on its own side,   it MUST log the error and present it to the RID system administrator   for handling; the error logging format is an implementation detail   and is considered out of scope for this specification.Moriarty & Trammell           Informational                     [Page 4]

RFC 6046                      RID Transport                November 2010   RID systems MUST support and SHOULD use HTTP/1.1 persistent   connections as described in [RFC2616].  RID systems MUST support   chunked transfer encoding on the HTTP server side to allow the   implementation of clients that do not need to precalculate message   sizes before constructing HTTP headers.   RID systems MUST use TLS for confidentiality, identification, and   strong mutual authentication as in [RFC2818]; seeSection 4 below for   details.4.  Security Considerations   All security considerations of related documents MUST be considered,   especially the Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF)   [RFC5070] and Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) [RFC6045].  The   transport described herein is built on the foundation of these   documents; the security considerations contained therein are   incorporated by reference.   For transport confidentiality, identification, and authentication,   TLS with mutual authentication MUST be used to secure the HTTP   connection as in [RFC2818].  The session MUST use non-NULL   ciphersuites for authentication, integrity, and confidentiality;   sessions MAY be renegotiated within these constraints.  Although TLS   implementations typically support the older Secure Socket Layer (SSL)   protocol, a RID peer MUST NOT request, offer, or use SSL 2.0, due to   known security vulnerabilities in this protocol; seeAppendix E of   [RFC5246] for more.   Each RID consortium SHOULD use a trusted public key infrastructure   (PKI) to manage identities for RID systems participating in TLS   connections.  At minimum, each RID system MUST trust a set of X.509   Issuer identities ("Certificate Authorities") [RFC5280] to directly   authenticate RID system peers with which it is willing to exchange   information, and/or a specific white list of X.509 Subject identities   of RID system peers.   RID systems MUST provide for the verification of the identity of a   RID system peer presenting a valid and trusted certificate, by   verifying the fully qualified domain name or other network-layer   identifier against that stored in the certificate, if available.   More information on best practices in peer identity verification is   available in [TLS-SERVER-ID].Moriarty & Trammell           Informational                     [Page 5]

RFC 6046                      RID Transport                November 20105.  IANA Considerations   Consistent withBCP 56 [RFC3205], since RID over HTTP/TLS is a   substantially new service, and should be controlled at the consortium   member network's border differently than HTTP/TLS, it requires a new   port number.  IANA has assigned port 4590/tcp to RID with the service   name RID over HTTP/TLS.6.  References6.1.  Normative References   [RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate               Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119, March 1997.   [RFC2616]   Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,               Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext               Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1",RFC 2616, June 1999.   [RFC2818]   Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS",RFC 2818, May 2000.   [RFC5070]   Danyliw, R., Meijer, J., and Y. Demchenko, "The Incident               Object Description Exchange Format",RFC 5070,               December 2007.   [RFC5246]   Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security               (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2",RFC 5246, August 2008.   [RFC5280]   Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,               Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key               Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation               List (CRL) Profile",RFC 5280, May 2008.   [RFC6045]   Moriarty, K., "Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)",RFC 6045, November 2010.6.2.  Informative References   [RFC3205]   Moore, K., "On the use of HTTP as a Substrate",BCP 56,RFC 3205, February 2002.   [TLS-SERVER-ID]               Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and               Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity               within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509               (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer               Security (TLS)", Work in Progress, October 2010.Moriarty & Trammell           Informational                     [Page 6]

RFC 6046                      RID Transport                November 2010Authors' Addresses   Kathleen M. Moriarty   RSA, The Security Division of EMC   174 Middlesex Turnpike   Bedford, MA  01730   US   EMail: Moriarty_Kathleen@EMC.com   Brian H. Trammell   Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich   Gloriastrasse 35   8092 Zurich   Switzerland   Phone: +41 44 632 70 13   EMail: trammell@tik.ee.ethz.chMoriarty & Trammell           Informational                     [Page 7]