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INFORMATIONAL
Network Working Group                                      P. Nesser, IIRequest for Comments: 3792                    Nesser & Nesser ConsultingCategory: Informational                                A. Bergstrom, Ed.                                              Ostfold University College                                                               June 2004Survey of IPv4 Addresses in Currently DeployedIETF Security Area Standards Track and Experimental DocumentsStatus of this Memo   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does   not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this   memo is unlimited.Copyright Notice   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).Abstract   This document seeks to document all usage of IPv4 addresses in   currently deployed IETF Security Area documented standards.  In order   to successfully transition from an all IPv4 Internet to an all IPv6   Internet, many interim steps will be taken.  One of these steps is   the evolution of current protocols that have IPv4 dependencies.  It   is hoped that these protocols (and their implementations) will be   redesigned to be network address independent, but failing that will   at least dually support IPv4 and IPv6.  To this end, all Standards   (Full, Draft, and Proposed) as well as Experimental RFCs will be   surveyed and any dependencies will be documented.Table of Contents1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22.  Document Organisation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23.  Full Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24.  Draft Standards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25.  Proposed Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .86.  Experimental RFCs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .207.  Summary of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .227.1.  Standards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .237.2.  Draft Standards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .237.3.  Proposed Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .237.4.  Experimental RFCs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .238.  Security Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .249.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24Nesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                      [Page 1]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 200410. Normative Reference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2411. Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2412. Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .251.0.  Introduction   This document is part of a document set aiming to document all usage   of IPv4 addresses in IETF standards.  In an effort to have the   information in a manageable form, it has been broken into 7 documents   conforming to the current IETF areas (Application, Internet,   Operations and Management, Routing, Security, Sub-IP, and Transport).   For a full introduction, please see the introduction [1].2.0.  Document Organization   Sections3,4,5, and6 each describe the raw analysis of Full,   Draft, and Proposed Standards, and Experimental RFCs.  Each RFC is   discussed in its turn starting withRFC 1 and ending with (around)RFC 3100. The comments for each RFC are "raw" in nature.  That is,   each RFC is discussed in a vacuum and problems or issues discussed do   not "look ahead" to see if the problems have already been fixed.Section 7 is an analysis of the data presented in Sections3,4,5,   and 6.  It is here that all of the results are considered as a whole   and the problems that have been resolved in later RFCs are   correlated.3.0.  Full Standards   Full Internet Standards (most commonly simply referred to as   "Standards") are fully mature protocol specification that are widely   implemented and used throughout the Internet.3.1.RFC 2289 A One-Time Password System   There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.4.0.  Draft Standards   Draft Standards represent the penultimate standard level in the IETF.   A protocol can only achieve draft standard when there are multiple,   independent, interoperable implementations.  Draft Standards are   usually quite mature and widely used.Nesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                      [Page 2]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 20044.1.RFC 1864 The Content-MD5 Header Field   There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.4.2.RFC 2617 HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access      AuthenticationSection 3.2.1 The WWW-Authenticate Response Header include he      following text:         (Note: including the IP address of the client in the nonce         would appear to offer the server the ability to limit the reuse         of the nonce to the same client that originally got it.         However, that would break proxy farms, where requests from a         single user often go through different proxies in the farm.         Also, IP address spoofing is not that hard.)Section 4.5 Replay Attacks contains the text:         Thus, for some purposes, it is necessary to protect against         replay attacks.  A good Digest implementation can do this in         various ways.  The server created "nonce" value is         implementation dependent, but if it contains a digest of the         client IP, a time-stamp, the resource ETag, and a private         server key (as recommended above) then a replay attack is not         simple.  An attacker must convince the server that the request         is coming from a false IP address and must cause the server to         deliver the document to an IP address different from the         address to which it believes it is sending the document.  An         attack can only succeed in the period before the time-stamp         expires.  Digesting the client IP and time-stamp in the nonce         permits an implementation which does not maintain state between         transactions.   Both of these statements are IP version independent and must rely on   the implementers discretion.4.3.RFC 2865 Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)Section 3.  Packet Format has the following notes:      Identifier         The Identifier field is one octet, and aids in matching         requests and replies.  The RADIUS server can detect a duplicate         request if it has the same client source IP address and source         UDP port and Identifier within a short span of time.Nesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                      [Page 3]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 2004      and         A RADIUS server MUST use the source IP address of the RADIUS         UDP packet to decide which shared secret to use, so that RADIUS         requests can be proxied.   This text is version neutral but implementers should allow for the   use of both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.Section 5.  Attributes defines a number of IP specific attributes:             4      NAS-IP-Address             8      Framed-IP-Address             9      Framed-IP-Netmask            10      Framed-Routing            14      Login-IP-Host            22      Framed-Route      and definitions for the "value" field of the following type:         address   32 bit value, most significant octet first.   The attributes are further defined as follows:      5.4.  NAS-IP-Address         Description            This Attribute indicates the identifying IP Address of the            NAS which is requesting authentication of the user, and            SHOULD be unique to the NAS within the scope of the RADIUS            server.  NAS-IP-Address is only used in Access-Request            packets.  Either NAS-IP-Address or NAS-Identifier MUST be            present in an Access-Request packet.            Note that NAS-IP-Address MUST NOT be used to select the            shared secret used to authenticate the request.  The source            IP address of the Access-Request packet MUST be used to            select the shared secret.            A summary of the NAS-IP-Address Attribute format is shown            below.  The fields are transmitted from left to right.Nesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                      [Page 4]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 2004     0                   1                   2                   3     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+    |     Type      |    Length     |            Address    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+             Address (cont)         |    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   Type      4 for NAS-IP-Address.   Length      6   Address      The Address field is four octets.   5.8.  Framed-IP-Address      Description         This Attribute indicates the address to be configured for the         user.  It MAY be used in Access-Accept packets.  It MAY be used         in an Access-Request packet as a hint by the NAS to the server         that it would prefer that address, but the server is not         required to honor the hint.   A summary of the Framed-IP-Address Attribute format is shown below.   The fields are transmitted from left to right.    0                   1                   2                   3    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   |     Type      |    Length     |            Address   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+            Address (cont)         |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   Type      8 for Framed-IP-Address.   Length      6Nesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                      [Page 5]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 2004   Address      The Address field is four octets.  The value 0xFFFFFFFF indicates      that the NAS Should allow the user to select an address (e.g.,      Negotiated).  The value 0xFFFFFFFE indicates that the NAS should      select an address for the user (e.g., Assigned from a pool of      addresses kept by the NAS).  Other valid values indicate that the      NAS should use that value as the user's IP address.   5.9.  Framed-IP-Netmask      Description         This Attribute indicates the IP netmask to be configured for         the user when the user is a router to a network.  It MAY be         used in Access-Accept packets.  It MAY be used in an Access-         Request packet as a hint by the NAS to the server that it would         prefer that netmask, but the server is not required to honor         the hint.   A summary of the Framed-IP-Netmask Attribute format is shown below.   The fields are transmitted from left to right.    0                   1                   2                   3    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   |     Type      |    Length     |            Address   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+            Address (cont)         |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   Type      9 for Framed-IP-Netmask.   Length      6   Address      The Address field is four octets specifying the IP netmask of the      user.Nesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                      [Page 6]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 2004   5.14.  Login-IP-Host      Description         "This Attribute indicates the system with which to connect the         user, when the Login-Service Attribute is included.  It MAY be         used in Access-Accept packets.  It MAY be used in an Access-         Request packet as a hint to the server that the NAS would         prefer to use that host, but the server is not required to         honor the hint."   A summary of the Login-IP-Host Attribute format is shown below.  The   fields are transmitted from left to right.    0                   1                   2                   3    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   |     Type      |    Length     |            Address   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+            Address (cont)         |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   Type      14 for Login-IP-Host.   Length      6   Address      The Address field is four octets.  The value 0xFFFFFFFF indicates      that the NAS SHOULD allow the user to select an address.  The      value 0 indicates that the NAS SHOULD select a host to connect the      user to.  Other values indicate the address the NAS SHOULD connect      the user to.      5.22.  Framed-Route      Description         This Attribute provides routing information to be configured         for the user on the NAS.  It is used in the Access-Accept         packet and can appear multiple times.   A summary of the Framed-Route Attribute format is shown below.  The   fields are transmitted from left to right.Nesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                      [Page 7]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 2004    0                   1                   2    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-   |     Type      |    Length     |  Text ...   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-   Type      22 for Framed-Route.   Length       >= 3   Text      The Text field is one or more octets, and its contents are      implementation dependent.  It is intended to be human readable and      MUST NOT affect operation of the protocol.  It is recommended that      the message contain UTF-8 encoded 10646 [7] characters.      For IP routes, it SHOULD contain a destination prefix in dotted      quad form optionally followed by a slash and a decimal length      specifier stating how many high order bits of the prefix to use.      That is followed by a space, a gateway address in dotted quad      form, a space, and one or more metrics separated by spaces.  For      example, "192.168.1.0/24 192.168.1.1 1 2 -1 3 400".  The length      specifier may be omitted, in which case it defaults to 8 bits for      class A prefixes, 16 bits for class B prefixes, and 24 bits for      class C prefixes.  For example, "192.168.1.0 192.168.1.1 1".      Whenever the gateway address is specified as "0.0.0.0" the IP      address of the user SHOULD be used as the gateway address.   There are also several example authentication sequences that use the   attributes discussed above and hence have IPv4 addresses.   Although the definitions in this RFC are limited to IPv4 addresses,   the specification is easily extensible for new attribute types.  It   is therefore relatively simple to create new IPv6 specific   attributes.5.0.  Proposed Standards   Proposed Standards are introductory level documents.  There are no   requirements for even a single implementation.  In many cases   Proposed are never implemented or advanced in the IETF standards   process.  They therefore are often just proposed ideas that areNesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                      [Page 8]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 2004   presented to the Internet community.  Sometimes flaws are exposed or   they are one of many competing solutions to problems.  In these later   cases, no discussion is presented as it would not serve the purpose   of this discussion.   5.001.RFC 1413 Identification Protocol      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.002.RFC 1421 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:           Part I      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.003.RFC 1422 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:           Part II      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.004.RFC 1423 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:           Part III      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.005.RFC 1424 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:           Part IV      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.006.RFC 1510 The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)      Although this specification specifies optional use of host      addresses, there are no specific requirements that the addresses      be IPv4.  The specification has no IPv4 dependencies, but      implementations might have issues.   5.007.RFC 1731 IMAP4 Authentication Mechanisms      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.008.RFC 1734 POP3 AUTHentication command      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.Nesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                      [Page 9]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 2004   5.009.RFC 1828 IP Authentication using Keyed MD5      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.  The      operations described operate on the entire IP packet without      specifying that the IP packet be IPv4 or IPv6.   5.010.RFC 1829 The ESP DES-CBC Transform      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.  The      operations described operate on the entire IP packet without      specifying that the IP packet be IPv4 or IPv6.   5.011.RFC 1847 Security Multiparts for MIME: Multipart/Signed and           Multipart/Encrypted      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.012.RFC 1848 MIME Object Security Services      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.013.RFC 1928 SOCKS Protocol Version      This specification is IPv6 aware and will function normally on      either IPv4 and IPv6.   5.014.RFC 1929 Username/Password Authentication for SOCKS V5      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.015.RFC 1961 GSS-API Authentication Method for SOCKS Version 5      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.016.RFC 1964 The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.017.RFC 1968 The PPP Encryption Control Protocol (ECP)      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.018.RFC 2015 MIME Security with Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.Nesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                     [Page 10]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 2004   5.019.RFC 2025 The Simple Public-Key GSS-API Mechanism (SPKM)      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.020.RFC 2082 RIP-2 MD5 Authentication      This RFC documents a security mechanism for an IPv4 only routing      specification.  It is expected that a similar (or better)      mechanism will be developed for RIPng.   5.021.RFC 2085 HMAC-MD5 IP Authentication with Replay Prevention      This document defines an IP version independent specification and      has no IPv4 dependencies.   5.022.RFC 2195 IMAP/POP AUTHorize Extension for Simple Challenge/           Response      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.023.RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.024.RFC 2222 Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.025.RFC 2228 FTP Security Extensions      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.026.RFC 2243 OTP Extended Responses      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.027.RFC 2245 Anonymous SASL Mechanism      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.028.RFC 2246 The TLS Protocol Version 1.0      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.029.RFC 2284 PPP Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.Nesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                     [Page 11]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 2004   5.030.RFC 2385 Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5           Signature Option      Although the specification enhancements have no IPv4 dependencies,      it is an update to an IPv4 only routing specification.   5.031.RFC 2401 Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol      This specification is both IPv4 and IPv6 aware.   5.032.RFC 2402 IP Authentication Header      This specification is both IPv4 and IPv6 aware.   5.033.RFC 2403 The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.034.RFC 2404 The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.035.RFC 2405 The ESP DES-CBC Cipher Algorithm With Explicit IV      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.036.RFC 2406 IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)      This specification is both IPv4 and IPv6 aware.   5.037.RFC 2407 The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation           for ISAKMP      This specification is both IPv4 and IPv6 aware.   5.038.RFC 2408 Internet Security Association and Key Management           Protocol (ISAKMP)      This specification is both IPv4 and IPv6 aware.   5.039.RFC 2409 The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.040.RFC 2410 The NULL Encryption Algorithm and Its Use With           IPsec      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.Nesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                     [Page 12]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 2004   5.041.RFC 2419 The PPP DES Encryption Protocol, Version 2           (DESE-bis)      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.042.RFC 2420 The PPP Triple-DES Encryption Protocol (3DESE)      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.043.RFC 2440 OpenPGP Message Format      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.044.RFC 2444 The One-Time-Password SASL Mechanism      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.045.RFC 2451 The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.046.RFC 2478 The Simple and Protected GSS-API Negotiation           Mechanism      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.047.RFC 2510 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure           Certificate Management Protocols      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.048.RFC 2511 Internet X.509 Certificate Request Message           Format      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.049.RFC 2535 Domain Name System Security Extensions      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.  There are      discussions of A and AAAA records in the document, but have no      real implications on IPv4 dependency or on any IP related address      records.   5.050.RFC 2536 DSA KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name System (DNS)      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.Nesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                     [Page 13]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 2004   5.051.RFC 2538 Storing Certificates in the Domain Name System          (DNS)Section 3.1 X.509 CERT RR Names      Some X.509 versions permit multiple names to be associated with      subjects and issuers under "Subject Alternate Name" and "Issuer      Alternate Name".  For example, x.509v3 has such Alternate Names      with an ASN.1 specification as follows:            GeneralName ::= CHOICE {               otherName                  [0] INSTANCE OF OTHER-NAME,               rfc822Name                 [1] IA5String,               dNSName                    [2] IA5String,               x400Address                [3] EXPLICIT OR-ADDRESS.&Type,               directoryName              [4] EXPLICIT Name,               ediPartyName               [5] EDIPartyName,               uniformResourceIdentifier  [6] IA5String,               iPAddress                  [7] OCTET STRING,               registeredID               [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER            }      uses a potential IPv4 only address.  It goes on with the following      example:         Example 2:  Assume that an X.509v3 certificate is issued to         /CN=James Hacker/L=Basingstoke/O=Widget Inc/C=GB/ with Subject         Alternate names of (a) domain name widget.foo.example,         (b) IPv4 address 10.251.13.201, and (c) string "James Hacker         <hacker@mail.widget.foo.example>".  Then the storage locations         recommended, in priority order, would be             (1) widget.foo.example,             (2) 201.13.251.10.in-addr.arpa, and             (3) hacker.mail.widget.foo.example.   Since the definition of X.509v3 certificates is not discussed in this   document it is unclear if IPv6 addresses are also supported in the   above mentioned field.  The document does however refer toRFC 2459   for the definition of a certificate, andRFC 2459 is IPv6 and IPv4   aware -- so it seems this specification is IPv4 and IPv6 aware.   5.052.RFC 2539 Storage of Diffie-Hellman Keys in the Domain           Name System (DNS)      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.Nesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                     [Page 14]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 2004   5.053.RFC 2560 X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online           Certificate Status Specification - OCSP      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.054.RFC 2585 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Operational           Protocols: FTP and HTTP      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.055.RFC 2587 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure           LDAPv2 Schema      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.056.RFC 2623 NFS Version 2 and Version 3 Security Issues and the           NFS Protocol's Use of RPCSEC_GSS and Kerberos V5      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.057.RFC 2631 Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.058.RFC 2632 S/MIME Version 3 Certificate Handling      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.059.RFC 2633 S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.060.RFC 2634 Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.061.RFC 2712 Addition of Kerberos Cipher Suites to Transport           Layer Security (TLS)      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.062.RFC 2743 Generic Security Service Application Program           Interface Version 2 Update 1      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.Nesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                     [Page 15]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 2004   5.063.RFC 2744 Generic Security Service API Version 2:           C-bindings      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.064.RFC 2747 RSVP Cryptographic Authentication      This specification is both IPv4 and IPv6 aware and needs no      changes.   5.065.RFC 2797 Certificate Management Messages over CMS      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.066.RFC 2817 Upgrading to TLS Within HTTP/1.1      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.067.RFC 2829 Authentication Methods for LDAP      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.068.RFC 2830 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (v3):           Extension for Transport Layer Security (LDAP)      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.069.RFC 2831 Using Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.070.RFC 2845 Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.071.RFC 2847 LIPKEY - A Low Infrastructure Public Key           Mechanism Using SPKM      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.072.RFC 2853 Generic Security Service API Version 2 :           Java Bindings      The document uses the InetAddress variable which does not      necessarily limit it to IPv4 addresses so there are no IPv4      dependencies in this specification.Nesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                     [Page 16]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 2004   5.073.RFC 2857 The Use of HMAC-RIPEMD-160-96 within ESP and AH      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.074.RFC 2875 Diffie-Hellman Proof-of-Possession Algorithms      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.075.RFC 2930 Secret Key Establishment for DNS (TKEY RR)      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.076.RFC 2931 DNS Request and Transaction           Signatures (SIG(0)s)      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.077.RFC 2935 Internet Open Trading Protocol (IOTP)           HTTP Supplement      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.078.RFC 2941 Telnet Authentication Option      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.079.RFC 2942 Telnet Authentication: Kerberos Version 5      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.080.RFC 2943 TELNET Authentication Using DSA      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.081.RFC 2944 Telnet Authentication: SRP      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.082.RFC 2945 The SRP Authentication and Key           Exchange System      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.083.RFC 2946 Telnet Data Encryption Option      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.Nesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                     [Page 17]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 2004   5.084.RFC 2947 Telnet Encryption: DES3 64 bit Cipher           Feedback      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.085.RFC 2948 Telnet Encryption: DES3 64 bit Output           Feedback      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.086.RFC 2949 Telnet Encryption: CAST-128 64 bit Output           Feedback      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.087.RFC 2950 Telnet Encryption: CAST-128 64 bit Cipher           Feedback      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.088.RFC 2984 Use of the CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm in CMS      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.089.RFC 3007 Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic Update      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.090.RFC 3008 Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Signing           Authority      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.091.RFC 3012 Mobile IPv4 Challenge/Response Extensions      This document is specifically designed for IPv4.   5.092.RFC 3039 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure           Qualified Certificates Profile      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.093.RFC 3041 Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address           Autoconfiguration in IPv6      This is an IPv6 related document and is not discussed in this      document.Nesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                     [Page 18]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 2004   5.094.RFC 3062 LDAP Password Modify Extended Operation      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.095.RFC 3090 DNS Security Extension Clarification on Zone           Status      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.096.RFC 3097 RSVP Cryptographic Authentication --           Updated Message Type Value      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.097.RFC 3110 RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain           Name System (DNS)      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.098.RFC 3118 Authentication for DHCP Messages      This document is only designated for IPv4.  It is expected that      similar functionality is available in DHCPv6.   5.099.RFC 3207 SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over           Transport Layer Security      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.100.RFC 3275 (Extensible Markup Language) XML-Signature           Syntax and Processing      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   5.101.RFC 3280 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure           Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile      This specification is IPv4 and IPv6 aware.   5.102.RFC 3369 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.Nesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                     [Page 19]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 20046.0.  Experimental RFCs   Experimental RFCs typically define protocols that do not have   widescale implementation or usage on the Internet.  They are often   propriety in nature or used in limited arenas.  They are documented   to the Internet community in order to allow potential   interoperability or some other potential useful scenario.  In a few   cases they are presented as alternatives to the mainstream solution   to an acknowledged problem.   6.01.RFC 1004 Distributed-protocol authentication scheme      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   6.02.RFC 1411 Telnet Authentication: Kerberos Version 4      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   6.03.RFC 1412 Telnet Authentication: SPX      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   6.04.RFC 1507 DASS - Distributed Authentication Security Service      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   6.05.RFC 1851 The ESP Triple DES Transform      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   6.06.RFC 1949 Scalable Multicast Key Distribution (SMKD)      This specification assumes the use of IGMP and is therefore      limited to IPv4 multicast.  It is assumed that a similar mechanism      may be defined for IPv6 multicasting.   6.07.RFC 2093 Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP) Specification      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   6.08.RFC 2094 Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP) Architecture      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   6.09.RFC 2154 OSPF with Digital Signatures      This OSPF option is IPv4 limited.  See the following packet      format:Nesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                     [Page 20]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 2004      7.2.  Router Public Key Certificate         A router public key certificate is a package of data signed by         a Trusted Entity.  This certificate is included in the router         PKLSA and in the router configuration information.  To change         any of the values in the certificate, a new certificate must be         obtained from a TE.                           1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+      |                          Router Id                            |      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+      |     TE Id     |   TE Key Id   |   Rtr Key Id  |    Sig Alg    |      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+      |                          Create Time                          |      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+      |        Key Field Length       |  Router Role  |  #Net Ranges  |      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+      |                          IP Address                           |      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+      |                         Address Mask                          |      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+      |           IP Address/Address Mask for each Net Range ...      /      | ...                                                           /      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+      |                       Router Public Key                       |      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+      |                         Certification                         /      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-*-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+         #NET RANGES     The number of network ranges that follow.  A                         network range is defined to be an IP Address                         and an Address Mask.  This list of ranges                         defines the addresses that the Router is                         permitted to advertise in its Router Links LSA.                         Valid values are 0-255.  If there are 0 ranges                         the router cannot advertise anything.  This is                         not generally useful.  One range with address=0                         and mask=0 will allow a router to advertise any                         address.         IP ADDRESS & ADDRESS MASK Define a range of addresses that this                         router may advertise.  Each is a 32 bit value.                         One range with address=0 and mask=0 will allow                         a router to advertise any address.Nesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                     [Page 21]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 2004   6.10.RFC 2522 Photuris: Session-Key Management Protocol      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   6.11.RFC 2523 Photuris: Extended Schemes and Attributes      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   6.12.RFC 2659 Security Extensions For HTML      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   6.13.RFC 2660 The Secure HyperText Transfer Protocol      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   6.14.RFC 2692 SPKI Requirements      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   6.15.RFC 2693 SPKI Certificate Theory      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   6.16.RFC 2716 PPP EAP TLS Authentication Protocol      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.   6.17.RFC 2773 Encryption using KEA and SKIPJACK      This specification is both IPv4 and IPv6 aware and needs no      changes.   6.18.RFC 3029 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Data          Validation and Certification Server Protocols      There are no IPv4 dependencies in this specification.7.0.  Summary of Results   In the initial survey of RFCs 4 positives were identified out of a   total of 124, broken down as follows:         Standards:                              0 out of   1 or  0.00%         Draft Standards:                        1 out of   3 or 33.33%         Proposed Standards:                     1 out of 102 or  0.98%         Experimental RFCs:                      2 out of  18 or 11.11%Nesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                     [Page 22]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 2004   Of those identified many require no action because they document   outdated and unused protocols, while others are document protocols   that are actively being updated by the appropriate working groups.   Additionally there are many instances of standards that should be   updated but do not cause any operational impact if they are not   updated.  The remaining instances are documented below.7.1.  Standards7.2.  Draft Standards   7.2.1.  RADIUS (RFC 2865)      The problems have been resolved inRFC 3162, RADIUS and IPv6.7.3.   Proposed Standards   7.3.1.  RIPv2 MD5 Authentication (RFC 2082)      This functionality has been assumed by the use of the IPsec AH      header as defined inRFC 2402, IP Authentication Header.   7.3.2.  Mobile IPv4 Challenge Response Extension (RFC 3012)      The problems are not being addressed and similar functions may be      needed in Mobile IPv6.   7.3.3.  Authentication for DHCP Messages (RFC 3118)      This problem has been fixed inRFC 3315, Dynamic Host      Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6).7.4.  Experimental RFCs   7.4.1.  Scalable Multicast Key Distribution (RFC 1949)      This specification relies on IPv4 IGMP Multicast and a new      specification may be produced; however, the SMKD is not believed      to be in use.   7.4.2.  OPSF with Digital Signatures (RFC 2154)      This specification is IPv4-only, and relies on an IPv4-only      routing protocol, OSPFv2.  Due to increased focus on routing      security, this specification may need to be revisited, and in that      case it should support both OSPFv2 and OPSFv3.Nesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                     [Page 23]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 20048.0.  Security Considerations   This memo examines the IPv6-readiness of specifications; this does   not have security considerations in itself.9.0.  Acknowledgements   The authors would like to acknowledge the support of the Internet   Society in the research and production of this document.   Additionally the author, Philip J. Nesser II, would like to thanks   his partner in all ways, Wendy M. Nesser.   The editor, Andreas Bergstrom, would like to thank Pekka Savola for   guidance and collection of comments for the editing of this document.10.0.  Normative Reference   [1]  Nesser, II, P. and A. Bergstrom, Editor, "Introduction to the        Survey of IPv4 Addresses in Currently Deployed IETF Standards",RFC 3789, June 2004.11.0.  Authors' Addresses   Please contact the author with any questions, comments or suggestions   at:   Philip J. Nesser II   Principal   Nesser & Nesser Consulting   13501 100th Ave NE, #5202   Kirkland, WA 98034   Phone:  +1 425 481 4303   Fax:    +1 425 48   EMail:  phil@nesser.com   Andreas Bergstrom (Editor)   Ostfold University College   Rute 503 Buer   N-1766 Halden   Norway   EMail: andreas.bergstrom@hiof.noNesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                     [Page 24]

RFC 3792        IPv4 Addresses in the IETF Security Area       June 200412.0.  Full Copyright Statement   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).  This document is subject   to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained inBCP 78, and   except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET   ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,   INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE   INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.Intellectual Property   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be   found inBCP 78 andBCP 79.   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository athttp://www.ietf.org/ipr.   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-   ipr@ietf.org.Acknowledgement   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the   Internet Society.Nesser II & Bergstrom        Informational                     [Page 25]

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