| RFC 9582 | Route Origin Authorization | May 2024 |
| Snijders, et al. | Standards Track | [Page] |
This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or more prefixes within the address block. This document obsoletes RFC 6482.¶
This is an Internet Standards Track document.¶
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.¶
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttps://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9582.¶
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶
The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is to improve routing security. (See[RFC6480] for more information.) As part of this system, a mechanism is needed to allow entities to verify that an Autonomous System (AS) has been given permission by an IP address block holder to advertise routes to one or more prefixes within that block. A Route Origin Authorization (ROA) provides this function.¶
The ROA makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed objects[RFC6488], which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) wrapper[RFC5652] for the ROA content as well as a generic validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. Therefore, to complete the specification of the ROA (seeSection 4 of [RFC6488]), this document defines:¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14[RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
This section summarizes the significant changes between[RFC6482] and the profile described in this document.¶
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"[RFC5280] and "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers"[RFC3779].¶
Additionally, this document makes use of the RPKI signed object profile[RFC6488]; thus, familiarity with that document is assumed. Note that the RPKI signed object profile makes use of certificates adhering to the RPKI resource certificate profile[RFC6487]; thus, familiarity with that profile is also assumed.¶
The content-type for a ROA is defined as id-ct-routeOriginAuthz and has the numerical value 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24.¶
This OIDMUST appear within both the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object and the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo object (see[RFC6488]).¶
The content of a ROA identifies a single AS that has been authorized by the address space holder to originate routes and a list of one or more IP address prefixes that will be advertised. If the address space holder needs to authorize multiple ASes to advertise the same set of address prefixes, the holder issues multiple ROAs, one per AS number. A ROA is formally defined as:¶
RPKI-ROA-2023 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0) id-mod-rpkiROA-2023(75) }DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=BEGINIMPORTS CONTENT-TYPE FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268] { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;ct-routeOriginAttestation CONTENT-TYPE ::= { TYPE RouteOriginAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-routeOriginAuthz }id-ct-routeOriginAuthz OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) routeOriginAuthz(24) }RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE { version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0, asID ASID, ipAddrBlocks SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..2)) OF ROAIPAddressFamily }ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE { addressFamily ADDRESS-FAMILY.&afi ({AddressFamilySet}), addresses ADDRESS-FAMILY.&Addresses ({AddressFamilySet}{@addressFamily}) }ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= CLASS { &afi OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)) UNIQUE, &Addresses} WITH SYNTAX { AFI &afi ADDRESSES &Addresses }AddressFamilySet ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= { addressFamilyIPv4 | addressFamilyIPv6 }addressFamilyIPv4 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= { AFI afi-IPv4 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv4 }addressFamilyIPv6 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= { AFI afi-IPv6 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv6 }afi-IPv4 OCTET STRING ::= '0001'Hafi-IPv6 OCTET STRING ::= '0002'HROAAddressesIPv4 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{ub-IPv4}ROAAddressesIPv6 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{ub-IPv6}ub-IPv4 INTEGER ::= 32ub-IPv6 INTEGER ::= 128ROAIPAddress {INTEGER: ub} ::= SEQUENCE { address BIT STRING (SIZE(0..ub)), maxLength INTEGER (0..ub) OPTIONAL }END¶The version number of the RouteOriginAttestation entryMUST be 0.¶
The asID element contains the AS number that is authorized to originate routes to the given IP address prefixes.¶
The ipAddrBlocks element encodes the set of IP address prefixes to which the AS is authorized to originate routes. Note that the syntax here is more restrictive than that used in the IP address delegation extension defined in[RFC3779]. That extension can represent arbitrary address ranges, whereas ROAs need to represent only IP prefixes.¶
Within the ROAIPAddressFamily structure, the addressFamily element contains the Address Family Identifier (AFI) of an IP address family. This specification only supports IPv4 and IPv6; therefore, addressFamilyMUST be either 0001 or 0002. IPv4 prefixesMUST NOT appear as IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (Section 2.5.5.2 of [RFC4291]).¶
ThereMUST be only one instance of ROAIPAddressFamily per unique AFI in the ROA. Thus, the ROAIPAddressFamily structureMUST NOT appear more than twice.¶
The addresses field contains IP prefixes as a sequence of type ROAIPAddress.¶
A ROAIPAddress structure is a sequence containing an address element of type BIT STRING and an optional maxLength element of type INTEGER.¶
The address element is of type BIT STRING and represents a single IP address prefix. This field uses the same representation of an IP address prefix as aBIT STRING as the IPAddress type defined inSection 2.2.3.8 of [RFC3779].¶
When present, the maxLength element specifies the maximum length of the IP address prefix that the AS is authorized to advertise. The maxLength elementSHOULD NOT be encoded if the maximum length is equal to the prefix length. Certification AuthoritiesSHOULD anticipate that future Relying Parties will become increasingly stringent in considering the presence of superfluous maxLength elements an encoding error.¶
If present, the maxLength elementMUST be:¶
For example, if the IP address prefix is 203.0.113.0/24 and maxLength is 26, the AS is authorized to advertise any more-specific prefix with a maximum length of 26. In this example, the AS would be authorized to advertise 203.0.113.0/24, 203.0.113.128/25, or 203.0.113.192/26, but not 203.0.113.0/27. See[RFC9319] for more information on the use of maxLength.¶
When the maxLength element is not present, the AS is only authorized to advertise the exact prefix specified in the ROAIPAddress structure's address element.¶
Note that a valid ROA may contain an IP address prefix (within a ROAIPAddress element) that is encompassed by another IP address prefix (within a separate ROAIPAddress element). For example, a ROA may contain the prefix 203.0.113.0/24 with maxLength 26, as well as the prefix 203.0.113.0/28 with maxLength 28. This ROA would authorize the indicated AS to advertise any prefix beginning with 203.0.113 with a minimum length of 24 and a maximum length of 26, as well as the specific prefix 203.0.113.0/28.¶
Additionally, a ROAMAY contain two ROAIPAddress elements, where the IP address prefix is identical in both cases. However, this isNOT RECOMMENDED, because in such a case, the ROAIPAddress element with the shorter maxLength grants no additional privileges to the indicated AS and thus can be omitted without changing the meaning of the ROA.¶
As the data structure described by the ROA ASN.1 module allows for many different ways to represent the same set of IP address information, a canonical form is defined such that every set of IP address information has a unique representation. In order to produce and verify this canonical form, the process described in this sectionSHOULD be used to ensure that information elements are unique with respect to one another and sorted in ascending order. Certification AuthoritiesSHOULD anticipate that future Relying Parties will impose a strict requirement for the ipAddrBlocks field to be in this canonical form. This canonicalization procedure builds upon the canonicalization procedure specified inSection 2.2.3.6 of [RFC3779].¶
In order to semantically compare, sort, and deduplicate the contents of the ipAddrBlocks field, each ROAIPAddress element is mapped to an abstract data element composed of four integer values:¶
Thus, the equality or relative order of two ROAIPAddress elements can be tested by comparing their abstract representations.¶
The set of ipAddrBlocks is totally ordered. The order of two ipAddrBlocks is determined by the first non-equal comparison in the following list.¶
Data elements for which all four values compare equal are duplicates of one another.¶
Before a Relying Party can use a ROA to validate a routing announcement, the Relying PartyMUST first validate the ROA. To validate a ROA, the Relying PartyMUST perform all the validation checks specified in[RFC6488] as well as the following additional ROA-specific validation steps:¶
If any of the above checks fail, the ROA in its entiretyMUST be considered invalid and an errorSHOULD be logged.¶
There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a ROA; it is anticipated that ROAs will be stored in repositories that are accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users. There is no explicit authentication associated with a ROA, since the PKI used for ROA validation provides authorization but not authentication. Although the ROA is a signed, application-layer object, there is no intent to convey non-repudiation via a ROA.¶
The purpose of a ROA is to convey authorization for an AS to originate a route to the prefix or prefixes in the ROA. Thus, the integrity of a ROAMUST be established. This ROA specification makes use of the RPKI signed object format; thus, all security considerations discussed in[RFC6488] also apply to ROAs.Additionally, the signed object profile uses the CMS signed message format for integrity; thus, ROAs inherit all security considerations associated with that data structure.¶
The right of the ROA signer to authorize the target AS to originate routes to the prefix or prefixes is established through the use of the address space and AS number PKI as described in[RFC6480]. Specifically, oneMUST verify the signature on the ROA using an X.509 certificate issued under this PKI and check that the prefix or prefixes in the ROA are contained within those in the certificate's IP address delegation extension.¶
IANA has updated the id-ct-routeOriginAuthz entry in the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows:¶
| Decimal | Description | References |
|---|---|---|
| 24 | id-ct-routeOriginAuthz | RFC 9582 |
IANA has updated the Route Origination Authorization entry in the "RPKI Signed Objects" registry created by[RFC6488] as follows:¶
| Name | OID | Reference |
|---|---|---|
| Route Origination Authorization | 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24 | RFC 9582 |
IANA has updated the entry for the ROA file extension in the "RPKI Repository Name Schemes" registry created by[RFC6481] as follows:¶
| Filename Extension | RPKI Object | Reference |
|---|---|---|
| .roa | Route Origination Authorization | RFC 9582 |
IANA has allocated the following entry in the "SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" registry:¶
| Decimal | Description | References |
|---|---|---|
| 75 | id-mod-rpkiROA-2023 | RFC 9582 |
IANA has updated the media type application/rpki-roa in the "Media Types" registry as follows:¶
An example of a DER-encoded ROA eContent is provided below, with annotation following the "#" character.¶
$ echo 16i 301802030100003011300F040200023009300703050020010DB8 P \ | dc | openssl asn1parse -inform DER -i -dump 0:d=0 hl=2 l= 24 cons: SEQUENCE # RouteOriginAttestation 2:d=1 hl=2 l= 3 prim: INTEGER :010000 # asID 65536 7:d=1 hl=2 l= 17 cons: SEQUENCE # ipAddrBlocks 9:d=2 hl=2 l= 15 cons: SEQUENCE # ROAIPAddressFamily11:d=3 hl=2 l= 2 prim: OCTET STRING # addressFamily 0000 - 00 02 # IPv615:d=3 hl=2 l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE # addresses17:d=4 hl=2 l= 7 cons: SEQUENCE # ROAIPAddress19:d=5 hl=2 l= 5 prim: BIT STRING # 2001:db8::/32 0000 - 00 20 01 0d b8¶
Below is a complete RPKI ROA signed object,Base64 encoded per [RFC4648].¶
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¶
The object in this appendix has the following properties:¶
Object size: 1668 octetsObject SHA256 message digest: 3a39e0b652e79ddf6efdd178ad5e3b29e0121b1e593b89f1e0ac18f3ba60d5e7CMS signing time: Wed 01 May 2024 00:34:13 +0000X.509 end-entity certificateSubject key id: DE145B193FB320B25A744355298C8BF7C2523D22Authority key id: D67208EA470E9D6DD6654022F553ADC1389AB434Issuer: CN=86525cd5-44d7-4df9-8079-4a9dcdf26944Serial: 3Not before: Wed 01 May 2024 00:34:13 +0000Not after: Thu 01 May 2025 00:34:13 +0000IP address delegation: 2001:db8::/32ROA eContentasID: 65536addresses: 2001:db8::/32¶
The authors wish to thankTheo Buehler,Ties de Kock,Martin Hoffmann,Charles Gardiner,Russ Housley,Jeffrey Haas,Bob Beck, andTom Harrison for their help and contributions. Additionally, the authors thankJim Fenton,Vijay Gurbani,Haoyu Song,Rob Austein,Roque Gagliano,Danny McPherson,Sam Weiler,Jasdip Singh, andMurray S. Kucherawy for their careful reviews and helpful comments.¶