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RFC 8778HSS/LMS HashSig with COSEApril 2020
HousleyStandards Track[Page]
Stream:
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
RFC:
8778
Category:
Standards Track
Published:
ISSN:
2070-1721
Author:
R. Housley
Vigil Security

RFC 8778

Use of the HSS/LMS Hash-Based Signature Algorithm with CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)

Abstract

This document specifies the conventions for using the HierarchicalSignature System (HSS) / Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS) hash-basedsignature algorithm with the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)syntax. The HSS/LMS algorithm is one form of hash-based digitalsignature; it is described in RFC 8554.

Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttps://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8778.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

1.Introduction

This document specifies the conventions for using the HierarchicalSignature System (HSS) / Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS) hash-basedsignature algorithm with the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption(COSE)[RFC8152] syntax. The LMS systemprovides a one-time digital signature that is a variant of Merkle Tree Signatures (MTS).The HSS isbuilt on top of the LMS system to efficiently scale for a larger numberof signatures. The HSS/LMS algorithm is one form of a hash-based digitalsignature, and it is described in[HASHSIG]. The HSS/LMS signature algorithm can only be used for a fixed number of signing operations. Thenumber of signing operations depends upon the size of the tree. TheHSS/LMS signature algorithm uses small public keys, and it has lowcomputational cost; however, the signatures are quite large. The HSS/LMSprivate key can be very small when the signer is willing to performadditional computation at signing time; alternatively, the private keycan consume additional memory and provide a faster signing time. TheHSS/LMS signatures[HASHSIG] are currentlydefined to use exclusively SHA-256[SHS].

1.1.Motivation

Recent advances in cryptanalysis[BH2013] and progress in the development of quantum computers[NAS2019]pose a threat to widely deployed digital signature algorithms. As a result, there is a needto prepare for a day that cryptosystems, such as RSA and DSA, thatdepend on discrete logarithm and factoring cannot be depended upon.

If large-scale quantum computers are ever built, these computers will have more than a trivial number of quantum bits (qubits), and they willbe able to break many of the public-key cryptosystems currently inuse. A post-quantum cryptosystem[PQC] is asystem that is secure against such large-scale quantum computers. When it will be feasible to build such computersis open to conjecture; however,RSA[RFC8017], DSA[DSS], Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)[DSS], and Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm(EdDSA)[RFC8032] areall vulnerable if large-scale quantum computers come to pass.

Since the HSS/LMS signature algorithm does not depend on the difficulty of discrete logarithm or factoring, the HSS/LMS signature algorithm isconsidered to be post-quantum secure. The use of HSS/LMS hash-basedsignatures to protect software update distribution will allow thedeployment of future software that implements new cryptosystems. Bydeploying HSS/LMS today, authentication and integrity protection ofthe future software can be provided, even if advances break currentdigital-signature mechanisms.

1.2.Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14[RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2.LMS Digital Signature Algorithm Overview

This specification makes use of the hash-based signature algorithmspecified in[HASHSIG], which is the Leightonand Micali adaptation[LM] of the originalLamport-Diffie-Winternitz-Merkle one-time signature system[M1979][M1987][M1989a][M1989b].

The hash-based signature algorithm has three major components:

As implied by the name, the hash-based signature algorithm depends ona collision-resistant hash function. The hash-based signaturealgorithm specified in[HASHSIG] currentlymakes use of the SHA-256 one-way hash function[SHS], but it alsoestablishes an IANA registry to permit the registration of additional one-way hash functions in thefuture.

2.1.Hierarchical Signature System (HSS)

The hash-based signature algorithm specified in[HASHSIG] uses a hierarchy of trees. The N-time Hierarchical Signature System (HSS)allows subordinate trees to be generated when needed by thesigner. Otherwise, generation of the entire tree might takeweeks or longer.

An HSS signature, as specified in[HASHSIG], carries the number of signed public keys (Nspk), followed by that number of signed public keys,followed by the LMS signature, as described inSection 2.2. The public key for the topmost LMS tree is the public key of the HSS system. The LMSprivate key in the parent tree signs the LMS public key in the childtree, and the LMS private key in the bottom-most tree signs the actualmessage. The signature over the public key and the signature over theactual message are LMS signatures, as described inSection 2.2.

The elements of the HSS signature value for a stand-alone tree (a toptree with no children) can be summarized as:

   u32str(0) ||   lms_signature  /* signature of message */

where the notation comes from[HASHSIG].

The elements of the HSS signature value for a tree with Nspk signed public keys can be summarized as:

   u32str(Nspk) ||   signed_public_key[0] ||   signed_public_key[1] ||      ...   signed_public_key[Nspk-2] ||   signed_public_key[Nspk-1] ||   lms_signature  /* signature of message */

As defined inSection 3.3 of [HASHSIG], a signed_public_key is the lms_signature over the public key followed by the public keyitself. Note that Nspk is the number of levels in the hierarchy oftrees minus 1.

2.2.Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS)

Subordinate LMS trees are placed in the HSS structure, as discussed inSection 2.1. Each tree in the hash-based signaturealgorithm specified in[HASHSIG] uses the Leighton-Micali Signature(LMS) system. LMS systems have two parameters. The first parameter is the height ofthe tree, h, which is the number of levels in the tree minus one.The[HASHSIG] includes support for five valuesof this parameter: h=5, h=10, h=15, h=20, and h=25. Note that there are 2^hleaves in the tree. The second parameter is the number of bytesoutput by the hash function, m, which is the amount of dataassociated with each node in the tree. The[HASHSIG] specification supports only SHA-256 with m=32. An IANA registry is defined so thatother hash functions could be used in the future.

The[HASHSIG] specification supports five tree sizes:

  • LMS_SHA256_M32_H5
  • LMS_SHA256_M32_H10
  • LMS_SHA256_M32_H15
  • LMS_SHA256_M32_H20
  • LMS_SHA256_M32_H25

The[HASHSIG] specification establishes anIANA registry to permit the registration of additional hash functions andadditional tree sizes in the future.

The[HASHSIG] specification defines the value I as the private key identifier, and the same I value is used for all computations with thesame LMS tree. The value I is also available in the public key. Inaddition, the[HASHSIG] specification definesthe value T[r] as the m-byte string associated with the ith node in the LMS tree, andthe nodes are indexed from 1 to 2^(h+1)-1. Thus, T[1] is the m-bytestring associated with the root of the LMS tree.

The LMS public key can be summarized as:

   u32str(lms_algorithm_type) || u32str(otstype) || I || T[1]

As specified in[HASHSIG], the LMS signature consists of four elements:

  • the number of the leaf associated with the LM-OTS signature,
  • an LM-OTS signature, as described inSection 2.3,
  • a type code indicating the particular LMS algorithm, and
  • an array of values that is associated with the path through the tree from the leaf associated with the LM-OTS signature to the root.

The array of values contains the siblings of the nodes on thepath from the leaf to the root but does not contain the nodes on the pathitself. The array for a tree with height h will have h values. Thefirst value is the sibling of the leaf, the next value is the sibling ofthe parent of the leaf, and so on up the path to the root.

The four elements of the LMS signature value can be summarized as:

   u32str(q) ||   ots_signature ||   u32str(type) ||   path[0] || path[1] || ... || path[h-1]

2.3.Leighton-Micali One-Time Signature (LM-OTS) Algorithm

The hash-based signature algorithm depends on a one-time signaturemethod. This specification makes use of the Leighton-Micali One-timeSignature (LM-OTS) Algorithm[HASHSIG]. AnLM-OTS has five parameters:

n:
The number of bytes output by the hash function. For SHA-256 [SHS], n=32.
H:
A preimage-resistant hash function that accepts byte strings of any length and returns an n-byte string.
w:
The width in bits of the Winternitz coefficients. [HASHSIG] supports four values for this parameter: w=1, w=2, w=4, and w=8.
p:
The number of n-byte string elements that make up the LM-OTS signature.
ls:
The number of left-shift bits used in the checksum function, which is defined inSection 4.4 of [HASHSIG].

The values of p and ls are dependent on the choices of the parametersn and w, as described inAppendix B of [HASHSIG].

The[HASHSIG] specification supports four LM-OTS variants:

  • LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W1
  • LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W2
  • LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W4
  • LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8

The[HASHSIG] specification establishes an IANA registry to permit the registration of additional hash functions and additional parametersets in the future.

Signing involves the generation of C, which is an n-byte random value.

The LM-OTS signature value can be summarized as the identifier of the LM-OTS variant, the random value, and a sequence of hash values (y[0] through y[p-1]), as described inSection 4.5 of [HASHSIG]:

   u32str(otstype) || C || y[0] || ... || y[p-1]

3.Hash-Based Signature Algorithm Identifiers

The CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)[RFC8152] supports two signature algorithm schemes. This specification makes use of thesignature with appendix scheme for hash-based signatures.

The signature value is a large byte string, as described inSection 2. The byte string is designed for easy parsing. The HSS, LMS, and LM-OTScomponents of the signature value format include counters and typecodes that indirectly provide all of the information that is needed toparse the byte string during signature validation.

When using a COSE key for this algorithm, the following checks are made:

4.Security Considerations

The security considerations from[RFC8152] and[HASHSIG] are relevant to implementations of this specification.

There are a number of security considerations that need to be takeninto account by implementers of this specification.

ImplementationsMUST protect the private keys. Compromise of the private keys may result in the ability to forge signatures. Alongwith the private key, the implementationMUST keep track of whichleaf nodes in the tree have been used. Loss of integrity of thistracking data can cause a one-time key to be used more than once. Asa result, when a private key and the tracking data are stored on nonvolatilemedia or in a virtual machine environment, failed writes, virtual machine snapshotting or cloning, and otheroperational concerns must be considered to ensure confidentiality andintegrity.

When generating an LMS key pair, an implementationMUST generate each key pair independently of all other key pairs in the HSS tree.

An implementationMUST ensure that an LM-OTS private key is used to generate a signature only one time and ensure that it cannot be used for any other purpose.

The generation of private keys relies on random numbers. The use ofinadequate pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) to generate thesevalues can result in little or no security. An attacker may find itmuch easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced the keys,searching the resulting small set of possibilities rather than brute-force searching the whole key space. The generation of qualityrandom numbers is difficult, and[RFC4086]offers important guidance in this area.

The generation of hash-based signatures also depends on randomnumbers. While the consequences of an inadequate PRNG to generate these values is much less severethan in the generation of private keys, the guidance in[RFC4086] remains important.

5.Operational Considerations

The public key for the hash-based signature is the key at the root ofHierarchical Signature System (HSS). In the absence of a public keyinfrastructure[RFC5280], this public key is atrust anchor, and the number of signatures that can be generated is bounded by the size ofthe overall HSS set of trees. When all of the LM-OTS signatures havebeen used to produce a signature, then the establishment of a newtrust anchor is required.

To ensure that none of the tree nodes are used to generate more than onesignature, the signer maintains state across different invocations ofthe signing algorithm.Section 9.2 of [HASHSIG] offers somepractical implementation approaches around this statefulness. Insome of these approaches, nodes are sacrificed to ensure that noneare used more than once. As a result, the total number of signaturesthat can be generated might be less than the overall HSS set of trees.

A COSE Key Type Parameter for encoding the HSS/LMS private key andthe state about which tree nodes have been used is deliberately notdefined. It was not defined to avoid creating the ability to save theprivate key and state, generate one or more signatures, and then restorethe private key and state. Such a restoration operation providesdisastrous opportunities for tree node reuse.

6.IANA Considerations

IANA has added entries for the HSS/LMS hash-based signature algorithm in the "COSE Algorithms" registry and added HSS/LMS hash-based signature public keys in the "COSE Key Types" registry and the "COSE Key Type Parameters" registry.

6.1.COSE Algorithms Registry Entry

The new entry in the "COSE Algorithms" registry[IANA] appears as follows:

Name:
HSS-LMS
Value:
-46
Description:
HSS/LMS hash-based digital signature
Reference:
RFC 8778
Recommended:
Yes

6.2.COSE Key Types Registry Entry

The new entry in the "COSE Key Types" registry[IANA] appears as follows:

Name:
HSS-LMS
Value:
5
Description:
Public key for HSS/LMS hash-based digital signature
Reference:
RFC 8778

6.3.COSE Key Type Parameters Registry Entry

The new entry in the "COSE Key Type Parameters" registry[IANA] appears as follows:

Key Type:
5
Name:
pub
Label:
-1
CBOR Type:
bstr
Description:
Public key for HSS/LMS hash-based digital signature
Reference:
RFC 8778

7.References

7.1.Normative References

[HASHSIG]
McGrew, D., Curcio, M., and S. Fluhrer,"Leighton-Micali Hash-Based Signatures",RFC 8554,DOI 10.17487/RFC8554,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8554>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S.,"Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119,DOI 10.17487/RFC2119,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8152]
Schaad, J.,"CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",RFC 8152,DOI 10.17487/RFC8152,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B.,"Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words",BCP 14,RFC 8174,DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[SHS]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),"Secure Hash Standard",FIPS Publication 180-4,DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4,,<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4>.

7.2.Informative References

[BH2013]
Ptacek, T., Ritter, T., Samuel, J., and A. Stamos,"The Factoring Dead: Preparing for the Cryptopocalypse",,<https://media.blackhat.com/us-13/us-13-Stamos-The-Factoring-Dead.pdf>.
[DSS]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),"Digital Signature Standard (DSS)",FIPS Publication 186-4,DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4,,<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4>.
[IANA]
IANA,"CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",<https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose>.
[LM]
Leighton, F. and S. Micali,"Large provably fast and secure digital signature schemes from secure hash functions",U.S. Patent 5,432,852,.
[M1979]
Merkle, R.,"Secrecy, Authentication, and Public Key Systems",Information Systems Laboratory, Stanford University,Technical Report No. 1979-1,.
[M1987]
Merkle, R.,"A Digital Signature Based on a Conventional Encryption Function",Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO '87 Proceedings,Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 291,DOI 10.1007/3-540-48184-2_32,,<https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48184-2_32>.
[M1989a]
Merkle, R.,"A Certified Digital Signature",Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO '89 Proceedings,Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 435,DOI 10.1007/0-387-34805-0_21,,<https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-34805-0_21>.
[M1989b]
Merkle, R.,"One Way Hash Functions and DES",Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO '89 Proceedings,Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 435,DOI 10.1007/0-387-34805-0_40,,<https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-34805-0_40>.
[NAS2019]
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine,"Quantum Computing: Progress and Prospects",The National Academies Press,DOI 10.17226/25196,,<http://dx.doi.org/10.17226/25196>.
[PQC]
Bernstein, D.,"Introduction to post-quantum cryptography",DOI 10.1007/978-3-540-88702-7_1,,<http://www.pqcrypto.org/www.springer.com/cda/content/document/cda_downloaddocument/9783540887010-c1.pdf>.
[RFC4086]
Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,"Randomness Requirements for Security",BCP 106,RFC 4086,DOI 10.17487/RFC4086,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC5280]
Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk,"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile",RFC 5280,DOI 10.17487/RFC5280,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC8017]
Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",RFC 8017,DOI 10.17487/RFC8017,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[RFC8032]
Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara,"Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)",RFC 8032,DOI 10.17487/RFC8032,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8610]
Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann,"Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures",RFC 8610,DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.

Appendix A.Examples

This appendix provides a non-normative example of a COSE full message signature and an example of a COSE_Sign1 message. This section is formatted according to the extended CBOR diagnostic format defined by[RFC8610].

The programs that were used to generate the examples can be found at<https://github.com/cose-wg/Examples>.

A.1.Example COSE Full Message Signature

This section provides an example of a COSE full message signature.

The size of binary file is 2560 bytes.

98(  [    / protected / h'a10300' / {        \ content type \ 3:0      } / ,    / unprotected / {},    / payload / 'This is the content.',    / signatures / [      [        / protected / h'a101382d' / {            \ alg \ 1:-46 \ HSS-LMS \          } / ,        / unprotected / {          / kid / 4:'ItsBig'        },        / signature / h'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'      ]    ]  ])

A.2.Example COSE_Sign1 Message

This section provides an example of a COSE_Sign1 message.

The size of binary file is 2552 bytes.

18(  [    / protected / h'a101382d' / {        \ alg \ 1:-46 \ HSS-LMS \      } / ,    / unprotected / {      / kid / 4:'ItsBig'    },    / payload / 'This is the content.',    / signature / h'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'  ])

Acknowledgements

Many thanks toRoman Danyliw,Elwyn Davies,Scott Fluhrer,Ben Kaduk,Laurence Lundblade,John Mattsson,Jim Schaad, andTony Putmanfor their valuable review and insights. In addition, an extraspecial thank you toJim Schaad for generating theexamples inAppendix A.

Author's Address

Russ Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
516 Dranesville Road
Herndon,VA20170
United States of America
Email:housley@vigilsec.com

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