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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                           R. BushRequest for Comments: 8481                     Internet Initiative JapanUpdates:6811                                             September 2018Category: Standards TrackISSN: 2070-1721Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based onResource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)Abstract   Deployment of BGP origin validation based on Resource Public Key   Infrastructure (RPKI) is hampered by, among other things, vendor   misimplementations in two critical areas: which routes are validated   and whether policy is applied when not specified by configuration.   This document is meant to clarify possible misunderstandings causing   those misimplementations; it thus updatesRFC 6811 by clarifying that   all prefixes should have their validation state set and that policy   must not be applied without operator configuration.Status of This Memo   This is an Internet Standards Track document.   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has   received public review and has been approved for publication by the   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on   Internet Standards is available inSection 2 of RFC 7841.   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttps://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8481.Bush                         Standards Track                    [Page 1]

RFC 8481             Origin Validation Clarification      September 2018Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of   publication of this document.  Please review these documents   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as   described in the Simplified BSD License.Table of Contents1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33.  Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34.  Evaluate ALL Prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35.  Set State, Don't Act  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51.  Introduction   Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation is hampered by, among   other things, vendor misimplementations in two critical areas: which   routes are validated and whether policy is applied when not specified   by configuration.  This document is meant to clarify possible   misunderstandings causing those misimplementations.   When a route is distributed into BGP, the origin validation state is   set to NotFound, Valid, or Invalid per [RFC6811].  Operational   testing has shown that the specifications of that RFC were not   sufficient to avoid divergent implementations.  This document   attempts to clarify two areas which seem to cause confusion.   The implementation issues seem not to be about how to validate, i.e.,   how to decide if a route is NotFound, Valid, or Invalid.  The issues   seem to be which routes should be evaluated and have their evaluation   state set, and whether to apply policy without operator   configuration.Bush                         Standards Track                    [Page 2]

RFC 8481             Origin Validation Clarification      September 20182.  Requirements Language   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described inBCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all   capitals, as shown here.3.  Suggested Reading   It is assumed that the reader understands BGP [RFC4271], the RPKI   [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482], and   RPKI-based Prefix Validation [RFC6811].4.  Evaluate ALL Prefixes   Significant Clarification: A router MUST evaluate and set the   validation state of all routes in BGP coming from any source (e.g.,   eBGP, iBGP, or redistribution from static or connected routes),   unless specifically configured otherwise by the operator.  Otherwise,   the operator does not have the ability to drop Invalid routes coming   from every potential source and is therefore liable to complaints   from neighbors about propagation of Invalid routes.  For this reason,   [RFC6811] says:      When a BGP speaker receives an UPDATE from a neighbor, it SHOULD      perform a lookup as described above for each of the Routes in the      UPDATE message.  The lookup SHOULD also be applied to routes that      are redistributed into BGP from another source, such as another      protocol or a locally defined static route.   [RFC6811] goes on to say, "An implementation MAY provide   configuration options to control which routes the lookup is applied   to."   When redistributing into BGP from any source (e.g., IGP, iBGP, or   from static or connected routes), there is no AS_PATH in the input to   allow RPKI validation of the originating Autonomous System (AS).  In   such cases, the router MUST use the AS of the router's BGP   configuration.  If that is ambiguous because of confederation, AS   migration, or other multi-AS configuration, then the router   configuration MUST provide a means of specifying the AS to be used on   the redistribution, either per redistribution or globally.Bush                         Standards Track                    [Page 3]

RFC 8481             Origin Validation Clarification      September 20185.  Set State, Don't Act   Significant Clarification: Once routes are evaluated and have their   state set, the operator should be in complete control of any policy   applied based on the evaluation state.  Absent specific operator   configuration, policy MUST NOT be applied.   Automatic origin validation policy actions such as those described in   "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community" [RFC8097]   MUST NOT be carried out or otherwise applied unless specifically   configured by the operator.6.  Security Considerations   This document does not create security considerations beyond those of   [RFC6811].7.  IANA Considerations   This document has no IANA actions.8.  Normative References   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate              Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119,              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A              Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)",RFC 4271,              DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.   [RFC6480]  Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support              Secure Internet Routing",RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,              February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.   [RFC6482]  Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route              Origin Authorizations (ROAs)",RFC 6482,              DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.   [RFC6811]  Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.              Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation",RFC 6811,              DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.Bush                         Standards Track                    [Page 4]

RFC 8481             Origin Validation Clarification      September 2018   [RFC8097]  Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R.              Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended              Community",RFC 8097, DOI 10.17487/RFC8097, March 2017,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8097>.   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase inRFC2119 Key Words",BCP 14,RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.Acknowledgments   Many thanks to John Scudder, who had the patience to give   constructive review multiple times, and Keyur Patel, who noted that   the AS might have to be specified.  George Michaelson, Jay   Borkenhagen, John Heasley, and Matthias Waehlisch kindly helped clean   up loose wording.Author's Address   Randy Bush   Internet Initiative Japan   5147 Crystal Springs   Bainbridge Island, Washington  98110   United States of America   Email: randy@psg.comBush                         Standards Track                    [Page 5]