Movatterモバイル変換
[0]ホーム
[RFC Home] [TEXT|PDF|HTML] [Tracker] [IPR] [Info page]
PROPOSED STANDARD
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) A. Lindem, Ed.Request for Comments: 8177 Cisco SystemsCategory: Standards Track Y. QuISSN: 2070-1721 Huawei D. Yeung Arrcus, Inc I. Chen Jabil J. Zhang Juniper Networks June 2017YANG Data Model for Key ChainsAbstract This document describes the key chain YANG data model. Key chains are commonly used for routing protocol authentication and other applications requiring symmetric keys. A key chain is a list containing one or more elements containing a Key ID, key string, send/accept lifetimes, and the associated authentication or encryption algorithm. By properly overlapping the send and accept lifetimes of multiple key chain elements, key strings and algorithms may be gracefully updated. By representing them in a YANG data model, key distribution can be automated.Status of This Memo This is an Internet Standards Track document. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available inSection 2 of RFC 7841. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttp://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8177.Lindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 2017Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.Table of Contents1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31.1. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31.2. Tree Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42.1. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42.2. Graceful Key Rollover Using Key Chains . . . . . . . . .43. Design of the Key Chain Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53.1. Key Chain Operational State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63.2. Key Chain Model Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63.3. Key Chain Model Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74. Key Chain YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .166. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .177. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .187.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .187.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21A.1. Simple Key Chain with an Always Valid Single Key . . . .21A.2. Key Chain with Keys Having Different Lifetimes . . . . .21A.3. Key Chain with Independent Send and Accept Lifetimes . .23 Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25Lindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 20171. Introduction This document describes the key chain YANG [YANG-1.1] data model. Key chains are commonly used for routing protocol authentication and other applications requiring symmetric keys. A key chain is a list containing one or more elements containing a Key ID, key string, send/accept lifetimes, and the associated authentication or encryption algorithm. By properly overlapping the send and accept lifetimes of multiple key chain elements, key strings and algorithms may be gracefully updated. By representing them in a YANG data model, key distribution can be automated. In some applications, the protocols do not use the key chain element key directly, but rather a key derivation function is used to derive a short-lived key from the key chain element key (e.g., the master keys used in [TCP-AO]).1.1. Requirements Notation The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described inBCP 14 [KEYWORDS] [KEYWORDS-UPD] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.1.2. Tree Diagrams A simplified graphical representation of the complete data tree is presented inSection 3.3. The following tree notation is used. o Brackets "[" and "]" enclose YANG list keys. These YANG list keys should not be confused with the key chain keys. o Curly braces "{" and "}" contain names of optional features that make the corresponding node conditional. o Abbreviations before data node names: "rw" means configuration (read-write), "ro" means state data (read-only), "-x" means RPC operations, and "-n" means notifications. o Symbols after data node names: "?" means an optional node, "!" denotes a container with presence, and "*" denotes a "list" or "leaf-list". o Parentheses enclose choice and case nodes, and case nodes are also marked with a colon (":").Lindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 2017 o Ellipsis ("...") stands for contents of subtrees that are not shown.2. Problem Statement This document describes a YANG [YANG-1.1] data model for key chains. Key chains have been implemented and deployed by a large percentage of network equipment vendors. Providing a standard YANG model will facilitate automated key distribution and non-disruptive key rollover. This will aid in tightening the security of the core routing infrastructure as recommended in [IAB-REPORT]. A key chain is a list containing one or more elements containing a Key ID, key string, send/accept lifetimes, and the associated authentication or encryption algorithm. A key chain can be used by any service or application requiring authentication or encryption using symmetric keys. In essence, the key chain is a reusable key policy that can be referenced wherever it is required. The key chain construct has been implemented by most networking vendors and deployed in many networks. A conceptual representation of a crypto key table is described in [CRYPTO-KEYTABLE]. The crypto key table includes keys as well as their corresponding lifetimes and algorithms. Additionally, the key table includes key selection criteria and is designed for a deployment model where the details of the applications or services requiring authentication or encryption permeate into the key database. The YANG key chain model described herein doesn't include key selection criteria or support this deployment model. At the same time, it does not preclude it. [YANG-CRYPTO-KEYTABLE] describes augmentations to the key chain YANG model in support of key selection criteria.2.1. Applicability Other YANG modules may reference ietf-key-chain YANG module key-chain names for authentication and encryption applications. A YANG type has been provided to facilitate reference to the key-chain name without having to specify the complete YANG XML Path Language (XPath) expression.2.2. Graceful Key Rollover Using Key Chains Key chains may be used to gracefully update the key string and/or algorithm used by an application for authentication or encryption. To achieve graceful key rollover, the receiver MAY accept all theLindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 2017 keys that have a valid accept lifetime, and the sender MAY send the key with the most recent send lifetime. One scenario for facilitating key rollover is to: 1. Distribute a key chain with a new key to all the routers or other network devices in the domain of that key chain. The new key's accept lifetime should be such that it is accepted during the key rollover period. The send lifetime should be a time in the future when it can be assured that all the routers in the domain of that key are upgraded. This will have no immediate impact on the keys used for transmission. 2. Assure that all the network devices have been updated with the updated key chain and that their system times are roughly synchronized. The system times of devices within an administrative domain are commonly synchronized (e.g., using the Network Time Protocol (NTP) [NTP-PROTO]). This also may be automated. 3. When the send lifetime of the new key becomes valid, the network devices within the domain of that key chain will use the new key for transmissions. 4. At some point in the future, a new key chain with the old key removed may be distributed to the network devices within the domain of the key chain. However, this may be deferred until the next key rollover. If this is done, the key chain will always include two keys: either the current and future key (during key rollovers) or the current and previous keys (between key rollovers). Since the most recent send lifetime is defined as the one with the latest start-time, specification of "always" will prevent using the graceful key rollover technique described above. Other key configuration and usage scenarios are possible, but these are beyond the scope of this document.3. Design of the Key Chain Model The ietf-key-chain module contains a list of one or more keys indexed by a Key ID. For some applications (e.g., OSPFv3 [OSPFV3-AUTH]), the Key ID is used to identify the key chain key to be used. In addition to the Key ID, each key chain key includes a key string and a cryptographic algorithm. Optionally, the key chain keys include send/accept lifetimes. If the send/accept lifetime is unspecified, the key is always considered valid.Lindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 2017 Note that different key values for transmission versus acceptance may be supported with multiple key chain elements. The key used for transmission will have a valid send-lifetime and invalid accept- lifetime (e.g., has an end-time equal to the start-time). The key used for acceptance will have a valid accept-lifetime and invalid send-lifetime. Due to the differences in key chain implementations across various vendors, some of the data elements are optional. Finally, the crypto algorithm identities are provided for reuse when configuring legacy authentication and encryption not using key chains. A key chain is identified by a unique name within the scope of the network device. The "key-chain-ref" typedef SHOULD be used by other YANG modules when they need to reference a configured key chain.3.1. Key Chain Operational State The key chain operational state is included in the same tree as key chain configuration consistent with Network Management Datastore Architecture [NMDA]. The timestamp of the last key chain modification is also maintained in the operational state. Additionally, the operational state includes an indication of whether or not a key chain key is valid for transmission or acceptance.3.2. Key Chain Model Features Features are used to handle differences between vendor implementations. For example, not all vendors support configuration of an acceptance tolerance or configuration of key strings in hexadecimal. They are also used to support security requirements (e.g., TCP-AO algorithms [TCP-AO-ALGORITHMS]) not yet implemented by vendors or implemented by only a single vendor. It is common for an entity with sufficient permissions to read and store a device's configuration, which would include the contents of this model. To avoid unnecessarily seeing and storing the keys in cleartext, this model provides the aes-key-wrap feature. More details are described in the Security Considerations (Section 5).Lindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 20173.3. Key Chain Model Tree +--rw key-chains +--rw key-chain* [name] | +--rw name string | +--rw description? string | +--rw accept-tolerance {accept-tolerance}? | | +--rw duration? uint32 | +--ro last-modified-timestamp? yang:date-and-time | +--rw key* [key-id] | +--rw key-id uint64 | +--rw lifetime | | +--rw (lifetime)? | | +--:(send-and-accept-lifetime) | | | +--rw send-accept-lifetime | | | +--rw (lifetime)? | | | +--:(always) | | | | +--rw always? empty | | | +--:(start-end-time) | | | +--rw start-date-time? | | | | yang:date-and-time | | | +--rw (end-time)? | | | +--:(infinite) | | | | +--rw no-end-time? empty | | | +--:(duration) | | | | +--rw duration? uint32 | | | +--:(end-date-time) | | | +--rw end-date-time? | | | yang:date-and-time | | +--:(independent-send-accept-lifetime) | | | {independent-send-accept-lifetime}? | | +--rw send-lifetime | | | +--rw (lifetime)? | | | +--:(always) | | | | +--rw always? empty | | | +--:(start-end-time) | | | +--rw start-date-time? | | | | yang:date-and-time | | | +--rw (end-time)? | | | +--:(infinite) | | | | +--rw no-end-time? empty | | | +--:(duration) | | | | +--rw duration? uint32 | | | +--:(end-date-time) | | | +--rw end-date-time? | | | yang:date-and-time | | +--rw accept-lifetime | | +--rw (lifetime)?Lindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 2017 | | +--:(always) | | | +--rw always? empty | | +--:(start-end-time) | | +--rw start-date-time? | | | yang:date-and-time | | +--rw (end-time)? | | +--:(infinite) | | | +--rw no-end-time? empty | | +--:(duration) | | | +--rw duration? uint32 | | +--:(end-date-time) | | +--rw end-date-time? | | yang:date-and-time | +--rw crypto-algorithm identityref | +--rw key-string | | +--rw (key-string-style)? | | +--:(keystring) | | | +--rw keystring? string | | +--:(hexadecimal) {hex-key-string}? | | +--rw hexadecimal-string? yang:hex-string | +--ro send-lifetime-active? boolean | +--ro accept-lifetime-active? boolean +--rw aes-key-wrap {aes-key-wrap}? +--rw enable? boolean4. Key Chain YANG Model <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-key-chain@2017-06-15.yang" module ietf-key-chain { yang-version 1.1; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain"; prefix key-chain; import ietf-yang-types { prefix yang; } import ietf-netconf-acm { prefix nacm; } organization "IETF RTGWG - Routing Area Working Group"; contact "WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/rtgwg> WG List: <mailto:rtgwg@ietf.org> Editor: Acee Lindem <mailto:acee@cisco.com>Lindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 8]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 2017 Yingzhen Qu <mailto:yingzhen.qu@huawei.com> Derek Yeung <mailto:derek@arrcus.com> Ing-Wher Chen <mailto:Ing-Wher_Chen@jabail.com> Jeffrey Zhang <mailto:zzhang@juniper.net>"; description "This YANG module defines the generic configuration data for key chains. It is intended that the module will be extended by vendors to define vendor-specific key chain configuration parameters. Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as authors of the code. All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth inSection 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). This version of this YANG module is part ofRFC 8177; see the RFC itself for full legal notices."; reference "RFC 8177"; revision 2017-06-15 { description "Initial RFC Revision"; reference "RFC 8177: YANG Data Model for Key Chains"; } feature hex-key-string { description "Support hexadecimal key string."; } feature accept-tolerance { description "Support the tolerance or acceptance limit."; } feature independent-send-accept-lifetime { descriptionLindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 2017 "Support for independent send and accept key lifetimes."; } feature crypto-hmac-sha-1-12 { description "Support for TCP HMAC-SHA-1 12-byte digest hack."; } feature cleartext { description "Support for cleartext algorithm. Usage is NOT RECOMMENDED."; } feature aes-cmac-prf-128 { description "Support for AES Cipher-based Message Authentication Code Pseudorandom Function."; } feature aes-key-wrap { description "Support for Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap."; } feature replay-protection-only { description "Provide replay protection without any authentication as required by protocols such as Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)."; } identity crypto-algorithm { description "Base identity of cryptographic algorithm options."; } identity hmac-sha-1-12 { base crypto-algorithm; if-feature "crypto-hmac-sha-1-12"; description "The HMAC-SHA1-12 algorithm."; } identity aes-cmac-prf-128 { base crypto-algorithm; if-feature "aes-cmac-prf-128"; description "The AES-CMAC-PRF-128 algorithm - required byLindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 2017RFC 5926 for TCP-AO key derivation functions."; } identity md5 { base crypto-algorithm; description "The MD5 algorithm."; } identity sha-1 { base crypto-algorithm; description "The SHA-1 algorithm."; } identity hmac-sha-1 { base crypto-algorithm; description "HMAC-SHA-1 authentication algorithm."; } identity hmac-sha-256 { base crypto-algorithm; description "HMAC-SHA-256 authentication algorithm."; } identity hmac-sha-384 { base crypto-algorithm; description "HMAC-SHA-384 authentication algorithm."; } identity hmac-sha-512 { base crypto-algorithm; description "HMAC-SHA-512 authentication algorithm."; } identity cleartext { base crypto-algorithm; if-feature "cleartext"; description "cleartext."; } identity replay-protection-only { base crypto-algorithm;Lindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 11]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 2017 if-feature "replay-protection-only"; description "Provide replay protection without any authentication as required by protocols such as Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)."; } typedef key-chain-ref { type leafref { path "/key-chain:key-chains/key-chain:key-chain/key-chain:name"; } description "This type is used by data models that need to reference configured key chains."; } grouping lifetime { description "Key lifetime specification."; choice lifetime { default "always"; description "Options for specifying key accept or send lifetimes"; case always { leaf always { type empty; description "Indicates key lifetime is always valid."; } } case start-end-time { leaf start-date-time { type yang:date-and-time; description "Start time."; } choice end-time { default "infinite"; description "End-time setting."; case infinite { leaf no-end-time { type empty; description "Indicates key lifetime end-time is infinite."; } }Lindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 12]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 2017 case duration { leaf duration { type uint32 { range "1..2147483646"; } units "seconds"; description "Key lifetime duration, in seconds"; } } case end-date-time { leaf end-date-time { type yang:date-and-time; description "End time."; } } } } } } container key-chains { description "All configured key-chains on the device."; list key-chain { key "name"; description "List of key-chains."; leaf name { type string; description "Name of the key-chain."; } leaf description { type string; description "A description of the key-chain"; } container accept-tolerance { if-feature "accept-tolerance"; description "Tolerance for key lifetime acceptance (seconds)."; leaf duration { type uint32; units "seconds"; default "0"; descriptionLindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 13]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 2017 "Tolerance range, in seconds."; } } leaf last-modified-timestamp { type yang:date-and-time; config false; description "Timestamp of the most recent update to the key-chain"; } list key { key "key-id"; description "Single key in key chain."; leaf key-id { type uint64; description "Numeric value uniquely identifying the key"; } container lifetime { description "Specify a key's lifetime."; choice lifetime { description "Options for specification of send and accept lifetimes."; case send-and-accept-lifetime { description "Send and accept key have the same lifetime."; container send-accept-lifetime { description "Single lifetime specification for both send and accept lifetimes."; uses lifetime; } } case independent-send-accept-lifetime { if-feature "independent-send-accept-lifetime"; description "Independent send and accept key lifetimes."; container send-lifetime { description "Separate lifetime specification for send lifetime."; uses lifetime; } container accept-lifetime { description "Separate lifetime specification for acceptLindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 14]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 2017 lifetime."; uses lifetime; } } } } leaf crypto-algorithm { type identityref { base crypto-algorithm; } mandatory true; description "Cryptographic algorithm associated with key."; } container key-string { description "The key string."; nacm:default-deny-all; choice key-string-style { description "Key string styles"; case keystring { leaf keystring { type string; description "Key string in ASCII format."; } } case hexadecimal { if-feature "hex-key-string"; leaf hexadecimal-string { type yang:hex-string; description "Key in hexadecimal string format. When compared to ASCII, specification in hexadecimal affords greater key entropy with the same number of internal key-string octets. Additionally, it discourages usage of well-known words or numbers."; } } } } leaf send-lifetime-active { type boolean; config false; description "Indicates if the send lifetime of theLindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 15]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 2017 key-chain key is currently active."; } leaf accept-lifetime-active { type boolean; config false; description "Indicates if the accept lifetime of the key-chain key is currently active."; } } } container aes-key-wrap { if-feature "aes-key-wrap"; description "AES Key Wrap encryption for key-chain key-strings. The encrypted key-strings are encoded as hexadecimal key strings using the hex-key-string leaf."; leaf enable { type boolean; default "false"; description "Enable AES Key Wrap encryption."; } } } } <CODE ENDS>5. Security Considerations The YANG module defined in this document is designed to be accessed via network management protocols such as NETCONF [NETCONF] or RESTCONF [RESTCONF]. The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is Secure Shell (SSH) [NETCONF-SSH]. The lowest RESTCONF layer is HTTPS, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS [TLS]. The NETCONF access control model [NETCONF-ACM] provides the means to restrict access for particular NETCONF or RESTCONF users to a pre- configured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol operations and content. The key strings are not accessible by default, and NETCONF access control model [NETCONF-ACM] rules are required to configure or retrieve them. When configured, the key strings can be encrypted using the AES Key Wrap algorithm [AES-KEY-WRAP]. The AES key-encryption key (KEK) is not included in the YANG model and must be set or derived independent of key chain configuration. When AES key encryption is used, theLindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 16]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 2017 hex-key-string feature is also required since the encrypted keys will contain characters that are not representable in the YANG string built-in type [YANG-1.1]. It is RECOMMENDED that key strings be encrypted using AES key encryption to prevent key chains from being retrieved and stored with the key strings in cleartext. This recommendation is independent of the access protection that is availed from the NETCONF access control model (NACM) [NETCONF-ACM]. The cleartext algorithm is included as a YANG feature. Usage is NOT RECOMMENDED except in cases where the application and device have no other alternative (e.g., a legacy network device that must authenticate packets at intervals of 10 milliseconds or less for many peers using Bidirectional Forwarding Detection [BFD]). Keys used with the cleartext algorithm are considered insecure and SHOULD NOT be reused with more secure algorithms. Similarly, the MD5 and SHA-1 algorithms have been proven to be insecure ([Dobb96a], [Dobb96b], and [SHA-SEC-CON]), and usage is NOT RECOMMENDED. Usage should be confined to deployments where it is required for backward compatibility. Implementations with keys provided via this model should store them using best current security practices.6. IANA Considerations This document registers a URI in the "IETF XML Registry" [XML-REGISTRY]. It follows the format in [XML-REGISTRY]. URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain Registrant Contact: The IESG. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace. This document registers a YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" registry [YANG-1.0]. name: ietf-key-chain namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain prefix: key-chain reference:RFC 8177Lindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 17]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 20177. References7.1. Normative References [KEYWORDS] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. [KEYWORDS-UPD] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase inRFC2119 Key Words",BCP 14,RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. [NETCONF] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)",RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>. [NETCONF-ACM] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) Access Control Model",RFC 6536, DOI 10.17487/RFC6536, March 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6536>. [NETCONF-SSH] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure Shell (SSH)",RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, June 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6242>. [RESTCONF] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF Protocol",RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>. [TLS] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2",RFC 5246, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>. [XML-REGISTRY] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry",BCP 81,RFC 3688, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.Lindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 18]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 2017 [YANG-1.0] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)",RFC 6020, DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>. [YANG-1.1] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.7.2. Informative References [AES-KEY-WRAP] Housley, R. and M. Dworkin, "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm",RFC 5649, DOI 10.17487/RFC5649, September 2009, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5649>. [BFD] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)",RFC 5880, DOI 10.17487/RFC5880, June 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880>. [CRYPTO-KEYTABLE] Housley, R., Polk, T., Hartman, S., and D. Zhang, "Database of Long-Lived Symmetric Cryptographic Keys",RFC 7210, DOI 10.17487/RFC7210, April 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7210>. [Dobb96a] Dobbertin, H., "Cryptanalysis of MD5 Compress", Technical Report Presented at the Rump Session of EuroCrypt '96, May 1996. [Dobb96b] Dobbertin, H., "The Status of MD5 After a Recent Attack", CryptoBytes, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 1996. [IAB-REPORT] Andersson, L., Davies, E., and L. Zhang, "Report from the IAB workshop on Unwanted Traffic March 9-10, 2006",RFC 4948, DOI 10.17487/RFC4948, August 2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4948>. [NMDA] Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Shafer, P., Watsen, K., and R. Wilton, "Network Management Datastore Architecture", Work in Progress,draft-ietf-netmod-revised-datastores-02, May 2017.Lindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 19]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 2017 [NTP-PROTO] Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification",RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>. [OSPFV3-AUTH] Bhatia, M., Manral, V., and A. Lindem, "Supporting Authentication Trailer for OSPFv3",RFC 7166, DOI 10.17487/RFC7166, March 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7166>. [SHA-SEC-CON] Polk, T., Chen, L., Turner, S., and P. Hoffman, "Security Considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-1 Message-Digest Algorithms",RFC 6194, DOI 10.17487/RFC6194, March 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6194>. [TCP-AO] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP Authentication Option",RFC 5925, DOI 10.17487/RFC5925, June 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5925>. [TCP-AO-ALGORITHMS] Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)",RFC 5926, DOI 10.17487/RFC5926, June 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5926>. [YANG-CRYPTO-KEYTABLE] Chen, I.,"YANG Data Model for RFC 7210 Key Table", Work in Progress,draft-chen-rtg-key-table-yang-00, March 2015.Lindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 20]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 2017Appendix A. ExamplesA.1. Simple Key Chain with an Always Valid Single Key <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <data xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0"> <key-chains xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain"> <key-chain> <name>keychain-no-end-time</name> <description> A key chain with a single key that is always valid for transmission and reception. </description> <key> <key-id>100</key-id> <lifetime> <send-accept-lifetime> <always/> </send-accept-lifetime> </lifetime> <crypto-algorithm>hmac-sha-256</crypto-algorithm> <key-string> <keystring>keystring_in_ascii_100</keystring> </key-string> </key> </key-chain> </key-chains> </data>A.2. Key Chain with Keys Having Different Lifetimes <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <data xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0"> <key-chains xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain"> <key-chain> <name>keychain2</name> <description> A key chain where each key contains a different send time and accept time and a different algorithm illustrating algorithm agility. </description> <key> <key-id>35</key-id> <lifetime> <send-lifetime> <start-date-time>2017-01-01T00:00:00Z</start-date-time> <end-date-time>2017-02-01T00:00:00Z</end-date-time> </send-lifetime>Lindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 21]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 2017 <accept-lifetime> <start-date-time>2016-12-31T23:59:55Z</start-date-time> <end-date-time>2017-02-01T00:00:05Z</end-date-time> </accept-lifetime> </lifetime> <crypto-algorithm>hmac-sha-256</crypto-algorithm> <key-string> <keystring>keystring_in_ascii_35</keystring> </key-string> </key> <key> <key-id>36</key-id> <lifetime> <send-lifetime> <start-date-time>2017-02-01T00:00:00Z</start-date-time> <end-date-time>2017-03-01T00:00:00Z</end-date-time> </send-lifetime> <accept-lifetime> <start-date-time>2017-01-31T23:59:55Z</start-date-time> <end-date-time>2017-03-01T00:00:05Z</end-date-time> </accept-lifetime> </lifetime> <crypto-algorithm>hmac-sha-512</crypto-algorithm> <key-string> <hexadecimal-string>fe:ed:be:af:36</hexadecimal-string> </key-string> </key> </key-chain> </key-chains> </data>Lindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 22]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 2017A.3. Key Chain with Independent Send and Accept Lifetimes <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> <data xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0"> <key-chains xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-key-chain"> <key-chain> <name>keychain2</name> <description> A key chain where each key contains different send times and accept times. </description> <key> <key-id>35</key-id> <lifetime> <send-lifetime> <start-date-time>2017-01-01T00:00:00Z</start-date-time> <end-date-time>2017-02-01T00:00:00Z</end-date-time> </send-lifetime> <accept-lifetime> <start-date-time>2016-12-31T23:59:55Z</start-date-time> <end-date-time>2017-02-01T00:00:05Z</end-date-time> </accept-lifetime> </lifetime> <crypto-algorithm>hmac-sha-256</crypto-algorithm> <key-string> <keystring>keystring_in_ascii_35</keystring> </key-string> </key> <key> <key-id>36</key-id> <lifetime> <send-lifetime> <start-date-time>2017-02-01T00:00:00Z</start-date-time> <end-date-time>2017-03-01T00:00:00Z</end-date-time> </send-lifetime> <accept-lifetime> <start-date-time>2017-01-31T23:59:55Z</start-date-time> <end-date-time>2017-03-01T00:00:05Z</end-date-time> </accept-lifetime> </lifetime> <crypto-algorithm>hmac-sha-256</crypto-algorithm> <key-string> <hexadecimal-string>fe:ed:be:af:36</hexadecimal-string> </key-string> </key> </key-chain> </key-chains> </data>Lindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 23]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 2017Contributors Yi Yang SockRate Email: yi.yang@sockrate.comAcknowledgments Thanks to Brian Weis for fruitful discussions on security requirements. Thanks to Ines Robles for Routing Directorate QA review comments. Thanks to Ladislav Lhotka for YANG Doctor comments. Thanks to Martin Bjorklund for additional YANG Doctor comments. Thanks to Tom Petch for comments during IETF last call. Thanks to Matthew Miller for comments made during the Gen-ART review. Thanks to Vincent Roca for comments made during the Security Directorate review. Thanks to Warren Kumari, Ben Campbell, Adam Roach, and Benoit Claise for comments received during the IESG review.Lindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 24]
RFC 8177 YANG Key Chain June 2017Authors' Addresses Acee Lindem (editor) Cisco Systems 301 Midenhall Way Cary, NC 27513 United States of America Email: acee@cisco.com Yingzhen Qu Huawei Email: yingzhen.qu@huawei.com Derek Yeung Arrcus, Inc Email: derek@arrcus.com Ing-Wher Chen Jabil Email: Ing-Wher_Chen@jabil.com Jeffrey Zhang Juniper Networks 10 Technology Park Drive Westford, MA 01886 United States of America Email: zzhang@juniper.netLindem, et al. Standards Track [Page 25]
[8]ページ先頭