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Network Working Group                                         S. BradnerRequest for Comments: 3751                                    Harvard U.Category: Informational                                     1 April 2004Omniscience Protocol RequirementsStatus of this Memo   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does   not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this   memo is unlimited.Copyright Notice   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).  All Rights Reserved.Abstract   There have been a number of legislative initiatives in the U.S. and   elsewhere over the past few years to use the Internet to actively   interfere with allegedly illegal activities of Internet users.  This   memo proposes a number of requirements for a new protocol, the   Omniscience Protocol, that could be used to enable such efforts.1.  Introduction   In a June 17, 2003 U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, entitled   "The Dark Side of a Bright Idea: Could Personal and National Security   Risks Compromise the Potential of Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing   Networks?," U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), the chair of the   committee, said he was interested in the ability to destroy the   computers of people who illegally download copyrighted material.  He   said this "may be the only way you can teach somebody about   copyrights."  "If we can find some way to do this without destroying   their machines, we'd be interested in hearing about that," Mr Hatch   was quoted as saying during a Senate hearing.  He went on to say "If   that's the only way, then I'm all for destroying their machines."   [Guardian]   Mr. Hatch was not the first U.S. elected official to propose   something along this line.  A year earlier, representatives, Howard   Berman (D-Calif.) and Howard Coble (R-N.C.), introduced a bill that   would have immunized groups such as the Motion Picture Association of   America (MPAA) and the Recording Industry Association of America   (RIAA) from all state and federal laws if they disable, block, or   otherwise impair a "publicly accessible peer-to-peer file-trading   network."Bradner                      Informational                      [Page 1]

RFC 3751           Omniscience Protocol Requirements        1 April 2004   The attitude of some of the copyright holders may be that it's OK for   a few honest people to have their computers or networks executed as   long as the machines and networks of the dishonest are killed.  But   it is not likely that any measurable error rate would be acceptable   to the public.  Clearly, anyone implementing laws of this type need   some way to reduce the error rate and be sure that they are dealing   with a real bad guy and not an innocent bystander.   Part of determining if someone is a "bad guy" is determining his or   her intent.  Historically, western jurisprudence has required that   prosecutors show that a person intended to commit a crime before that   person could be convicted of committing that crime.  [Holdsworth,   Restatement, Prosser, United States v. Wise, Garratt v. Dailey]   Because it can be quite difficult to establish a person's intent   lawmakers have, in some cases, reduced the requirement for   prosecutors to establish intent and mere possession is now proof   enough of intent.   This memo proposes a set of requirements for a new protocol to be   used by prosecutors to determine a person's intent, thus reducing the   need to dilute the historical legal requirement to show intent and by   groups such as the MPAA and RIAA to be sure they are dealing with   lawbreakers and not 60 year old non computer users.2.  Omniscience Protocol Requirements   For the purpose of these requirements, I will assume that the OP is   implemented using a client-server model, where the OP client is   installed on the user's computer and the server is installed on a   computer run by a law or copyright enforcement organization.  OP   Clients would register with all OP Servers that pertain to the legal   jurisdiction in which the client is located each time the computer is   started.  OP Servers would then, on whatever schedule they have been   configured to use, send OP Queries to OP Clients to find out if the   computer operator has engaged in an illegal act of interest to the   operator of the OP Server.  Future versions of the OP might operate   using a peer-to-peer model if the copyright enforcement people can   ever get over their visceral disgust at the very concept of peer-to-   peer networks.   For the purpose of this memo, I will use copyright infringement as an   example of an illegal act that the OP protocol could be used to   expose.  The OP has numerous possible applications beyond ferreting   out copyright infringement.  For example, the OP would be of great   assistance to instructors trying to determine if their students are   producing original work or engaging in plagiarism.  The same function   would be invaluable to newspaper editors checking up on reporter's   dispatches.Bradner                      Informational                      [Page 2]

RFC 3751           Omniscience Protocol Requirements        1 April 2004   Also for the purpose of this memo, I assume that an evil-doer (also   referred to as a miscreant) is in full control of a computer and that   OP Servers will generally be operated by "Good guys."  (See   Functional Requirements FR5-7 for requirements to ensure that the   latter is the case.)  In the context of this memo, "evil-doer" and   "miscreant" are defined as individuals or groups of individuals who   perform acts that the operator of an OP Server has a legally   recognized right to prevent.  In the context of this memo, "good   guys" refers to individuals or groups of individuals who have a   legally recognized right to prevent certain acts that computer users   may attempt to do with their computers.  The use of this term is not   meant to convey any value judgment of the morality, forward thinking   nature, public spiritedness, or the monetary worth relative to most   of humanity of such individuals or groups of individuals.2.1.  Operational Requirements   OR1: The OP client must be able to install itself into all types of        computers over the objections of the computer user.        Discussion: The OP client would be installed by legal mandate in        all new computers, but since there are hundreds of millions of        existing computers, the OP client must be able to install itself        in all of these existing computers in order to afford universal        coverage of all possible miscreants.  This installation must be        accomplished even if the user, many of whom have full        administrative control over their computers, tries to prevent        it.   OR2: True OP clients must not be findable by the computer user by any        means, including commercial virus detectors, but all hackers'        programs that mimic OP clients must be easily findable by        commercial virus detectors.        Discussion: Since anyone whose intent was to violate the law        would not want the OP client to be watching their action, they        would try to disable the OP client.  Thus the OP Client, once        installed, should be invisible to all methods a user might        employ to discover it.  Users must be able to find and remove        any virus or worm that tries to masquerade as an OP client to        escape detection.Bradner                      Informational                      [Page 3]

RFC 3751           Omniscience Protocol Requirements        1 April 2004   OR3: The OP must be able to communicate through uncooperative        firewalls, NATs, and when the computer is disconnected from the        Internet.        Discussion: Since the evil-doer may have control of a local        firewall or NAT, the OP must be able to communicate with the OP        server, even when the firewall or NAT has been configured to        block all unused ports.  Also, since the evil-doer might try to        hide his or her evil-doing by disconnecting the computer from        the network, the OP must be able to continue to communicate,        even under these circumstances.  Meeting this requirement may        require that the OP client be able to reconfigure the user's        machine into a cell phone or to implement GMPLS-WH [GMPLS-WH].   OR4: Neither the operation of the OP client or the OP server must be        able to be spoofed.        Discussion: The user must not be able to create their own        version of an OP client that can fool the OP server.  Nor can it        be possible for someone to create their own OP server that can        be used to query OP clients.        Discussion: Because of the potential for a user to hide their        illicit activities by mimicking the operation of the OP client        on their machine, it must not be possible to do so.  In the same        vein, because of the potential for violating the user's privacy,        it must not be possible for a non-authorized OP server to be        seen as authorized by OP clients.  Since there will be an        arbitrary, and changing, number of OP servers, at least one for        each type of protected material, OP authentication and        authorization must be able to be accomplished with no prior        knowledge of a particular OP server by the OP client.   OR5: The OP client must be able to be installed on any portable        device that can be used to play protected material or execute        protected software.        Discussion:  Since small, portable devices, such as MP3 players,        are becoming the preferred method of playing back prerecorded        music and videos, they must all include OP clients.  OP clients        must be able to be automatically installed on all such existing        devices.Bradner                      Informational                      [Page 4]

RFC 3751           Omniscience Protocol Requirements        1 April 20042.2.  Functional Requirements   FR1: The OP client must be able to determine the user's intent.        Discussion: Just knowing that the user has a copy of a protected        work on their system does not, by itself, mean that the copy is        illegal.  It could easily be a copy that the user purchased.        The OP must be able to tell if a copy is an illegal copy with        complete reliability.  The OP must be able to differentiate        between an original, and legal, copy and a bit-for-bit illegal        reproduction.  The OP client must be able to differentiate        between copies that were created for the purpose of backup, and        are thus generally legal, and those copies created for the        purpose of illegal distribution.  In the case of some types of        software, the OP client must be able to determine the intent of        the user for the software.  An example of this need is related        to the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and similar        laws around the world.  These laws outlaw the possession of        circumvention technology, such as crypto analysis software, in        most cases.  Some exemption is made for legitimate researchers,        but without an OP it is quite hard to determine if the        circumvention technology is to be used for research or to break        copyright protections for the purpose of making illegal copies        of protected material.  With the OP, the DMCA, and laws like it,        can be rewritten so that circumvention technology is legal and        developers can find out if their security protocols are any        good, something which may be illegal under current law.   FR2: The OP client must be able to remotely differentiate between        illegal material and other material with the same file name.        Discussion: A user might create a file that has the same        filename as that of a protected work.  The OP must not be fooled        into thinking that the user's file is a protected one.   FR3: The OP client must be able to find illegal copies, even if the        filename has been changed.        Discussion: The user must not be able to disguise a protected        work by just changing its name.   FR4: The OP client must be able to find illegal copies, even if the        user has modified the work in some way.        Discussion: The user must not be able to disguise a protected        work by modifying the work, for example, by prepending,        appending, or inserting extra material, or by changing some of        the protected work.  The OP must be able to make a legalBradner                      Informational                      [Page 5]

RFC 3751           Omniscience Protocol Requirements        1 April 2004        determination that a modified work is no longer legally the same        as the original if the amount and type of modification exceed a        subjective threshold.   FR5: The OP client must not be able to be run by a hacker, and the OP        interface into a user's computer must not be able to be        exploited by a hacker.        Discussion: OP clients will be attractive targets for hackers        since they will have full access within a user's computer.  The        interface between the OP client and server must be secure        against all possible hacking attacks.   FR6: The OP client must be able to discern the motives of the        operator of the OP server and not run if those motives are not        pure.        Discussion: Since it cannot be assumed that the operators of the        OP server will always have the best motives, the OP client must        be able to reject requests from the OP server if the operator of        the server has an evil (or illegal) intent.  For example, the OP        client must block any operation that might stem from a vendetta        that the OP server operator might have against the user.   FR7: The OP client must not be able to be used to extract information        from a user's computer that is unrelated to illegal copies.        In order to minimize the threat to the privacy of the user, the        OP client must not be able to be used to extract information        from the user's computer that is not germane to determining if        the user has illegal copies of works or intends to use protected        works in illegal ways.   FR8: The OP client must be able to differentiate between protected        material that was placed on the user's computer by the user and        any material placed by others.        Discussion: It must not be possible for a third party to put        protected material on a user's computer for the purpose of        incriminating the user.  The OP client must be able to know,        with certainty, who placed material on each computer, even in        the cases where a third party has physical access to an        unprotected computer or when the third party knows the user's        logname and password.Bradner                      Informational                      [Page 6]

RFC 3751           Omniscience Protocol Requirements        1 April 2004   FR9: The OP client must only implement the laws that apply to the        specific computer that it is running on.        Discussion: Since the Internet crosses many legal boundaries, an        OP client will have to know just where, in geo-political space,        the computer it is running in is currently located in order to        know what set of laws to apply when it is scanning the user's        computer.  The OP client must also be able to be automatically        updated if the laws change or the computer is moved to a        location where the laws are different.  Note that this        requirement also implies that the OP client knows where its OP        server is located to know if the client and server are both in        the same legal jurisdiction.  The OP client must know what to        do, or not do, when they are not in the same legal jurisdiction.        The OP client must also include a mechanism to automatically        retrieve any applicable new laws or court decisions and properly        interpret them.3.  Security Considerations   The OP requires strong authentication of the clients and servers to   ensure that they cannot be spoofed.  It also requires the use of   strong integrity technology to ensure that the messages between the   client and server cannot be modified in flight.  It also requires   strong encryption to be sure that the communication between the   client and the server cannot be observed.  All of this is required in   an environment where many of the users are in full control of their   computers and will be actively hostile to the reliable operation of   the protocol.  Good luck.4.  Informative References   [Garratt v. Dailey]     Supreme Court of Washington, 6 Wash. 2d 197;                           279 P.2d 1091 (1955)   [GMPLS-WH]              Generalized Multi-Protocol Label Switching                           (GMPLS) for Worm Holes, work to be in process   [Guardian]              "Senator proposes destruction of file-                           swapping computers."  The Guardian, June 19,                           2003.  (http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/                           0,12271,980890,00.html)   [Holdsworth]            Holdsworth, W., History of English Law                           680-683 (1938)   [Processer]             Prosser, W., et al., "Prosser and Keeton on                           Torts," Hornbook Series, 5th ed., 1984Bradner                      Informational                      [Page 7]

RFC 3751           Omniscience Protocol Requirements        1 April 2004   [Restatement]           1. Restatement of the Law: sec 13 Torts                           (American Law Institute) (1934)   [United States v. Wise] 550 F.2d 1180, 1194 (9th Cir.)5.  Authors Address   Scott Bradner   Harvard University   29 Oxford St.   Cambridge MA, 02138   EMail: sob@harvard.edu   Phone: +1 617 495 3864Bradner                      Informational                      [Page 8]

RFC 3751           Omniscience Protocol Requirements        1 April 20046.  Full Copyright Statement   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).  This document is subject   to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained inBCP 78 and   except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET   ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,   INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE   INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.Intellectual Property   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be   found inBCP 78 andBCP 79.   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository athttp://www.ietf.org/ipr.   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-   ipr@ietf.org.Acknowledgement   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the   Internet Society.Bradner                      Informational                      [Page 9]