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INFORMATIONAL
Internet Architecture Board (IAB)                              N. RooneyRequest for Comments: 8462                               S. Dawkins, Ed.Category: Informational                                     October 2018ISSN: 2070-1721Report from the IAB Workshop onManaging Radio Networks in an Encrypted World (MaRNEW)Abstract   The Internet Architecture Board (IAB) and GSM Association (GSMA) held   a joint workshop on Managing Radio Networks in an Encrypted World   (MaRNEW), on September 24-25, 2015.  This workshop aimed to discuss   solutions for bandwidth optimization on mobile networks for encrypted   content, as current solutions rely on unencrypted content, which is   not indicative of the security needs of today's Internet users.  The   workshop gathered IETF attendees, IAB members, and participants from   various organizations involved in the telecommunications industry   including original equipment manufacturers, content providers, and   mobile network operators.   The group discussed Internet encryption trends and deployment issues   identified within the IETF and the privacy needs of users that should   be adhered to.  Solutions designed around sharing data from the   network to the endpoints and vice versa were then discussed; in   addition, issues experienced when using current transport-layer   protocols were also discussed.  Content providers and Content   Delivery Networks (CDNs) gave their own views of their experiences   delivering their content with mobile network operators.  Finally,   technical responses to regulation were discussed to help the   regulated industries relay the issues of impossible-to-implement or   bad-for-privacy technologies back to regulators.   A group of suggested solutions were devised, which will be discussed   in various IETF groups moving forward.Rooney & Dawkins              Informational                     [Page 1]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 2018Status of This Memo   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is   published for informational purposes.   This document is a product of the Internet Architecture Board (IAB)   and represents information that the IAB has deemed valuable to   provide for permanent record.  It represents the consensus of the   Internet Architecture Board (IAB).  Documents approved for   publication by the IAB are not candidates for any level of Internet   Standard; seeSection 2 of RFC 7841.   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttps://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8462.Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of   publication of this document.  Please review these documents   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect   to this document.Rooney & Dawkins              Informational                     [Page 2]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 2018Table of Contents1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41.1.  Understanding "Bandwidth Optimization"  . . . . . . . . .41.2.  Topics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51.3.  Organization of This Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51.4.  Use of Note Well and the Chatham House Rule . . . . . . .61.5.  IETF and GSMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62.  Scene-Setting Sessions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72.1.  Scene Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72.1.1.  Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8       2.1.2.  Encryption Statistics and Radio Access Network               Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82.2.  Encryption Deployment Considerations  . . . . . . . . . .92.3.  Awareness of User Choice (Privacy)  . . . . . . . . . . .103.  Network or Transport Solution Sessions  . . . . . . . . . . .113.1.  Sending Data Up/Down for Network Management Benefits  . .11       3.1.1.  Competition, Cooperation, and Mobile Network               Complexities  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .124.  Transport Layer: Issues, Optimization, and Solutions  . . . .135.  Application-Layer Optimization, Caching, and CDNs . . . . . .14   6.  Technical Analysis and Response to Potential Regulatory       Reaction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .157.  Suggested Principles and Solutions  . . . . . . . . . . . . .167.1.  Better Collaboration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .198.  Since MaRNEW  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .199.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2010. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2011. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20Appendix A.  Workshop Attendees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24Appendix B.  Workshop Position Papers . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28Rooney & Dawkins              Informational                     [Page 3]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 20181.  Introduction   The Internet Architecture Board (IAB) and GSM Association (GSMA) held   a joint workshop on Managing Radio Networks in an Encrypted World   (MaRNEW), on September 24-25, 2015.  This workshop aimed to discuss   solutions for bandwidth optimization on mobile networks for encrypted   content, as current solutions rely on unencrypted content, which is   not indicative of the security needs of today's Internet users.   Mobile networks have a set of properties that place a large emphasis   on sophisticated bandwidth optimization.  The use of encryption is   increasing on the Internet, which is positive for consumer and   business privacy and security.  Many existing solutions for mobile   bandwidth optimization primarily operate on non-encrypted   communications; this can lead to performance issues being amplified   on mobile networks.  The use of encryption on networks will continue   to increase; with this understanding, the workshop aimed to   understand how we can solve the issues of bandwidth optimization and   performance on radio networks in this encrypted world.1.1.  Understanding "Bandwidth Optimization"   For the purposes of this workshop, bandwidth optimization encompasses   a variety of technical topics related to traffic engineering,   prioritization, optimization, and efficiency enhancements.  It also   encompasses user-related topics such as specific subscription or   billing models, and it may touch upon regulatory aspects or other   issues relating to government-initiated regulatory concerns.   The first category of bandwidth optimization includes the following:   o  Caching   o  Prioritization of interactive traffic over background traffic   o  Per-user bandwidth limits   The second category of bandwidth optimization may depend on one or   more of the first category optimization strategies, but may, in   particular, also encompass business-related topics such as content   delivery arrangements with content providers.   Finally, while not strictly speaking of traffic management, some   networks employ policy-based filtering (e.g., requested parental   controls), and many networks support some form of legal interception   functionality per applicable laws.Rooney & Dawkins              Informational                     [Page 4]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 2018   Many of these functions can continue as they are performed today,   even with increased use of encryption.  Others are using methods that   inspect parts of the communication that are not encrypted today, but   will be encrypted, and these functions will have to be done   differently in an increasingly encrypted Internet.1.2.  Topics   The workshop aimed to answer questions that focused on:   o  understanding the bandwidth optimization use cases particular to      radio networks;   o  understanding existing approaches and how these do not work with      encrypted traffic;   o  understanding reasons why the Internet has not standardized      support for lawful intercept and why mobile networks have;   o  determining how to match traffic types with bandwidth optimization      methods   o  discussing minimal information to be shared to manage networks but      ensure user security and privacy;   o  developing new bandwidth optimization techniques and protocols      within these new constraints;   o  discussing the appropriate network layer(s) for each management      function; and   o  cooperative methods of bandwidth optimization and issues      associated with these.   The further aim was to gather architectural and engineering guidance   on future work in the bandwidth optimization area based on the   discussions around the proposed approaches.  The workshop also   explored possible areas for standardization, e.g., new protocols that   can aid bandwidth optimization whilst ensuring that user security is   in line with new work in transport-layer protocols.1.3.  Organization of This Report   This workshop report summarizes the contributions to and discussions   at the workshop, organized by topic.  The workshop began with scene-   setting topics that covered the issues around deploying encryption,   the increased need for privacy on the Internet, and setting a clear   understanding that ciphertext should remain unbroken.  Later sessionsRooney & Dawkins              Informational                     [Page 5]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 2018   focused on key solution areas; these included evolution on the   transport layer and sending data up or down the path.  A session on   application layers and CDNs aimed to highlight both issues and   solutions experienced on the application layer.  The workshop ended   with a session dedicated to discussing a technical response to   regulation with regards to encryption.  The contributing documents   identified the issues experienced with encryption on radio networks   and suggested solutions.  Of the solutions suggested, some focused on   transport evolution, some on trusted middleboxes, and others on   collaborative data exchange.  Solutions were discussed within the   sessions.  All accepted position papers and detailed transcripts of   discussion are available at [MARNEW].   The outcomes of the workshop are discussed in Sections7 and8; they   discuss the progress made since the workshop toward each of the   identified work items through the time this document was approved for   publication.   Report readers should be reminded that this workshop did not aim to   discuss regulation or legislation, although policy topics were   mentioned in discussions from time to time.1.4.  Use of Note Well and the Chatham House Rule   The workshop was conducted under the IETF [NOTE_WELL] with the   exception of the "Technical Analysis and Response to Potential   Regulatory Reaction" session, which was conducted under the   [CHATHAM_HOUSE_RULE].1.5.  IETF and GSMA   The IETF and GSMA [GSMA] have different working practices, standards,   and processes.  IETF is an open organization with community-driven   standards, with the key aim of functionality and security for the   Internet's users, while the GSMA is membership based and serves the   needs of its membership base, most of whom are mobile network   operators.   Unlike IETF, GSMA makes few standards.  Within the telecommunications   industry, standards are set in various divergent groups depending on   their purpose.  Perhaps of most relevance to the bandwidth   optimization topic here is the work of the 3rd Generation Partnership   Project (3GPP) [SDO_3GPP], which works on radio network and core   network standards.  3GPP members include mobile operators and   original equipment manufacturers.Rooney & Dawkins              Informational                     [Page 6]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 2018   One of the 3GPP standards relevant to this workshop is Policy and   Charging Control QoS [PCC-QOS].  Traditionally, mobile networks have   managed different applications and services based on the resources   available and priorities given; for instance, emergency services have   a top priority, data has a lower priority, and voice services are   somewhere in-between.  3GPP defined the PCC-QoS mechanism to support   this functionality, and this depends on unencrypted communications   [EffectEncrypt].2.  Scene-Setting Sessions   Scene-setting sessions aimed to bring all attendees up to a basic   understanding of the problem and the scope of the workshop.   There were three scene-setting sessions:   oSection 2.1: Scene Setting   oSection 2.2: Encryption Deployment Considerations   oSection 2.3: Awareness of User Choice (Privacy)2.1.  Scene Setting   The telecommunications industry and Internet standards community are   extremely different in terms of ethos and practices.  Both groups   drive technical standards in their domain and build technical   solutions with some policy-driven use cases.  These technologies, use   cases, and technical implementations are different, and the   motivators between the two industries are also diverse.   To ensure all attendees were aligned with contributing to discussions   and driving solutions, this "Scene Setting" session worked on   generating a clear scope with all attendees involved.  In short, it   was agreed that 1) ciphertext encrypted by one party and intended to   be decrypted by a second party should not be decrypted by a third   party in any solution, 2) the Radio Access Network (RAN) does   experience issues with increased encrypted traffic, 3) the RAN issues   need to be understood precisely, and 4) the goal is to improve user   experience on the Internet.  Proposing new technical solutions based   on presumed future regulation was not in scope.  The full scope is   given below.Rooney & Dawkins              Informational                     [Page 7]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 20182.1.1.  Scope   The attendees identified and agreed to the scope described here.   We should do the following:   o  in discussion, assume that there is no broken crypto; ciphertext      is increasingly common; congestion does need to be controlled (as      do other transport issues); and network management, including      efficient use of resources in RAN and elsewhere, has to work;   o  identify how/why RAN is different for transport, and attempt to      understand the complexities of RAN (i.e., how hard it is to      manage) and why those complexities matter;   o  identify the precise problems caused by increased use of      encryption;   o  identify players (in addition to end users), the resulting      tensions, and how ciphertext changes those tensions;   o  discuss how some solutions will be radically changed by ciphertext      (it's ok to talk about that)   o  assume that the best possible quality of experience for the end      user is a goal; and lastly,   o  for the next two days, aim to analyze the situation and identify      specific achievable tasks that could be tackled in the IETF or      GSMA (or elsewhere) and that improve the Internet given the      assumptions above.   We should not delve into the following:   o  ways of doing interception, legal or not, for the reasons      described in [RFC2804]; and,   o  unpredictable political actions.2.1.2.  Encryption Statistics and Radio Access Network Differences   According to then-current statistics, attendees were shown that   encrypted content reaches around 50% [STATE_BROWSER] [STATE_SERVER].   The IAB is encouraging all IETF working groups to consider the effect   encryption being "on by default" will have on new protocol work.  The   IETF is also working on encryption at lower layers.  One recentRooney & Dawkins              Informational                     [Page 8]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 2018   example of this work is opportunistic TCP encryption within the TCP   Increased Security [TCPINC] Working Group.  The aims of these work   items are greater security and privacy for end users and their data.   Telecommunications networks often contain middleboxes that operators   have previously considered to be trusted, but qualifying trust is   difficult and should not be assumed.  Some interesting use cases   exist with these middleboxes, such as anti-spam and malware   detection, but these need to be balanced against their ability to   open up cracks in the network for attacks such as pervasive   monitoring.   When operators increase the number of radio access network cells   (base stations), this can improve the radio access network quality of   service; however, it also adds to radio pollution.  This is one   example of the balancing act required when devising radio access   network architecture.2.2.  Encryption Deployment Considerations   Encryption across the Internet is on the rise.  However, some   organizations and individuals that are mainly driven by commercial   perspectives come across a common set of operational issues when   deploying encryption.  [RFC8404] explains these network management   function impacts, detailing areas around incident monitoring, access   control management, and regulation on mobile networks.  The data was   collected from various Internet players, including system and network   administrators across enterprise, governmental organizations, and   personal use.  The aim of the document is to gain an understanding of   what is needed for technical solutions to these issues while   maintaining security and privacy for users.  Attendees commented that   worthwhile additions would be different business environments (e.g.,   cloud environments) and service chaining.  Incident monitoring in   particular was noted as a difficult issue to solve given the use of   URLs in today's incident monitoring middleware.   Some of these impacts to mobile networks can be resolved using   different methods, and the [NETWORK_MANAGEMENT] document details   these methods.  The document focuses heavily on methods to manage   network traffic without breaching user privacy and security.   By reviewing encryption deployment issues and the alternative methods   of network management, MaRNEW attendees were made aware of the issues   that affect radio networks, the deployment issues that are solvable   and require no further action, and those issues that have not yet   been solved but should be addressed within the workshop.Rooney & Dawkins              Informational                     [Page 9]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 20182.3.  Awareness of User Choice (Privacy)   Some solutions intended to improve delivery of encrypted content   could affect some or all of the privacy benefits that encryption   provides.  Understanding user needs and desires for privacy is   therefore important when designing these solutions.   From a then-current study [Pew2014], 64% of users said concerns over   privacy have increased, and 67% of mobile Internet users would like   to do more to protect their privacy.  The World Wide Web Consortium   (W3C) and IETF have both responded to user desires for better privacy   by recommending encryption for new protocols and web technologies.   Within the W3C, new security standards are emerging, and the design   principles for HTML maintain that users are the stakeholders with the   highest priority, followed by implementors and other stakeholders,   which further enforces the "user first" principle.  Users also have   certain security expectations from particular contexts and sometimes   use new technologies to further protect their privacy, even if those   technologies weren't initially developed for that purpose.   Operators may deploy technologies that can either impact user privacy   without being aware of those privacy implications or incorrectly   assume that the benefits users gain from the new technology outweigh   the loss of privacy.  If these technologies are necessary, they   should be opt in.   Internet stakeholders should understand the priority of other   stakeholders.  Users should be considered the first priority.  Other   stakeholders include implementors, developers, advertisers,   operators, and other ISPs.  Some technologies, such as cookie use and   JavaScript injection, have been abused by these parties.  This has   caused some developers to encrypt content to circumvent these   technologies that are seen as intrusive or bad for user privacy.   If users and content providers are to opt in to network management   services with negative privacy impacts, they should see clear value   from using these services and understand the impacts of using these   services.  Users should also have easy abilities to opt out.  Some   users will always automatically click through consent requests, so   any model relying on explicit consent is flawed for these users.   Understanding the extent of "auto click-through" may improve   decisions about the use of consent requests in the future.  One model   (Cooperative Traffic Management) works as an agent of the user; by   opting in, metadata can be shared.  Issues with this involve trust   only being applied at endpoints.Rooney & Dawkins              Informational                    [Page 10]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 20183.  Network or Transport Solution Sessions   Network or Transport Solution Sessions discussed proposed solutions   for managing encrypted traffic on radio access networks.  Most   solutions focus on metadata sharing, whether this sharing takes place   from the endpoint to the network, from the network to the endpoint,   or cooperatively in both directions.  Transport-layer protocol   evolution could be another approach to solve some of the issues radio   access networks experience, which cause them to rely on network   management middleboxes.  By removing problems at the transport layer,   reliance on expensive and complex middleboxes could decrease.3.1.  Sending Data Up/Down for Network Management Benefits   Collaboration between network elements and endpoints could bring   about better content distribution.  A number of suggestions were   given; these included the following:   o  Mobile Throughput Guidance [MTG]: exchanges metadata between      network elements and endpoints via TCP options.  It also allows      for better understanding of how the transport protocol behaves and      further improves the user experience, although additional work on      MTG is still required.   o  Session Protocol for User Datagrams [SPUD]: a UDP-based      encapsulation protocol to allow explicit cooperation with      middleboxes while using, new encrypted transport protocols.   o  Network Status API: an API for operators to share congestion      status or the state of a cell before an application starts sending      data that could allow applications to change their behavior.   o  Traffic Classification: classifying traffic and adding these      classifications as metadata for analysis throughout the network.      This idea has trust and privacy implications.   o  Congestion Exposure [CONEX]: a mechanism where senders inform the      network about the congestion encountered by previous packets on      the same flow, in-band at the IP layer.   o  Latency versus Bandwidth: a bit that allows the content provider      to indicate whether higher bandwidth or lower latency is of      greater priority and allows the network to react based on that      indication.  Where this bit resides in the protocol stack and how      it is authenticated would need to be decided.Rooney & Dawkins              Informational                    [Page 11]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 2018   o  No Network Management Tools: disabling all network management      tools from the network and relying only on end-to-end protocols to      manage congestion.   o  Flow Queue Controlled Delay (FQ-CoDel) [FLOWQUEUE]: a hybrid      packet scheduler / Active Queue Management (AQM) [RFC7567]      algorithm aiming to reduce bufferbloat and latency.  FQ-CoDel      manages packets from multiple flows and reduces the impact of      head-of-line blocking from bursty traffic.   Some of these suggestions rely on signaling from network elements to   endpoints.  Others aim to create "hop-by-hop" solutions, which could   be more aligned with how congestion is managed today but with greater   privacy implications.   Still others rely on signaling from endpoints to network elements.   Some of these rely on implicit signaling and others on explicit   signaling.  Some workshop attendees agreed that relying on   applications to explicitly declare the quality of service they   require was not a good path forward given the lack of success with   this model in the past.3.1.1.  Competition, Cooperation, and Mobile Network Complexities   One of the larger issues in sharing data about the problems   encountered with encrypted traffic in wireless networks is the matter   of competition; network operators are reluctant to relinquish data   about their own networks because it contains information that is   valuable to competitors, and application providers wish to protect   their users and reveal as little information as possible to the   network.  Some people think that if middleboxes were authenticated   and invoked explicitly, this would be an improvement over current   transparent middleboxes that intercept traffic without endpoint   consent.  Some workshop attendees suggested any exchange of   information should be bidirectional in an effort to improve   cooperation between the elements.  A robust incentive framework could   provide a solution to these issues or at least help mitigate them.   The radio access network is complex because it must deal with a   number of conflicting demands.  Base stations reflect this   environment, and information within these base stations can be of   value to other entities on the path.  Some workshop participants   thought solutions for managing congestion on radio networks should   involve the base station if possible.  For instance, understanding   how the radio resource controller and AQM [RFC7567] interact (or   don't interact) could provide valuable information for solvingRooney & Dawkins              Informational                    [Page 12]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 2018   issues.  Although many workshop attendees agreed that even though   there is a need to understand the base station, not all agreed that   the base station should be part of a future solution.   Some suggested solutions were based on network categorization and on   providing this information to the protocols or endpoints.  Completely   categorizing radio networks could be impossible due to their   complexity, but categorizing essential network properties could be   possible and valuable.4.  Transport Layer: Issues, Optimization, and Solutions   TCP has been the dominant transport protocol since TCP/IP replaced   the Network Control Protocol (NCP) on the ARPANET in March 1983.  TCP   was originally devised to work on a specific network model that did   not anticipate the high error rates and highly variable available   bandwidth scenarios experienced on modern radio access networks.   Furthermore, new network elements have been introduced (NATs and   network devices with large buffers creating bufferbloat), and   considerable peer-to-peer traffic is competing with traditional   client-server traffic.  Consequently, the transport layer today has   requirements beyond what TCP was designed to meet.  TCP has other   issues as well; too many services rely on TCP and only TCP, blocking   deployment of new transport protocols like the Stream Control   Transmission Protocol (SCTP) and Datagram Congestion Control Protocol   (DCCP).  This means that true innovation on the transport layer   becomes difficult because deployment issues are more complicated than   just building a new protocol.   The IETF is trying to solve these issues through the IAB's IP Stack   Evolution program, and the first step in this program is to collect   data.  Network and content providers can provide data including: the   cost of encryption, the advantages of network management tools, the   deployment of protocols, and the effects when network management   tools are disabled.  For mostly competitive reasons, network   operators do not tend to reveal network information and so are   unlikely to donate this information freely to the IETF.  The GSMA is   in a position to try to collect this data and anonymize it before   bringing it to IETF, which should alleviate the network operator   worries but still provide IETF with some usable data.   Although congestion is only detected when packet loss is encountered   and better methods based on detecting congestion would be beneficial,   a considerable amount of work has already been done on TCP,   especially innovation in bandwidth management and congestion control.Rooney & Dawkins              Informational                    [Page 13]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 2018   Furthermore, although the deficiencies of TCP are often considered   key issues in the evolution of the Internet protocol stack, the main   route to resolve these issues may not be a new TCP, but an evolved   stack.  Some workshop participants suggested that SPUD [SPUD] and   Information-Centric Networking (ICN) [RFC7476] may help here.  Quick   UDP Internet Connection [QUIC] engineers stated that the problems   solved by QUIC are general problems, rather than TCP issues.  This   view was not shared by all attendees of the workshop.  Moreover, TCP   has had some improvements in the last few years, which may mean some   of the network lower layers should be investigated to see whether   improvements can be made.5.  Application-Layer Optimization, Caching, and CDNs   Many discussions on the effects of encrypted traffic on radio access   networks happen between implementers and the network operators.  This   session aimed to gather the opinions of the content and caching   providers regarding their experiences running over mobile networks,   the quality of experience their users expect, and the content and   caching that providers would like to achieve by working with or using   the mobile network.   Content providers explained how even though this workshop cited   encrypted data over radio access networks as the main issue, the real   issue is network management generally, and all actors (applications   providers, networks, and devices) need to work together to overcome   these general network management issues.  Content providers explained   how they assume the mobile networks are standards compliant.  When   the network is not standards compliant (e.g., using non-standards-   compliant intermediaries), content providers can experience real   costs as users contact their support centers to report issues that   are difficult to test for and resolve.   Content providers cited other common issues concerning data traffic   over mobile networks.  Data subscription limits (known as "caps")   cause issues for users; users are confused about how data caps work   or are unsure how expensive media is and how much data it consumes.   Developers build products on networks not indicative of the networks   their customers are using, and not every organization has the   finances to build a caching infrastructure.   Strongly related to content providers, content owners consider CDNs   to be trusted deliverers of content, and CDNs have shown great   success in fixed networks.  Now that more traffic is moving to mobile   networks, there is a need to place caches near the user at the edge   of the mobile network.  Placing caches at the edge of the mobile   network is a solution, but it requires standards developed by content   providers and mobile network operators.  The IETF's CDNRooney & Dawkins              Informational                    [Page 14]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 2018   Interconnection [CDNI] Working Group aims to allow global CDNs to   interoperate with mobile CDNs, but this causes huge issues for the   caching of encrypted data between these CDNs.  Some CDNs are   experimenting with approaches like "Keyless SSL" [KeylessSSL] to   enable safer storage of content without passing private keys to the   CDN.  Blind Caching [BLIND_CACHING] is another proposal aimed at   caching encrypted content closer to the user and managing the   authentication at the original content provider servers.   At the end of the session, each panelist was asked to identify one   key collaborative work item.  Work items named were: evolving to   cache encrypted content, using one bit for latency / bandwidth trade-   off (explained below), better collaboration between the network and   application, better metrics to aid troubleshooting and innovation,   and indications from the network to allow the application to adapt.6.  Technical Analysis and Response to Potential Regulatory Reaction   This session was conducted under the Chatham House Rule.  The session   aimed to discuss regulatory and political issues, but not their worth   or need, and to understand the laws that exist and how technologists   can properly respond to them.   Mobile networks are regulated; compliance is mandatory and can incur   costs on the mobile network operator, while non-compliance can result   in service license revocation in some nations.  Regulation does vary   geographically.  Some regulations are court orders and others are   self-imposed regulations, for example, "block lists" of websites such   as the Internet Watch Foundation [IWF] list.  Operators are not   expected to decrypt sites, so those encrypted sites will not be   blocked because of content.   Parental-control-type filters also exist on the network and are   easily bypassed today, vastly limiting their effectiveness.  Better   solutions would allow for users to easily set these restrictions   themselves.  Other regulations are also hard to meet, such as user   data patterns, or will become harder to collect, such as Internet of   Things (IoT) cases.  Most attendees agreed that if a government   cannot get information it needs (and is legally entitled to have)   from network operators, they will approach content providers.  Some   governments are aware of the impact of encryption and are working   with, or trying to work with, content providers.  The IAB has   concluded that blocking and filtering can be done at the endpoints of   the communication.Rooney & Dawkins              Informational                    [Page 15]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 2018   Not all of these regulations apply to the Internet, and the Internet   community is not always aware of their existence.  Collectively, the   Internet community can work with GSMA and 3GPP and act together to   alleviate the risk imposed by encrypted traffic.  Some participants   expressed concern that governments might require operators to provide   information that they no longer have the ability to provide because   previously unencrypted traffic is now being encrypted, and this might   expose operators to new liability, but no specific examples were   given during the workshop.  A suggestion from some attendees was that   if any new technical solutions are necessary, they should easily be   "switched off".   Some mobile network operators are producing transparency reports   covering regulations including lawful intercept.  Operators who have   done this already are encouraging others to do the same.7.  Suggested Principles and Solutions   Based on the talks and discussions throughout the workshop, a set of   suggested principles and solutions has been collected.  This is not   an exhaustive list, and no attempt was made to come to consensus   during the workshop, so there are likely at least some participants   who would not agree with any particular principle listed below.  The   list is a union of participant thinking, not an intersection.   o  Encrypted Traffic: Any solution should encourage and support      encrypted traffic.   o  Flexibility: Radio access network qualities vary vastly, and the      network needs of content can differ significantly, so any new      solution should be flexible across either the network type,      content type, or both.   o  Privacy: New solutions should not introduce new ways for      information to be discovered and attributed to individual users.   o  Minimum data only for collaborative work: User data, application      data, and network data all need protection, so new solutions      should use minimal information to make a working solution.   A collection of solutions suggested by various participants during   the workshop is given below.  Inclusion in this list does not imply   that other workshop participants agreed.  Again, the list is a union   of proposed solutions, not an intersection.   o  Evolving TCP or evolution on the transport layer: This could take      a number of forms, and some of this work is already underway      within the IETF.Rooney & Dawkins              Informational                    [Page 16]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 2018   o  Congestion Control: Many attendees cited congestion control as a      key issue.  Further analysis, investigation, and work could be      done in this space.   o  Sprout [SPROUT]: Researched at MIT, Sprout is a transport protocol      for applications that desire high throughput and low delay.   o  PCC [PCC]: Performance-oriented Congestion Control is a new      architecture that aims for consistent high performance, even in      challenging scenarios.  PCC endpoints observe the connection      between their actions and their known performance, which allows      them to adapt their actions.   o  CDNs and Caches: This suggests that placing caches closer to the      edge of the radio network, as close as possible to the mobile      user, or making more intelligent CDNs, would result in faster      content delivery and less strain on the network.   o  Blind Caching [BLIND_CACHING]: This is a proposal for caching of      encrypted content.   o  CDN Improvements: This includes Keyless SSL and better CDN      placement.   o  Mobile Throughput Guidance [MTG]: This is a mechanism and protocol      elements that allow the cellular network to provide near real-time      information on capacity available to the TCP server.   o  One Bit for Latency / Bandwidth Trade-Off: This suggests      determining whether using a single bit in an unencrypted transport      header to distinguish between traffic that the sender prefers to      be queued and traffic that the sender would prefer to drop rather      than delay provides additional benefits beyond what can be      achieved without this signaling.   o  Base Station: Some suggestions involved using the base station,      but this was not defined in detail.  The base station holds the      radio resource controller and scheduler, which could provide a      place to host solutions, or data from the base station could help      in devising new solutions.   o  Identify Traffic Types via 5-Tuple: Information from the 5-tuple      could provide understanding of the traffic type, and network      management appropriate for that traffic type could then be      applied.Rooney & Dawkins              Informational                    [Page 17]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 2018   o  Heuristics: Networks can sometimes identify traffic types by      observing characteristics, such as data flow rate, and then apply      network management to these identified flows.  This is not      recommended, as categorizations can be incorrect.   o  APIs: An API for operators to share congestion status or the state      of a cell before an application starts sending data could allow      applications to change their behavior.  Alternatively, an API      could provide the network with information on the data type,      allowing appropriate network management for that data type;      however, this method exposes privacy issues.   o  Standard approach for the operator to offer services to Content      Providers: Mobile network operators could provide caching services      or other services for content providers to use for faster and      smoother content delivery.   o  AQM [RFC7567] and ECN [RFC3168] deployments: Queuing and      congestion management methods have existed for some time in the      form of AQM, ECN, and others, which can help the transport and      Internet protocol layers adapt to congestion faster.   o  Trust Model or Trust Framework: Some solutions in this area (e.g.,      SPUD) have a reliance on trust when content providers or the      network are being asked to add classifiers to their traffic.   o  Keyless SSL [KeylessSSL]: This allows content providers to      maintain their private keys on a key server and host the content      elsewhere (e.g., on a CDN).  This could become standardized in the      IETF.  [LURK]   o  Meaningful capacity sharing: This includes the ConEx [CONEX] work,      which exposes information about congestion to the network nodes.   o  Hop-by-hop: Some suggestions offer hop-by-hop methods that allow      nodes to adapt flow given the qualities of the networks around      them and the congestion they are experiencing.   o  Metrics and metric standards: In order to evolve current protocols      to be best suited to today's networks, data is needed about      current network conditions, protocol deployments, packet traces,      and middlebox behavior.  Beyond this, proper testing and debugging      on networks could provide great insight for stack evolution.   o  5G: Mobile operator standards bodies are in the process of setting      the requirements for 5G.  Requirements for network management      could be added.Rooney & Dawkins              Informational                    [Page 18]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 2018   In the workshop, attendees identified other areas where greater   understanding could help the standards process.  These were   identified as:   o  greater understanding of the RAN within the IETF;   o  reviews and comments on 3GPP perspective; and,   o  how to do congestion control in the RAN.7.1.  Better Collaboration   Throughout the workshop, attendees placed emphasis on the need for   better collaboration between the IETF and telecommunications bodies   and organizations.  The workshop was one such way to achieve this,   but the good work and relationships built in the workshop should   continue so the two groups can work on solutions that are better for   both technologies and users.8.  Since MaRNEW   Since MaRNEW, a number of activities have taken place in various IETF   working groups and in groups external to IETF.  The Alternatives to   Content Classification for Operator Resource Deployment (ACCORD) BoF   was held at IETF 95 in November 2015, which brought the workshop   discussion to the wider IETF audiences by providing an account of the   discussions that had taken place within the workshop and highlighting   key areas to progress on.  Key areas to progress on and an update on   their current status are as follows:   o  The collection of usable metrics and data were requested by a      number of MaRNEW attendees, especially for use within the IRTF      Measurement and Analysis for Protocols (MAP) Research Group; this      data has been difficult to collect due to the closed nature of      mobile network operators.   o  Understanding impediments to protocol stack evolution has      continued within the IAB's IP Stack Evolution program and      throughout transport-related IETF working groups such as the      Transport Area Working Group (TSVWG).   o  The Mobile Throughput Guidance document [MTG] has entered into a      testing and data collection phase, although further advancements      in transport technologies (QUIC, among others) may have stalled      efforts in TCP-related proposals.Rooney & Dawkins              Informational                    [Page 19]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 2018   o  Work on proposals for caching encrypted content continue, albeit      with some security flaws that proponents are working on further      proposals to fix.  Most often, these are discussed within the IETF      HTTPbis Working Group.   o  The Path Layer UDP Substrate (PLUS) BOF at IETF 96 in July 2016      did not result in the formation of a working group, as attendees      expressed concern on the privacy issues associated with the      proposed data-sharing possibilities of the shim layer.   o  The Limited Use of Remote Keys (LURK) BOF at IETF 96 in July 2016      did not result in the formation of a working group because the BOF      identified more problems with the presumed approach than      anticipated.   The most rewarding output of MaRNEW is perhaps the most intangible.   MaRNEW gave two rather divergent industry groups the opportunity to   connect and discuss common technologies and issues affecting users   and operations.  Mobile network providers and key Internet engineers   and experts have developed a greater collaborative relationship to   aid development of further standards that work across networks in a   secure manner.9.  Security Considerations   This document is an IAB report from a workshop on interactions   between network security, especially privacy, and network   performance.   It does not affect the security of the Internet, taken on its own.10.  IANA Considerations   This document has no IANA actions.11.  Informative References   [BLIND_CACHING]              Thomson, M., Eriksson, G., and C. Holmberg, "Caching              Secure HTTP Content using Blind Caches", Work in              Progress,draft-thomson-http-bc-01, October 2016.   [CDNI]     IETF, "Content Delivery Networks Interconnection (cdni)",              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/cdni/charter/>.   [CHATHAM_HOUSE_RULE]              Chatham House, "Chatham House Rule | Chatham House",              <https://www.chathamhouse.org/about/chatham-house-rule>.Rooney & Dawkins              Informational                    [Page 20]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 2018   [CONEX]    IETF, "Congestion Exposure (conex) - Documents",              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/conex/documents/>.   [EffectEncrypt]              Xiong, C. and M. Patel, "The effect of encrypted traffic              on the QoS mechanisms in cellular networks", August 2015,              <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/08/MaRNEW_1_paper_25.pdf>.   [FLOWQUEUE]              Hoeiland-Joergensen, T., McKenney, P., Taht, D., Gettys,              J., and E. Dumazet, "FlowQueue-Codel", Work in Progress,draft-hoeiland-joergensen-aqm-fq-codel-01, November 2014.   [GSMA]     GSMA, "GSMA Homepage", <http://gsma.com>.   [IWF]      IWF, "Internet Watch Foundation Homepage",              <https://www.iwf.org.uk/>.   [KeylessSSL]              Sullivan, N., "Keyless SSL: The Nitty Gritty Technical              Details", September 2014, <https://blog.cloudflare.com/keyless-ssl-the-nitty-gritty-technical-details/>.   [LURK]     Migault, D., Ma, K., Salz, R., Mishra, S., and O. Dios,              "LURK TLS/DTLS Use Cases", Work in Progress,draft-mglt-lurk-tls-use-cases-02, June 2016.   [MARNEW]   IAB, "Managing Radio Networks in an Encrypted World              (MaRNEW) Workshop 2015",              <https://www.iab.org/activities/workshops/marnew/>.   [MTG]      Jain, A., Terzis, A., Flinck, H., Sprecher, N.,              Arunachalam, S., Smith, K., Devarapalli, V., and R. Yanai,              "Mobile Throughput Guidance Inband Signaling Protocol",              Work in Progress,draft-flinck-mobile-throughput-guidance-04, March 2017.   [NETWORK_MANAGEMENT]              Smith, K.,"Network management of encrypted traffic", Work              in Progress,draft-smith-encrypted-traffic-management-05,              May 2016.   [NOTE_WELL]              IETF, "IETF Note Well",              <https://www.ietf.org/about/note-well.html>.Rooney & Dawkins              Informational                    [Page 21]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 2018   [PCC]      Dong, M., Li, Q., Zarchy, D., Brighten Godfrey, P., and M.              Schapira, "PCC: Re-architecting Congestion Control for              Consistent High Performance", Proceedings of the 12th              USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and              Implementation (NSDI '15), USENIX Association, May 2015,              <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/nsdi15/nsdi15-paper-dong.pdf>.   [PCC-QOS]  3GPP, "Policy and charging control signalling flows and              Quality of Service (QoS) parameter mapping", 3GPP TS              29.213, version 15.3.0, Release 15, June 2018,              <http://www.3gpp.org/DynaReport/29213.htm>.   [Pew2014]  Madden, M., "Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in              the Post-Snowden Era", November 2014,              <http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/>.   [QUIC]     Hamilton, R., Iyengar, J., Swett, I., and A. Wilk, "QUIC:              A UDP-Based Secure and Reliable Transport for HTTP/2",              Work in Progress,draft-tsvwg-quic-protocol-02, January              2016.   [RFC2804]  IAB and IESG, "IETF Policy on Wiretapping",RFC 2804,              DOI 10.17487/RFC2804, May 2000,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2804>.   [RFC3168]  Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition              of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP",RFC 3168, DOI 10.17487/RFC3168, September 2001,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3168>.   [RFC7476]  Pentikousis, K., Ed., Ohlman, B., Corujo, D., Boggia, G.,              Tyson, G., Davies, E., Molinaro, A., and S. Eum,              "Information-Centric Networking: Baseline Scenarios",RFC 7476, DOI 10.17487/RFC7476, March 2015,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7476>.   [RFC7567]  Baker, F., Ed. and G. Fairhurst, Ed., "IETF              Recommendations Regarding Active Queue Management",BCP 197,RFC 7567, DOI 10.17487/RFC7567, July 2015,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7567>.   [RFC8404]  Moriarty, K., Ed. and A. Morton, Ed., "Effects of              Pervasive Encryption on Operators",RFC 8404,              DOI 10.17487/RFC8404, July 2018,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8404>.Rooney & Dawkins              Informational                    [Page 22]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 2018   [SDO_3GPP] 3GPP, "3GPP Homepage", <http://www.3gpp.org/>.   [SPROUT]   Winstein, K., Sivaraman, A., and H. Balakrishnan,              "Stochastic Forecasts Achieve High Throughput and Low              Delay over Cellular Networks", 10th USENIX Symposium on              Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI              '13), USENIX Association, April 2013,              <https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/nsdi13/nsdi13-final113.pdf>.   [SPUD]     IETF, "Session Protocol for User Datagrams (spud)",              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/spud/about/>.   [STATE_BROWSER]              Barnes, R., "Some observations of TLS in the web", July              2015, <https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/93/slides/slides-93-saag-3.pdf>.   [STATE_SERVER]              Salz, R., "Some observations of TLS in the web", July              2015, <https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/93/slides/slides-93-saag-4.pdf>.   [TCPINC]   "TCP Increased Security (tcpinc)",              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/tcpinc/charter/>.Rooney & Dawkins              Informational                    [Page 23]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 2018Appendix A.  Workshop Attendees   o  Rich Salz, Akamai   o  Aaron Falk, Akamai   o  Vinay Kanitkar, Akamai   o  Julien Maisonneuve, Alcatel Lucent   o  Dan Druta, AT&T   o  Humberto La Roche, Cisco   o  Thomas Anderson, Cisco   o  Paul Polakos, Cisco   o  Marcus Ihlar, Ericsson   o  Szilveszter Nadas, Ericsson   o  John Mattsson, Ericsson   o  Salvatore Loreto, Ericsson   o  Blake Matheny, Facebook   o  Andreas Terzis, Google   o  Jana Iyengar, Google   o  Natasha Rooney, GSMA   o  Istvan Lajtos, GSMA   o  Emma Wood, GSMA   o  Jianjie You, Huawei   o  Chunshan Xiong, Huawei   o  Russ Housley, IAB   o  Mary Barnes, IAB   o  Joe Hildebrand, IAB / CiscoRooney & Dawkins              Informational                    [Page 24]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 2018   o  Ted Hardie, IAB / Google   o  Robert Sparks, IAB / Oracle   o  Spencer Dawkins, IETF AD   o  Benoit Claise, IETF AD / Cisco   o  Kathleen Moriarty, IETF AD / EMC   o  Barry Leiba, IETF AD / Huawei   o  Ben Campbell, IETF AD / Oracle   o  Stephen Farrell, IETF AD / Trinity College Dublin   o  Jari Arkko, IETF Chair / Ericsson   o  Karen O'Donoghue, ISOC   o  Phil Roberts, ISOC   o  Olaf Kolkman, ISOC   o  Christian Huitema, Microsoft   o  Patrick McManus, Mozilla   o  Dirk Kutscher, NEC Europe Network Laboratories   o  Mark Watson, Netflix   o  Martin Peylo, Nokia   o  Mohammed Dadas, Orange   o  Diego Lopez, Telefonica   o  Matteo Varvello, Telefonica   o  Zubair Shafiq, The University of Iowa   o  Vijay Devarapalli, Vasona Networks   o  Sanjay Mishra, Verizon   o  Gianpaolo Scassellati, VimplecomRooney & Dawkins              Informational                    [Page 25]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 2018   o  Kevin Smith, Vodafone   o  Wendy Seltzer, W3CAppendix B.  Workshop Position Papers   o  Mohammed Dadas, Emile Stephan, Mathilde Cayla, Iuniana Oprescu,      "Cooperation Framework between Application layer and Lower Layers"      at <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/08/MaRNEW_1_paper_33.pdf>   o  Julien Maisonneuve, Vijay Gurbani, and Thomas Fossati, "The      security pendulum" at <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/08/MaRNEW_1_paper_4.pdf>   o  Martin Peylo, "Enabling Secure QoE Measures for Internet      Applications over Radio Networks is a MUST" at      <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/08/MaRNEW_1_paper_32.pdf>   o  Vijay Devarapalli, "The Bandwidth Balancing Act: Managing QoE as      encrypted services change the traffic optimization game" at      <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/08/MaRNEW_1_paper_10.pdf>   o  Humberto J.  La Roche, "Use Cases for Communicating End-Points in      Mobile Network Middleboxes" at <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/08/MaRNEW_1_paper_12.pdf>   o  Patrick McManus and Richard Barnes, "User Consent and Security as      a Public Good" at <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/08/MaRNEW_1_paper_13.pdf>   o  Iuniana Oprescu, Jon Peterson, and Natasha Rooney, "A Framework      for Consent and Permissions in Mediating TLS" at      <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/08/MaRNEW_1_paper_31.pdf>   o  Jari Arkko and Goran Eriksson, "Characteristics of Traffic Type      Changes and Their Architectural Implications" at      <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/08/MaRNEW_1_paper_15.pdf>   o  Szilveszter Nadas and Attila Mihaly, "Concept for Cooperative      Traffic Management" at <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/08/MaRNEW_1_paper_16.pdf>Rooney & Dawkins              Informational                    [Page 26]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 2018   o  Gianpaolo Scassellati, "Vimpelcom Position paper for MaRNEW      Workshop" at <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/09/MaRNEW_1_paper_17.pdf>   o  Mirja Kuhlewind, Dirk Kutscher, and Brian Trammell, "Enabling      Traffic Management without DPI" at <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/08/MaRNEW_1_paper_18.pdf>   o  Andreas Terzis and Chris Bentzel, "Sharing network state with      application endpoints" at <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/08/MaRNEW_1_paper_19.pdf>   o  Marcus Ihlar, Salvatore Loreto, and Robert Skog, "The needed      existence of PEP in an encrypted world" at <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/08/MaRNEW_1_paper_20.pdf>   o  John Mattsson, "Network Operation in an All-Encrypted World" at      <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/08/MaRNEW_1_paper_21.pdf>   o  Dirk Kutscher, Giovanna Carofiglio, Luca Muscariello, and Paul      Polakos, "Maintaining Efficiency and Privacy in Mobile Networks      through Information-Centric Networking" at <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/08/MaRNEW_1_paper_23.pdf>   o  Chunshan Xiong and Milan Patel, "The effect of encrypted traffic      on the QoS mechanisms in cellular networks" at      <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/08/MaRNEW_1_paper_25.pdf>   o  Thomas Anderson, Peter Bosch, and Alessandro Duminuco, "Bandwidth      Control and Regulation in Mobile Networks via SDN/NFV-Based      Platforms" at <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/08/MaRNEW_1_paper_26.pdf>   o  Karen O'Donoghue and Phil Roberts, "Barriers to Deployment:      Probing the Potential Differences in Developed and Developing      Infrastructure" at <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/08/MaRNEW_1_paper_27.pdf>   o  Wendy Seltzer, "Security, Privacy, and Performance Considerations      for the Mobile Web" at <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/08/MaRNEW_1_paper_28.pdf>   o  Jianjie You, Hanyu Wei, and Huaru Yang, "Use Case Analysis and      Potential Bandwidth Optimization Methods for Encrypted Traffic" at      <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/08/MaRNEW_1_paper_29.pdf>Rooney & Dawkins              Informational                    [Page 27]

RFC 8462                         MaRNEW                     October 2018   o  Mangesh Kasbekar and Vinay Kanitkar, "CDNs, Network Services and      Encrypted Traffic" at <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/08/MaRNEW_1_paper_30.pdf>   o  Yves Hupe, Claude Rocray, and Mark Santelli, "Providing      Optimization of Encrypted HTTP Traffic" at <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/08/MaRNEW_1_paper_341.pdf>   o  M. Zubair Shafiq, "Tracking Mobile Video QoE in the Encrypted      Internet" at <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/08/MaRNEW_1_paper_35.pdf>   o  Kevin Smith, "Encryption and government regulation: what happens      now?" at <https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2015/09/MaRNEW_1_paper_1.pdf>Acknowledgements   Stephen Farrell reviewed this report in draft form and provided   copious comments and suggestions.   Barry Leiba provided some clarifications on specific discussions   about Lawful Intercept that took place during the workshop.   Bob Hinden and Warren Kumari provided comments and suggestions during   the IAB Call for Comments.   Amelia Andersdotter and Shivan Kaul Sahib provided comments from the   Human Rights Review Team during the IAB Call for Comments.Authors' Addresses   Natasha Rooney   GSMA   Email: nrooney@gsma.com   URI:https://gsma.com   Spencer Dawkins (editor)   Wonder Hamster   Email: spencerdawkins.ietf@gmail.comRooney & Dawkins              Informational                    [Page 28]

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