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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                             D. MaRequest for Comments: 8416                                          ZDNSCategory: Standards Track                                  D. MandelbergISSN: 2070-1721                                             Unaffiliated                                                          T. Bruijnzeels                                                              NLnet Labs                                                             August 2018Simplified Local Internet Number Resource Management with the RPKI(SLURM)Abstract   The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global   authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet   Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those   resources.  Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers   (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origin assertions.   ISPs can also use the RPKI to validate the path of a BGP route.   However, ISPs may want to establish a local view of exceptions to the   RPKI data in the form of local filters and additions.  The mechanisms   described in this document provide a simple way to enable INR holders   to establish a local, customized view of the RPKI, overriding global   RPKI repository data as needed.Status of This Memo   This is an Internet Standards Track document.   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has   received public review and has been approved for publication by the   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on   Internet Standards is available inSection 2 of RFC 7841.   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttps://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8416.Ma, et al.                   Standards Track                    [Page 1]

RFC 8416                          SLURM                      August 2018Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of   publication of this document.  Please review these documents   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as   described in the Simplified BSD License.Table of Contents1. Introduction ....................................................31.1. Terminology ................................................42. RP with SLURM ...................................................43. SLURM Files and Mechanisms ......................................53.1. Use of JSON ................................................53.2. SLURM File Overview ........................................53.3. Validation Output Filters ..................................63.3.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters ........................63.3.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters ............................73.4. Locally Added Assertions ...................................93.4.1. ROA Prefix Assertions ...............................93.4.2. BGPsec Assertions ..................................103.5. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions .......114. SLURM File Configuration .......................................134.1. SLURM File Atomicity ......................................134.2. Multiple SLURM Files ......................................135. IANA Considerations ............................................146. Security Considerations ........................................147. References .....................................................147.1. Normative References ......................................147.2. Informative References ....................................16   Acknowledgments ...................................................17   Authors' Addresses ................................................17Ma, et al.                   Standards Track                    [Page 2]

RFC 8416                          SLURM                      August 20181.  Introduction   The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global   authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet   Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those   resources.  For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6)   addresses can issue a Route Origin Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482] to   authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that   block.  Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to   validate BGP routes.  (Validation of the origin of a route is   described in [RFC6811], and validation of the path of a route is   described in [RFC8205].)   However, an RPKI Relying Party (RP) may want to override some of the   information expressed via configured Trust Anchors (TAs) and the   certificates downloaded from the RPKI repository system.  For   instance, [RFC6491] recommends the creation of ROAs that would   invalidate public routes for reserved and unallocated address space,   yet some ISPs might like to use BGP and the RPKI with private address   space (see [RFC1918], [RFC4193], and [RFC6598]) or private AS numbers   (see [RFC1930] and [RFC6996]).  Local use of private address space   and/or AS numbers is consistent with the RFCs cited above, but such   use cannot be verified by the global RPKI.  This motivates creation   of mechanisms that enable a network operator to publish, at its   discretion, an exception to the RPKI in the form of filters and   additions (for its own use and that of its customers).  Additionally,   a network operator might wish to make use of a local override   capability to protect routes from adverse actions [RFC8211], until   the results of such actions have been addressed.  The mechanisms   developed to provide this capability to network operators are hereby   called "Simplified Local Internet Number Resource Management with the   RPKI (SLURM)".   SLURM allows an operator to create a local view of the global RPKI by   generating sets of assertions.  For origin validation [RFC6811], an   assertion is a tuple of {IP prefix, prefix length, maximum length,   Autonomous System Number (ASN)} as used by the RPKI-Router protocol,   version 0 [RFC6810] and version 1 [RFC8210].  For BGPsec [RFC8205],   an assertion is a tuple of {ASN, subject key identifier, router   public key} as used by version 1 of the RPKI-Router protocol.  (For   the remainder of this document, these assertions are called "ROA   Prefix Assertions" and "BGPsec Assertions", respectively.)Ma, et al.                   Standards Track                    [Page 3]

RFC 8416                          SLURM                      August 20181.1.  Terminology   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described inBCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all   capitals, as shown here.2.  RP with SLURM   SLURM provides a simple way to enable an RP to establish a local,   customized view of the RPKI, overriding RPKI repository data if   needed.  To that end, an RP with SLURM filters out (i.e., removes   from consideration for routing decisions) any assertions in the RPKI   that are overridden by local ROA Prefix Assertions and BGPsec   Assertions.   In general, the primary output of an RP is the data it sends to   routers over the RPKI-Router protocol [RFC8210].  The RPKI-Router   protocol enables routers to query an RP for all assertions it knows   about (Reset Query) or for an update of only the changes in   assertions (Serial Query).  The mechanisms specified in this document   are to be applied to the result set for a Reset Query and to both the   old and new sets that are compared for a Serial Query.  RP software   may modify other forms of output in comparable ways, but that is   outside the scope of this document.   +--------------+   +---------------------------+   +------------+   |              |   |                           |   |            |   | Repositories +--->Local cache of RPKI objects+---> Validation |   |              |   |                           |   |            |   +--------------+   +---------------------------+   +-----+------+                                                            |          +-------------------------------------------------+          |   +------v-------+   +------------+   +-----------+   +-------------+   |              |   |            |   |           |   |             |   |    SLURM     +--->   SLURM    +--->RPKI-Router+---> BGP Speakers|   |   Filters    |   | Assertions |   | Protocol  |   |             |   +--------------+   +------------+   +-----------+   +-------------+                Figure 1: SLURM's Position in the RP StackMa, et al.                   Standards Track                    [Page 4]

RFC 8416                          SLURM                      August 20183.  SLURM Files and Mechanisms3.1.  Use of JSON   SLURM filters and assertions are specified in JSON format [RFC8259].   JSON members that are not defined here MUST NOT be used in SLURM   files.  An RP MUST consider any deviations from the specifications to   be errors.  Future additions to the specifications in this document   MUST use an incremented value for the "slurmVersion" member.3.2.  SLURM File Overview   A SLURM file consists of a single JSON object containing the   following members:   o  A "slurmVersion" member that MUST be set to 1, encoded as a number   o  A "validationOutputFilters" member (Section 3.3), whose value is      an object.  The object MUST contain exactly two members:      *  A "prefixFilters" member, whose value is described inSection 3.3.1.      *  A "bgpsecFilters" member, whose value is described inSection 3.3.2.   o  A "locallyAddedAssertions" member (Section 3.4), whose value is an      object.  The object MUST contain exactly two members:      *  A "prefixAssertions" member, whose value is described inSection 3.4.1.      *  A "bgpsecAssertions" member, whose value is described inSection 3.4.2.   In the envisioned typical use case, an RP uses both Validation Output   Filters and Locally Added Assertions.  In this case, the resulting   assertions MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed   before locally adding assertions; that is, Locally Added Assertions   MUST NOT be removed by output filtering.   The following JSON structure with JSON members represents a SLURM   file that has no filters or assertions:Ma, et al.                   Standards Track                    [Page 5]

RFC 8416                          SLURM                      August 2018   {     "slurmVersion": 1,     "validationOutputFilters": {       "prefixFilters": [],       "bgpsecFilters": []     },     "locallyAddedAssertions": {       "prefixAssertions": [],       "bgpsecAssertions": []     }   }                        Figure 2: Empty SLURM File3.3.  Validation Output Filters3.3.1.  Validated ROA Prefix Filters   The RP can configure zero or more Validated ROA Prefix Filters   ("Prefix Filters" for short).  Each Prefix Filter can contain either   an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and/or an ASN.  It is RECOMMENDED that an   explanatory comment is included with each Prefix Filter so that it   can be shown to users of the RP software.   The above is expressed as a value of the "prefixFilters" member, as   an array of zero or more objects.  Each object MUST contain either 1)   one of the following members or 2) one of each of the following   members.   o  A "prefix" member, whose value is a string representing either an      IPv4 prefix (seeSection 3.1 of [RFC4632]) or an IPv6 prefix (see      [RFC5952]).   o  An "asn" member, whose value is a number.   In addition, each object MAY contain one optional "comment" member,   whose value is a string.   The following example JSON structure represents a "prefixFilters"   member with an array of example objects for each use case listed   above:Ma, et al.                   Standards Track                    [Page 6]

RFC 8416                          SLURM                      August 2018           "prefixFilters": [             {               "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24",               "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix"             },             {               "asn": 64496,               "comment": "All VRPs matching ASN"             },             {               "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",               "asn": 64497,               "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"             }           ]                    Figure 3: "prefixFilters" Examples   Any Validated ROA Payload (VRP) [RFC6811] that matches any configured   Prefix Filter MUST be removed from the RP's output.   A VRP is considered to match with a Prefix Filter if one of the   following cases applies:   1.  If the Prefix Filter only contains an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix, the       VRP is considered to match the filter if the VRP prefix is equal       to or covered by the Prefix Filter prefix.   2.  If the Prefix Filter only contains an ASN, the VRP is considered       to match the filter if the VRP ASN matches the Prefix Filter ASN.   3.  If the Prefix Filter contains both an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and an       ASN, the VRP is considered to match if the VRP prefix is equal to       or covered by the Prefix Filter prefix and the VRP ASN matches       the Prefix Filter ASN.3.3.2.  BGPsec Assertion Filters   The RP can configure zero or more BGPsec Assertion Filters ("BGPsec   Filters" for short).  Each BGPsec Filter can contain an ASN and/or   the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a Router Subject Key Identifier   (SKI), as described in [RFC8209] and [RFC6487].  It is RECOMMENDED   that an explanatory comment is also included with each BGPsec Filter,   so that it can be shown to users of the RP software.   The above is expressed as a value of the "bgpsecFilters" member, as   an array of zero or more objects.  Each object MUST contain one of   either, or one each of both following members:Ma, et al.                   Standards Track                    [Page 7]

RFC 8416                          SLURM                      August 2018   o  An "asn" member, whose value is a number   o  An "SKI" member, whose value is the Base64 encoding without      trailing '=' (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) of the certificate's Subject      Key Identifier as described inSection 4.8.2 of [RFC6487].  (This      is the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the ASN.1 tag or      length fields.)   In addition, each object MAY contain one optional "comment" member,   whose value is a string.   The following example JSON structure represents a "bgpsecFilters"   member with an array of example objects for each use case listed   above:           "bgpsecFilters": [             {               "asn": 64496,               "comment": "All keys for ASN"             },             {               "SKI": "<Base 64 of some SKI>",               "comment": "Key matching Router SKI"             },             {               "asn": 64497,               "SKI": "<Base 64 of some SKI>",               "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"             }           ]                    Figure 4: "bgpsecFilters" Examples   Any BGPsec Assertion that matches any configured BGPsec Filter MUST   be removed from the RP's output.  A BGPsec Assertion is considered to   match with a BGPsec Filter if one of the following cases applies:   1.  If the BGPsec Filter only contains an ASN, a BGPsec Assertion is       considered to match if the Assertion ASN matches the Filter ASN.   2.  If the BGPsec Filter only contains an SKI, a BGPsec Assertion is       considered to match if the Assertion Router SKI matches the       Filter SKI.   3.  If the BGPsec Filter contains both an ASN and a Router SKI, then       a BGPsec Assertion is considered to match if both the Assertion       ASN matches the Filter ASN and the Assertion Router SKI matches       the Filter SKI.Ma, et al.                   Standards Track                    [Page 8]

RFC 8416                          SLURM                      August 20183.4.  Locally Added Assertions3.4.1.  ROA Prefix Assertions   Each RP is locally configured with a (possibly empty) array of ROA   Prefix Assertions ("Prefix Assertions" for short).  Each ROA Prefix   Assertion MUST contain an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and an ASN.  It MAY   include a value for the maximum length.  It is RECOMMENDED that an   explanatory comment is also included with each so that it can be   shown to users of the RP software.   The above is expressed as a value of the "prefixAssertions" member,   as an array of zero or more objects.  Each object MUST contain one of   each of the following members:   o  A "prefix" member, whose value is a string representing either an      IPv4 prefix (seeSection 3.1 of [RFC4632]) or an IPv6 prefix (see      [RFC5952]).   o  An "asn" member, whose value is a number.   In addition, each object MAY contain one of each of the following   members:   o  A "maxPrefixLength" member, whose value is a number.   o  A "comment" member, whose value is a string.   The following example JSON structure represents a "prefixAssertions"   member with an array of example objects for each use case listed   above:     "prefixAssertions": [       {         "asn": 64496,         "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",         "comment": "My other important route"       },       {         "asn": 64496,         "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32",         "maxPrefixLength": 48,         "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes"       }     ]                   Figure 5: "prefixAssertions" ExamplesMa, et al.                   Standards Track                    [Page 9]

RFC 8416                          SLURM                      August 2018   Note that the combination of the prefix, ASN, and optional maximum   length describes a VRP as described in [RFC6811].  The RP MUST add   all Prefix Assertions found this way to the VRP found through RPKI   validation and ensure that it sends the complete set of Protocol Data   Units (PDUs), excluding duplicates when using the RPKI-Router   protocol (see Sections5.6 and5.7 of [RFC8210]).3.4.2.  BGPsec Assertions   Each RP is locally configured with a (possibly empty) array of BGPsec   Assertions.  Each BGPsec Assertion MUST contain an AS number, a   Router SKI, and the router public key.  It is RECOMMENDED that an   explanatory comment is also included so that it can be shown to users   of the RP software.   The above is expressed as a value of the "bgpsecAssertions" member,   as an array of zero or more objects.  Each object MUST contain one   each of all of the following members:   o  An "asn" member, whose value is a number.   o  An "SKI" member, whose value is the Base64 encoding without      trailing '=' (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) of the certificate's Subject      Key Identifier as described inSection 4.8.2 of [RFC6487] (This is      the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the ASN.1 tag or      length fields.)   o  A "routerPublicKey" member, whose value is the Base64 encoding      without trailing '=' (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) of the equivalent to      the subjectPublicKeyInfo value of the router certificate's public      key, as described in [RFC8208].  This is the full ASN.1 DER      encoding of the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag and      length values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE.   The following example JSON structure represents a "bgpsecAssertions"   member with one object as described above:     "bgpsecAssertions": [       {         "asn": 64496,         "SKI": "<some base64 SKI>",         "routerPublicKey": "<some base64 public key>",         "comment": "My known key for my important ASN"       }     ]                   Figure 6: "bgpsecAssertions" ExamplesMa, et al.                   Standards Track                   [Page 10]

RFC 8416                          SLURM                      August 2018   Note that a "bgpsecAssertions" member matches the syntax of the   Router Key PDU described inSection 5.10 of [RFC8210].  Relying   Parties MUST add any "bgpsecAssertions" member thus found to the set   of Router Key PDUs, excluding duplicates, when using the RPKI-Router   protocol [RFC8210].3.5.  Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions   The following JSON structure represents an example of a SLURM file   that uses all the elements described in the previous sections:     {       "slurmVersion": 1,       "validationOutputFilters": {         "prefixFilters": [           {             "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24",             "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix"           },           {             "asn": 64496,             "comment": "All VRPs matching ASN"           },           {             "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",             "asn": 64497,             "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"           }         ],         "bgpsecFilters": [           {             "asn": 64496,             "comment": "All keys for ASN"           },           {             "SKI": "Zm9v",             "comment": "Key matching Router SKI"           },           {             "asn": 64497,             "SKI": "YmFy",             "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"           }         ]       },       "locallyAddedAssertions": {         "prefixAssertions": [           {Ma, et al.                   Standards Track                   [Page 11]

RFC 8416                          SLURM                      August 2018             "asn": 64496,             "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",             "comment": "My other important route"           },           {             "asn": 64496,             "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32",             "maxPrefixLength": 48,             "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes"           }         ],         "bgpsecAssertions": [           {             "asn": 64496,             "comment" : "My known key for my important ASN",             "SKI": "<some base64 SKI>",             "routerPublicKey": "<some base64 public key>"           }         ]       }     }                   Figure 7: Example of Full SLURM FileMa, et al.                   Standards Track                   [Page 12]

RFC 8416                          SLURM                      August 20184.  SLURM File Configuration4.1.  SLURM File Atomicity   To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic.   That is, the output of the RP either MUST be the same as if a SLURM   file were not used or MUST reflect the entire SLURM configuration.   For an example of why this is required, consider the case of two   local routes for the same prefix but different origin ASNs.  Both   routes are configured with Locally Added Assertions.  If neither   addition occurs, then both routes could be in the NotFound state   [RFC6811].  If both additions occur, then both routes would be in the   Valid state.  However, if one addition occurs and the other does not,   then one could be Invalid while the other is Valid.4.2.  Multiple SLURM Files   An implementation MAY support the concurrent use of multiple SLURM   files.  In this case, the resulting inputs to Validation Output   Filters and Locally Added Assertions are the respective unions of the   inputs from each file.  The envisioned typical use case for multiple   files is when the files have distinct scopes.  For instance,   operators of two distinct networks may resort to one RP system to   frame routing decisions.  As such, they probably deliver SLURM files   to this RP independently.  Before an RP configures SLURM files from   different sources, it MUST make sure there is no internal conflict   among the INR assertions in these SLURM files.  To do so, the RP   SHOULD check the entries of each SLURM file with regard to overlaps   of the INR assertions and report errors to the sources that created   the SLURM files in question.  The RP gets multiple SLURM files as a   set, and the whole set MUST be rejected in case of any overlaps among   the SLURM files.   If a problem is detected with the INR assertions in these SLURM   files, the RP MUST NOT use them and SHOULD issue a warning as error   report in the following cases:   1.  There may be conflicting changes to ROA Prefix Assertions if an       IP address X and distinct SLURM files Y and Z exist such that X       is contained by any prefix in any "prefixAssertions" or       "prefixFilters" in file Y and X is contained by any prefix in any       "prefixAssertions" or "prefixFilters" in file Z.   2.  There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec Assertions if an ASN X       and distinct SLURM files Y and Z exist such that X is used in any       "bgpsecAssertions" or "bgpsecFilters" in file Y and X is used in       any "bgpsecAssertions" or "bgpsecFilters" in file Z.Ma, et al.                   Standards Track                   [Page 13]

RFC 8416                          SLURM                      August 20185.  IANA Considerations   This document has no IANA actions.6.  Security Considerations   The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator   with additional ways to control use of RPKI data while preserving   autonomy in address space and ASN management.  These mechanisms are   only applied locally; they do not influence how other network   operators interpret RPKI data.  Nonetheless, care should be taken in   how these mechanisms are employed.  Note that it also is possible to   use SLURM to (locally) manipulate assertions about non-private INRs,   e.g., allocated address space that is globally routed.  For example,   a SLURM file may be used to override RPKI data that a network   operator believes has been corrupted by an adverse action.  Network   operators who elect to use SLURM in this fashion should use extreme   caution.   The goal of the mechanisms described in this document is to enable an   RP to create its own view of the RPKI, which is intrinsically a   security function.  An RP using a SLURM file is trusting the   assertions made in that file.  Errors in the SLURM file used by an RP   can undermine the security offered to that RP by the RPKI.  A SLURM   file could declare as invalid ROAs that would otherwise be valid, and   vice versa.  As a result, an RP MUST carefully consider the security   implications of the SLURM file being used, especially if the file is   provided by a third party.   Additionally, each RP using SLURM MUST ensure the authenticity and   integrity of any SLURM file that it uses.  Initially, the SLURM file   may be preconfigured out of band, but if the RP updates its SLURM   file over the network, it MUST verify the authenticity and integrity   of the updated SLURM file.  The mechanism to update the SLURM file to   guarantee authenticity and integrity is out of the scope of this   document.7.  References7.1.  Normative References   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate              Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119,              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.Ma, et al.                   Standards Track                   [Page 14]

RFC 8416                          SLURM                      August 2018   [RFC4632]  Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing              (CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation              Plan",BCP 122,RFC 4632, DOI 10.17487/RFC4632, August              2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4632>.   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data              Encodings",RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.   [RFC5952]  Kawamura, S. and M. Kawashima, "A Recommendation for IPv6              Address Text Representation",RFC 5952,              DOI 10.17487/RFC5952, August 2010,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5952>.   [RFC6487]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for              X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates",RFC 6487,              DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.   [RFC6811]  Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.              Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation",RFC 6811,              DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase inRFC2119 Key Words",BCP 14,RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.   [RFC8205]  Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol              Specification",RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September              2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.   [RFC8208]  Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key              Formats, and Signature Formats",RFC 8208,              DOI 10.17487/RFC8208, September 2017,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8208>.   [RFC8209]  Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for              BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,              and Certification Requests",RFC 8209,              DOI 10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8209>.   [RFC8259]  Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data              Interchange Format", STD 90,RFC 8259,              DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.Ma, et al.                   Standards Track                   [Page 15]

RFC 8416                          SLURM                      August 20187.2.  Informative References   [RFC1918]  Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,              and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",BCP 5,RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>.   [RFC1930]  Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation,              selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)",BCP 6,RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1930>.   [RFC4193]  Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast              Addresses",RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>.   [RFC6482]  Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route              Origin Authorizations (ROAs)",RFC 6482,              DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.   [RFC6491]  Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public              Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA",RFC 6491, DOI 10.17487/RFC6491, February 2012,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6491>.   [RFC6598]  Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and              M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address              Space",BCP 153,RFC 6598, DOI 10.17487/RFC6598, April              2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6598>.   [RFC6810]  Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key              Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol",RFC 6810,              DOI 10.17487/RFC6810, January 2013,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6810>.   [RFC6996]  Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for              Private Use",BCP 6,RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996, July              2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6996>.   [RFC8210]  Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key              Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8210>.Ma, et al.                   Standards Track                   [Page 16]

RFC 8416                          SLURM                      August 2018   [RFC8211]  Kent, S. and D. Ma, "Adverse Actions by a Certification              Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in the Resource              Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",RFC 8211,              DOI 10.17487/RFC8211, September 2017,              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8211>.Acknowledgments   The authors would like to thank Stephen Kent for his guidance and   detailed reviews of this document.  The authors would also like to   thank Richard Hansen for his careful reviews and Hui Zou and Chunlin   An for their editorial assistance.Authors' Addresses   Di Ma   ZDNS   4 South 4th St. Zhongguancun   Haidian, Beijing  100190   China   Email: madi@zdns.cn   David Mandelberg   Unaffiliated   Email: david@mandelberg.org   URI:https://david.mandelberg.org   Tim Bruijnzeels   NLnet Labs   Science Park 400   Amsterdam  1098 XH   The Netherlands   Email: tim@nlnetlabs.nlMa, et al.                   Standards Track                   [Page 17]