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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                          M. JonesRequest for Comments: 7523                                     MicrosoftCategory: Standards Track                                    B. CampbellISSN: 2070-1721                                            Ping Identity                                                            C. Mortimore                                                              Salesforce                                                                May 2015JSON Web Token (JWT) Profilefor OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization GrantsAbstract   This specification defines the use of a JSON Web Token (JWT) Bearer   Token as a means for requesting an OAuth 2.0 access token as well as   for client authentication.Status of This Memo   This is an Internet Standards Track document.   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has   received public review and has been approved for publication by the   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on   Internet Standards is available inSection 2 of RFC 5741.   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttp://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7523.Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of   publication of this document.  Please review these documents   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as   described in the Simplified BSD License.Jones, et al.                Standards Track                    [Page 1]

RFC 7523              OAuth JWT Assertion Profiles              May 2015Table of Contents1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21.1.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42.  HTTP Parameter Bindings for Transporting Assertions . . . . .42.1.  Using JWTs as Authorization Grants  . . . . . . . . . . .42.2.  Using JWTs for Client Authentication  . . . . . . . . . .53.  JWT Format and Processing Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . .53.1.  Authorization Grant Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . .73.2.  Client Authentication Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . .84.  Authorization Grant Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85.  Interoperability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .96.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .108.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10     8.1.  Sub-Namespace Registration of           urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer . . . . . . .10     8.2.  Sub-Namespace Registration of           urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer  .  109.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121.  Introduction   JSON Web Token (JWT) [JWT] is a JSON-based [RFC7159] security token   encoding that enables identity and security information to be shared   across security domains.  A security token is generally issued by an   Identity Provider and consumed by a Relying Party that relies on its   content to identify the token's subject for security-related   purposes.   The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749] provides a method for   making authenticated HTTP requests to a resource using an access   token.  Access tokens are issued to third-party clients by an   authorization server (AS) with the (sometimes implicit) approval of   the resource owner.  In OAuth, an authorization grant is an abstract   term used to describe intermediate credentials that represent the   resource owner authorization.  An authorization grant is used by the   client to obtain an access token.  Several authorization grant types   are defined to support a wide range of client types and user   experiences.  OAuth also allows for the definition of new extension   grant types to support additional clients or to provide a bridge   between OAuth and other trust frameworks.  Finally, OAuth allows theJones, et al.                Standards Track                    [Page 2]

RFC 7523              OAuth JWT Assertion Profiles              May 2015   definition of additional authentication mechanisms to be used by   clients when interacting with the authorization server.   "Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and   Authorization Grants" [RFC7521] is an abstract extension to OAuth 2.0   that provides a general framework for the use of assertions (a.k.a.   security tokens) as client credentials and/or authorization grants   with OAuth 2.0.  This specification profiles the OAuth Assertion   Framework [RFC7521] to define an extension grant type that uses a JWT   Bearer Token to request an OAuth 2.0 access token as well as for use   as client credentials.  The format and processing rules for the JWT   defined in this specification are intentionally similar, though not   identical, to those in the closely related specification "Security   Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client   Authentication and Authorization Grants" [RFC7522].  The differences   arise where the structure and semantics of JWTs differ from SAML   Assertions.  JWTs, for example, have no direct equivalent to the   <SubjectConfirmation> or <AuthnStatement> elements of SAML   Assertions.   This document defines how a JWT Bearer Token can be used to request   an access token when a client wishes to utilize an existing trust   relationship, expressed through the semantics of the JWT, without a   direct user-approval step at the authorization server.  It also   defines how a JWT can be used as a client authentication mechanism.   The use of a security token for client authentication is orthogonal   to and separable from using a security token as an authorization   grant.  They can be used either in combination or separately.  Client   authentication using a JWT is nothing more than an alternative way   for a client to authenticate to the token endpoint and must be used   in conjunction with some grant type to form a complete and meaningful   protocol request.  JWT authorization grants may be used with or   without client authentication or identification.  Whether or not   client authentication is needed in conjunction with a JWT   authorization grant, as well as the supported types of client   authentication, are policy decisions at the discretion of the   authorization server.   The process by which the client obtains the JWT, prior to exchanging   it with the authorization server or using it for client   authentication, is out of scope.Jones, et al.                Standards Track                    [Page 3]

RFC 7523              OAuth JWT Assertion Profiles              May 20151.1.  Notational Conventions   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this   document are to be interpreted as described inRFC 2119 [RFC2119].   Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values   are case sensitive.1.2.  Terminology   All terms are as defined in the following specifications: "The OAuth   2.0 Authorization Framework" [RFC6749], the OAuth Assertion Framework   [RFC7521], and "JSON Web Token (JWT)" [JWT].2.  HTTP Parameter Bindings for Transporting Assertions   The OAuth Assertion Framework [RFC7521] defines generic HTTP   parameters for transporting assertions (a.k.a. security tokens)   during interactions with a token endpoint.  This section defines   specific parameters and treatments of those parameters for use with   JWT Bearer Tokens.2.1.  Using JWTs as Authorization Grants   To use a Bearer JWT as an authorization grant, the client uses an   access token request as defined inSection 4 of the OAuth Assertion   Framework [RFC7521] with the following specific parameter values and   encodings.   The value of the "grant_type" is "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-   type:jwt-bearer".   The value of the "assertion" parameter MUST contain a single JWT.   The "scope" parameter may be used, as defined in the OAuth Assertion   Framework [RFC7521], to indicate the requested scope.   Authentication of the client is optional, as described inSection 3.2.1 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] and consequently, the   "client_id" is only needed when a form of client authentication that   relies on the parameter is used.Jones, et al.                Standards Track                    [Page 4]

RFC 7523              OAuth JWT Assertion Profiles              May 2015   The following example demonstrates an access token request with a JWT   as an authorization grant (with extra line breaks for display   purposes only):     POST /token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1     Host: as.example.com     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded     grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Ajwt-bearer     &assertion=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjE2In0.     eyJpc3Mi[...omitted for brevity...].     J9l-ZhwP[...omitted for brevity...]2.2.  Using JWTs for Client Authentication   To use a JWT Bearer Token for client authentication, the client uses   the following parameter values and encodings.   The value of the "client_assertion_type" is   "urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer".   The value of the "client_assertion" parameter contains a single JWT.   It MUST NOT contain more than one JWT.   The following example demonstrates client authentication using a JWT   during the presentation of an authorization code grant in an access   token request (with extra line breaks for display purposes only):     POST /token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1     Host: as.example.com     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded     grant_type=authorization_code&     code=n0esc3NRze7LTCu7iYzS6a5acc3f0ogp4&     client_assertion_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3A     client-assertion-type%3Ajwt-bearer&     client_assertion=eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjIyIn0.     eyJpc3Mi[...omitted for brevity...].     cC4hiUPo[...omitted for brevity...]3.  JWT Format and Processing Requirements   In order to issue an access token response as described in OAuth 2.0   [RFC6749] or to rely on a JWT for client authentication, the   authorization server MUST validate the JWT according to the criteria   below.  Application of additional restrictions and policy are at the   discretion of the authorization server.Jones, et al.                Standards Track                    [Page 5]

RFC 7523              OAuth JWT Assertion Profiles              May 2015   1.   The JWT MUST contain an "iss" (issuer) claim that contains a        unique identifier for the entity that issued the JWT.  In the        absence of an application profile specifying otherwise,        compliant applications MUST compare issuer values using the        Simple String Comparison method defined in Section 6.2.1 ofRFC3986 [RFC3986].   2.   The JWT MUST contain a "sub" (subject) claim identifying the        principal that is the subject of the JWT.  Two cases need to be        differentiated:        A.  For the authorization grant, the subject typically            identifies an authorized accessor for which the access token            is being requested (i.e., the resource owner or an            authorized delegate), but in some cases, may be a            pseudonymous identifier or other value denoting an anonymous            user.        B.  For client authentication, the subject MUST be the            "client_id" of the OAuth client.   3.   The JWT MUST contain an "aud" (audience) claim containing a        value that identifies the authorization server as an intended        audience.  The token endpoint URL of the authorization server        MAY be used as a value for an "aud" element to identify the        authorization server as an intended audience of the JWT.  The        authorization server MUST reject any JWT that does not contain        its own identity as the intended audience.  In the absence of an        application profile specifying otherwise, compliant applications        MUST compare the audience values using the Simple String        Comparison method defined inSection 6.2.1 of RFC 3986        [RFC3986].  As noted inSection 5, the precise strings to be        used as the audience for a given authorization server must be        configured out of band by the authorization server and the        issuer of the JWT.   4.   The JWT MUST contain an "exp" (expiration time) claim that        limits the time window during which the JWT can be used.  The        authorization server MUST reject any JWT with an expiration time        that has passed, subject to allowable clock skew between        systems.  Note that the authorization server may reject JWTs        with an "exp" claim value that is unreasonably far in the        future.   5.   The JWT MAY contain an "nbf" (not before) claim that identifies        the time before which the token MUST NOT be accepted for        processing.Jones, et al.                Standards Track                    [Page 6]

RFC 7523              OAuth JWT Assertion Profiles              May 2015   6.   The JWT MAY contain an "iat" (issued at) claim that identifies        the time at which the JWT was issued.  Note that the        authorization server may reject JWTs with an "iat" claim value        that is unreasonably far in the past.   7.   The JWT MAY contain a "jti" (JWT ID) claim that provides a        unique identifier for the token.  The authorization server MAY        ensure that JWTs are not replayed by maintaining the set of used        "jti" values for the length of time for which the JWT would be        considered valid based on the applicable "exp" instant.   8.   The JWT MAY contain other claims.   9.   The JWT MUST be digitally signed or have a Message        Authentication Code (MAC) applied by the issuer.  The        authorization server MUST reject JWTs with an invalid signature        or MAC.   10.  The authorization server MUST reject a JWT that is not valid in        all other respects per "JSON Web Token (JWT)" [JWT].3.1.  Authorization Grant Processing   JWT authorization grants may be used with or without client   authentication or identification.  Whether or not client   authentication is needed in conjunction with a JWT authorization   grant, as well as the supported types of client authentication, are   policy decisions at the discretion of the authorization server.   However, if client credentials are present in the request, the   authorization server MUST validate them.   If the JWT is not valid, or the current time is not within the   token's valid time window for use, the authorization server   constructs an error response as defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].  The   value of the "error" parameter MUST be the "invalid_grant" error   code.  The authorization server MAY include additional information   regarding the reasons the JWT was considered invalid using the   "error_description" or "error_uri" parameters.Jones, et al.                Standards Track                    [Page 7]

RFC 7523              OAuth JWT Assertion Profiles              May 2015   For example:     HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request     Content-Type: application/json     Cache-Control: no-store     {      "error":"invalid_grant",      "error_description":"Audience validation failed"     }3.2.  Client Authentication Processing   If the client JWT is not valid, the authorization server constructs   an error response as defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].  The value of   the "error" parameter MUST be the "invalid_client" error code.  The   authorization server MAY include additional information regarding the   reasons the JWT was considered invalid using the "error_description"   or "error_uri" parameters.4.  Authorization Grant Example   The following examples illustrate what a conforming JWT and an access   token request would look like.   The example shows a JWT issued and signed by the system entity   identified as "https://jwt-idp.example.com".  The subject of the JWT   is identified by email address as "mike@example.com".  The intended   audience of the JWT is "https://jwt-rp.example.net", which is an   identifier with which the authorization server identifies itself.   The JWT is sent as part of an access token request to the   authorization server's token endpoint at "https://authz.example.net/   token.oauth2".   Below is an example JSON object that could be encoded to produce the   JWT Claims Set for a JWT:     {"iss":"https://jwt-idp.example.com",      "sub":"mailto:mike@example.com",      "aud":"https://jwt-rp.example.net",      "nbf":1300815780,      "exp":1300819380,      "http://claims.example.com/member":true}   The following example JSON object, used as the header of a JWT,   declares that the JWT is signed with the Elliptic Curve Digital   Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) P-256 SHA-256 using a key identified by   the "kid" value "16".Jones, et al.                Standards Track                    [Page 8]

RFC 7523              OAuth JWT Assertion Profiles              May 2015     {"alg":"ES256","kid":"16"}   To present the JWT with the claims and header shown in the previous   example as part of an access token request, for example, the client   might make the following HTTPS request (with extra line breaks for   display purposes only):     POST /token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1     Host: authz.example.net     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded     grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Ajwt-bearer     &assertion=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjE2In0.     eyJpc3Mi[...omitted for brevity...].     J9l-ZhwP[...omitted for brevity...]5.  Interoperability Considerations   Agreement between system entities regarding identifiers, keys, and   endpoints is required in order to achieve interoperable deployments   of this profile.  Specific items that require agreement are as   follows: values for the issuer and audience identifiers, the location   of the token endpoint, the key used to apply and verify the digital   signature or MAC over the JWT, one-time use restrictions on the JWT,   maximum JWT lifetime allowed, and the specific subject and claim   requirements of the JWT.  The exchange of such information is   explicitly out of scope for this specification.  In some cases,   additional profiles may be created that constrain or prescribe these   values or specify how they are to be exchanged.  Examples of such   profiles include the OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Core   Protocol [OAUTH-DYN-REG], OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration   1.0 [OpenID.Registration], and OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0   [OpenID.Discovery].   The "RS256" algorithm, from [JWA], is a mandatory-to-implement JSON   Web Signature algorithm for this profile.6.  Security Considerations   The security considerations described within the following   specifications are all applicable to this document: "Assertion   Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization   Grants" [RFC7521], "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework" [RFC6749],   and "JSON Web Token (JWT)" [JWT].Jones, et al.                Standards Track                    [Page 9]

RFC 7523              OAuth JWT Assertion Profiles              May 2015   The specification does not mandate replay protection for the JWT   usage for either the authorization grant or for client   authentication.  It is an optional feature, which implementations may   employ at their own discretion.7.  Privacy Considerations   A JWT may contain privacy-sensitive information and, to prevent   disclosure of such information to unintended parties, should only be   transmitted over encrypted channels, such as Transport Layer Security   (TLS).  In cases where it is desirable to prevent disclosure of   certain information to the client, the JWT should be encrypted to the   authorization server.   Deployments should determine the minimum amount of information   necessary to complete the exchange and include only such claims in   the JWT.  In some cases, the "sub" (subject) claim can be a value   representing an anonymous or pseudonymous user, as described inSection 6.3.1 of the OAuth Assertion Framework [RFC7521].8.  IANA Considerations8.1.  Sub-Namespace Registration of      urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer   This section registers the value "grant-type:jwt-bearer" in the IANA   "OAuth URI" registry established by "An IETF URN Sub-Namespace for   OAuth" [RFC6755].   o  URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer   o  Common Name: JWT Bearer Token Grant Type Profile for OAuth 2.0   o  Change Controller: IESG   o  Specification Document:RFC 75238.2.  Sub-Namespace Registration of      urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer   This section registers the value "client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer"   in the IANA "OAuth URI" registry established by "An IETF URN Sub-   Namespace for OAuth" [RFC6755].   o  URN: urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer   o  Common Name: JWT Bearer Token Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client      Authentication   o  Change Controller: IESG   o  Specification Document:RFC 7523Jones, et al.                Standards Track                   [Page 10]

RFC 7523              OAuth JWT Assertion Profiles              May 20159.  References9.1.  Normative References   [JWA]      Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)",RFC 7518,              DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.   [JWT]      Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token              (JWT)",RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate              Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119,              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.   [RFC7159]  Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data              Interchange Format",RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March              2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.   [RFC7521]  Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland,              "Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication              and Authorization Grants",RFC 7521, DOI 10.17487/RFC7521,              May 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7521>.9.2.  Informative References   [OAUTH-DYN-REG]              Richer, J., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and P.              Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",              Work in Progress,draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-29, May 2015.   [OpenID.Discovery]              Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and E. Jay, "OpenID              Connect Discovery 1.0 incorporating errata set 1",              November 2014, <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html>.Jones, et al.                Standards Track                   [Page 11]

RFC 7523              OAuth JWT Assertion Profiles              May 2015   [OpenID.Registration]              Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, "OpenID Connect              Dynamic Client Registration 1.0 incorporating errata set              1", November 2014, <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-registration-1_0.html>.   [RFC6755]  Campbell, B. and H. Tschofenig, "An IETF URN Sub-Namespace              for OAuth",RFC 6755, DOI 10.17487/RFC6755, October 2012,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6755>.   [RFC7522]  Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., and M. Jones, "Security              Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 Profile for OAuth 2.0              Client Authentication and Authorization Grants",RFC 7522,              DOI 10.17487/RFC7522, May 2015,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7522>.Acknowledgements   This profile was derived from "Security Assertion Markup Language   (SAML) 2.0 Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and   Authorization Grants" [RFC7522], which has the same authors as this   document.Authors' Addresses   Michael B. Jones   Microsoft   EMail: mbj@microsoft.com   URI:http://self-issued.info/   Brian Campbell   Ping Identity   EMail: brian.d.campbell@gmail.com   Chuck Mortimore   Salesforce   EMail: cmortimore@salesforce.comJones, et al.                Standards Track                   [Page 12]

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