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Internet Research Task Force (IRTF)                          RJ AtkinsonRequest for Comments: 6744                                    ConsultantCategory: Experimental                                         SN BhattiISSN: 2070-1721                                            U. St Andrews                                                           November 2012IPv6 Nonce Destination Option for theIdentifier-Locator Network Protocol for IPv6 (ILNPv6)Abstract   The Identifier-Locator Network Protocol (ILNP) is an experimental,   evolutionary enhancement to IP.  ILNP has multiple instantiations.   This document describes an experimental Nonce Destination Option used   only with ILNP for IPv6 (ILNPv6).  This document is a product of the   IRTF Routing Research Group.Status of This Memo   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is   published for examination, experimental implementation, and   evaluation.   This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet   community.  This document is a product of the Internet Research Task   Force (IRTF).  The IRTF publishes the results of Internet-related   research and development activities.  These results might not be   suitable for deployment.  This RFC represents the individual   opinion(s) of one or more members of the Routing Research Group of   the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF).  Documents approved for   publication by the IRSG are not a candidate for any level of Internet   Standard; seeSection 2 of RFC 5741.   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttp://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6744.Atkinson & Bhatti             Experimental                      [Page 1]

RFC 6744                  ILNP Nonce for IPv6              November 2012Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of   publication of this document.  Please review these documents   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect   to this document.   This document may not be modified, and derivative works of it may not   be created, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to   translate it into languages other than English.Table of Contents1. Introduction ....................................................21.1. ILNP Document Roadmap ......................................31.2. Terminology ................................................52. Syntax ..........................................................53. Transport Protocol Effects ......................................64. Location Changes ................................................75. Implementation Considerations ...................................75.1. ILNP Communication Cache ...................................85.2. Mode Indicator .............................................85.3. IP Security ................................................86. Backwards Compatibility .........................................87. Security Considerations ........................................108. IANA Considerations ............................................129. References .....................................................129.1. Normative References ......................................129.2. Informative References ....................................1310. Acknowledgements ..............................................141.  Introduction   This document is part of the ILNP document set, which has had   extensive review within the IRTF Routing RG.  ILNP is one of the   recommendations made by the RG Chairs.  Separately, various refereed   research papers on ILNP have also been published during this decade.   So, the ideas contained herein have had much broader review than the   IRTF Routing RG.  The views in this document were considered   controversial by the Routing RG, but the RG reached a consensus that   the document still should be published.  The Routing RG has had   remarkably little consensus on anything, so virtually all Routing RG   outputs are considered controversial.Atkinson & Bhatti             Experimental                      [Page 2]

RFC 6744                  ILNP Nonce for IPv6              November 2012   At present, the Internet research and development community is   exploring various approaches to evolving the Internet Architecture to   solve a variety of issues including, but not limited to, scalability   of inter-domain routing [RFC4984].  A wide range of other issues   (e.g., site multihoming, node multihoming, site/subnet mobility, node   mobility) are also active concerns at present.  Several different   classes of evolution are being considered by the Internet research   and development community.  One class is often called "Map and   Encapsulate", where traffic would be mapped and then tunnelled   through the inter-domain core of the Internet.  Another class being   considered is sometimes known as "Identifier/Locator Split".  This   document relates to a proposal that is in the latter class of   evolutionary approaches.   This document describes a new option for the IPv6 Destination Options   header that is used with the Identifier-Locator Network Protocol for   IPv6 (ILNPv6).  ILNPv6 is an experimental protocol that is backwards   compatible with, and incrementally upgradable from, IPv6.  This   option is ONLY used in ILNPv6 sessions and is never used with classic   IPv6 sessions.   The Nonce Option for the IPv6 Destination Options Header that is   described in this document provides two functions.  First, it   provides protection against off-path attacks for packets when ILNPv6   is in use.  Second, it provides a signal during initial network-layer   session creation that ILNPv6 is proposed for use with this network-   layer session, rather than classic IPv6.  This last function is   particularly important for ensuring that ILNP is both incrementally   deployable and backwards compatible with IPv6.  Consequently, this   option MUST NOT be used except by an ILNPv6-capable node.   Further, each Nonce value is unidirectional.  Since packets often   travel asymmetric paths between two correspondents, having separate   Nonces for each direction limits the number of on-path nodes that can   easily learn an ILNP session's nonce.  So a typical TCP session will   have two different nonce values in use: one nonce is used from Local   Node to the Correspondent Node and a different nonce is used from the   Correspondent Node to the Local Node.1.1.  ILNP Document Roadmap   This document defines a new IPv6 Nonce Destination Option used by   ILNPv6 nodes (1) to indicate to ILNP correspondent nodes (by   inclusion within the initial packets of an ILNP session) that the   node is operating in the ILNP mode and (2) to prevent off-path   attacks against ILNP ICMP messages.  This Nonce is used, for example,   with all ILNP ICMPv6 Locator Update messages that are exchanged among   ILNP correspondent nodes.Atkinson & Bhatti             Experimental                      [Page 3]

RFC 6744                  ILNP Nonce for IPv6              November 2012   The ILNP architecture can have more than one engineering   instantiation.  For example, one can imagine a "clean-slate"   engineering design based on the ILNP architecture.  In separate   documents, we describe two specific engineering instances of ILNP.   The term "ILNPv6" refers precisely to an instance of ILNP that is   based upon, and backwards compatible with, IPv6.  The term "ILNPv4"   refers precisely to an instance of ILNP that is based upon, and   backwards compatible with, IPv4.   Many engineering aspects common to both ILNPv4 and ILNPv6 are   described in [RFC6741].  A full engineering specification for either   ILNPv6 or ILNPv4 is beyond the scope of this document.   Readers are referred to other related ILNP documents for details not   described here:   a) [RFC6740] is the main architectural description of ILNP, including      the concept of operations.   b) [RFC6741] describes engineering and implementation considerations      that are common to both ILNPv4 and ILNPv6.   c) [RFC6742] defines additional DNS resource records that support      ILNP.   d) [RFC6743] defines a new ICMPv6 Locator Update message used by an      ILNP node to inform its correspondent nodes of any changes to its      set of valid Locators.   e) [RFC6745] defines a new ICMPv4 Locator Update message used by an      ILNP node to inform its correspondent nodes of any changes to its      set of valid Locators.   f) [RFC6746] defines a new IPv4 Nonce Option used by ILNPv4 nodes to      carry a security nonce to prevent off-path attacks against ILNP      ICMP messages and also defines a new IPv4 Identifier Option used      by ILNPv4 nodes.   g) [RFC6747] describes extensions to Address Resolution Protocol      (ARP) for use with ILNPv4.   h) [RFC6748] describes optional engineering and deployment functions      for ILNP.  These are not required for the operation or use of ILNP      and are provided as additional options.Atkinson & Bhatti             Experimental                      [Page 4]

RFC 6744                  ILNP Nonce for IPv6              November 20121.2.  Terminology   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].2.  Syntax   The Nonce Option is carried within an IPv6 Destination Options   header.Section 4 of [RFC2460] provides much more information on the   various options and optional headers used with IPv6.   More than one option might be inside the IPv6 Destination Options   Header; however, at most, one Nonce Option exists in a given IPv6   packet.   A system that receives a packet containing more than one Nonce Option   SHOULD discard the packet as "Authentication Failed" (instead of   passing the packet up to the appropriate transport-layer protocol or   to ICMP) and SHOULD log the event, including the Source Locator,   Source Identifier, Destination Locator, Destination Identifier,   upper-layer protocol (e.g., OSPF, TCP, UDP) if any, and transport-   layer port numbers (if any), as a security fault in accordance with   local logging policies.   As of this writing, IPv6 Destination Options headers, and the options   carried by such headers, are extremely uncommon in the deployed   Internet.  So, it is expected that this Nonce Option commonly would   be the only IPv6 Destination Option present in a given IPv6 packet.   If a Common Architecture Label IPv6 Security Option (CALIPSO) label   option [RFC5570] is also present in the same IPv6 Destination Options   header, the CALIPSO Option SHOULD precede the Nonce Option.  The   Nonce Option SHOULD precede other possible options in the same IPv6   Destination Options header.   In the diagram below, we show not only the Nonce Option but also the   IPv6 Destination Options header that carries the Nonce Option.     0                   1                   2                   3     0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+    | Next Header   | Hdr Ext Len   |  Option Type  | Option Length |    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+    /                         Nonce Value                           /    +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+Atkinson & Bhatti             Experimental                      [Page 5]

RFC 6744                  ILNP Nonce for IPv6              November 2012   Next Header:       8-bit selector.  Identifies the type of header                      immediately following the Destination Options                      header.  This field uses the same values as the                      IPv4 Protocol field, as described in [RFC2460].   Hdr Ext Len:       8-bit unsigned integer.  Length of the Destination                      Options header in 8-octet units, not including the                      first 8 octets.   Option Type:       This contains the value 0x8B (139).  This is the                      first octet of the Nonce Option itself.   Option Length:     This indicates the length in 8-bit octets of the                      Nonce Value field of the Nonce Option.  This value                      must be selected so that the enveloping IPv6                      Destination Option complies with the IPv6 header                      alignment rules.  Common values are 4 (when the                      Nonce Value is 32 bits) and 12 (when the Nonce                      value is 96 bits).   Nonce Value:       An unpredictable cryptographically random value                      [RFC4086] used to prevent off-path attacks on an                      ILNP session.  This field has variable length,                      with the length indicated by the Option Length                      field preceding it.  Note that the overall IPv6                      IPv6 Destination Option MUST comply with IPv6                      header alignment rules.  Implementations MUST                      support sending and receiving 32-bit and 96-bit                      Nonce values.3.  Transport Protocol Effects   When the initial packet(s) of an IPv6 session contain this Nonce   Destination Option, ILNPv6 is in use for that network-layer session.   (NOTE: Backwards compatibility and incremental deployment are   discussed in more detail inSection 6 below.)   When a network-layer session is using ILNPv6, the transport-layer   pseudo-header calculations MUST set to zero the high-order 64-bits   ("Locator" or "Routing Prefix") of each IPv6 address.  This has the   effect that the transport-layer is no longer aware of the topological   network location of either node in that transport-layer session.   The preceding rule applies not only to unicast ILNPv6 sessions but   also to multicast or anycast ILNPv6 sessions.Atkinson & Bhatti             Experimental                      [Page 6]

RFC 6744                  ILNP Nonce for IPv6              November 20124.  Location Changes   When a node has a change in its Locator set that causes all   previously valid Locators to become invalid, the node MUST send an   ICMP Locator Update message (containing the Nonce Option with the   appropriate nonce value) to each of its correspondents [RFC6740]   [RFC6743].   In the deployed Internet, packets sometimes arrive at a destination   out of order.  A receiving node MUST drop a packet arriving from a   correspondent if the Source Locator of the received packet is not in   the receiving node's Identifier-Locator Communication Cache's   (ILCC's) Set of Correspondent Locators UNLESS that packet contains a   Nonce Option with the appropriate nonce value for that Source   Identifier and Destination Identifier pair.  This is done to reduce   the risk of ILNP session hijacking or ILNP session interference   attacks.   Hence, the node that has had all previously valid Locators become   invalid MUST include the Nonce Option with the appropriate nonce   value in all packets (data or otherwise) to all correspondents for at   least three round-trip times (RTTs) for each correspondent.  (N.B. An   implementation need not actually calculate RTT values; it could just   use a fixed timer with a time long enough to cover the longest RTT   path, such as 1 minute.)  This "gratuitous authentication" ensures   that the correspondent can authenticate any received packet, even if   the ICMP Locator Update control message arrives and is processed   AFTER some other packet using the new Source Locator(s).  If an ILNP   session is using IPsec, then, of course, IPsec SHOULD continue to be   used even if one or more participating nodes change location.   Because IP Security for ILNP [RFC6741] binds only to the Identifiers,   and not to the Locators in the packet, changes in Locator value have   no impact on IP Security for ILNP sessions.   As mobility and multihoming are functionally equivalent for ILNP,   this section applies equally to either situation and also to any   other situation in which a node's set of Locators might change over   time.5.  Implementation Considerations   Implementers may use any internal implementation they wish, PROVIDED   that the externally visible behaviour is the same as this   implementation approach.Atkinson & Bhatti             Experimental                      [Page 7]

RFC 6744                  ILNP Nonce for IPv6              November 20125.1.  ILNP Communication Cache   As described in [RFC6741], ILNP nodes maintain an Identifier-Locator   Communication Cache (ILCC) that contains several variables for each   correspondent.  The ILNP Nonce value is an important part of that   cache.5.2.  Mode Indicator   To support ILNP, and to retain needed incremental deployability and   backwards compatibility, the network layer needs a (logical) mode bit   in the Transport Control Block (or equivalent for one's   implementation) to track which IP sessions are using traditional IPv6   and which IP sessions are using ILNPv6.   If a given transport-layer session is using ILNP, then an entry   corresponding to the network-layer components of that transport-layer   session also will exist in the ILNP Communication Cache.  Multiple   transport-layer sessions between a given pair of nodes normally share   a single entry in the ILNP Communication Cache, provided their   network-layer details (e.g., Identifiers, Nonces) are identical.   Because two different ILNP nodes at two different locations might   share the same Identifier value, it is important for an ILNP   implementation to use the ILNP Nonce values to distinguish between   different ILNP nodes that happen to be using the same (or some of the   same) Identifier value(s).5.3.  IP Security   Whether or not ILNP is in use, the IPsec subsystem MUST maintain an   IPsec Security Association Database (SAD) and MUST maintain   information about which IPsec Selectors apply to traffic received by   or sent from the local node [RFC4301].  By combining the information   in the IPsec SAD, of what IPsec Selectors apply, and the information   in the ILCC, an implementation has sufficient knowledge to apply   IPsec properly to both received and transmitted packets.6.  Backwards Compatibility   This option MUST NOT be present in an IPv6 packet unless the packet   is part of an ILNPv6 session.  As is explained below in more detail,   the presence or absence of this option from the initial packets of a   new IPv6 session is an important indication of whether the session is   using classic IPv6 or ILNPv6.   ILNPv6 nodes MUST include this option in the first few packets of   each ILNPv6 session, MUST include this option in all ICMP messages   generated by endpoints participating in an ILNPv6 session, and MAYAtkinson & Bhatti             Experimental                      [Page 8]

RFC 6744                  ILNP Nonce for IPv6              November 2012   include this option in any and all packets of an ILNPv6 session.  It   is recommended that this option be included in all packets of the   ILNPv6 session if the packet loss for that session is known to be   much higher than normal.   If a node supports ILNP and the node wishes to be able to receive   incoming new ILNP sessions, then that node's FQDN SHOULD have one or   more Node Identifier (NID) records and also one or more Locator   (e.g., L64 or LP) records associated with it in the DNS [RFC6742].   When a host ("initiator") initiates a new IP session with a   correspondent ("responder"), it normally will perform a DNS lookup to   determine the address(es) of the responder.  A host that has been   enhanced to support the Identifier/Locator Split operating mode   SHOULD look for Node Identifier ("NID") and Locator ("L64") records   in any received DNS replies.  DNS servers that support Identifier and   Locator (i.e., L64 or LP) records might include them (when they   exist) as additional data in all DNS replies to DNS queries for DNS A   or AAAA records associated with a specified DNS FQDN.   If the initiator supports ILNP, and from DNS data learns that the   responder also supports ILNP, then the initiator SHOULD attempt to   use ILNP for new sessions with that responder.  In such cases, the   initiator MUST generate an unpredictable, cryptographically random,   ILNP Nonce value, MUST store that ILNP Nonce value in the local ILCC,   and MUST include the ILNP Nonce Destination Option in its initial   packet(s) to the responder.  The IETF has provided advice on   generating cryptographically random numbers, such as this nonce value   [RFC4086].   If the responder supports ILNP and receives initial packet(s)   containing the ILNP Nonce Destination Option, the responder will   thereby learn that the initiator supports ILNP and the responder also   will use ILNP for this new IP session.   If the responder supports ILNP and receives initial IP packet(s) NOT   containing the Nonce Destination Option, the responder will thereby   learn that the initiator does NOT support ILNP and the responder will   use classic IPv6 for this new IP session.   If the responder does not support ILNP and receives initial packet(s)   containing the ILNP Nonce Destination Option, the responder MUST drop   the packet and MUST send an ICMP "Parameter Problem" error message   back to the initiator [RFC4443].  Indeed, it is not expected that   this behaviour will need to be coded into non-ILNP nodes, as this is   the normal behaviour for nodes receiving unknown option headers.Atkinson & Bhatti             Experimental                      [Page 9]

RFC 6744                  ILNP Nonce for IPv6              November 2012   If the initiator EITHER does not receive a response from the   responder in a timely manner (e.g., within the applicable TCP timeout   for a TCP session), and does not receive an ICMP Unreachable error   message for that packet, OR receives an ICMP Parameter Problem error   message for that packet, then the initiator infers that the responder   is not able to support ILNP.  In this case, the initiator should try   again to create the new IP session, but this time use classic IPv6   and hence MUST NOT include the ILNP Nonce Destination Option.7.  Security Considerations   The ILNPv6 Nonce Destination Option is used ONLY for ILNPv6 sessions,   because this option is part of the backwards compatibility and   incremental-deployment approach for the Identifier-Locator Network   Protocol (ILNP).  This option MUST NOT be used with classic IPv6   sessions.   The ILNPv6 Nonce Destination Option only seeks to provide protection   against off-path attacks on an IP session.  Ordinary IPv6 is   vulnerable to on-path attacks unless IPsec is in use [CA-1995-01]   [RFC4301].  This option exists to provide non-cryptographic   protection for ILNP sessions, protection equivalent to the security   of IP sessions that do NOT use IPsec.   When ILNPv6 is in use, the ILNP Nonce Destination Option MUST be   included in any ICMP control messages (e.g., ICMP Unreachable, ICMP   Locator Update) sent by participants in that ILNPv6 session, even if   IPsec also is in use for that ILNPv6 session.  Note that certain ICMP   messages, for example, a "Packet Too Big" message, might be generated   by transit devices that are not aware of the ILNP Nonce in use for   that ILNPv6 session; hence, they are not able to include the ILNP   Nonce.  Again, this is also true of classic IPv6 in the same   operational situations, so this does not create a new security issue.   For ILNPv6 sessions, any ICMP control messages received from a   participant in that ILNPv6 session that lack a Nonce Destination   Option MUST be discarded as forgeries.  This security event SHOULD be   logged in accordance with local security logging policies, including   details of the received packet (i.e., Source Locator, Source   Identifier, Destination Locator, Destination Identifier, upper-layer   protocol (e.g., TCP, UDP, OSPF) if any, transport-layer port numbers   if any, and the date and time the packet was received).   For ILNPv6 sessions, ICMP control messages received from a   participant in that ILNPv6 session that have a Nonce Destination   Option, but do NOT have the correct nonce value inside the Nonce   Destination Option, MUST be discarded as forgeries.  This security   event SHOULD be logged as described above.Atkinson & Bhatti             Experimental                     [Page 10]

RFC 6744                  ILNP Nonce for IPv6              November 2012   Of course, longer nonce values provide greater resistance to random   guessing of the nonce value.  However, ILNPv6 sessions operating in   higher risk environments SHOULD also use the cryptographic   authentication provided by IP Security for ILNP [RFC6741] [RFC4301].   Use of IP Security for ILNP for an ILNPv6 session does not eliminate   the need for the ILNPv6 Nonce Option to be included as described here   or as described in [RFC6743].   As a performance optimisation, it is suggested that when both the   Nonce Option and IPsec are present in a packet and the Nonce Option   has not been encrypted the Nonce Option value be checked for validity   before beginning IPsec processing.  This minimises the ability of an   off-path attacker to force the recipient to perform expensive   cryptographic computations on received control packets.   For environments with data at differing Sensitivity Levels operating   over common infrastructure (e.g., when the IPv6 CALIPSO is deployed),   it is recommended that the ILNP Nonce Option be encrypted by using   ESP Transport-Mode or ESP Tunnel-Mode in order to reduce the covert   channel bandwidth potential created by the Nonce Option and to   prevent a node at one Sensitivity Level from attacking an ILNP   session at a different Sensitivity Level [RFC5570].  Further, Multi-   Level Secure (MLS) systems SHOULD use different nonce values for ILNP   sessions having different Sensitivity Levels [RFC5570].  Also, an MLS   implementation of ILNP will also store the Sensitivity Label   information associated with each ILNP session in the implementation's   ILCC.  When the Nonce Option and the CALIPSO Option are present in   the same IPv6 Destination Options header, the CALIPSO Option SHOULD   appear before the Nonce Option.   In all cases, the ILNP Nonce Value MUST be unpredictable and   cryptographically random.  [RFC4086] provides concrete advice on how   to generate a suitable nonce value.   As this is an option within the IPv6 Destination Options header,   rather than an option within the IPv6 Hop-by-Hop Option Header, the   presence of this option in an IPv6 packet ought not disturb routers   along the path an IP packet containing this option happens to travel.   Further, many deployed modern IP routers (both IPv4 and IPv6) have   been explicitly configured to ignore all IP Options, even including   the "Router Alert" option, when forwarding packets not addressed to   the router itself.  Reports indicate this has been done to preclude   use of IP Options as a (Distributed) Denial-of-Service attack vector   on backbone routers.Atkinson & Bhatti             Experimental                     [Page 11]

RFC 6744                  ILNP Nonce for IPv6              November 2012   As the Nonce is used in the checksum of all Authentication Header   (AH) protected packets, as an implementation hint, it would seem   sensible to include the Nonce value from the ILCC for that ILNP   session.8.  IANA Considerations   Consistent with the procedures of [RFC2780], IANA has assigned a new   IPv6 Destination Option Type value of 0x8B.   The Nonce Option MUST NOT change in transit and MUST be included in   IP Authentication Header calculations.   Further, if an end system receives an IPv6 packet containing this   option, but does not recognise this option, the end system MUST   discard the packet and, regardless of whether or not the received   packet's Destination Address was a multicast address, send an ICMPv6   Parameter Problem, Code 2 ("Unrecognised IPv6 Option Encountered"),   message to the received packet's Source IPv6 Address, pointing to the   unrecognised Option Type.9.  References9.1.  Normative References   [RFC2119]     Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate                 Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119, March 1997.   [RFC2460]     Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version                 6 (IPv6) Specification",RFC 2460, December 1998.   [RFC2780]     Bradner, S. and V. Paxson, "IANA Allocation Guidelines                 For Values In the Internet Protocol and Related                 Headers",BCP 37,RFC 2780, March 2000.   [RFC4301]     Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the                 Internet Protocol",RFC 4301, December 2005.   [RFC4443]     Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet                 Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet                 Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification",RFC 4443,                 March 2006.   [RFC6740]     Atkinson, R. and S. Bhatti, "Identifier-Locator Network                 Protocol (ILNP) Architectural Description",RFC 6740,                 November 2012.Atkinson & Bhatti             Experimental                     [Page 12]

RFC 6744                  ILNP Nonce for IPv6              November 2012   [RFC6741]     Atkinson, R. and S. Bhatti, "Identifier-Locator Network                 Protocol (ILNP) Engineering and Implementation                 Considerations",RFC 6741, November 2012.   [RFC6743]     Atkinson, R. and S. Bhatti, "ICMPv6 Locator Update                 Message",RFC 6743, November 2012.9.2.  Informative References   [CA-1995-01]  US CERT, "CERT Advisory CA-1995-01 IP Spoofing Attacks                 and Hijacked Terminal Connections", Pittsburgh, PA,                 USA, 1995.   [RFC4086]     Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,                 "Randomness Requirements for Security",BCP 106,RFC4086, June 2005.   [RFC4984]     Meyer, D., Ed., Zhang, L., Ed., and K. Fall, Ed.,                 "Report from the IAB Workshop on Routing and                 Addressing",RFC 4984, September 2007.   [RFC5570]     StJohns, M., Atkinson, R., and G. Thomas, "Common                 Architecture Label IPv6 Security Option (CALIPSO)",RFC5570, July 2009.   [RFC6742]     Atkinson, R., Bhatti, S. and S. Rose, "DNS Resource                 Records for the Identifier-Locator Network Protocol                 (ILNP)",RFC 6742, November 2012.   [RFC6745]     Atkinson, R. and S. Bhatti,  "ICMP Locator Update                 Message for the Identifier-Locator Network Protocol for                 IPv4 (ILNPv4)",RFC 6745, November 2012.   [RFC6746]     Atkinson, R. and S.Bhatti, "IPv4 Options for the                 Identifier-Locator Network Protocol (ILNP)",RFC 6746,                 November 2012.   [RFC6747]     Atkinson, R. and S. Bhatti, "Address Resolution                 Protocol (ARP) Extension for the Identifier-Locator                 Network Protocol for IPv4 (ILNPv4)",RFC 6747, November                 2012.   [RFC6748]     Atkinson, R. and S. Bhatti, "Optional Advanced                 Deployment Scenarios for the Identifier-Locator Network                 Protocol (ILNP)",RFC 6748, November 2012.Atkinson & Bhatti             Experimental                     [Page 13]

RFC 6744                  ILNP Nonce for IPv6              November 201210.  Acknowledgements   Steve Blake, Stephane Bortzmeyer, Mohamed Boucadair, Noel Chiappa,   Wes George, Steve Hailes, Joel Halpern, Mark Handley, Volker Hilt,   Paul Jakma, Dae-Young Kim, Tony Li, Yakov Rehkter, Bruce Simpson,   Robin Whittle, and John Wroclawski (in alphabetical order) provided   review and feedback on earlier versions of this document.  Steve   Blake provided an especially thorough review of an early version of   the entire ILNP document set, which was extremely helpful.  We also   wish to thank the anonymous reviewers of the various ILNP papers for   their feedback.   Roy Arends provided expert guidance on technical and procedural   aspects of DNS issues.Authors' Addresses   RJ Atkinson   Consultant   San Jose, CA 95125   USA   EMail: rja.lists@gmail.com   SN Bhatti   School of Computer Science   University of St Andrews   North Haugh, St Andrews   Fife  KY16 9SX   Scotland, UK   EMail: saleem@cs.st-andrews.ac.ukAtkinson & Bhatti             Experimental                     [Page 14]