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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                       R. GaglianoRequest for Comments: 6495                                 Cisco SystemsUpdates:3971                                                S. KrishnanCategory: Standards Track                                       EricssonISSN: 2070-1721                                                 A. Kukec                                                   Enterprise Architects                                                           February 2012Subject Key Identifier (SKI) SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)Name Type FieldsAbstract   SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) defines the Name Type field in the   ICMPv6 Trust Anchor option.  This document specifies new Name Type   fields based on certificate Subject Key Identifiers (SKIs).Status of This Memo   This is an Internet Standards Track document.   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has   received public review and has been approved for publication by the   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on   Internet Standards is available inSection 2 of RFC 5741.   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttp://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6495.Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of   publication of this document.  Please review these documents   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as   described in the Simplified BSD License.Gagliano, et al.             Standards Track                    [Page 1]

RFC 6495                 SEND Name Type Registry           February 2012Table of Contents1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22.  Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2   3.  Name Type Fields in the ICMPv6 TA Option Defined in This       Document  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34.  Processing Rules for Routers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51.  Introduction   SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) [RFC3971] utilizes X.509v3   certificates that include the [RFC3779] extension for IPv6 addresses   to certify a router's authority over an IPv6 prefix for the NDP   (Neighbor Discovery Protocol).  The Trust Anchor (TA) option inSection 6.4.3 of [RFC3971] allows the identification of the Trust   Anchor selected by the host.  In that same section, two name types   were defined: the DER Encoded X.501 Name and a Fully Qualified Domain   Name (FQDN).   In any Public Key Infrastructure, the subject name of a certificate   is only unique within each Certification Authority (CA).   Consequently, a new option to identify TAs across CAs is needed.   In [RFC6494], the certificate profile described in [RFC6487] is   adopted for SEND.  In these documents, the Subject field in the   certificates is declared to be meaningless and the subjectAltName   field is not allowed.  On the other hand, the Subject Key Identifier   (SKI) extension for the X.509 certificates is defined as mandatory   and non-critical.   This document specifies new Name Type fields in the SEND TA option   that allows the use of the SKI X.509 extension to identify TA X.509   certificates.  This document also defines experimental and reserved   Name Types values.   Finally, this document updates [RFC3971] by changing the "Trust   Anchor option (Type 15) Name Type field" registration procedures from   Standards Action to Standards Action or IESG Approval [RFC5226].2.  Requirements Notation   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].Gagliano, et al.             Standards Track                    [Page 2]

RFC 6495                 SEND Name Type Registry           February 20123.  Name Type Fields in the ICMPv6 TA Option Defined in This Document   The following Name Type fields in the ICMPv6 TA option are defined:           Name Type      Description            0              Reserved            3              SHA-1 Subject Key Identifier (SKI)            4              SHA-224 Subject Key Identifier (SKI)            5              SHA-256 Subject Key Identifier (SKI)            6              SHA-384 Subject Key Identifier (SKI)            7              SHA-512 Subject Key Identifier (SKI)            253-254        Experimental            255            Reserved   Name Type field values 0 and 255 are marked as reserved.  This means   that they are not available for allocation.   When the Name Type field is set to 3, the Name Type field contains a   160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value of the DER-encoded ASN.1 bit string   of the subject public key, as described inSection 4.8.2 of   [RFC6487].  Implementations MAY support SHA-1 SKI name type.   When the Name Type field is set to 4, 5, 6, or 7, the hash function   will respectively be: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512.   Implementations MAY support SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512   SKI name types.   Name Type fields 253 and 254 are marked as experimental, per guidance   in [RFC3692].4.  Processing Rules for Routers   As specified in [RFC3971], a TA is identified by the SEND TA option.   If the TA option is represented as a SKI, then the SKI MUST be equal   to the X.509 SKI extension in the trust anchor's certificate.  The   router SHOULD include the TA option(s) in the advertisement for which   the certification path was found.  Also, following the specification   defined in [RFC3971], if the router is unable to find a path to the   requested anchor, it SHOULD send an advertisement without any   certificate.  In this case, the router SHOULD include the TA options   that were solicited.Gagliano, et al.             Standards Track                    [Page 3]

RFC 6495                 SEND Name Type Registry           February 20125.  IANA Considerations   IANA has updated the "Trust Anchor option (Type 15) Name Type field"   registry to include the following values:      +---------+--------------------------------------------------+      | Value   | Description                                      |      +---------+--------------------------------------------------+      | 0       | Reserved (Section 3)                             |      | 3       | SHA-1 Subject Key Identifier (SKI) (Section 3)   |      | 4       | SHA-224 Subject Key Identifier (SKI) (Section 3) |      | 5       | SHA-256 Subject Key Identifier (SKI) (Section 3) |      | 6       | SHA-384 Subject Key Identifier (SKI) (Section 3) |      | 7       | SHA-512 Subject Key Identifier (SKI) (Section 3) |      | 253-254 | Experimental Use (Section 3)                     |      | 255     | Reserved (Section 3)                             |      +---------+--------------------------------------------------+        Table 1: New Name Type Field Values in the ICMPv6 TA Option   IANA has also modified the registration procedures for the "Trust   Anchor option (Type 15) Name Type field" registry to Standards Action   or IESG Approval [RFC5226].6.  Security Considerations   The hash functions referenced in this document to calculate the SKI   have reasonable random properties in order to provide reasonably   unique identifiers.  Two identical identifiers in the same validation   path will cause the router to stop fetching certificates once the   first certificate has been fetched.  In the case that the upward   certificate was configured as a TA by a host, the router will send to   this host an incomplete list of certificates, causing the SEND   validation to fail.   For experimental values of the Name Type field, the guidance given in   [RFC3692] about the use of experimental values needs to be followed.7.  Normative References   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate              Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119, March 1997.   [RFC3692]  Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers              Considered Useful",BCP 82,RFC 3692, January 2004.   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP              Addresses and AS Identifiers",RFC 3779, June 2004.Gagliano, et al.             Standards Track                    [Page 4]

RFC 6495                 SEND Name Type Registry           February 2012   [RFC3971]  Arkko, J., Ed., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander,              "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)",RFC 3971, March 2005.   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs",BCP 26,RFC 5226,              May 2008.   [RFC6487]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for              X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates",RFC 6487,              February 2012.   [RFC6494]  Gagliano, R., Krishnan, S., and A. Kukec, "Certificate              Profile and Certificate Management for SEcure Neighbor              Discovery (SEND)",RFC 6494, February 2012.Authors' Addresses   Roque Gagliano   Cisco Systems   Avenue des Uttins 5   Rolle,   1180   Switzerland   EMail: rogaglia@cisco.com   Suresh Krishnan   Ericsson   8400 Decarie Blvd.   Town of Mount Royal, QC   Canada   Phone: +1 514 345 7900 x42871   EMail: suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com   Ana Kukec   Enterprise Architects   46/525 Collins St   Melbourne, VIC  3000   Australia   EMail: ana.kukec@enterprisearchitects.comGagliano, et al.             Standards Track                    [Page 5]

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