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Network Working Group                                       G. CamarilloRequest for Comments: 5363                                      EricssonCategory: Standards Track                                     A.B. Roach                                                                 Tekelec                                                            October 2008Framework and Security Considerations forSession Initiation Protocol (SIP) URI-List ServicesStatus of This Memo   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.Abstract   This document describes the need for SIP URI-list services and   provides requirements for their invocation.  Additionally, it defines   a framework for SIP URI-list services, which includes security   considerations applicable to these services.Table of Contents1. Introduction ....................................................22. Terminology .....................................................23. Requirements ....................................................2      3.1. Requirements for URI-List Services Using           Request-Contained Lists ....................................33.2. General Requirements for URI-List Services .................34. Framework .......................................................34.1. Carrying URI Lists in SIP ..................................34.2. Processing of URI Lists ....................................44.3. Results ....................................................55. Security Considerations .........................................55.1. List Integrity and Confidentiality .........................55.2. Amplification Attacks ......................................55.3. General Issues .............................................76. IANA Considerations .............................................77. Acknowledgements ................................................88. References ......................................................88.1. Normative References .......................................88.2. Informative References .....................................8Camarillo & Roach           Standards Track                     [Page 1]

RFC 5363          Framework for SIP URI-List Services       October 20081.  Introduction   Some applications require that, at a given moment, a SIP [RFC3261] UA   (User Agent) performs a similar transaction with a number of remote   UAs.  For example, an instant messaging application that needs to   send a particular message (e.g., "Hello folks") to n receivers needs   to send n MESSAGE requests; one to each receiver.   When the transaction that needs to be repeated consists of a large   request, or when the number of recipients is high, or both, the   access network of the UA needs to carry a considerable amount of   traffic.  Completing all the transactions on a low-bandwidth access   would require a long time.  This is unacceptable for a number of   applications.   A solution to this problem consists of introducing URI-list services   in the network.  The task of a SIP URI-list service is to receive a   request that contains or references a URI list (i.e., a list of one   or more URIs) and send a number of similar requests to the   destinations in this list.  Once the requests are sent, the URI-list   service typically informs the UA about their status.  Effectively,   the URI-list service behaves as a B2BUA (Back-to-Back-User-Agent).   A given URI-list service can take as an input a URI list contained in   the SIP request sent by the client or an external URI list (e.g., the   Request-URI is a SIP URI that is associated with a URI list at the   server).  External URI lists are typically set up using out-of-band   mechanisms (e.g., XML Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)   [RFC4825]).  An example of a URI-list service for SUBSCRIBE requests   that uses stored URI lists is described in [RFC4662].   The remainder of this document provides requirements and a framework   for URI-list services using request-contained URI lists, external URI   lists, or both.2.  Terminology   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].3.  RequirementsSection 3.1 discusses requirements that only apply to URI-list   services that use request-contained lists, andSection 3.2 discusses   requirements that also apply to services using external lists.Camarillo & Roach           Standards Track                     [Page 2]

RFC 5363          Framework for SIP URI-List Services       October 20083.1.  Requirements for URI-List Services Using Request-Contained Lists   REQ 1:  The URI-list service invocation mechanism MUST allow the           invoker to provide a list of destination URIs to the URI-list           service.   REQ 2:  The invocation mechanism SHOULD NOT require more than one           transaction.3.2.  General Requirements for URI-List Services   GEN 1:  A URI-list service MAY include services beyond sending           requests to the URIs in the URI list.  That is, URI-list           services can be modeled as application servers.  For example,           a URI-list service handling INVITE requests may behave as a           conference server and perform media mixing for all the           participants.   GEN 2:  The interpretation of the meaning of the URI list sent by the           invoker MUST be at the discretion of the application to which           the list is sent.   GEN 3:  It MUST be possible for the invoker to find out about the           result of the operations performed by the URI-list service           with the URI list.  An invoker may, for instance, be           interested in the status of the transactions initiated by the           URI-list service.   GEN 4:  URI-list services MUST NOT send requests to any destination           without authenticating the invoker.4.  Framework   This framework is not restricted to application servers that only   provide request fan-out services.  Per GEN 1, this framework also   deals with application servers that provide a particular service that   includes a request fan-out (e.g., a conference server that INVITEs   several participants that are chosen by a user agent).4.1.  Carrying URI Lists in SIP   The requirements related to URI-list services that use request-   contained lists identify the need for a mechanism to provide a SIP   URI-list service with a URI list in a single transaction.  We define   a new disposition type [RFC2183] for the Content-Disposition header   field: recipient-list.  Both requests and responses MAY carryCamarillo & Roach           Standards Track                     [Page 3]

RFC 5363          Framework for SIP URI-List Services       October 2008   recipient-list bodies.  Bodies whose disposition type is recipient-   list carry a list of URIs that contains the final recipients of the   requests to be generated by a URI-list service.   The default format for recipient-list bodies is service specific.   So, URI-list services specifications MUST specify a default format   for recipient-list bodies used within a particular service.  In any   case, clients SHOULD NOT include any particular URI more than once in   a given URI list.   A UA server receiving a request with more than one recipient-list   body parts (e.g., each body part using a different URI-list format)   MUST behave as if it had received a single URI list that contains all   the URIs present in the different body parts.   A UA server receiving a recipient-list URI list that contains a URI   more than once MUST behave as if that URI appeared in the URI list   only once.  The UA server uses the comparison rules specific to the   URI scheme of each of the URIs in the URI list to determine if there   is any URI that appears more than once.  Additionally,Section 4 of   "Extensible Markup Language (XML) Format Extension for Representing   Copy Control Attributes in Resource Lists" [RFC5364] discusses cases   where duplicated URI entries are tagged with different values of the   'copyControl' attribute.  Naturally, URI-list services using the   'copyControl' attribute defined in [RFC5364] need to follow the   recommendations in [RFC5364] with respect to avoiding sending   duplicated requests.   The way a UA server interprets a URI list that it has received is   service specific, as described inSection 4.2.4.2.  Processing of URI Lists   According to GEN 1 and GEN 2, URI-list services can behave as   application servers.  That is, taking a URI list as an input, they   can provide arbitrary services.  So, the interpretation of the URI   list by the server depends on the service to be provided.  For   example, for a conference server, the URIs in the list may identify   the initial set of participants.  On the other hand, for a server   dealing with MESSAGEs, the URIs in the list may identify the   recipients of an instant message.   At the SIP level, this implies that the behavior of application   servers receiving requests with URI lists SHOULD be specified on a   per-service basis.  Examples of such specifications are [RFC5366] for   INVITE, [RFC5365] for MESSAGE, and [RFC5367] for SUBSCRIBE.Camarillo & Roach           Standards Track                     [Page 4]

RFC 5363          Framework for SIP URI-List Services       October 20084.3.  Results   According to GEN 3, user agents should have a way to obtain   information about the operations performed by the application server.   Since these operations are service specific, the way user agents are   kept informed is also service specific.  For example, a user agent   establishing an ad hoc conference with an INVITE with a URI list may   discover which participants were successfully brought into the   conference by using the conference package [RFC4575].5.  Security Considerations   Security plays an important role in the implementation of any URI-   list service.  In fact, it is the most important common area across   all types of URI-list services.   By definition, a URI-list service takes one request in and sends a   potentially large number of them out.  Attackers may attempt to use   URI-list services as traffic amplifiers to launch DoS (denial-of-   service) attacks.  This section provides guidelines to avoid these   attacks.5.1.  List Integrity and Confidentiality   Attackers may attempt to modify URI lists sent from clients to   servers.  This would cause a different behavior at the server than   expected by the client (e.g., requests being sent to different   recipients than the ones specified by the client).  To prevent this   attack, clients SHOULD integrity protect URI lists using end-to-end   mechanisms such as S/MIME or, if not available, hop-by-hop mechanisms   such as TLS.  Both S/MIME and TLS can also provide URI-list   confidentiality if needed.5.2.  Amplification Attacks   URI-list services take a request in and send a potentially large   number of them out.  Given that URI-list services are typically   implemented on top of powerful servers with high-bandwidth access   links, we should be careful to keep attackers from using them as   amplification tools to launch DoS attacks.   Attackers may attempt to send a URI list containing URIs whose host   parts route to the victims of the DoS attack.  These victims do not   need to be SIP nodes; they can be non-SIP endpoints or even routers.   If this attack is successful, the result is that an attacker can   flood a set of nodes, or a single node, with traffic without needing   to generate a high volume of traffic itself.Camarillo & Roach           Standards Track                     [Page 5]

RFC 5363          Framework for SIP URI-List Services       October 2008      In any case, note that this problem is not specific to SIP URI-      list services; it also appears in scenarios that relate to      multihoming where a server needs to contact a set of IP addresses      provided by a client.   There are several measures that need to be taken to prevent this type   of attack.  The first one is keeping unauthorized users from using   URI-list services.  So, URI-list services MUST NOT perform any   request explosion for an unauthorized user.  URI-list services MUST   authenticate users and check whether they are authorized to request   the service before performing any request fan-out.   Note that the risk of this attack also exists when a client uses   stored URI lists.  Application servers MUST use authentication and   authorization mechanisms with equivalent security properties when   dealing with stored and request-contained URI lists.   Even though the previous rule keeps unauthorized users from using   URI-list services, authorized users may still launch attacks using   these services.  To prevent these attacks, we introduce the concept   of opt-in lists.  That is, URI-list services should not allow a   client to place a user (identified by his or her URI) in a URI list   unless the user has previously agreed to be placed in such a URI   list.  So, URI-list services MUST NOT send a request to a destination   that has not agreed to receive requests from the URI-list service   beforehand.  Users can agree to receive requests from a URI-list   service in several ways, such as filling a web page, sending an   email, signing a contract, or using "A Framework for Consent-Based   Communications in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)" [RFC5360],   whose requirements are discussed in [RFC4453].  Additionally, users   MUST be able to further describe the requests they are willing to   receive.  For example, a user may only want to receive requests from   a particular URI-list service on behalf of a particular user.   Effectively, these rules make URI lists that used by URI-list   services into opt-in lists.   When a URI-list service receives a request with a URI list from a   client, the URI-list service checks whether all the destinations have   agreed beforehand to receive requests from the service on behalf of   this client.  If the URI list has permission to send requests to all   of the targets in the request, it does so.  If not, it does not send   any request at all.   The Framework for Consent-Based Communications in SIP [RFC5360]   specifies a means for the URI-list service to inform the client that   some permissions were missing and how to request them.Camarillo & Roach           Standards Track                     [Page 6]

RFC 5363          Framework for SIP URI-List Services       October 2008      Note that the mechanism used to obtain permissions should not      create opportunities to launch DoS amplification attacks.  These      attacks would be possible if, for instance, the URI-list service      automatically contacted the full set of targets for which it did      not have permissions in order to request permissions.  The URI-      list service would be receiving one SIP request and sending out a      number of authorization request messages.  The Framework for      Consent-Based Communications in SIP [RFC5360] avoids this type of      attack by having the client generate roughly the same amount of      traffic towards the URI-list service as the service generates      towards the destinations.   In order to have an interoperable way to meet the requirements   related to opt-in lists described in this section, URI-list services   MUST implement and SHOULD use "A Framework for Consent-Based   Communications in SIP" [RFC5360].5.3.  General Issues   URI-list services MAY have policies that limit the number of URIs in   the lists they accept, as a very long list could be used in a   denial-of-service attack to place a large burden on the URI-list   service to send a large number of SIP requests.   A URI-list service generates a set of requests from a URI list.Section 19.1.5 of [RFC3261] provides recommendations that need to be   taken into consideration when forming a request from a URI.   Naturally, those recommendations apply to all SIP URI-list services.   The general requirement GEN 4, which states that URI-list services   need to authenticate their clients, and the previous rules apply to   URI-list services in general.  In addition, specifications dealing   with individual methods MUST describe the security issues that relate   to each particular method.6.  IANA Considerations   This document defines a new Content-Disposition header field   disposition type (recipient-list) inSection 4.1.  This value has   been registered in the IANA registry for Mail Content Disposition   Values and Parameters with the following description:   recipient-list    The body includes a list of URIs to which URI-list                     services are to be applied.Camarillo & Roach           Standards Track                     [Page 7]

RFC 5363          Framework for SIP URI-List Services       October 20087.  Acknowledgements   Duncan Mills and Miguel A. Garcia-Martin supported the idea of 1 to n   MESSAGE requests.  Jon Peterson, Dean Willis, and Jonathan Rosenberg   provided useful comments.8.  References8.1.  Normative References   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate              Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119, March 1997.   [RFC2183]  Troost, R., Dorner, S., and K. Moore, "Communicating              Presentation Information in Internet Messages: The              Content-Disposition Header Field",RFC 2183, August 1997.   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol",RFC 3261,              June 2002.   [RFC5360]  Rosenberg, J., Camarillo, G., Ed., and D. Willis, "A              Framework for Consent-Based Communications in the Session              Initiation Protocol (SIP)",RFC 5360, October 2008.8.2.  Informative References   [RFC4453]  Rosenberg, J., Camarillo, G., and D. Willis, "Requirements              for Consent-Based Communications in the Session Initiation              Protocol (SIP)",RFC 4453, April 2006.   [RFC4575]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., and O. Levin, "A Session              Initiation Protocol (SIP) Event Package for Conference              State",RFC 4575, August 2006.   [RFC4662]  Roach, A.B., Campbell, B., and J. Rosenberg, "A Session              Initiation Protocol (SIP) Event Notification Extension for              Resource Lists",RFC 4662, August 2006.   [RFC4825]  Rosenberg, J., "The Extensible Markup Language (XML)              Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)",RFC 4825, May 2007.   [RFC5364]  Garcia-Martin, M. and G. Camarillo, "Extensible Markup              Language (XML) Format Extension for Representing Copy              Control Attributes in Resource Lists",RFC 5364, October              2008.Camarillo & Roach           Standards Track                     [Page 8]

RFC 5363          Framework for SIP URI-List Services       October 2008   [RFC5365]  Garcia-Martin, M. and G. Camarillo, "Multiple-Recipient              MESSAGE Requests in the Session Initiation Protocol              (SIP)",RFC 5365, October 2008.   [RFC5366]  Camarillo, G. and A. Johnston, "Conference Establishment              Using Request-Contained Lists in the Session Initiation              Protocol (SIP)",RFC 5366, October 2008.   [RFC5367]  Camarillo, G., Roach, A.B., and O. Levin, "Subscriptions              to Request-Contained Resource Lists in the Session              Initiation  Protocol (SIP)",RFC 5367, October 2008.Authors' Addresses   Gonzalo Camarillo   Ericsson   Hirsalantie 11   Jorvas  02420   Finland   EMail: Gonzalo.Camarillo@ericsson.com   Adam Roach   Tekelec   17210 Campbell Rd Ste 250   Dallas, TX  75252   USA   EMail: Adam.Roach@tekelec.comCamarillo & Roach           Standards Track                     [Page 9]

RFC 5363          Framework for SIP URI-List Services       October 2008Full Copyright Statement   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions   contained inBCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors   retain all their rights.   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND   THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS   OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF   THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.Intellectual Property   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be   found inBCP 78 andBCP 79.   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository athttp://www.ietf.org/ipr.   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at   ietf-ipr@ietf.org.Camarillo & Roach           Standards Track                    [Page 10]

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