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Network Working Group                                       S. SantessonRequest for Comments: 4325                                     MicrosoftUpdates:3280                                                 R. HousleyCategory: Standards Track                                 Vigil Security                                                           December 2005Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Authority InformationAccess Certificate Revocation List (CRL) ExtensionStatus of This Memo   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.Copyright Notice   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).Abstract   This document updatesRFC 3280 by defining the Authority Information   Access Certificate Revocation List (CRL) extension.RFC 3280 defines   the Authority Information Access certificate extension using the same   syntax.  The CRL extension provides a means of discovering and   retrieving CRL issuer certificates.Table of Contents1. Introduction ....................................................21.1. Terminology ................................................32. Authority Information Access CRL Extension ......................33. Security Considerations .........................................54. References ......................................................54.1. Normative References .......................................54.2. Informative References .....................................6Santesson & Housley         Standards Track                     [Page 1]

RFC 4325       Authority Information Access CRL Extension  December 20051.  IntroductionRFC 3280 [PKIX1] specifies the validation of certification paths.   One aspect involves the determination that a certificate has not been   revoked, and one revocation checking mechanism is the Certificate   Revocation List (CRL).  CRL validation is also specified inRFC 3280,   which involves the constructions of a valid certification path for   the CRL issuer.  Building a CRL issuer certification path from the   signer of the CRL to a trust anchor is straightforward when the   certificate of the CRL issuer is present in the certification path   associated with the target certificate, but it can be complex in   other situations.   There are several legitimate scenarios where the certificate of the   CRL issuer is not present, or easily discovered, from the target   certification path.  This can be the case when indirect CRLs are   used, when the Certification Authority (CA) that issued the target   certificate changes its certificate signing key, or when the CA   employs separate keys for certificate signing and CRL signing.   Methods of finding the certificate of the CRL issuer are currently   available, such as through an accessible directory location or   through use of the Subject Information Access extension in   intermediary CA certificates.   Directory lookup requires existence and access to a directory that   has been populated with all of the necessary certificates.  The   Subject Information Access extension, which supports building the CRL   issuer certification path top-down (in the direction from the trust   anchor to the CRL issuer), requires that some certificates in the CRL   issuer certification path includes an appropriate Subject Information   Access extension.RFC 3280 [PKIX1] provides for bottom-up discovery of certification   paths through the Authority Information Access extension, where the   id-ad-caIssuers access method may specify one or more accessLocation   fields that reference CA certificates associated with the certificate   containing this extension.   This document enables the use of the Authority Information Access   extension in CRLs, enabling a CRL checking application to use the   access method (id-ad-caIssuers) to locate certificates that may be   useful in the construction of a valid CRL issuer certification path   to an appropriate trust anchor.Santesson & Housley         Standards Track                     [Page 2]

RFC 4325       Authority Information Access CRL Extension  December 20051.1.  Terminology   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this   document are to be interpreted as described inRFC 2119 [RFC2119].2.  Authority Information Access CRL Extension   This section defines the use of the Authority Information Access   extension in a CRL.  The syntax and semantics defined inRFC 3280   [PKIX1] for the certificate extensions are also used for the CRL   extension.   This CRL extension MUST NOT be marked critical.   This extension MUST be identified by the extension object identifier   (OID) defined inRFC 3280 (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1), and the   AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax MUST be used to form the extension value.   For convenience, the ASN.1 [X.680] definition of the Authority   Information Access extension is repeated below.      id-pe-authorityInfoAccess OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { id-pe 1 }      AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax  ::=  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF                               AccessDescription      AccessDescription  ::=  SEQUENCE {         accessMethod          OBJECT IDENTIFIER,         accessLocation        GeneralName  }      id-ad OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { id-pkix 48 }      id-ad-caIssuers OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { id-ad 2 }   When present in a CRL, this extension MUST include at least one   AccessDescription specifying id-ad-caIssuers as the accessMethod.   Access method types other than id-ad-caIssuers MUST NOT be included.   At least one instance of AccessDescription SHOULD specify an   accessLocation that is an HTTP [HTTP/1.1] or Lightweight Directory   Access Protocol [LDAP] Uniform Resource Identifier [URI].   Where the information is available via HTTP or FTP, accessLocation   MUST be a uniformResourceIdentifier and the URI MUST point to a   certificate containing file.  The certificate file MUST contain   either a single Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X.690] encoded   certificate (indicated by the .cer file extension) or a collection of   certificates (indicated by the .p7c file extension):Santesson & Housley         Standards Track                     [Page 3]

RFC 4325       Authority Information Access CRL Extension  December 2005      .cer   A single DER encoded certificate as specified inRFC 2585 [PKIX-CERT].      .p7c   A "certs-only" CMS message as specified inRFC 2797 [CMC].     Conforming applications that support HTTP or FTP for accessing     certificates MUST be able to accept .cer files and SHOULD be able     to accept .p7c files.     HTTP server implementations accessed via the URI SHOULD use the     appropriate MIME content-type for the certificate containing file.     Specifically, the HTTP server SHOULD use the content-type     application/pkix-cert [PKIX-CERT] for a single DER encoded     certificate and application/pkcs7-mime [CMC] for CMS certs-only     (PKCS#7).  Consuming clients may use the MIME type and file     extension as a hint to the file content, but should not depend     solely on the presence of the correct MIME type or file extension     in the server response.     When the accessLocation is a directoryName, the information is to     be obtained by the application from whatever directory server is     locally configured.  When one CA public key is used to validate     signatures on certificates and CRLs, the desired CA certificate is     stored in the crossCertificatePair and/or cACertificate attributes     as specified in [RFC2587].  When different public keys are used to     validate signatures on certificates and CRLs, the desired     certificate is stored in the userCertificate attribute as specified     in [RFC2587].  Thus, implementations that support the directoryName     form of accessLocation MUST be prepared to find the needed     certificate in any of these three attributes.  The protocol that an     application uses to access the directory (e.g., DAP or LDAP) is a     local matter.     Where the information is available via LDAP, the accessLocation     SHOULD be a uniformResourceIdentifier.  The URI MUST specify a     distingishedName and attribute(s) and MAY specify a host name     (e.g., ldap://ldap.example.com/cn=example%20CA,dc=example,dc=com?     cACertificate;binary,crossCertificatePair;binary).  Omitting the     host name (e.g.,     ldap:///cn=example%20CA,dc=example,dc=com?cACertificate;binary) has     the effect of specifying the use of whatever LDAP server is locally     configured.  The URI MUST list appropriate attribute descriptions     for one or more attributes holding certificates or cross-     certificate pairs.Santesson & Housley         Standards Track                     [Page 4]

RFC 4325       Authority Information Access CRL Extension  December 20053.  Security Considerations     Implementers should take into account the possible existence of     multiple unrelated CAs and CRL issuers with the same name.     Implementers should be aware of risks involved if the Authority     Information Access extensions of corrupted CRLs contain links to     malicious code.  Implementers should always take the steps of     validating the retrieved data to ensure that the data is properly     formed.4.  References4.1.  Normative References   [RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate               Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119, March 1997.   [RFC2587]   Boeyen, S., Howes, T., and P. Richard, "Internet X.509               Public Key Infrastructure: LDAPv2 Schema",RFC 2587, June               1999.   [PKIX1]     Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet               X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and               Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile",RFC 3280,               April 2002.   [HTTP/1.1]  Fielding,  R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,               Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext               Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1",RFC 2616, June 1999.   [URI]       Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform               Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,RFC3986, January 2005.   [LDAP]      Wahl, M., Howes, T., and S. Kille, "Lightweight Directory               Access Protocol (v3)",RFC 2251, December 1997.   [PKIX-CERT] Housley, R. and P. Hoffman, "Internet X.509 Public Key               Infrastructure Operational Protocols: FTP and HTTP",RFC2585, May 1999.   [CMC]       Myers, M., Liu, X., Schaad, J., and J. Weinstein,               "Certificate Management Messages over CMS",RFC 2797,               April 2000.Santesson & Housley         Standards Track                     [Page 5]

RFC 4325       Authority Information Access CRL Extension  December 20054.2.  Informative References   [X.680]     ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002),               Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One,               2002.   [X.690]     ITU-T Recommendation X.690 Information Technology - ASN.1               encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules               (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished               Encoding Rules (DER), 1997.Authors' Addresses   Stefan Santesson   Microsoft   Tuborg Boulevard 12   2900 Hellerup   Denmark   EMail: stefans@microsoft.com   Russell Housley   Vigil Security, LLC   918 Spring Knoll Drive   Herndon, VA 20170   USA   EMail: housley@vigilsec.comSantesson & Housley         Standards Track                     [Page 6]

RFC 4325       Authority Information Access CRL Extension  December 2005Full Copyright Statement   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions   contained inBCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors   retain all their rights.   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET   ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,   INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE   INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.Intellectual Property   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be   found inBCP 78 andBCP 79.   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository athttp://www.ietf.org/ipr.   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-   ipr@ietf.org.Acknowledgement   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the   Internet Society.Santesson & Housley         Standards Track                     [Page 7]

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