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Network Working Group                                       S. SantessonRequest for Comments: 3739                                     MicrosoftObsoletes:3039                                               M. NystromCategory: Standards Track                                   RSA Security                                                                 T. Polk                                                                    NIST                                                              March 2004Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:Qualified Certificates ProfileStatus of this Memo   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.Copyright Notice   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).  All Rights Reserved.Abstract   This document forms a certificate profile, based onRFC 3280, for   identity certificates issued to natural persons.   The profile defines specific conventions for certificates that are   qualified within a defined legal framework, named Qualified   Certificates.  However, the profile does not define any legal   requirements for such Qualified Certificates.   The goal of this document is to define a certificate profile that   supports the issuance of Qualified Certificates independent of local   legal requirements.  The profile is however not limited to Qualified   Certificates and further profiling may facilitate specific local   needs.Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                     [Page 1]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004Table of Contents1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21.1.  Changes sinceRFC 3039 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31.2.  Definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42.  Requirements and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42.1.  Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52.2.  Statement of Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52.3.  Policy Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52.4.  Uniqueness of Names. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63.  Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile . . . . . . . .63.1.  Basic Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63.1.1.  Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63.1.2.  Subject. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73.2.  Certificate Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93.2.1.  Subject Alternative Name . . . . . . . . . . . .93.2.2.  Subject Directory Attributes . . . . . . . . . .93.2.3.  Certificate Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113.2.4.  Key Usage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113.2.5.  Biometric Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . .113.2.6.  Qualified Certificate Statements . . . . . . . .134.  Security Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15A.  ASN.1 Definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17A.1.  1988 ASN.1 Module (Normative). . . . . . . . . . . . . .17A.2.  1997 ASN.1 Module (Informative). . . . . . . . . . . . .19B.  A Note on Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23C.  Example Certificate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23C.1.  ASN.1 Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24C.1.1.  Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24C.1.2.  The Certificate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25C.2.  ASN.1 Dump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27C.3.  DER-encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30C.4.  CA's Public Key. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31   References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33   Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .341.  Introduction   This specification is one part of a family of standards for the X.509   Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the Internet.  It is based on   [X.509] and [RFC 3280], which defines underlying certificate formats   and semantics needed for a full implementation of this standard.   This profile includes specific mechanisms intended for use with   Qualified Certificates.  The term Qualified Certificates and the   assumptions that affect the scope of this document are discussed inSection 2.Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                     [Page 2]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004Section 3 defines requirements on certificate information content.   This specification provides profiles for two certificate fields:   issuer and subject.  It also provides profiles for four certificate   extensions defined inRFC 3280: subject alternate name, subject   directory attributes, certificate policies, and key usage, and it   defines two additional extensions: biometric information and   qualified certificate statements.  The certificate extensions are   presented in the 1997 Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) [X.680],   but in conformance withRFC 3280 the 1988 ASN.1 module inAppendix A   contains all normative definitions (the 1997 module inAppendix A is   informative).   InSection 4, some security considerations are discussed in order to   clarify the security context in which the standard may be utilized.Appendix A contains all relevant ASN.1 structures that are not   already defined inRFC 3280.Appendix B contains a note on   attributes.Appendix C contains an example certificate.   The appendices sections are followed by the References, Authors   Addresses, and the Full Copyright Statement.1.1.  Changes sinceRFC 3039   This specification obsoletesRFC 3039.  This specification differs   fromRFC 3039 in the following basic areas:      *  Some editorial clarifications have been made to introductory         sections to clarify that this profile is generally applicable         to a broad type of certificates, even if its prime purpose is         to facilitate issuance of Qualified Certificates.      *  To align withRFC 3280, support for domainComponent and title         attributes in subject names are included, and postalAddress is         no longer supported.      *  To align with actual usage, support for the title attribute in         the subject directory attributes extension is no longer         supported.      *  To better facilitate broad applicability of this profile, some         constraints on key usage settings in the key usage extension         have been removed.      *  A new qc-Statement reflecting this second version of the         profile has been defined inSection 3.2.6.1.  This profile         obsoletesRFC 3039, but the qc-statement reflecting compliance         withRFC 3039 is also defined for backwards compatibility.Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                     [Page 3]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 20041.2.  Definitions   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this   document are to be interpreted as described inBCP 14, [RFC 2119].2.  Requirements and Assumptions   The term "Qualified Certificate" is used by the European Directive on   Electronic Signature [EU-ESDIR] to refer to a specific type of   certificates, with appliance in European electronic signature   legislation.  This specification is intended to support this class of   certificates, but its scope is not limited to this application.   Within this standard, the term "Qualified Certificate" is used   generally, describing a certificate whose primary purpose is to   identify a person with a high level of assurance, where the   certificate meets some qualification requirements defined by an   applicable legal framework, such as the European Directive on   Electronic Signature [EU-ESDIR].  The actual mechanisms that decide   whether a certificate should or should not be considered a "Qualified   Certificate" in regard to any legislation are outside the scope of   this standard.   Harmonization in the field of identity certificates issued to natural   persons, in particular Qualified Certificates, is essential within   several aspects that fall outside the scope ofRFC 3280.  The most   important aspects that affect the scope of this specification are:   -  Definition of names and identity information in order to identify      the associated subject in a uniform way.   -  Definition of information which identifies the CA and the      jurisdiction under which the CA operates when issuing a particular      certificate.   -  Definition of key usage extension usage for Qualified      Certificates.   -  Definition of information structure for storage of biometric      information.   -  Definition of a standardized way to store predefined statements      with relevance for Qualified Certificates.   -  Requirements for critical extensions.Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                     [Page 4]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 20042.1.  Properties   This profile accommodates profiling needs for Qualified Certificates   based on the assumptions that:   -  Qualified Certificates are issued by a CA that makes a statement      that the certificate serves the purpose of a Qualified      Certificate, as discussed inSection 2.2.   -  The Qualified Certificate indicates a certificate policy      consistent with liabilities, practices, and procedures undertaken      by the CA, as discussed inSection 2.3.   -  The Qualified Certificate is issued to a natural person (living      human being).   -  The Qualified Certificate contains a name which may be either      based on the real name of the subject or a pseudonym.2.2.  Statement of Purpose   This profile defines conventions to declare within a certificate that   it serves the purpose of being a Qualified Certificate.  This enables   the CA to explicitly define this intent.   The function of this declaration is thus to assist any concerned   entity in evaluating the risk associated with creating or accepting   signatures that are based on a Qualified Certificate.   This profile defines two ways to include this information:   -  As information defined by a certificate policy included in the      certificate policies extension, and   -  As a statement included in the Qualified Certificates Statements      extension.2.3.  Policy Issues   Certain policy aspects define the context in which this profile is to   be understood and used.  It is however outside the scope of this   profile to specify any policies or legal aspects that will govern   services that issue or utilize certificates according to this   profile.   It is however an underlying assumption in this profile that a   responsible issuing CA will undertake to follow a certificate policy   that is consistent with its liabilities, practices, and procedures.Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                     [Page 5]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 20042.4.  Uniqueness of names   Distinguished name is originally defined in X.501 [X.501] as a   representation of a directory name, defined as a construct that   identifies a particular object from among a set of all objects.  The   distinguished name MUST be unique for each subject entity certified   by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field, for the whole life   time of the CA.3.  Certificate and Certificate Extensions Profile   This section defines certificate profiling conventions.  The profile   is based on the Internet certificate profileRFC 3280, which in turn   is based on the X.509 version 3 format.  For full implementation of   this section, implementers are REQUIRED to consult the underlying   formats and semantics defined inRFC 3280.   ASN.1 definitions, relevant for this section that are not supplied byRFC 3280, are supplied inAppendix A.3.1.  Basic Certificate Fields   This section provides additional details regarding the contents of   two fields in the basic certificate.  These fields are the issuer and   subject fields.3.1.1.  Issuer   The issuer field SHALL identify the organization responsible for   issuing the certificate.  The name SHOULD be an officially registered   name of the organization.   The distinguished name of the issuer SHALL be specified using an   appropriate subset of the following attributes:      domainComponent;      countryName;      stateOrProvinceName;      organizationName;      localityName; and      serialNumber.   The domainComponent attribute is defined in [RFC 2247], all other   attributes are defined in [RFC 3280] and [X.520].   Additional attributes MAY be present, but they SHOULD NOT be   necessary to identify the issuing organization.Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                     [Page 6]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004   A relying party MAY have to consult associated certificate policies   and/or the issuer's CPS, in order to determine the semantics of name   fields.3.1.2.  Subject   The subject field of a certificate compliant with this profile SHALL   contain a distinguished name of the subject (see 2.4 for definition   of distinguished name).   The subject field SHALL contain an appropriate subset of the   following attributes:      domainComponent;      countryName;      commonName;      surname;      givenName;      pseudonym;      serialNumber;      title;      organizationName;      organizationalUnitName;      stateOrProvinceName; and      localityName.   The domainComponent attribute is defined in [RFC 2247], all other   attributes are defined in [RFC 3280] and [X.520].   Other attributes MAY also be present; however, the use of other   attributes MUST NOT be necessary to distinguish one subject name from   another subject name.  That is, the attributes listed above are   sufficient to ensure unique subject names.   Of these attributes, the subject field SHALL include at least one of   the following:      Choice   I:  commonName      Choice  II:  givenName      Choice III:  pseudonym      The countryName attribute value specifies a general context in      which other attributes are to be understood.  The country      attribute does not necessarily indicate the subject's country of      citizenship or country of residence, nor does it have to indicate      the country of issuance.Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                     [Page 7]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004   Note: Many X.500 implementations require the presence of countryName   in the DIT.  In cases where the subject name, as specified in the   subject field, specifies a public X.500 directory entry, the   countryName attribute SHOULD always be present.      The commonName attribute value SHALL, when present, contain a name      of the subject.  This MAY be in the subject's preferred      presentation format, or a format preferred by the CA, or some      other format.  Pseudonyms, nicknames, and names with spelling      other than defined by the registered name MAY be used.  To      understand the nature of the name presented in commonName,      complying applications MAY have to examine present values of the      givenName and surname attributes, or the pseudonym attribute.   Note: Many client implementations presuppose the presence of the   commonName attribute value in the subject field and use this value to   display the subject's name regardless of present givenName, surname,   or pseudonym attribute values.      The surname and givenName attribute types SHALL be used in the      subject field if neither the commonName attribute nor the      pseudonym attribute is present.  In cases where the subject only      has a givenName, the surname attribute SHALL be omitted.      The pseudonym attribute type SHALL, if present, contain a      pseudonym of the subject.  Use of the pseudonym attribute MUST NOT      be combined with use of any of the attributes surname and/or      givenName.      The serialNumber attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to      differentiate between names where the subject field would      otherwise be identical.  This attribute has no defined semantics      beyond ensuring uniqueness of subject names.  It MAY contain a      number or code assigned by the CA or an identifier assigned by a      government or civil authority.  It is the CA's responsibility to      ensure that the serialNumber is sufficient to resolve any subject      name collisions.      The title attribute type SHALL, when present, be used to store a      designated position or function of the subject within the      organization specified by present organizational attributes in the      subject field.  The association between the title, the subject,      and the organization is beyond the scope of this document.      The organizationName and the organizationalUnitName attribute      types SHALL, when present, be used to store the name and relevant      information of an organization with which the subject isSantesson, et al.           Standards Track                     [Page 8]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004      associated.  The type of association between the organization and      the subject is beyond the scope of this document.      The stateOrProvinceName and the localityName attribute types      SHALL, when present, be used to store geographical information      with which the subject is associated.  If an organizationName      value is also present, then the stateOrProvinceName and      localityName attribute values SHALL be associated with the      specified organization.  The type of association between the      stateOrProvinceName and the localityName and either the subject or      the organizationName is beyond the scope of this document.   Compliant implementations SHALL be able to interpret the attributes   named in this section.3.2.  Certificate Extensions   This section provides additional details regarding the contents of   four certificate extensions defined inRFC 3280: Subject Alternative   Name, Subject directory attributes, Certificate policies, and Key   usage.  This section also defines two additional extensions:   biometric information and qualified certificate statements.3.2.1.  Subject Alternative Name   If the subjectAltName extension is present, and it contains a   directoryName name, then the directoryName MUST follow the   conventions specified insection 3.1.2 of this profile.3.2.2.  Subject Directory Attributes   The subjectDirectoryAttributes extension MAY be present and MAY   contain additional attributes associated with the subject, as a   complement to present information in the subject field and the   subject alternative name extension.   Attributes suitable for storage in this extension are attributes   which are not part of the subject's distinguished name, but which MAY   still be useful for other purposes (e.g., authorization).   This extension MUST NOT be marked critical.   Compliant implementations SHALL be able to interpret the following   attributes:      dateOfBirth;      placeOfBirth;      gender;Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                     [Page 9]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004      countryOfCitizenship; and      countryOfResidence.   Other attributes MAY be included according to local definitions.      The dateOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value      of the date of birth of the subject.  The manner in which the date      of birth is associated with the subject is outside the scope of      this document.  The date of birth is defined in the      GeneralizedTime format and SHOULD specify GMT 12.00.00 (noon) down      to the granularity of seconds, in order to prevent accidental      change of date due to time zone adjustments.  For example, a birth      date of September 27, 1959 is encoded as "19590927120000Z".      Compliant certificate parsing applications SHOULD ignore any time      data and just present the contained date without any time zone      adjustments.      The placeOfBirth attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value      of the place of birth of the subject.  The manner in which the      place of birth is associated with the subject is outside the scope      of this document.      The gender attribute SHALL, when present, contain the value of the      gender of the subject.  For females the value "F" (or "f"), and      for males the value "M" (or "m"), have to be used.  The manner in      which the gender is associated with the subject is outside the      scope of this document.      The countryOfCitizenship attribute SHALL, when present, contain      the identifier of at least one of the subject's claimed countries      of citizenship at the time the certificate was issued.  If more      than one country of citizenship is specified, each country of      citizenship SHOULD be specified through a separate, single-valued      countryOfCitizenship attribute.  Determination of citizenship is a      matter of law and is outside the scope of this document.      The countryOfResidence attribute SHALL, when present, contain the      value of at least one country in which the subject is resident.      If more than one country of residence is specified, each country      of residence SHOULD be specified through a separate, single-valued      countryOfResidence attribute.  Determination of residence is a      matter of law and is outside the scope of this document.Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 10]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 20043.2.3.  Certificate Policies   The certificate policies extension SHALL be present and SHALL contain   the identifier of at least one certificate policy which reflects the   practices and procedures undertaken by the CA.  The certificate   policy extension MAY be marked critical.   Information provided by the issuer stating the purpose of the   certificate, as discussed inSection 2.2, SHOULD be evident through   indicated policies.   The certificate policies extension MUST include all policy   information needed for certification path validation.  If policy   related statements are included in the QCStatements extension (see   3.2.6), then these statements SHOULD also be contained in the   identified policies.   Certificate policies MAY be combined with any qualifier defined inRFC 3280.3.2.4.  Key Usage   The key usage extension SHALL be present.  Key usage settings SHALL   be set in accordance withRFC 3280 definitions.  Further requirements   on key usage settings MAY be defined by local policy and/or local   legal requirements.   The key usage extension SHOULD be marked critical.3.2.5.  Biometric Information   This section defines an OPTIONAL extension for storage of biometric   information.  Biometric information is stored in the form of a hash   of a biometric template.   The purpose of this extension is to provide a means for the   authentication of biometric information.  The biometric information   that corresponds to the stored hash is not stored in this extension,   but the extension MAY include a URI (sourceDataUri) that references a   file containing this information.   If included, the URI MUST use the HTTP scheme (http://) [HTTP/1.1] or   the HTTPS scheme (https://) [RFC 2818].  Since the fact that   identifying data is being checked may itself be sensitive   information, those deploying this mechanism may also wish to consider   using URIs which cannot be easily tied by outsiders to the identities   of those whose information is being retrieved.Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 11]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004   Use of the URI option presumes that the data encoding format of the   file content is determined through means outside the scope of this   specification, such as file naming conventions and metadata inside   the file.  Use of this URI option does not imply that it is the only   way to access this information.   It is RECOMMENDED that biometric information in this extension be   limited to information types suitable for human verification, i.e.,   where the decision of whether the information is an accurate   representation of the subject is naturally performed by a person.   This implies a usage where the biometric information is represented   by, for example, a graphical image displayed to the relying party,   which MAY be used by the relying party to enhance identification of   the subject.   This extension MUST NOT be marked critical.      biometricInfo  EXTENSION ::= {          SYNTAX             BiometricSyntax          IDENTIFIED BY      id-pe-biometricInfo }      id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= {id-pe 2}      BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData      BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {          typeOfBiometricData  TypeOfBiometricData,          hashAlgorithm        AlgorithmIdentifier,          biometricDataHash    OCTET STRING,          sourceDataUri        IA5String OPTIONAL }      TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {          predefinedBiometricType    PredefinedBiometricType,          biometricDataID            OBJECT IDENTIFIER }      PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER { picture(0),          handwritten-signature(1)} (picture|handwritten-signature,...)   The predefined biometric type picture, when present, SHALL identify   that the source picture is in the form of a displayable graphical   image of the subject.  The hash of the graphical image SHALL be   calculated over the whole referenced image file.   The predefined biometric type handwritten-signature, when present,   SHALL identify that the source data is in the form of a displayable   graphical image of the subject's handwritten signature.  The hash of   the graphical image SHALL be calculated over the whole referenced   image file.Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 12]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 20043.2.6.  Qualified Certificate Statements   This section defines an OPTIONAL extension for the inclusion of   statements defining explicit properties of the certificate.   Each statement SHALL include an object identifier for the statement   and MAY also include optional qualifying data contained in the   statementInfo parameter.   If the statementInfo parameter is included, then the object   identifier of the statement SHALL define the syntax and SHOULD define   the semantics of this parameter.  If the object identifier does not   define the semantics, a relying party may have to consult a relevant   certificate policy or CPS to determine the exact semantics.   This extension may be critical or non-critical.  If the extension is   critical, this means that all statements included in the extension   are regarded as critical.      qcStatements  EXTENSION ::= {          SYNTAX             QCStatements          IDENTIFIED BY      id-pe-qcStatements }      -- NOTE: This extension does not allow to mix critical and      -- non-critical Qualified Certificate Statements. Either all      -- statements must be critical or all statements must be      -- non-critical.      id-pe-qcStatements     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3 }      QCStatements ::= SEQUENCE OF QCStatement      QCStatement ::= SEQUENCE {          statementId   QC-STATEMENT.&Id({SupportedStatements}),          statementInfo QC-STATEMENT.&Type          ({SupportedStatements}{@statementId}) OPTIONAL }      SupportedStatements QC-STATEMENT ::= { qcStatement-1,...}   A statement suitable for inclusion in this extension MAY be a   statement by the issuer that the certificate is issued as a Qualified   Certificate in accordance with a particular legal system (as   discussed inSection 2.2).   Other statements suitable for inclusion in this extension MAY be   statements related to the applicable legal jurisdiction within which   the certificate is issued.  As an example, this MAY include a maximum   reliance limit for the certificate indicating restrictions on CA's   liability.Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 13]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 20043.2.6.1.  Predefined Statements   The certificate statement (id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1), identifies   conformance with requirements defined in the obsoletedRFC 3039   (Version 1).  This statement is thus provided for identification of   old certificates issued in conformance withRFC 3039.  This statement   MUST NOT be included in certificates issued in accordance with this   profile.   This profile includes a new qualified certificate statement   (identified by the OID id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2), identifying   conformance with requirements defined in this profile.  This   Qualified Certificate profile is referred to as version 2, whileRFC3039 is referred to as version 1.      qcStatement-1 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation          IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 }      --  This statement identifies conformance with requirements      --  defined inRFC 3039 (Version 1). This statement may      --  optionally contain additional semantics information as      --  specified below.      qcStatement-2 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation          IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2 }      --  This statement identifies conformance with requirements      --  defined in this Qualified Certificate profile      --  (Version 2). This statement may optionally contain      --  additional semantics information as specified below.      SemanticsInformation ::= SEQUENCE {          semanticsIdentifier        OBJECT IDENTIFIER   OPTIONAL,          nameRegistrationAuthorities NameRegistrationAuthorities                                                          OPTIONAL }          (WITH COMPONENTS {..., semanticsIdentifier PRESENT}|           WITH COMPONENTS {..., nameRegistrationAuthorities PRESENT})      NameRegistrationAuthorities ::=  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF          GeneralName   The SementicsInformation component identified by id-qcs-   pkixQCSyntax-v1 MAY contain a semantics identifier and MAY identify   one or more name registration authorities.   The semanticsIdentifier component, if present, SHALL contain an OID,   defining semantics for attributes and names in basic certificate   fields and certificate extensions.  The OID may define semantics for   all, or for a subgroup of all present attributes and/or names.Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 14]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004   The NameRegistrationAuthorities component, if present, SHALL contain   a name of one or more name registration authorities, responsible for   registration of attributes or names associated with the subject.  The   association between an identified name registration authority and   present attributes MAY be defined by a semantics identifier OID, by a   certificate policy (or CPS), or some other implicit factors.   If a value of type SemanticsInformation is present in a QCStatement   where the statementID component is set to id-qcs-pkix-QCSyntax-v1 or   id-qcs-pkix-QCSyntax-v2, then at least one of the semanticsIdentifier   or nameRegistrationAuthorities fields must be present, as indicated.   Note that the statementInfo component need not be present in a   QCStatement value even if the statementID component is set to id-   qcs-pkix-QCSyntax-v1 or id-qcs-pkix-QCSyntax-v2.4.  Security Considerations   The legal value of a digital signature that is validated with a   Qualified Certificate will be highly dependent upon the policy   governing the use of the associated private key.  Both the private   key holder, as well as the relying party, should make sure that the   private key is used only with the consent of the legitimate key   holder.   Since the public keys are for public use with legal implications for   involved parties, certain conditions should exist before CAs issue   certificates as Qualified Certificates.  The associated private keys   must be unique for the subject, and must be maintained under the   subject's sole control.  That is, a CA should not issue a qualified   certificate if the means to use the private key is not protected   against unintended usage.  This implies that the CA has some   knowledge about the subject's cryptographic module.   The CA must further verify that the public key contained in the   certificate is legitimately representing the subject.   CAs should not issue CA certificates with policy mapping extensions   indicating acceptance of another CA's policy unless these conditions   are met.   Combining the nonRepudiation bit in the keyUsage certificate   extension with other keyUsage bits may have security implications   depending on the context in which the certificate is to be used.   Applications validating electronic signatures based on such   certificates should determine whether the present key usage   combination is appropriate for their use.Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 15]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004   The ability to compare two qualified certificates to determine if   they represent the same physical entity is dependent on the semantics   of the subjects' names.  The semantics of a particular attribute may   be different for different issuers.  Comparing names without   knowledge of the semantics of names in these particular certificates   may provide misleading results.   This specification is a profile ofRFC 3280.  The security   considerations section of that document applies to this specification   as well.Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 16]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004A.  ASN.1 Definitions   As inRFC 3280, ASN.1 modules are supplied in two different variants   of the ASN.1 syntax.Appendix A.1 is in the 1988 syntax, and does not use macros.   However, since the module imports type definitions from modules inRFC 3280 which are not completely in the 1988 syntax, the same   comments as inRFC 3280 regarding its use applies here as well; i.e.,Appendix A.1 may be parsed by an 1988 ASN.1-parser by removing the   definitions for the UNIVERSAL types and all references to them inRFC3280's 1988 modules.Appendix A.2 is in the 1997 syntax.   In case of discrepancies between these modules, the 1988 module is   the normative one.A.1.  1988 ASN.1 Module (Normative)   PKIXqualified88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)       internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)       id-mod-qualified-cert(31) }   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=   BEGIN   -- EXPORTS ALL --   IMPORTS   GeneralName       FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)       internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)       id-pkix1-implicit(19)}   AlgorithmIdentifier, DirectoryString, AttributeType, id-pkix, id-pe       FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)       internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)       id-pkix1-explicit(18)};   -- Locally defined OIDs   -- Arc for QC personal data attributes   id-pda  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 9 }Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 17]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004   -- Arc for QC statements   id-qcs  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 11 }   -- Personal data attributes   id-pda-dateOfBirth          AttributeType ::= { id-pda 1 }   DateOfBirth ::=             GeneralizedTime   id-pda-placeOfBirth         AttributeType ::= { id-pda 2 }   PlaceOfBirth ::=            DirectoryString   id-pda-gender               AttributeType ::= { id-pda 3 }   Gender ::=                  PrintableString (SIZE(1))                               -- "M", "F", "m" or "f"   id-pda-countryOfCitizenship AttributeType ::= { id-pda 4 }   CountryOfCitizenship ::=    PrintableString (SIZE (2))                               -- ISO 3166 Country Code   id-pda-countryOfResidence   AttributeType ::= { id-pda 5 }   CountryOfResidence ::=      PrintableString (SIZE (2))                               -- ISO 3166 Country Code   -- Certificate extensions   -- Biometric info extension   id-pe-biometricInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= {id-pe 2}   BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData   BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {       typeOfBiometricData  TypeOfBiometricData,       hashAlgorithm        AlgorithmIdentifier,       biometricDataHash    OCTET STRING,       sourceDataUri        IA5String OPTIONAL }   TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {       predefinedBiometricType   PredefinedBiometricType,       biometricDataOid          OBJECT IDENTIFIER }   PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER {       picture(0), handwritten-signature(1)}       (picture|handwritten-signature)Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 18]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004   -- QC Statements Extension   -- NOTE: This extension does not allow to mix critical and   -- non-critical Qualified Certificate Statements. Either all   -- statements must be critical or all statements must be   -- non-critical.   id-pe-qcStatements OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3}   QCStatements ::= SEQUENCE OF QCStatement   QCStatement ::= SEQUENCE {       statementId        OBJECT IDENTIFIER,       statementInfo      ANY DEFINED BY statementId OPTIONAL}   -- QC statements   id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 1 }   --  This statement identifies conformance with requirements   --  defined inRFC 3039 (Version 1). This statement may   --  optionally contain additional semantics information as specified   --  below.   id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 2 }   --  This statement identifies conformance with requirements   --  defined in this Qualified Certificate profile   --  (Version 2). This statement may optionally contain   --  additional semantics information as specified below.   SemanticsInformation  ::= SEQUENCE {       semanticsIndentifier        OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,       nameRegistrationAuthorities NameRegistrationAuthorities OPTIONAL       } -- At least one field shall be present   NameRegistrationAuthorities ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName   ENDA.2.  1997 ASN.1  Module (Informative)   PKIXqualified97 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)       internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)       id-mod-qualified-cert-97(35) }   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=   BEGIN   -- EXPORTS ALL --Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 19]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004   IMPORTS   informationFramework, certificateExtensions, selectedAttributeTypes,       authenticationFramework, upperBounds, id-at       FROM UsefulDefinitions {joint-iso-itu-t(2) ds(5) module(1)       usefulDefinitions(0) 3 }   ub-name       FROM UpperBounds upperBounds   GeneralName       FROM CertificateExtensions certificateExtensions   ATTRIBUTE, AttributeType       FROM InformationFramework informationFramework   DirectoryString       FROM SelectedAttributeTypes selectedAttributeTypes   AlgorithmIdentifier, Extension, EXTENSION       FROM AuthenticationFramework authenticationFramework   id-pkix, id-pe       FROM PKIX1Explicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)       internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)       id-pkix1-explicit(18) };   -- Locally defined OIDs   -- Arc for QC personal data attributes   id-pda  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 9 }   -- Arc for QC statements   id-qcs  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 11 }   -- Personal data attributes   id-pda-dateOfBirth          AttributeType ::= { id-pda 1 }   id-pda-placeOfBirth         AttributeType ::= { id-pda 2 }   id-pda-gender               AttributeType ::= { id-pda 3 }   id-pda-countryOfCitizenship AttributeType ::= { id-pda 4 }   id-pda-countryOfResidence   AttributeType ::= { id-pda 5 }   -- Certificate extensions   id-pe-biometricInfo         OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 2 }   id-pe-qcStatements          OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 3 }Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 20]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004   -- QC statements   id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 1 }   id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-qcs 2 }   -- Personal data attributes   dateOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= {       WITH SYNTAX GeneralizedTime       ID          id-pda-dateOfBirth }   placeOfBirth ATTRIBUTE ::= {      WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-name}      ID          id-pda-placeOfBirth }   gender ATTRIBUTE ::= {       WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE(1) ^ FROM("M"|"F"|"m"|"f"))       ID          id-pda-gender }   countryOfCitizenship ATTRIBUTE ::= {       WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE (2))           (CONSTRAINED BY { -- ISO 3166 codes only -- })       ID          id-pda-countryOfCitizenship }   countryOfResidence ATTRIBUTE ::= {       WITH SYNTAX PrintableString (SIZE (2))           (CONSTRAINED BY { -- ISO 3166 codes only -- })       ID          id-pda-countryOfResidence }   -- Certificate extensions   -- Biometric info extension   biometricInfo  EXTENSION ::= {       SYNTAX             BiometricSyntax       IDENTIFIED BY      id-pe-biometricInfo }   BiometricSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF BiometricData   BiometricData ::= SEQUENCE {       typeOfBiometricData TypeOfBiometricData,       hashAlgorithm       AlgorithmIdentifier,       biometricDataHash   OCTET STRING,       sourceDataUri       IA5String OPTIONAL,       ... -- For future extensions -- }   TypeOfBiometricData ::= CHOICE {       predefinedBiometricType PredefinedBiometricType,Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 21]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004       biometricDataOid        OBJECT IDENTIFIER }   PredefinedBiometricType ::= INTEGER {       picture(0), handwritten-signature(1)}       (picture|handwritten-signature,...)   -- QC Statements Extension   -- NOTE: This extension does not allow to mix critical and   -- non-critical Qualified Certificate Statements. Either all   -- statements must be critical or all statements must be   -- non-critical.   qcStatements  EXTENSION ::= {       SYNTAX        QCStatements       IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-qcStatements }   QCStatements ::= SEQUENCE OF QCStatement   QCStatement ::= SEQUENCE {       statementId   QC-STATEMENT.&id({SupportedStatements}),       statementInfo QC-STATEMENT.&Type       ({SupportedStatements}{@statementId}) OPTIONAL }   QC-STATEMENT ::= CLASS {       &id   OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,       &Type OPTIONAL }       WITH SYNTAX {       [SYNTAX &Type] IDENTIFIED BY &id }   qcStatement-1 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation       IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1}       --  This statement identifies conformance with requirements       --  defined inRFC 3039 (Version 1). This statement       --  may optionally contain additional semantics information       --  as specified below.   qcStatement-2 QC-STATEMENT ::= { SYNTAX SemanticsInformation       IDENTIFIED BY id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2}       --  This statement identifies conformance with requirements       --  defined in this Qualified Certificate profile       --  (Version 2). This statement may optionally contain       --  additional semantics information as specified below.   SemanticsInformation ::= SEQUENCE {       semanticsIdentifier         OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,       nameRegistrationAuthorities NameRegistrationAuthorities OPTIONAL       }(WITH COMPONENTS {..., semanticsIdentifier PRESENT}|         WITH COMPONENTS {..., nameRegistrationAuthorities PRESENT})Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 22]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004   NameRegistrationAuthorities ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF GeneralName   -- The following information object set is defined to constrain the   -- set of attributes applications are required to recognize as QCSs.   SupportedStatements QC-STATEMENT ::= {       qcStatement-1 |       qcStatement-2 , ... -- For future extensions -- }   ENDB.  A Note on Attributes   This document defines several new attributes, both for use in the   subject field of issued certificates and in the   subjectDirectoryAttributes extension.  A complete definition of these   new attributes (including matching rules), along with object classes   to support them in LDAP-accessible directories, can be found in   PKCS 9 [RFC 2985].C.  Example Certificate   This section contains the ASN.1 structure, an ASN.1 dump, and the   DER-encoding of a certificate issued in conformance with this   profile.  The example has been developed with the help of the OSS   ASN.1 compiler.  The certificate has the following characteristics:      1.  The certificate is signed with RSA and the SHA-1 hash          algorithm      2.  The issuer's distinguished name is (using the syntax specified          in [RFC 2253]):  O=GMD - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik          GmbH, C=DE      3.  The subject's distinguished name is (using the syntax          specified in [RFC 2253]): GN=Petra+SN=Barzin, O=GMD          - Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH, C=DE      4.  The certificate was issued on 1 February, 2004 and will expire          on 1 February, 2008      5.  The certificate contains a 1024 bit RSA key      6.  The certificate includes a critical key usage extension          exclusively indicating non-repudiation      7.  The certificate includes a certificate policy identifier          extension indicating the practices and procedures undertaken          by the issuing CA (object identifier 1.3.36.8.1.1).  TheSantesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 23]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004          certificate policy object identifier is defined by TeleTrust,          Germany.      8.  The certificate includes a subject directory attributes          extension containing the following attributes:              date of birth:         October, 14th 1971              place of birth:        Darmstadt              country of citizenship:Germany              gender:                Female      9.  The certificate includes a qualified statement certificate          extension indicating that the naming registration authority's          name is "municipality@darmstadt.de".      10. The certificate includes, in conformance withRFC 3280, an          authority key identifier extension.C.1.  ASN.1 StructureC.1.1.  Extensions   Since extensions are DER-encoded already when placed in the structure   to be signed, they are, for clarity, shown here in the value notation   defined in [X.680].C.1.1.1.  The subjectDirectoryAttributes Extension   certSubjDirAttrs AttributesSyntax ::= {       {           type id-pda-countryOfCitizenship,           values {               PrintableString : "DE"           }       },       {           type id-pda-gender,           values {               PrintableString : "F"           }       },       {           type id-pda-dateOfBirth,           values {               GeneralizedTime : "197110141200Z"           }       },       {Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 24]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004           type id-pda-placeOfBirth,           values {               DirectoryString : utf8String : "Darmstadt"           }       }   }C.1.1.2.  The keyUsage Extension   certKeyUsage KeyUsage ::= {nonRepudiation}C.1.1.3.  The certificatePolicies Extension   certCertificatePolicies CertificatePoliciesSyntax ::= {       {           policyIdentifier {1 3 36 8 1 1}       }   }C.1.1.4.  The qcStatements Extension   certQCStatement QCStatements ::= {       {           statementId   id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v2,           statementInfo SemanticsInformation : {               nameRegistrationAuthorities {                   rfc822Name : "municipality@darmstadt.de"               }           }       }   }C.1.1.5.  The authorityKeyIdentifier Extension   certAKI AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= {       keyIdentifier '000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0FFEDCBA98'H   }C.1.2.  The Certificate   The signed portion of the certificate is shown here in the value   notation defined in [X.680].  Note that extension values are already   DER encoded in this structure.  Some values have been truncated for   readability purposes.   certCertInfo CertificateInfo ::= {     version v3,     serialNumber 1234567890,Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 25]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004     signature     {       algorithm { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 5 },       parameters RSAParams : NULL     },     issuer rdnSequence :       {         {           {             type { 2 5 4 6 },             value PrintableString : "DE"           }         },         {           {             type { 2 5 4 10 },             value UTF8String :           }         }       },     validity     {       notBefore utcTime : "040201100000Z",       notAfter utcTime :  "080201100000Z"     },     subject rdnSequence :       {         {           {             type { 2 5 4 6 },             value PrintableString : "DE"           }         },         {           {             type { 2 5 4 10 },             value UTF8String :               "GMD Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH"           }         },         {           {             type { 2 5 4 4 },             value UTF8String : "Barzin"           },           {             type { 2 5 4 42 },             value UTF8String : "Petra"Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 26]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004           }         }       },     subjectPublicKeyInfo     {       algorithm       {         algorithm { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 1 },         parameters RSAParams : NULL       },       subjectPublicKey '30818902818100DCE74CD5...0203010001'H     },     extensions     {       {         extnId { 2 5 29 9 },  -- subjectDirectoryAttributes         extnValue '305B301006082B0601050507090...7374616474'H       },       {         extnId { 2 5 29 15 }, -- keyUsage         critical TRUE,         extnValue '03020640'H       },       {         extnId { 2 5 29 32 }, -- certificatePolicies         extnValue '3009300706052B24080101'H       },       {         extnId { 2 5 29 35 }, -- authorityKeyIdentifier         extnValue '30168014000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0FFEDCBA98'H       },       {         extnId { 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 3 }, -- qcStatements         extnValue '302B302906082B06010505070B0...4742E6465 'H       }     }   }C.2.  ASN.1 Dump   This section contains an ASN.1 dump of the signed portion of the   certificate.  Some values have been truncated for readability   purposes.CertificateInfo SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed; length = 633  version : tag = [0] constructed; length = 3    Version INTEGER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 2] primitive; length = 1      2Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 27]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004  serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber INTEGER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 2]  primitive; length = 4    1234567890  signature AlgorithmIdentifier SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]  constructed; length = 13    algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]    primitive; length = 9      { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 5 }    parameters OpenType      NULL  issuer Name CHOICE    rdnSequence RDNSequence SEQUENCE OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]    constructed; length = 72      RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]      constructed; length = 11        AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]        constructed; length = 9          type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]          primitive; length = 3            { 2 5 4 6 } -- id-at-countryName          value PrintableString            "DE"      RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]      constructed; length = 57        AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]        constructed; length = 55          type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]          primitive; length = 3            { 2 5 4 10 } -- id-at-organizationName          value UTF8String            "GMD Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH"  validity Validity SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]  constructed; length = 30    notBefore Time CHOICE      utcTime UTCTime: tag = [UNIVERSAL 23] primitive; length = 13        040201100000Z    notAfter Time CHOICE      utcTime UTCTime: tag = [UNIVERSAL 23] primitive; length = 13        080201100000Z  subject Name CHOICE    rdnSequence RDNSequence SEQUENCE OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]    constructed; length = 101      RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]      constructed; length = 11        AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]        constructed; length = 9          type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]          primitive; length = 3Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 28]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004            { 2 5 4 6 } -- id-at-countryName          value PrintableString            "DE"      RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]      constructed; length = 55        AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]        constructed; length = 53          type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]          primitive; length = 3            { 2 5 4 10 } -- id-at-organizationName          value UTF8String            "GMD Forschungszentrum Informationstechnik GmbH"      RelativeDistinguishedName SET OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 17]      constructed; length = 29        AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]        constructed; length = 13          type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]          primitive; length = 3            { 2 5 4 4 } -- id-at-surname          value UTF8String            "Barzin"        AttributeTypeAndValue SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]        constructed; length = 12          type OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]          primitive; length = 3            { 2 5 4 42 } -- id-at-givenName          value UTF8String            "Petra"  subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE:  tag = [UNIVERSAL 16] constructed; length = 159    algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]    constructed; length = 13      algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]      primitive; length = 9        { 1 2 840 113549 1 1 1 } -- rsaEncryption      parameters OpenType        NULL    subjectPublicKey BIT STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 3]    primitive; length = 141      0x0030818902818100dce74cd5a1d55aeb01cf5ecc20f3c3fca787...  extensions : tag = [3] constructed; length = 233    Extensions SEQUENCE OF: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]    constructed; length = 230      Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]      constructed; length = 100        extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]        primitive; length = 3          { 2 5 29 9 } -- id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributesSantesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 29]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004        extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4]        primitive; length = 93          0x305b301006082b06010505070904310413024445300f06082...      Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]      constructed; length = 14        extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]          primitive; length = 3          { 2 5 29 15 } -- id-ce-keyUsage        critical BOOLEAN: tag = [UNIVERSAL 1] primitive; length = 1          TRUE        extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4]        primitive; length = 4          0x03020640      Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]      constructed; length = 18        extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]        primitive; length = 3          { 2 5 29 32 } -- id-ce-certificatePolicies        extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4]        primitive; length = 11          0x3009300706052b24080101      Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]      constructed; length = 31        extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]        primitive; length = 3          { 2 5 29 35 } -- id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier        extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4]        primitive; length = 24          0x30168014000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0ffedcba98      Extension SEQUENCE: tag = [UNIVERSAL 16]      constructed; length = 57        extnId OBJECT IDENTIFIER: tag = [UNIVERSAL 6]        primitive; length = 8          { 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 3 } -- id-pe-qcStatements        extnValue OCTET STRING: tag = [UNIVERSAL 4]        primitive; length = 45          0x302b302906082b06010505070b02301d301b81196d756e696...C.3 DER-encoding   This section contains the full, DER-encoded certificate, in hex.30820310 30820279 A0030201 02020449 9602D230 0D06092A 864886F7 0D01010505003048 310B3009 06035504 06130244 45313930 37060355 040A0C30 474D44202D20466F 72736368 756E6773 7A656E74 72756D20 496E666F 726D6174 696F6E7374656368 6E696B20 476D6248 301E170D 30343032 30313130 30303030 5A170D3038303230 31313030 3030305A 3065310B 30090603 55040613 02444531 373035060355040A 0C2E474D 4420466F 72736368 756E6773 7A656E74 72756D20 496E666FSantesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 30]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004726D6174 696F6E73 74656368 6E696B20 476D6248 311D300C 06035504 2A0C055065747261 300D0603 5504040C 06426172 7A696E30 819F300D 06092A86 4886F70D01010105 0003818D 00308189 02818100 DCE74CD5 A1D55AEB 01CF5ECC 20F3C3FCA787CFCB 571A21AA 8A20AD5D FF015130 DE724E5E D3F95392 E7BB16C4 A71D0F31B3A9926A 8F08EA00 FDC3A8F2 BB016DEC A3B9411B A2599A2A 8CB655C6 DFEA25BFEDDC73B5 94FAA0EF E595C612 A6AE5B8C 7F0CA19C EC4FE7AB 60546768 4BB2387D5F2F7EBD BC3EF0A6 04F6B404 01176925 02030100 01A381E9 3081E630 640603551D09045D 305B3010 06082B06 01050507 09043104 13024445 300F0608 2B06010505070903 31031301 46301D06 082B0601 05050709 01311118 0F313937 3131303134313230 3030305A 30170608 2B060105 05070902 310B0C09 4461726D 7374616474300E06 03551D0F 0101FF04 04030206 40301206 03551D20 040B3009 300706052B240801 01301F06 03551D23 04183016 80140001 02030405 06070809 0A0B0C0D0E0FFEDC BA983039 06082B06 01050507 0103042D 302B3029 06082B06 010505070B02301D 301B8119 6D756E69 63697061 6C697479 40646172 6D737461 64742E6465300D06 092A8648 86F70D01 01050500 03818100 8F8C80BB B2D86B75 F4E21F82EFE0F20F 6C558890 A6E73118 8359B9C7 8CE71C92 0C66C600 53FBC924 825090F295B08826 EAF3FF1F 5917C80B B4836129 CFE5563E 78592B5B B0F9ACB5 2915F0F2BC36991F 21436520 E9064761 D932D871 F71FFEBD AD648FA7 CF3C1BC0 96F112D4B882B39F E1A16A90 AE1A80B8 A9676518 B5AA7E97C.4.  CA's Public RSA Key   This section contains the DER-encoded public RSA key of the CA who   signed the example certificate.  It is included with the purpose of   simplifying verifications of the example certificate.   30818902818100c88f4bdb66f713ba3dd7a9069880e888d4321acb53cda7fcdf   da89b834e25430b956d46a438baa6798035af30db378424e00a8296b012b1b24   f9cf0b3f83be116cd8a36957dc3f54cbd7c58a10c380b3dfa15bd2922ea8660f   96e1603d81357c0442ad607c5161d083d919fd5307c1c3fa6dfead0e6410999e   8b8a8411d525dd0203010001ReferencesNormative References   [RFC 2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate              Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119, March 1997.   [RFC 2247] Kille, S., Wahl, M., Grimstad, A., Huber R. and S.              Sataluri, "Using Domains in LDAP/X.500 Distinguished              Names",RFC 2247, January 1998.   [RFC 2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS",RFC 2818, May 2000.Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 31]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004   [RFC 2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object              Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0",RFC 2985,              November 2000.   [RFC 3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W. and D. Solo, "Internet              X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and              Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile",RFC 3280,              April 2002.   [X.509]    ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (2000) | ISO/IEC 9594-8:2001,              Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection -              The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate              frameworks   [X.520]    ITU-T Recommendation X.520 (2001) | ISO/IEC 9594-6:2001,              Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection -              The Directory: Selected Attribute Types, 2001.   [X.680]    ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002),              Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One,              2002.   [ISO 3166] ISO 3166-1:1997, Codes for the representation of names of              countries, 1997.   [HTTP/1.1] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,              Masinter, L., Leach, P. and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext              Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1",RFC 2616, June 1999.Informative References   [X.501]    ITU-T recommendation X.501 (2001) | ISO/IEC 9594-2:2001,              Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection -              The Directory: Models, 2001.   [EU-ESDIR] Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the              Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for              electronic signatures, 1999.   [RFC 2253] Wahl, M., Kille, S. and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory              Access Protocol (v3): UTF-8 String Representation of              Distinguished Names",RFC 2253, December 1997.Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 32]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004Authors' Addresses   Stefan Santesson   Microsoft Denmark   Tuborg Boulevard 12   DK-2900 Hellerup   Denmark   EMail: stefans@microsoft.com   Tim Polk   NIST   Building 820, Room 426   Gaithersburg, MD 20899, USA   EMail: wpolk@nist.gov   Magnus Nystrom   RSA Security   Box 10704   S-121 29 Stockholm   Sweden   EMail: magnus@rsasecurity.comSantesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 33]

RFC 3739             Qualified Certificates Profile           March 2004Full Copyright Statement   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).  This document is subject   to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained inBCP 78 and   except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE   REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE   INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR   IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF   THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.Intellectual Property   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed   to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology   described in this document or the extent to which any license   under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it   represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any   such rights.  Information on the procedures with respect to   rights in RFC documents can be found inBCP 78 andBCP 79.   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use   of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository   athttp://www.ietf.org/ipr.   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention   any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other   proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required   to implement this standard.  Please address the information to the   IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org.Acknowledgement   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the   Internet Society.Santesson, et al.           Standards Track                    [Page 34]