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Network Working Group                                            S. KentRequest for Comments: 1108                            BBN CommunicationsObsoletes: RFC1038                                        November 1991U.S. Department of DefenseSecurity Options for the Internet ProtocolStatus of this Memo   This RFC specifies an IAB standards track protocol for the Internet   community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.   Please refer to the current edition of the "IAB Official Protocol   Standards" for the standardization state and status of this protocol.   Distribution of this memo is unlimited.Abstract   This RFC specifies the U.S. Department of Defense Basic Security   Option and the top-level description of the Extended Security Option   for use with the Internet Protocol.  This RFC obsoletesRFC 1038   "Revised IP Security Option", dated January 1988.1.  DoD Security Options Defined   The following two internet protocol options are defined for use on   Department of Defense (DoD) common user data networks:   CF  CLASS  #  TYPE  LENGTH   DESCRIPTION   1     0    2   130   var.    DoD Basic Security:  Used to carry the                                classification level and protection                                authority flags.   1     0    5   133   var.    DoD Extended Security:  Used to carry                                additional security information as                                required by registered authorities.   CF = Copy on Fragmentation2.  DoD Basic Security Option   This option identifies the U.S. classification level at which the   datagram is to be protected and the authorities whose protection   rules apply to each datagram.Kent                                                            [Page 1]

RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option           November 1991   This option is used by end systems and intermediate systems of an   internet to:        a.  Transmit from source to destination in a network standard        representation the common security labels required by computer        security models,        b.  Validate the datagram as appropriate for transmission from        the source and delivery to the destination,        c.  Ensure that the route taken by the datagram is protected to        the level required by all protection authorities indicated on        the datagram.  In order to provide this facility in a general        Internet environment, interior and exterior gateway protocols        must be augmented to include security label information in        support of routing control.   The DoD Basic Security option must be copied on fragmentation.  This   option appears at most once in a datagram.  Some security systems   require this to be the first option if more than one option is   carried in the IP header, but this is not a generic requirement   levied by this specification.   The format of the DoD Basic Security option is as follows:      +------------+------------+------------+-------------//----------+      |  10000010  |  XXXXXXXX  |  SSSSSSSS  |  AAAAAAA[1]    AAAAAAA0 |      |            |            |            |         [0]             |      +------------+------------+------------+-------------//----------+        TYPE = 130     LENGTH   CLASSIFICATION         PROTECTION                                     LEVEL              AUTHORITY                                                          FLAGS                    FIGURE 1.  DoD BASIC SECURITY OPTION FORMAT2.1.  Type   The value 130 identifies this as the DoD Basic Security Option.2.2.  Length   The length of the option is variable.  The minimum length of the   option is 3 octets, including the Type and Length fields (the   Protection Authority field may be absent).  A length indication of   less than 3 octets should result in error processing as described inSection 2.8.1.Kent                                                            [Page 2]

RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option           November 19912.3.  Classification Level        Field Length:  One Octet   This field specifies the (U.S.) classification level at which the   datagram must be protected.  The information in the datagram must be   protected at this level.  The field is encoded as shown in Table 1   and the order of values in this table defines the ordering for   comparison purposes.  The bit string values in this table were chosen   to achieve a minimum Hamming distance of four (4) between any two   valid values.  This specific assignment of classification level names   to values has been defined for compatibility with security devices   which have already been developed and deployed.   "Reserved" values in the table must be treated as invalid until such   time they are assigned to named classification levels in a successor   to this document.  A datagram containing a value for this field which   is either not in this table or which is listed as "reserved" is in   error and must be processed according to the "out-of-range"   procedures defined insection 2.8.1.   A classification level value from the Basic Security Option in a   datagram may be checked for equality against any of the (assigned)   values in Table 1 by performing a simple bit string comparison.   However, because of the sparseness of the classification level   encodings, range checks involving a value from this field must not be   performed based solely using arithmetic comparisons (as such   comparisons would encompass invalid and or unassigned values within   the range).  The details of how ordered comparisons are performed for   this field within a system is a local matter, subject to the   requirements set forth in this paragraph.                    Table 1.  Classification Level Encodings                         Value              Name                        00000001   -   (Reserved 4)                        00111101   -   Top Secret                        01011010   -   Secret                        10010110   -   Confidential                        01100110   -   (Reserved 3)                        11001100   -   (Reserved 2)                        10101011   -   Unclassified                        11110001   -   (Reserved 1)Kent                                                            [Page 3]

RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option           November 19912.4.  Protection Authority Flags        Field Length:  Variable   This field identifies the National Access Programs or Special Access   Programs which specify protection rules for transmission and   processing of the information contained in the datagram.  Note that   protection authority flags do NOT represent accreditation   authorities, though the semantics are superficially similar.  In   order to maintain architectural consistency and interoperability   throughout DoD common user data networks, users of these networks   should submit requirements for additional Protection Authority Flags   to DISA DISDB, Washington, D.C.  20305-2000, for review and approval.   Such review and approval should be sought prior to design,   development or deployment of any system which would make use of   additional facilities based on assignment of new protection authority   flags.  As additional flags are approved and assigned, they will be   published, along with the values defined above, in the Assigned   Numbers RFC edited by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).        a.  Field Length: This field is variable in length.  The low-        order bit (Bit 7) of each octet is encoded as "0" if it is the        final octet in the field or as "1" if there are additional        octets.  Initially, only one octet is required for this field        (because there are fewer than seven authorities defined), thus        the final bit of the first octet is encoded as "0".  However,        minimally compliant implementations must be capable of        processing a protection authority field consisting of at least 2        octets (representing up to 14 protection authorities).        Implementations existing prior to the issuance of this RFC, and        which process fewer protection authority than specified here,        will be considered minimally compliant so long as such        implementations process the flags in accordance with the RFC.        This field must be a minimally encoded representation, i.e., no        trailing all-zero octets should be emitted.  If the length of        this field as indicated by this extensible encoding is not        consistent with the length field for the option, the datagram is        in error and the procedure described inSection 2.8.1 must be        followed.  (Figure 2 illustrates the relative significance of        the bits within an octet).                        0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7                      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+          High-order  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  Low-order                      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+                         Figure 2.  Significance of BitsKent                                                            [Page 4]

RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option           November 1991        b.  Source Flags: The first seven bits (Bits 0 through 6) in        each octet are flags.  Each flag is associated with an        authority.  Protection Authority flags currently assigned are        indicated in Table 2.  The bit corresponding to an authority is        "1" if the datagram is to be protected in accordance with the        rules of that authority.  More than one flag may be present in a        single instance of this option if the data contained in the        datagram should be protected according to rules established by        multiple authorities.  Table 3 identifies a point of contact for        each of the authorities listed in Table 2.  No "unassigned" bits        in this or other octets in the Protection Authority Field shall        be considered valid Protection Authority flags until such time        as such bits are assigned and the assignments are published in        the Assigned Numbers RFC.  Thus a datagram containing flags for        unassigned bits in this field for this option is in error and        must be processed according to the "out-of-range" procedures        defined insection 2.8.1.        Two protection authority flag fields can be compared for        equality (=) via simple bit string matching.  No relative        ordering between two protection authority flag fields is        defined.  Because these flags represent protection authorities,        security models such as Bell-LaPadula do not apply to        interpretation of this field.  However, the symbol "=<" refers        to set inclusion when comparing a protection authority flag        field to a set of such fields.  Means for effecting these tests        within a system are a local matter, subject to the requirements        set forth in this paragraph.                      Table 2 - Protection Authority Bit Assignments                                BIT                               NUMBER     AUTHORITY                                 0        GENSER                                 1        SIOP-ESI                                 2        SCI                                 3        NSA                                 4        DOE                              5, 6        Unassigned                                 7        Field Termination IndicatorKent                                                            [Page 5]

RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option           November 1991                Table 3 - Protection Authority Points of Contact                AUTHORITY             POINT OF CONTACT                GENSER                Designated Approving Authority                                      per DOD 5200.28                SIOP-ESI              Department of Defense                                      Organization of the                                      Joint Chiefs of Staff                                      Attn: J6                                      Washington, DC  20318-6000                SCI                   Director of Central Intelligence                                      Attn: Chairman, Information                                      Handling Committee, Intelligence                                      Community Staff                                      Washington, D.C. 20505                NSA                   National Security Agency                                      9800 Savage Road                                      Attn: T03                                      Ft. Meade, MD 20755-6000                DOE                   Department of Energy                                      Attn:  DP343.2                                      Washington, DC  205452.5.  System Security Configuration Parameters   Use of the Basic Security Option (BSO) by an end or intermediate   system requires that the system configuration include the parameters   described below.  These parameters are critical to secure processing   of the BSO, and thus must be protected from unauthorized   modification.  Note that compliant implementations must allow a   minimum of 14 distinct Protection Authority flags (consistent with   the Protection Authority field size defined inSection 2.4) to be set   independently in any parameter involving Protection Authority flag   fields.        a. SYSTEM-LEVEL-MAX: This parameter specifies the highest        Classification Level (see Table 1) which may be present in the        classification level field of the Basic Security Option in any        datagram transmitted or received by the system.        b. SYSTEM-LEVEL-MIN: This parameter specifies the lowest        Classification Level (see Table 1) which may be present in the        classification level field of the Basic Security Option in anyKent                                                            [Page 6]

RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option           November 1991        datagram transmitted by the system.        c. SYSTEM-AUTHORITY-IN:  This parameter is a set, each member of        which is a Protection Authority flag field.  The set enumerates        all of the Protection Authority flag fields which may be present        in the Protection Authority field of the Basic Security Option        in any datagram received by this system.  A compliant        implementation must be capable of representing at least 256        distinct Protection Authority flag fields (each field must be        capable of representing 14 distinct Protection Authority flags)        in this set.  Each element of the enumerated set may be a        combination of multiple protection authority flags.        Set elements representing multiple Protection Authorities are        formed by ORing together the flags that represent each        authority.  Thus, for example, a set  element representing        datagrams to be protected according to NSA and SCI rules might        be represented as "00110000" while an element representing        protection mandated by NSA, DOE and SIOP-ESI might be        represented as "01011000".  (These examples illustrate 8-bit set        elements apropos the minimal encodings for currently defined        Protection Authority flags.  If additional flags are defined        beyond the first byte of the Protection Authority Field, longer        encodings for set elements may be required.)        It is essential that implementations of the Internet Protocol        Basic Security Option provide a convenient and compact way for        system security managers to express which combinations of flags        are allowed.  The details of such an interface are outside the        scope of this RFC, however, enumeration of bit patterns is NOT a        recommended interface.  As an alternative, one might consider a        notation of the form COMB(GENSER,NSA,SCI)+COMB(SIOP-ESI,NSA,SCI)        in which "COMB" means ANY combination of the flags referenced as        parameters of the COMB function are allowed and "+" means "or".        d. SYSTEM-AUTHORITY-OUT:  This parameter is a set, each member        of which is a Protection Authority flag field.  The set        enumerates all of the Protection Authority flag fields which may        be present in the Protection Authority field of the Basic        Security Option in any datagram transmitted by this system.  A        compliant implementation must be capable of representing at        least 256 distinct Protection Authority flag fields in this set.        Explicit enumeration of all authorized Protection Authority        field flags permits great flexibility, and in particular does        not impose set inclusion restrictions on this parameter.   The following configuration parameters are defined for each network   port present on the system.  The term "port" is used here to referKent                                                            [Page 7]

RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option           November 1991   either to a physical device interface (which may represent multiple   IP addresses) or to a single IP address (which may be served via   multiple physical interfaces).  In general the former interpretation   will apply and is consistent with the Trusted Network Interpretation   of the Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation Criteria (TNI) concept of   a "communications channel" or "I/O device."  However, the latter   interpretation also may be valid depending on local system security   capabilities.  Note that some combinations of port parameter values   are appropriate only if the port is "single level," i.e., all data   transmitted or received via the port is accurately characterized by   exactly one Classification Level and Protection Authority Flag field.        e. PORT-LEVEL-MAX: This parameter specifies the highest        Classification Level (see Table 1) which may be present in the        classification level field of the Basic Security Option in any        datagram transmitted or received by the system via this network        port.        f. PORT-LEVEL-MIN: This parameter specifies the lowest        Classification Level (see Table 1) which may be present in the        classification level field of the Basic Security Option in any        datagram transmitted by the system via this network port.        g. PORT-AUTHORITY-IN:  This parameter is a set each member of        which is a Protection Authority flag field.  The set enumerates        all of the Protection Authority flag fields which may be present        in the Protection Authority field of the Basic Security Option        in any datagram received via this port.  A compliant        implementation must be capable of representing at least 256        distinct Protection Authority flag fields in this set.        h. PORT-AUTHORITY-OUT:  This parameter is a set each member of        which is a Protection Authority flag field.  The set enumerates        all of the Protection Authority flag fields which may be present        in the Protection Authority field of the Basic Security Option        in any datagram transmitted via this port.  A compliant        implementation must be capable of representing at least 256        distinct Protection Authority flag fields in this set.        i. PORT-AUTHORITY-ERROR:  This parameter is a single Protection        Authority flag field assigned to transmitted ICMP error messages        (seeSection 2.8).  The PORT-AUTHORITY-ERROR value is selected        from the set of values which constitute PORT-AUTHORITY-OUT.        Means for selecting the PORT-AUTHORITY-ERROR value within a        system are a local matter subject to local security policies.        j. PORT-IMPLICIT-LABEL:  This parameter specifies a single        Classification Level and a Protection Authority flag fieldKent                                                            [Page 8]

RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option           November 1991        (which may be null) to be associated with all unlabelled        datagrams received via the port.  This parameter is meaningful        only if PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-RECEIVE = FALSE, otherwise receipt of        an unlabelled datagram results in an error response.        k. PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-RECEIVE:  This parameter is a boolean which        indicates whether all datagrams received via this network port        must contain a Basic Security Option.        l. PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-TRANSMIT:  This parameter is a boolean        which indicates whether all datagrams transmitted via this        network port must contain a Basic Security Option.   If this        parameter is set to FALSE, then PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-RECEIVE should        also be set to FALSE (to avoid communication failures resulting        from asymmetric labelling constraints).   In every intermediate or end system, the following relationship must   hold for these parameters for all network interfaces.  The symbol   ">=" is interpreted relative to the linear ordering defined for   security levels specified inSection 2.3 for the "LEVEL" parameters,   and as set inclusion for the "AUTHORITY" parameters.           SYSTEM-LEVEL-MAX >= PORT-LEVEL-MAX >=                   PORT-LEVEL-MIN >= SYSTEM-LEVEL-MIN           SYSTEM-AUTHORITY-IN >= PORT-AUTHORITY-IN                            and           SYSTEM-AUTHORITY-OUT >= PORT-AUTHORITY-OUT2.6.  Configuration Considerations   Systems which do not maintain separation for different security   classification levels of data should have only trivial ranges for the   LEVEL parameters, i.e., SYSTEM-LEVEL-MAX = PORT-LEVEL-MAX = PORT-   LEVEL-MIN = SYSTEM-LEVEL-MIN.   Systems which do maintain separation for different security   classification levels of data may have non-trivial ranges for the   LEVEL parameters, e.g., SYSTEM-LEVEL-MAX >= PORT-LEVEL-MAX >= PORT-   LEVEL-MIN >= SYSTEM-LEVEL-MIN.2.7.  Processing the Basic Security Option   For systems implementing the Basic Security Option, the parameters   PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-TRANSMIT and PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-RECEIVE are used to   specify the local security policy with regard to requiring the   presence of this option on transmitted and received datagrams,   respectively, on a per-port basis.  Each datagram transmitted orKent                                                            [Page 9]

RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option           November 1991   received by the system must be processed in accordance with the per-   port and system-wide security parameters configured for the system.   Systems which process only Unclassified data may or may not be   configured to generate the BSO on transmitted datagrams.  Such   systems also may or may not require a BSO to be present on received   datagrams.  However, all systems must be capable of accepting   datagrams containing this option, irrespective of whether the option   is processed or not.   In general, systems which process classified data must generate this   option for transmitted datagrams.  The only exception to this rule   arises in (dedicated or system high [DoD 5200.28]) networks where   traffic may be implicitly labelled rather than requiring each   attached system to generate explicit labels.  If the local security   policy permits receipt of datagrams without the option, each such   datagram is presumed to be implicitly labelled based on the port via   which the datagram is received.  A per-port parameter (PORT-   IMPLICIT-LABEL) specifies the label to be associated with such   datagrams upon receipt.  Note that a datagram transmitted in response   to receipt of an implicitly labelled datagram, may, based on local   policy, require an explicit Basic Security Option.2.7.1.  Handling Unclassified Datagrams   If an unmarked datagram is received via a network port for which   PORT-BSO-REQUIRED = FALSE and PORT-IMPLICIT-LABEL = UNCLASSIFIED (NO   FLAGS), the datagram shall be processed as though no Protection   Authority Flags were set.  Thus there are two distinct, valid   representations for Unclassified datagrams to which no Protection   Authority rules apply (an unmarked datagram as described here and a   datagram containing an explicit BSO with Classification Level set to   Unclassified and with no Protection Authority flags set).  Note that   a datagram also may contain a Basic Security Option in which the   Classification Level is Unclassified and one or more Protection   Authority Field Flags are set.  Such datagrams are explicitly   distinct from the equivalence class noted above (datagrams marked   Unclassified with no Protection Authority field flags set and   datagrams not containing a Basic Security Option).2.7.2.  Input Processing   Upon receipt of any datagram a system compliant with this RFC must   perform the following actions.  First, if PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-RECEIVE =   TRUE for this port, then any received datagram must contain a Basic   Security Option and a missing BSO results in an ICMP error response   as specified inSection 2.8.1.  A received datagram which contains a   Basic Security Option must be processed as described below.  ThisKent                                                           [Page 10]

RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option           November 1991   algorithm assumes that the IP header checksum has already been   verified and that, in the course of processing IP options, this   option has been encountered.  The value of the Classification Level   field from the option will be designated "DG-LEVEL" and the value of   the Protection Authority Flags field will be designated "DG-   AUTHORITY."   Step 1. Check that DG-LEVEL is a valid security classification level,           i.e., it must be one of the (non-reserved) values from Table           1.  If this test fails execute the out-of-range procedure inSection 2.8.1.   Step 2. Check that PORT-LEVEL-MAX >= DG-LEVEL.  If this test fails,           execute out-of-range procedure specified inSection 2.8.2.   Step 3. Check that DG-AUTHORITY =< PORT-AUTHORITY-IN.  If this test           fails, execute out-of-range procedure specified inSection2.8.2.2.7.3.  Output Processing   Any system which implements the Basic Security Option must adhere to   a fundamental rule with regard to transmission of datagrams, i.e., no   datagram shall be transmitted with a Basic Security Option the value   of which is outside of the range for which the system is configured.   Thus for every datagram transmitted by a system the following must   hold: PORT-LEVEL-MAX >= DG-LEVEL >= PORT-LEVEL-MIN and DG-AUTHORITY   =< PORT-AUTHORITY-OUT.  It is a local matter as to what procedures   are followed by a system which detects at attempt to transmit a   datagram for which these relationships do not hold.   If a port is configured to allow both labelled and unlabelled   datagrams (PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-TRANSMIT = FALSE) to be transmitted, the   question arises as to whether a label should be affixed.  In   recognition of the lack of widespread implementation or use of this   option, especially in unclassified networks, this RFC recommends that   the default be transmission of unlabelled datagrams.  If the   destination requires all datagrams to be labelled on input, then it   will respond with an ICMP error message (seeSection 2.8.1) and the   originator can respond by labelling successive packets transmitted to   this destination.   To support this mode of operation, a system which allows transmission   of both labelled and unlabelled datagrams must maintain state   information (a cache) so that the system can associate the use of   labels with specific destinations, e.g., in response to receipt of an   ICMP error message as specified inSection 2.8.1.  This requirement   for maintaining a per-destination cache is very much analogous toKent                                                           [Page 11]

RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option           November 1991   that imposed for processing the IP source route option or for   maintaining first hop routing information (RFC 1122).  This RFC does   not specify which protocol module must maintain the per-destination   cache (e.g., IP vs.  TCP or UDP) but security engineering constraints   may dictate an IP implementation in trusted systems.  This RFC also   does not specify a cache maintenance algorithm, though use of a timer   and activity flag may be appropriate.2.8.  Error Procedures   Datagrams received with errors in the Basic Security Option or which   are out of range for the network port via which they are received,   should not be delivered to user processes.  Local policy will specify   whether logging and/or notification of a system security officer is   required in response to receipt of such datagrams.  The following are   the least restrictive actions permitted by this protocol.  Individual   end or intermediate systems, system administrators, or protection   authorities may impose more stringent restrictions on responses and   in some instances may not permit any response at all to a datagram   which is outside the security range of a host or system.   In all cases, if the error is triggered by receipt of an ICMP, the   ICMP is discarded and no response is permitted (consistent with   general ICMP processing rules).2.8.1.Parameter Problem Response   If a datagram is received with no Basic Security Option and the   system security configuration parameters require the option on the   network port via which the datagram was received, an ICMP Parameter   Problem Missing Option (Type = 12, Code = 1) message is transmitted   in response.  The Pointer field of the ICMP should be set to the   value "130" to indicate the type of option missing.  A Basic Security   Option is included in the response datagram with Clearance Level set   to PORT-LEVEL-MIN and Protection Authority Flags set to PORT-   AUTHORITY-ERROR.   If a datagram is received in which the Basic Security Option is   malformed (e.g., an invalid Classification Level Protection Authority   Flag field), an ICMP Parameter Problem (Type = 12, Code = 0) message   is transmitted in response.  The pointer field is set to the   malformed Basic Security Option.  The Basic Security Option is   included in the response datagram with Clearance Level set to PORT-   LEVEL-MIN and Protection Authority Flags set to PORT-AUTHORITY-ERROR.Kent                                                           [Page 12]

RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option           November 19912.8.2.  Out-Of-Range Response   If a datagram is received which is out of range for the network port   on which it was received, an ICMP Destination Unreachable   Communication Administratively Prohibited (Type = 3, Code = 9 for net   or Code = 10 for host) message is transmitted in response.  A Basic   Security Option is included in the response datagram with Clearance   Level set to PORT-LEVEL-MIN and Protection Authority Flags set to   PORT-AUTHORITY-ERROR.2.9.  Trusted Intermediary Procedure   Certain devices in an internet may act as intermediaries to validate   that communications between two hosts are authorized.  This decision   is based on the knowledge of the accredited security levels of the   hosts and the values in the DoD Basic Security Option.  These devices   may receive IP datagrams which are in range for the intermediate   device, but are not within the accredited range either for the source   or for the destination.  In the former case, the datagram should be   treated as described above for an out-of-range option.  In the latter   case, an ICMP Destination Unreachable Communication Administratively   Prohibited (Type = 3, Code = 9 for net or Code = 10 for host)   response should be transmitted. The security range of the network   interface on which the reply will be sent determines whether a reply   is allowed and at what level it will be sent.3.  DoD Extended Security Option   This option permits additional security labelling information, beyond   that present in the Basic Security Option, to be supplied in an IP   datagram to meet the needs of registered authorities.  Note that   information which is not labelling data or which is meaningful only   to the end systems (not intermediate systems) is not appropriate for   transmission in the IP layer and thus should not be transported using   this option.  This option must be copied on fragmentation.  Unlike   the Basic Option, this option may appear multiple times within a   datagram, subject to overall IP header size constraints.   This option may be present only in conjunction with the Basic   Security Option, thus all systems which support Extended Security   Options must also support the Basic Security Option.  However, not   all systems which support the Basic Security Option need to support   Extended Security Options and support for these options may be   selective, i.e., a system need not support all Extended Security   Options.   The top-level format for this option is as follows:Kent                                                           [Page 13]

RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option           November 1991             +------------+------------+------------+-------//-------+             |  10000101  |  000LLLLL  |  AAAAAAAA  |  add sec info  |             +------------+------------+------------+-------//-------+              TYPE = 133      LENGTH     ADDITIONAL      ADDITIONAL                                        SECURITY INFO     SECURITY                                         FORMAT CODE        INFO                   FIGURE 3.  DoD EXTENDED SECURITY OPTION FORMAT3.1.  Type   The value 133 identifies this as the DoD Extended Security Option.3.2.  Length.   The length of the option, which includes the "Type" and "Length"   fields, is variable.  The minimum length of the option is 3 octets.3.3.  Additional Security Info Format Code        Length:  1 Octet   The value of the Additional Security Info Format Code identifies the   syntax and semantics for a specific "Additional Security Information"   field.  For each Additional Security Info Format Code, an RFC will be   published to specify the syntax and to provide an algorithmic   description of the processing required to determine whether a   datagram carrying a label specified by this Format Code should be   accepted or rejected.  This specification must be sufficiently   detailed to permit vendors to produce interoperable implementations,   e.g., it should be comparable to the specification of the Basic   Security Option provided in this RFC.  However, the specification   need not include a mapping from the syntax of the option to human   labels if such mapping would cause distribution of the specification   to be restricted.   In order to maintain the architectural consistency of DoD common user   data networks, and to maximize interoperability, each activity should   submit its plans for the definition and use of an Additional Security   Info Format Code to DISA DISDB, Washington, D.C.  20305-2000 for   review and approval.  DISA DISDB will forward plans to the Internet   Activities Board for architectural review and, if required, a cleared   committee formed by the IAB will be constituted for the review   process.  Once approved, the Internet Assigned Number authority will   assign an Additional Security Info Format Code to the requesting   activity, concurrent with publication of the corresponding RFC.   Note: The bit assignments for the Protection Authority flags of theKent                                                           [Page 14]

RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option           November 1991   Basic Security Option have no relationship to the "Additional   Security Info Format Code" of this option.3.4.  Additional Security Information.        Length:  Variable   The Additional Security Info field contains the additional security   labelling information specified by the "Additional Security Info   Format Code" of the Extended Security Option.  The syntax and   processing requirements for this field are specified by the   associated RFC as noted above.  The minimum length of this field is   zero.3.5.  System Security Configuration Parameters   Use of the Extended Security Option requires that the intermediate or   end system configuration accurately reflect the security parameters   associated with communication via each network port (seeSection 2.5   as a guide).  Internal representation of the security parameters   implementation dependent.  The set of parameters required to support   processing of the Extended Security Option is a function of the set   of Additional Security Info Format Codes supported by the system.   The RFC which specifies syntax and processing rules for a registered   Additional Security Info Format Code will specify the additional   system security parameters required for processing an Extended   Security Option relative to that Code.3.6.  Processing Rules   Any datagram containing an Extended Security Option must also contain   a Basic Security Option and receipt of a datagram containing the   former absent the latter constitutes an error.  If the length   specified by the Length field is inconsistent with the length   specified by the variable length encoding for the Additional Security   Info field, the datagram is in error.  If the datagram is received in   which the Additional Security Info Format Code contains a non-   registered value, the datagram is in error.  Finally, if the   Additional Security Info field contains data inconsistent with the   defining RFC for the Additional Security Info Format Code, the   datagram is in error.  In any of these cases, an ICMP Parameter   Problem response should be sent as perSection 2.8.1.  Any additional   error processing rules will be specified in the defining RFC for this   Additional Security Info Format Code.   If the additional security information contained in the Extended   Security Option indicates that the datagram is within range according   to the security policy of the system, then the datagram should beKent                                                           [Page 15]

RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option           November 1991   accepted for further processing.  Otherwise, the datagram should be   rejected and the procedure specified inSection 2.8.2 should be   followed (with the Extended Security Option values set apropos the   Additional Security Info Format Code port security parameters).   As with the Basic Security Option, it will not be possible in a   general internet environment for intermediate systems to provide   routing control for datagrams based on the labels contained in the   Extended Security Option until such time as interior and exterior   gateway routing protocols are enhanced to process such labels.References   [DoD 5200.28]  Department of Defense Directive 5200.28, "Security                  Requirements for Automated Information Systems," 21                  March 1988.Security Considerations   The focus of this RFC is the definition of formats and processing   conventions to support security labels for data contained in IP   datagrams, thus a variety of security issues must be considered   carefully when making use of these options.  It is not possible to   address all of the security considerations which affect correct   implementation and use of these options, however the following   paragraph highglights some of these issues.   Correct implementation and operation of the software and hardware   which processes these options is essential to their effective use.   Means for achieving confidence in such correct implementation and   operation are outside of the scope of this RFC.  The options   themselves incorporate no facilities to ensure the integrity of the   security labels in transit (other than the IP checksum mechanism),   thus appropriate technology must be employed whenever datagrams   containing these options transit "hostile" communication   environments.  Careful, secure management of the configuration   variables associated with each system making use of these options is   essential if the options are to provide the intended security   functionality.Kent                                                           [Page 16]

RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option           November 1991Author's Address   Stephen Kent   BBN Communications   150 CambridgePark Drive   Cambridge, MA  02140   Phone: (617) 873-3988   Email: kent@bbn.comKent                                                           [Page 17]

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