Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.¶

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.¶

Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttps://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9632.¶

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.¶

Table of Contents

1.Introduction

Providers of Internet content and other services may wish to customize those services based on the geographic location of the user of the service. This is often done using the source IP address used to contact the service, which may not point to a user; seeSection 14 of [RFC6269] in particular. Also, administrators of infrastructure and other services might wish to publish the locale of said infrastructure or services. infrastructure and other services might wish to publish the locale of their services.[RFC8805] defines geofeed, a syntax to associate geographic locales with IP addresses, but it does not specify how to find the relevant geofeed data given an IP address.¶

This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL)[RFC2725] inetnum: class to refer specifically to geofeed data files and how to prudently use them. In all places inetnum: is used, inet6num: should also be assumed[RFC4012].¶

The reader may find[INETNUM] and[INET6NUM] informative, and certainly more verbose, descriptions of the inetnum: database classes.¶

An optional utterly awesome but slightly complex means for authenticating geofeed data is also defined inSection 5.¶

This document obsoletes[RFC9092]. Changes from[RFC9092] include the following:¶

• RIPE has implemented the geofeed: attribute.¶
• This document allows, but discourages, an inetnum: to have both a geofeed remarks: attribute and a geofeed: attribute.¶
• The Authentication section (Section 5) has been rewritten to be more formal.¶
• Geofeed files are only UTF-8 CSV.¶
• This document stresses that authenticating geofeed data is optional.¶
• IP Address Delegation extensions must not use "inherit".¶
• If geofeed data are present, geographic location hints in other data should be ignored.¶

2.Geofeed Files

Geofeed files are described in[RFC8805]. They provide a facility for an IP address resource "owner" to associate those IP addresses to geographic locales.¶

Per[RFC8805], geofeed files consist of comma-separated values (CSV) in UTF-8 text format, not HTML, richtext, or other formats.¶

Content providers and other parties who wish to locate an IP address to a geographic locale need to find the relevant geofeed data. InSection 3, this document specifies how to find the relevant geofeed[RFC8805] file given an IP address.¶

Geofeed data for large providers with significant horizontal scale and high granularity can be quite large. The size of a file can be even larger if an unsigned geofeed file combines data for many prefixes, if dual IPv4/IPv6 spaces are represented, etc.¶

Geofeed data do have privacy considerations (seeSection 7); this process makes bulk access to those data easier.¶

This document also suggests an optional signature to strongly authenticate the data in the geofeed files.¶

3.inetnum: Class

The original RPSL specifications starting with[RIPE81],[RIPE181], and a trail of subsequent documents were written by the RIPE community. The IETF standardized RPSL in[RFC2622] and[RFC4012]. Since then, it has been modified and extensively enhanced in the Regional Internet Registry (RIR) community, mostly by RIPE[RIPE-DB]. At the time of publishing this document, change control of the RPSL effectively lies in the operator community.¶

The inetnum: database class is specified by the RPSL, as well as Routing Policy System Security[RFC2725] and RPSLng[RFC4012], which are used by the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). Each of these objects describes an IP address range and its attributes. The inetnum: objects form a hierarchy ordered on the address space.¶

Ideally, the RPSL would be augmented to define a new RPSL geofeed: attribute in the inetnum: class. Absent implementation of the geofeed: attribute in a particular RIR database, this document defines the syntax of a Geofeed remarks: attribute, which contains an HTTPS URL of a geofeed file. The format of the inetnum: geofeed remarks: attributeMUST be as in this example, "remarks: Geofeed ", where the token "Geofeed "MUST be case sensitive, followed by a URL that will vary, but itMUST refer only to a single geofeed[RFC8805] file.¶

    inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example    remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed

While we leave global agreement of RPSL modification to the relevant parties, we specify that a proper geofeed: attribute in the inetnum: classMUST be "geofeed:" andMUST be followed by a single URL that will vary, but itMUST refer only to a single geofeed[RFC8805] file.¶

    inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example    geofeed: https://example.com/geofeed

The URL uses HTTPS, so the WebPKI provides authentication, integrity, and confidentiality for the fetched geofeed file. However, the WebPKI cannot provide authentication of IP address space assignment. In contrast, the RPKI (see[RFC6481]) can be used to authenticate IP space assignment; see optional authentication inSection 5.¶

Until all producers of inetnum: objects, i.e., the RIRs, state that they have migrated to supporting a geofeed: attribute, consumers looking at inetnum: objects to find geofeed URLsMUST be able to consume both the remarks: and geofeed: forms.¶

The migration not only implies that the RIRs support the geofeed: attribute, but that all registrants have migrated any inetnum: objects from remarks: to geofeed: attributes.¶

Any particular inetnum: objectSHOULD have, at most, one geofeed reference, whether a remarks: or a proper geofeed: attribute when it is implemented. As the remarks: form cannot be formally checked by the RIR, this cannot be formally enforced. A geofeed: attribute is preferred, of course, if the RIR supports it. If there is more than one type of attribute in the intetnum: object, the geofeed: attributeMUST be used.¶

For inetnum: objects covering the same address range, a signed geofeed fileMUST be preferred over an unsigned file. If none are signed, or more than one is signed, the (signed) inetnum: with the most recent last-modified: attributeMUST be preferred.¶

If a geofeed file describes multiple disjoint ranges of IP address space, there are likely to be geofeed references from multiple inetnum: objects. Files with geofeed references from multiple inetnum: objects are not compatible with the signing procedure inSection 5.¶

An unsigned, and only an unsigned, geofeed fileMAY be referenced by multiple inetnum: objects andMAY contain prefixes from more than one registry.¶

When fetching, the most specific inetnum: object with a geofeed referenceMUST be used.¶

It is significant that geofeed data may have finer granularity than the inetnum: that refers to them. For example, an INETNUM object for an address range P could refer to a geofeed file in which P has been subdivided into one or more longer prefixes.¶

4.Fetching Geofeed Data

This document provides a guideline for how interested parties should fetch and read geofeed files.¶

Historically, before[RFC9092], this was done in varied ways, at the discretion of the implementor, often without consistent authentication, where data were mostly imported from email without formal authorization or validation.¶

To minimize the load on RIRs' WHOIS[RFC3912] services, the RIR's FTP[RFC0959] servicesSHOULD be used for large-scale access to gather inetnum: objects with geofeed references. This uses efficient bulk access instead of fetching via brute-force search through the IP space.¶

When reading data from an unsigned geofeed file, oneMUST ignore data outside the referring inetnum: object's address range. This is to avoid importing data about ranges not under the control of the operator. Note that signed filesMUST only contain prefixes within the referring inetnum:'s range as mandated inSection 5.¶

If geofeed files are fetched, other location information from the inetnum:MUST be ignored.¶

Given an address range of interest, the most specific inetnum: object with a geofeed referenceMUST be used to fetch the geofeed file. For example, if the fetching party finds the following inetnum: objects:¶

    inetnum: 192.0.0.0/22 # example    remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed_1    inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example    remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed_2

An application looking for geofeed data for 192.0.2.0/29MUST ignore data in geofeed_1 because 192.0.2.0/29 is within the more specific 192.0.2.0/24 inetnum: covering that address range and that inetnum: does have a geofeed reference.¶

Hints in inetnum: objects such as country:, geoloc:, etc., tend to be administrative, and not deployment specific. Consider large, possibly global, providers with headquarters very far from most of their deployments. Therefore, if geofeed data are specified, either as a geofeed: attribute or in a geofeed remarks: attribute, other geographic hints such as country:, geoloc:, DNS geoloc RRsets, etc., for that address rangeMUST be ignored.¶

There is open-source code to traverse the RPSL data across all of the RIRs, collect all geofeed references, and process them[GEOFEED-FINDER]. It implements the steps above and of all the Operational Considerations described inSection 6, including caching. It produces a single geofeed file, merging all the geofeed files found. This open-source code can be run daily by a cron job, and the output file can be directly used.¶

RIRs are converging on Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) support, which includes geofeed data; see[RDAP-GEOFEED]. ThisSHOULD NOT be used for bulk retrieval of geofeed data.¶

5.Authenticating Geofeed Data (Optional)

The question arises whether a particular geofeed[RFC8805] data set is valid, i.e., is authorized by the "owner" of the IP address space and is authoritative in some sense. The inetnum: that points to the geofeed[RFC8805] file provides some assurance. Unfortunately, the RPSL in some repositories is weakly authenticated at best. An approach where the RPSL was signed per[RFC7909] would be good, except it would have to be deployed by all RPSL registries, and there is a fair number of them.¶

The remainder of this section specifies an optional authenticator for the geofeed data set that follows "Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)"[RFC6488].¶

A single optional authenticatorMAY be appended to a geofeed[RFC8805] file. It is a digest of the main body of the file signed by the private key of the relevant RPKI certificate for a covering address range. The following format bundles the relevant RPKI certificate with a signature over the geofeed text.¶

The canonicalization procedure converts the data from their internal character representation to the UTF-8[RFC3629] character encoding, and the <CRLF> sequenceMUST be used to denote the end of each line of text. A blank line is represented solely by the <CRLF> sequence. For robustness, any non-printable charactersMUST NOT be changed by canonicalization. Trailing blank linesMUST NOT appear at the end of the file. That is, the file must not end with multiple consecutive <CRLF> sequences. Any end-of-file marker used by an operating system is not considered to be part of the file content. When present, such end-of-file markersMUST NOT be covered by the digital signature.¶

If the authenticator is not in the canonical form described above, then the authenticator is invalid.¶

Borrowing detached signatures from[RFC5485], after file canonicalization, the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)[RFC5652] is used to create a detached DER-encoded signature that is then Base64 encoded with padding (as defined inSection 4 of [RFC4648]) and line wrapped to 72 or fewer characters. The same digest algorithmMUST be used for calculating the message digest of the content being signed, which is the geofeed file, and for calculating the message digest on the SignerInfo SignedAttributes[RFC8933]. The message digest algorithm identifierMUST appear in both the CMS SignedData DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers and the SignerInfo DigestAlgorithmIdentifier[RFC5652]. The RPKI certificate covering the geofeed inetnum: object's address range is included in the CMS SignedData certificates field[RFC5652].¶

The address range of the signing certificateMUST cover all prefixes in the signed geofeed file. If not, the authenticator is invalid.¶

The signing certificateMUST NOT include the Autonomous System Identifier Delegation certificate extension[RFC3779]. If it is present, the authenticator is invalid.¶

As with many other RPKI signed objects, the IP Address Delegation certificate extensionMUST NOT use the "inherit" capability defined inSection 2.2.3.5 of [RFC3779]. If "inherit" is used, the authenticator is invalid.¶

An IP Address Delegation extension using "inherit" would complicate processing. The implementation would have to build the certification path from the end entity to the trust anchor, then validate the path from the trust anchor to the end entity, and then the parameter would have to be remembered when the validated public key was used to validate a signature on a CMS object. Having to remember things from certification path validation for use with CMS object processing would be quite complex and error-prone. Additionally, the certificates do not get that much bigger by repeating the information.¶

An address range A "covers" address range B if the range of B is identical to or a subset of A. "Address range" is used here because inetnum: objects and RPKI certificates need not align on Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR)[RFC4632] prefix boundaries, while those of the lines in a geofeed file do align.¶

The Certification Authority (CA)SHOULD sign only one geofeed file with each generated private key andSHOULD generate a new key pair for each new version of a particular geofeed file. The CAMUST generate a new end entity (EE) certificate for each signing of a particular geofeed file. An associated EE certificate used in this fashion is termed a "one-time-use" EE certificate (seeSection 3 of [RFC6487]).¶

Identifying the private key associated with the certificate and getting the department that controls the private key (which might be stored in a Hardware Security Module (HSM)) to generate the CMS signature is left as an exercise for the implementor. On the other hand, verifying the signature has no similar complexity; the certificate, which is validated in the public RPKI, contains the needed public key. The RPKI trust anchors for the RIRs are expected to already be available to the party performing signature validation. Validation of the CMS signature over the geofeed file involves:¶

1. Obtaining the signer's certificate from the CMS SignedData CertificateSet[RFC5652]. The certificate SubjectKeyIdentifier extension[RFC5280]MUST match the SubjectKeyIdentifier in the CMS SignerInfo SignerIdentifier[RFC5652]. If the key identifiers do not match, then validationMUST fail.¶
2. Validating the signer's certificateMUST ensure that it is part of the current[RFC9286] manifest and that all resources are covered by the RPKI certificate.¶
3. Constructing the certification path for the signer's certificate. All of the needed certificates are expected to be readily available in the RPKI repository. The certification pathMUST be valid according to the validation algorithm in[RFC5280] and the additional checks specified in[RFC3779] associated with the IP Address Delegation certificate extension and the Autonomous System Identifier Delegation certificate extension. If certification path validation is unsuccessful, then validationMUST fail.¶
4. Validating the CMS SignedData as specified in[RFC5652] using the public key from the validated signer's certificate. If the signature validation is unsuccessful, then validationMUST fail.¶
5. Confirming that the eContentType object identifier (OID) is id-ct-geofeedCSVwithCRLF (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.47). This OIDMUST appear within both the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object and within the ContentType signed attribute in the signerInfo object (see[RFC6488]).¶
6. Verifying that the IP Address Delegation certificate extension[RFC3779] covers all of the address ranges of the geofeed file. If all of the address ranges are not covered, then validationMUST fail.¶

All of the above stepsMUST be successful to consider the geofeed file signature as valid.¶

The authenticatorMUST be hidden as a series of "#" comments at the end of the geofeed file. The following simple example is cryptographically incorrect:¶

    # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0 - 192.0.2.255    # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ    # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu    ...    # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa    # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk=    # End Signature: 192.0.2.0 - 192.0.2.255

A correct and full example is inAppendix A.¶

The CMS signature does not cover the signature lines.¶

The bracketing "# RPKI Signature:" and "# End Signature:"MUST be present as shown in the example. The RPKI Signature's IP address rangeMUST match that of the geofeed URL in the inetnum: that points to the geofeed file.¶

6.Operational Considerations

To create the needed inetnum: objects, an operator wishing to register the location of their geofeed file needs to coordinate with their Regional Internet Registry (RIR) or National Internet Registry (NIR) and/or any provider Local Internet Registry (LIR) that has assigned address ranges to them. RIRs/NIRs provide means for assignees to create and maintain inetnum: objects. They also provide means of assigning or sub-assigning IP address resources and allowing the assignee to create WHOIS data, including inetnum: objects, thereby referring to geofeed files.¶

The geofeed filesMUST be published via and fetched using HTTPS[RFC9110].¶

When using data from a geofeed file, oneMUST ignore data outside the referring inetnum: object's inetnum: attribute address range.¶

If and only if the geofeed file is not signed perSection 5, then multiple inetnum: objectsMAY refer to the same geofeed file, and the consumerMUST use only lines in the geofeed file where the prefix is covered by the address range of the inetnum: object's URL it has followed.¶

If the geofeed file is signed, and the signer's certificate changes, the signature in the geofeed fileMUST be updated.¶

It is good key hygiene to use a given key for only one purpose. To dedicate a signing private key for signing a geofeed file, an RPKI Certification Authority (CA) may issue a subordinate certificate exclusively for the purpose shown inAppendix A.¶

Harvesting and publishing aggregated geofeed data outside of the RPSL model should be avoided as it could lead to detailed data of one aggregatee undesirably affecting the less detailed data of a different aggregatee. Moreover, publishing aggregated geofeed data prevents the reader of the data from performing the checks described in Sections4 and5.¶

At the time of publishing this document, geolocation providers have bulk WHOIS data access at all the RIRs. An anonymized version of such data is openly available for all RIRs except ARIN, which requires an authorization. However, for users without such authorization, the same result can be achieved with extra RDAP effort. There is open-source code to pass over such data across all RIRs, collect all geofeed references, and process them[GEOFEED-FINDER].¶

To prevent undue load on RPSL and geofeed servers, entity-fetching geofeed data using these mechanismsMUST NOT do frequent real-time lookups.Section 3.4 of [RFC8805] suggests use of the HTTP Expires header[RFC9111] to signal when geofeed data should be refetched. As the data change very infrequently, in the absence of such an HTTP Header signal, collectorsSHOULD NOT fetch more frequently than weekly. It would be polite not to fetch at magic times such as midnight UTC, the first of the month, etc., because too many others are likely to do the same.¶

7.Privacy Considerations

[RFC8805] geofeed data may reveal the approximate location of an IP address, which might in turn reveal the approximate location of an individual user. Unfortunately,[RFC8805] provides no privacy guidance on avoiding or ameliorating possible damage due to this exposure of the user. In publishing pointers to geofeed files as described in this document, the operator should be aware of this exposure in geofeed data and be cautious. All the privacy considerations ofSection 4 of [RFC8805] apply to this document.¶

Where[RFC8805] provided the ability to publish location data, this document makes bulk access to those data readily available. This is a goal, not an accident.¶

8.Implementation Status

At the time of publishing this document, the geofeed: attribute in inetnum objects has been implemented in the RIPE and APNIC databases.¶

Registrants in databases that do not yet support the geofeed: attribute are using the remarks: attribute, or equivalent.¶

At the time of publishing this document, the registry data published by ARIN are not the same RPSL as that of the other registries (see[RFC7485] for a survey of the WHOIS Tower of Babel). Therefore, when fetching from ARIN via FTP[RFC0959], WHOIS[RFC3912], the RDAP[RFC9082], etc., the "NetRange" attribute/key must be treated as "inetnum", and the "Comment" attribute must be treated as "remarks".¶

[rpki-client] can be used to authenticate a signed geofeed file.¶

9.Security Considerations

It is generally prudent for a consumer of geofeed data to also use other sources to cross-validate the data. All the security considerations of[RFC8805] apply here as well.¶

The consumer of geofeed dataSHOULD fetch and process the data themselves. Importing data sets produced and/or processed by a third-party places significant trust in the third-party.¶

As mentioned inSection 5, some RPSL repositories have weak, if any, authentication. This allows spoofing of inetnum: objects pointing to malicious geofeed files.Section 5 suggests an unfortunately complex method for stronger authentication based on the RPKI.¶

For example, if an inetnum: for a wide address range (e.g., a /16) points to an RPKI-signed geofeed file, a customer or attacker could publish an unsigned equal or narrower (e.g., a /24) inetnum: in a WHOIS registry that has weak authorization, abusing the rule that the most-specific inetnum: object with a geofeed referenceMUST be used.¶

If signatures were mandatory, the above attack would be stymied, but of course that is not happening anytime soon.¶

The RPSL providers have had to throttle fetching from their servers due to too-frequent queries. Usually, they throttle by the querying IP address or block. Similar defenses will likely need to be deployed by geofeed file servers.¶

10.IANA Considerations

In the SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) in the Structure of Management Information (SMI) Numbers (MIB Module Registrations) registry group (located at<https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/>), the reference for this registration has been updated to this document:¶

Appendix A.Example

This appendix provides an example, including a trust anchor, a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) signed by the trust anchor, a CA certificate subordinate to the trust anchor, a CRL signed by the CA, an end entity certificate subordinate to the CA for signing the geofeed, and a detached signature.¶

The trust anchor is represented by a self-signed certificate. As usual in the RPKI, the trust anchor has authority over all IPv4 address blocks, all IPv6 address blocks, and all Autonomous System (AS) numbers.¶

   -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----   MIIEQTCCAymgAwIBAgIUEggycNoFVRjAuN/Fw7URu0DEZNAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL   BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMzA5MTkyMDMzMzlaFw0zMzA5   MTYyMDMzMzlaMBUxEzARBgNVBAMTCmV4YW1wbGUtdGEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB   AQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDQprR+g/i4JyObVURTp1JpGM23vGPyE5fDKFPqV7rw   M1Amm7cnew66U02IzV0X5oiv5nSGfRX5UxsbR+vwPBMceQyDgS5lexFiv4fB/Vjf   DT2qX/UjsLL9QOeaSOh7ToJSLjmtpa0D9iz7ful3hdxRjpMMZiE/reX9/ymdpW/E   dg0F6+T9WGZE1miPeIjl5OZwnmLHCftkN/aaYk1iPNjNniHYIOjC1jSpABmoZyTj   sgrwLE2F1fIRkVkwASqToq/D5v9voXaYYaXUNJb4H/5wenRuvT5O/n6PXh70rMQy   F5yzLs96ytxqg5gGX9kabVnvxFU8nHfPa0rhlwfTJnljAgMBAAGjggGHMIIBgzAd   BgNVHQ4EFgQUwL1SXb7SeLIW7LOjQ5XSBguZCDIwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUwL1SXb7S   eLIW7LOjQ5XSBguZCDIwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYw   GAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggrBgEFBQcOAjCBuQYIKwYBBQUHAQsEgawwgakwPgYI   KwYBBQUHMAqGMnJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4   YW1wbGUtdGEubWZ0MDUGCCsGAQUFBzANhilodHRwczovL3JyZHAuZXhhbXBsZS5u   ZXQvbm90aWZpY2F0aW9uLnhtbDAwBggrBgEFBQcwBYYkcnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4   YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvMCcGCCsGAQUFBwEHAQH/BBgwFjAJBAIAATAD   AwEAMAkEAgACMAMDAQAwIQYIKwYBBQUHAQgBAf8EEjAQoA4wDDAKAgEAAgUA////   /zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAa9eLY9QAmnlZOIyOzbpta5wqcOUQV/yR7o/0   1zkEZaSavKBt19lMK6AXZurx1T5jyjIwG7bEtZZThjtH2m80V5kc2tsFjSq/yp7N   JBclMHVd3tXse9If3nXYF4bxRIcir1lXlAbYN+Eo1U3i5qJO+fxouzt7Merk2Dih   nsenTeXKzN7tfmuCYZZHCC8viCoJWdH+o1uRM4TiQApZsUJ8sF4TABrrRJmA/Ed5   v0CTBbgqTx7yg0+VarFLPdnjYgtpoCJqwE2C1UpX15rZSaLVuGXtbwXd/cHEg5vF   W6QTsMeMQFEUa6hkicDGtxLTUdhckBgmCGoF2nlZii5f1BTWAg==   -----END CERTIFICATE-----

The CRL is issued by the trust anchor.¶

   -----BEGIN X509 CRL-----   MIIBjjB4AgEBMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMBUxEzARBgNVBAMTCmV4YW1wbGUtdGEX   DTIzMDkyMzE1NTUzOFoXDTIzMTAyMzE1NTUzOFqgLzAtMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFMC9   Ul2+0niyFuyzo0OV0gYLmQgyMAoGA1UdFAQDAgEEMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IB   AQCngOu+Nq3WC4y/pHtLoheAOtNg32WWsKPNiEyL+QalmOtURUsWMzOq41bmoPzQ   NDQoRmXe9mvohAVRe0CnM7A07HOtSfjw5aoouPXGTtfwEomHG2CYk+2U1bvxgZyA   E1c5TvyhkabFMO0+857wqxRP+ht9NV0lMX6kUFlEOCw3ELVd9oNNRBwKQtXj1huM   6Sf26va2a1tnC5zP01hN+EY3S9T5T1gcgPGBcqRWKoXJEbRzCrLsb/TMj5cMpIje   AHZoBojVAmvL1AIH/BnGAQj0+XqaJ0axHvlqJa8iX8QwKqhp+o6sv/atY2QDDRmE   Yjq/VrBVKu5VsDY2Lr29HszA   -----END X509 CRL-----

The CA certificate is issued by the trust anchor. This certificate grants authority over one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24) and two AS numbers (64496 and 64497).¶

   -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----   MIIE7DCCA9SgAwIBAgIUcyCzS10hdfG65kbRq7toQAvRDLkwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL   BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMzA5MjMxNTU1MzhaFw0yNDA5   MjIxNTU1MzhaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDNBQ0UyQ0VGNEZCMjFCN0QxMUUzRTE4NEVG   QzFFMjk3QjM3Nzg2NDIwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDc   zz1qwTxC2ocw5rqp8ktm2XyYkl8riBVuqlXwfefTxsR2YFpgz9vkYUd5Az9EVEG7   6wGIyZbtmhK63eEeaqbKz2GHub467498BXeVrYysO+YuIGgCEYKznNDZ4j5aaDbo   j5+4/z0Qvv6HEsxQd0f8br6lKJwgeRM6+fm7796HNPB0aqD7Zj9NRCLXjbB0DCgJ   liH6rXMKR86ofgll9V2mRjesvhdKYgkGbOif9rvxVpLJ/6zdru5CE9yeuJZ59l+n   YH/r6PzdJ4Q7yKrJX8qD6A60j4+biaU4MQ72KpsjhQNTTqF/HRwi0N54GDaknEwE   TnJQHgLJDYqww9yKWtjjAgMBAAGjggIUMIICEDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUOs4s70+yG30R   4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUwL1SXb7SeLIW7LOjQ5XSBguZCDIwDwYD   VR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAQYwGAYDVR0gAQH/BA4wDDAKBggr   BgEFBQcOAjBDBgNVHR8EPDA6MDigNqA0hjJyc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5u   ZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS9leGFtcGxlLXRhLmNybDBOBggrBgEFBQcBAQRCMEAwPgYI   KwYBBQUHMAKGMnJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4   YW1wbGUtdGEuY2VyMIG5BggrBgEFBQcBCwSBrDCBqTA+BggrBgEFBQcwCoYycnN5   bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvZXhhbXBsZS1jYS5tZnQw   NQYIKwYBBQUHMA2GKWh0dHBzOi8vcnJkcC5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9ub3RpZmljYXRp   b24ueG1sMDAGCCsGAQUFBzAFhiRyc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVw   b3NpdG9yeS8wHwYIKwYBBQUHAQcBAf8EEDAOMAwEAgABMAYDBADAAAIwIQYIKwYB   BQUHAQgBAf8EEjAQoA4wDDAKAgMA+/ACAwD78TANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEA   arIrZWb22wFmP+hVjhdg3IsKHB6fQdMuUR0u2DyZTVvbL6C+HyGAH32pi5mR/QLX   FAfdqALaB7r68tQTGLIW6bGljT+BqUPJmZcj56x3cBLJlltxwFatTloypjFt3cls   xFCuuD9J2iBxc6odTKi6u0mhQjD+C9m4xkbe8XXWWx85IHm1s6rYbpGgiMWxBC80   qqAzmBHGROWKUEvh00EYIYdiAvyFcrj7QtDiRJL5TDOySVd9pWJkerDzhqwE1IaZ   rpHck+lkYTS7jTD++6v32HG62GdsmryOQUk3aU1rLb3kS8vzaGbrgHpGPid0Hd0x   ZSl1AoIMpp5mZ7/h9aW5+A==   -----END CERTIFICATE-----

The CRL is issued by the CA.¶

   -----BEGIN X509 CRL-----   MIIBrTCBlgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAzMTEwLwYDVQQDEygzQUNFMkNFRjRG   QjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0IzNzc4NjQyFw0yMzA5MjMxNTU1MzhaFw0y   MzEwMjMxNTU1MzhaoC8wLTAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQ6zizvT7IbfRHj4YTvweKXs3eG   QjAKBgNVHRQEAwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEACwCNzcAoqbMcUL1kBY65   YhL95OnBqAcuc99pD4i9c1BmVOl7bXU3cJqLaOZ6Z8CmN0kBbcHyqlHBJ9oA/aYD   ByhxsjzKk7jxtM2IlTpEvCEqvnGLSVihgS3h0NA+sgWqHGL3Rhcj6hVsi+j9GENc   T6F9np1mxbI3i2xhgeDJG1pryvH0hWXh7yJiYS8ItNEaIIXDT3szK/J9wnPjukTR   5MITiK9P3TCFujawb3O7rIT5PPgkM6eiCdwDgt6gjmw6cow5+rMjNHSRa+GOviSd   gXljVDfJvF4tKHmw59Jc2aFnSGfX1/ITDNiNfXYpUYFOcsqxkYf8F0uO7AtbRmTF   2w==   -----END X509 CRL-----

The end entity certificate is issued by the CA. This certificate grants signature authority for one IPv4 address block (192.0.2.0/24). Signature authority for AS numbers is not needed for geofeed data signatures, so no AS numbers are included in the end entity certificate.¶

   -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----   MIIEVjCCAz6gAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZvAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL   BQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdC   Mzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMzA5MjMxNTU1MzhaFw0yNDA3MTkxNTU1MzhaMDMxMTAvBgNV   BAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEi   MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycTQrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEW   yii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQgtPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0c   K0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZmr5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upm   BXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXhaFLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQp   tmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKGzqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEog   qtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMB   AAGjggFgMIIBXDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71RwUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0j   BBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgeAMBgGA1Ud   IAEB/wQOMAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHDgIwYQYDVR0fBFowWDBWoFSgUoZQcnN5bmM6Ly9y   cGtpLmV4YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNF   MTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0Mi5jcmwwbAYIKwYBBQUHAQEEYDBeMFwGCCsGAQUF   BzAChlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNF   RjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNlcjAfBggrBgEFBQcB   BwEB/wQQMA4wDAQCAAEwBgMEAMAAAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAlxt25FUe   e0+uCidTH+4p7At3u2ncgHcGTsag3UcoPjcE/I1JgQJRu9TiM4iNB1C7Lbdd131g   MdliL5GQ3P4QfKnfkuPR6S1V8suq6ZT1KQRyLJx+EPgDN2rb/iji0TOK6RKPNBdG   lXVLjth4x/uu1O4V54GLEhDAPQC8IUm5intL/Hx1M1x2ptN/+j5HD3XUXd3x13yi   s6u758nbA7ND40JNhGG5JNGQgDchL4IQzIhylMNC+bKUiyyMHz3MqoVAklIB86IW   Ucv72Mekq+i46T/w3RnaGn4x7RAJctVJWw3e5YMrFnQcuuaGOs0QcoxW7Bi4W7Eg   8fK1fd/f6fjZ9w==   -----END CERTIFICATE-----

The end entity certificate is displayed below in detail. For brevity, the other two certificates are not.¶

      0 1110: SEQUENCE {      4  830:  SEQUENCE {      8    3:   [0] {     10    1:    INTEGER 2            :     }     13   20:   INTEGER            :    27 AD 39 40 83 D7 F2 B5 B9 9B 86 70 C7 75 B2 B9            :    6E E1 66 F0     35   13:   SEQUENCE {     37    9:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER            :     sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)     48    0:    NULL            :     }     50   51:   SEQUENCE {     52   49:    SET {     54   47:     SEQUENCE {     56    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)     61   40:      PrintableString            :       '3ACE2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642'            :       }            :      }            :     }    103   30:   SEQUENCE {    105   13:    UTCTime 23/09/2023 15:55:38 GMT    120   13:    UTCTime 19/07/2024 15:55:38 GMT            :     }    135   51:   SEQUENCE {    137   49:    SET {    139   47:     SEQUENCE {    141    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)    146   40:      PrintableString            :       '914652A3BD51C144260198889F5C45ABF053A187'            :       }            :      }            :     }    188  290:   SEQUENCE {    192   13:    SEQUENCE {    194    9:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER            :      rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)    205    0:     NULL            :      }    207  271:    BIT STRING, encapsulates {    212  266:     SEQUENCE {    216  257:      INTEGER            :      00 B2 71 34 2B 39 BF EA 07 65 B7 8B 72 A2 F0 F8            :      40 FC 31 16 CA 28 B6 4E 01 A8 F6 98 02 C0 EF 65            :      B0 84 48 E9 96 FF 93 E6 92 89 65 8F F6 44 9C CE            :      57 10 82 D3 C2 57 0A FA DA 14 D0 64 22 28 C0 13            :      74 04 BD 1C 2B 4F F9 93 58 A6 25 D8 B9 A9 D3 37            :      9E F2 AC C0 CF 02 9E 84 75 D6 F0 7C A5 01 70 AE            :      E6 66 AF 9C 69 85 74 6F 13 E9 B3 B8 95 4B 82 ED            :      95 D6 EA 66 05 7B 96 96 87 B2 9A E7 61 E9 65 89            :      F8 60 E3 C0 F5 CE DD 18 97 05 E8 C1 AC E1 4D 5E            :      16 85 2D ED 3C CB 80 CF 7E BF D2 FE D5 C9 38 19            :      BB 43 34 29 B6 66 CF 2D 8B 46 7E 9A D8 BB 8E 65            :      88 51 6A A8 FF 78 51 E2 E9 21 27 D7 77 7E 80 28            :      6C EA 4C 50 9C 73 71 16 F6 5E 54 14 4D 4C 14 B9            :      67 A0 4A 20 AA DA 0B A0 A0 01 B7 42 24 38 51 8A            :      78 2F C4 81 E6 81 75 62 DE E3 AF 5D 74 2F 6B 41            :      FB 79 C3 A8 3A 72 6C 46 F9 A6 03 74 81 01 DF 8C            :      EB    477    3:      INTEGER 65537            :       }            :      }            :     }    482  352:   [3] {    486  348:    SEQUENCE {    490   29:     SEQUENCE {    492    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER            :       subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)    497   22:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {    499   20:       OCTET STRING            :      91 46 52 A3 BD 51 C1 44 26 01 98 88 9F 5C 45 AB            :      F0 53 A1 87            :        }            :       }    521   31:     SEQUENCE {    523    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER            :       authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)    528   24:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {    530   22:       SEQUENCE {    532   20:        [0]            :      3A CE 2C EF 4F B2 1B 7D 11 E3 E1 84 EF C1 E2 97            :      B3 77 86 42            :         }            :        }            :       }    554   14:     SEQUENCE {    556    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)    561    1:      BOOLEAN TRUE    564    4:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {    566    2:       BIT STRING 7 unused bits            :        '1'B (bit 0)            :        }            :       }    570   24:     SEQUENCE {    572    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32)    577    1:      BOOLEAN TRUE    580   14:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {    582   12:       SEQUENCE {    584   10:        SEQUENCE {    586    8:         OBJECT IDENTIFIER            :          resourceCertificatePolicy (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 14 2)            :          }            :         }            :        }            :       }    596   97:     SEQUENCE {    598    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER            :       cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)    603   90:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {    605   88:       SEQUENCE {    607   86:        SEQUENCE {    609   84:         [0] {    611   82:          [0] {    613   80:           [6]            :          'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE'            :          '2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.crl'            :            }            :           }            :          }            :         }            :        }            :       }    695  108:     SEQUENCE {    697    8:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER            :       authorityInfoAccess (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1)    707   96:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {    709   94:       SEQUENCE {    711   92:        SEQUENCE {    713    8:         OBJECT IDENTIFIER            :          caIssuers (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2)    723   80:         [6]            :          'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE'            :          '2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.cer'            :          }            :         }            :        }            :       }    805   31:     SEQUENCE {    807    8:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER            :       ipAddrBlocks (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7)    817    1:      BOOLEAN TRUE    820   16:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {    822   14:       SEQUENCE {    824   12:        SEQUENCE {    826    2:         OCTET STRING 00 01    830    6:         SEQUENCE {    832    4:          BIT STRING            :           '010000000000000000000011'B            :           }            :          }            :         }            :        }            :       }            :      }            :     }            :    }    838   13:  SEQUENCE {    840    9:   OBJECT IDENTIFIER            :    sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)    851    0:   NULL            :    }    853  257:  BIT STRING            :   97 1B 76 E4 55 1E 7B 4F AE 0A 27 53 1F EE 29 EC            :   0B 77 BB 69 DC 80 77 06 4E C6 A0 DD 47 28 3E 37            :   04 FC 8D 49 81 02 51 BB D4 E2 33 88 8D 07 50 BB            :   2D B7 5D D7 7D 60 31 D9 62 2F 91 90 DC FE 10 7C            :   A9 DF 92 E3 D1 E9 2D 55 F2 CB AA E9 94 F5 29 04            :   72 2C 9C 7E 10 F8 03 37 6A DB FE 28 E2 D1 33 8A            :   E9 12 8F 34 17 46 95 75 4B 8E D8 78 C7 FB AE D4            :   EE 15 E7 81 8B 12 10 C0 3D 00 BC 21 49 B9 8A 7B            :   4B FC 7C 75 33 5C 76 A6 D3 7F FA 3E 47 0F 75 D4            :   5D DD F1 D7 7C A2 B3 AB BB E7 C9 DB 03 B3 43 E3            :   42 4D 84 61 B9 24 D1 90 80 37 21 2F 82 10 CC 88            :   72 94 C3 42 F9 B2 94 8B 2C 8C 1F 3D CC AA 85 40            :   92 52 01 F3 A2 16 51 CB FB D8 C7 A4 AB E8 B8 E9            :   3F F0 DD 19 DA 1A 7E 31 ED 10 09 72 D5 49 5B 0D            :   DE E5 83 2B 16 74 1C BA E6 86 3A CD 10 72 8C 56            :   EC 18 B8 5B B1 20 F1 F2 B5 7D DF DF E9 F8 D9 F7            :   }

To allow reproduction of the signature results, the end entity private key is provided. For brevity, the other two private keys are not.¶

   -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----   MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAsnE0Kzm/6gdlt4tyovD4QPwxFsootk4BqPaYAsDvZbCESOmW   /5Pmkollj/ZEnM5XEILTwlcK+toU0GQiKMATdAS9HCtP+ZNYpiXYuanTN57yrMDP   Ap6EddbwfKUBcK7mZq+caYV0bxPps7iVS4LtldbqZgV7lpaHsprnYellifhg48D1   zt0YlwXowazhTV4WhS3tPMuAz36/0v7VyTgZu0M0KbZmzy2LRn6a2LuOZYhRaqj/   eFHi6SEn13d+gChs6kxQnHNxFvZeVBRNTBS5Z6BKIKraC6CgAbdCJDhRingvxIHm   gXVi3uOvXXQva0H7ecOoOnJsRvmmA3SBAd+M6wIDAQABAoIBAQCyB0FeMuKm8bRo   18aKjFGSPEoZi53srIz5bvUgIi92TBLez7ZnzL6Iym26oJ+5th+lCHGO/dqlhXio   pI50C5Yc9TFbblb/ECOsuCuuqKFjZ8CD3GVsHozXKJeMM+/o5YZXQrORj6UnwT0z   ol/JE5pIGUCIgsXX6tz9s5BP3lUAvVQHsv6+vEVKLxQ3wj/1vIL8O/CN036EV0GJ   mpkwmygPjfECT9wbWo0yn3jxJb36+M/QjjUP28oNIVn/IKoPZRXnqchEbuuCJ651   IsaFSqtiThm4WZtvCH/IDq+6/dcMucmTjIRcYwW7fdHfjplllVPve9c/OmpWEQvF   t3ArWUt5AoGBANs4764yHxo4mctLIE7G7l/tf9bP4KKUiYw4R4ByEocuqMC4yhmt   MPCfOFLOQet71OWCkjP2L/7EKUe9yx7G5KmxAHY6jOjvcRkvGsl6lWFOsQ8p126M   Y9hmGzMOjtsdhAiMmOWKzjvm4WqfMgghQe+PnjjSVkgTt+7BxpIuGBAvAoGBANBg   26FF5cDLpixOd3Za1YXsOgguwCaw3Plvi7vUZRpa/zBMELEtyOebfakkIRWNm07l   nE+lAZwxm+29PTD0nqCFE91teyzjnQaLO5kkAdJiFuVV3icLOGo399FrnJbKensm   FGSli+3KxQhCNIJJfgWzq4bE0ioAMjdGbYXzIYQFAoGBAM6tuDJ36KDU+hIS6wu6   O2TPSfZhF/zPo3pCWQ78/QDb+Zdw4IEiqoBA7F4NPVLg9Y/H8UTx9r/veqe7hPOo   Ok7NpIzSmKTHkc5XfZ60Zn9OLFoKbaQ40a1kXoJdWEu2YROaUlAe9F6/Rog6PHYz   vLE5qscRbu0XQhLkN+z7bg5bAoGBAKDsbDEb/dbqbyaAYpmwhH2sdRSkphg7Niwc   DNm9qWa1J6Zw1+M87I6Q8naRREuU1IAVqqWHVLr/ROBQ6NTJ1Uc5/qFeT2XXUgkf   taMKv61tuyjZK3sTmznMh0HfzUpWjEhWnCEuB+ZYVdmO52ZGw2A75RdrILL2+9Dc   PvDXVubRAoGAdqXeSWoLxuzZXzl8rsaKrQsTYaXnOWaZieU1SL5vVe8nK257UDqZ   E3ng2j5XPTUWli+aNGFEJGRoNtcQvO60O/sFZUhu52sqq9mWVYZNh1TB5aP8X+pV   iFcZOLUvQEcN6PA+YQK5FU11rAI1M0Gm5RDnVnUl0L2xfCYxb7FzV6Y=   -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

The signing of "192.0.2.0/24,US,WA,Seattle," (terminated by CR and LF) yields the following detached CMS signature.¶

   # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24   # MIIGQAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGMTCCBi0CAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ   # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggRaMIIEVjCCAz6gAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZv   # AwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExR   # TNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMzA5MjMxNTU1MzhaFw0yNDA3MTkx   # NTU1MzhaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM   # 0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycT   # QrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEWyii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQg   # tPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0cK0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZm   # r5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upmBXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXha   # FLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQptmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKG   # zqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEogqtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQ   # ft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMBAAGjggFgMIIBXDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71R   # wUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkI   # wDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgeAMBgGA1UdIAEB/wQOMAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHDgIwYQYDVR   # 0fBFowWDBWoFSgUoZQcnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvc   # nkvM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0Mi5jcmww   # bAYIKwYBBQUHAQEEYDBeMFwGCCsGAQUFBzAChlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXB   # sZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRT   # I5N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNlcjAfBggrBgEFBQcBBwEB/wQQMA4wDAQCAAEwBgMEAMAAA   # jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAlxt25FUee0+uCidTH+4p7At3u2ncgHcGTsag   # 3UcoPjcE/I1JgQJRu9TiM4iNB1C7Lbdd131gMdliL5GQ3P4QfKnfkuPR6S1V8su   # q6ZT1KQRyLJx+EPgDN2rb/iji0TOK6RKPNBdGlXVLjth4x/uu1O4V54GLEhDAPQ   # C8IUm5intL/Hx1M1x2ptN/+j5HD3XUXd3x13yis6u758nbA7ND40JNhGG5JNGQg   # DchL4IQzIhylMNC+bKUiyyMHz3MqoVAklIB86IWUcv72Mekq+i46T/w3RnaGn4x   # 7RAJctVJWw3e5YMrFnQcuuaGOs0QcoxW7Bi4W7Eg8fK1fd/f6fjZ9zGCAaowggG   # mAgEDgBSRRlKjvVHBRCYBmIifXEWr8FOhhzALBglghkgBZQMEAgGgazAaBgkqhk   # iG9w0BCQMxDQYLKoZIhvcNAQkQAS8wHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIzMDkyMzE1N   # TUzOFowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEICvi8p5S8ckg2wTRhDBQzGijjyqs5T6I+4Vt   # BHypfcEWMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAKZND7pKdVdfpB6zaJN89wTt+sXd0io   # 0WULMc+o6gRJFt3wmKNW2nYPrDbocJ+Q/rDMGxbp4QetJ0MQtn1+AYAS8v5jPDO   # 4a63U4/mJ2D3wSnQsDP0lUVknqRzfnS66HgHqiOVdHB0U+OnMEJuqHNTLx0dknb   # L3zwxyDJTHdo+dMB0U9xdcjwpsPM3xqg57EXj5EIQK5JbardXCjrsysAnEdktUY   # oyayGNbbQelANYJcOmuHhSXArR+qqzvNP2MDRqqKEcpd65YW6FSnqlVMIBH2M3P   # D2F0p3sdm4IeGAZWaERVB4AXO1PUFDNdhamr4XpIwqIoAig7xiLm7j8qu5Oc=   # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24

Acknowledgments

Thanks toRob Austein for the CMS and detached signature clue,George Michaelson for the first and substantial external review, andErik Kline who was too shy to agree to coauthorship. Additionally, we express our gratitude to early implementors, includingMenno Schepers,Flavio Luciani,Eric Dugas, andKevin Pack. Also, thanks to the following geolocation providers who are consuming geofeeds with this described solution:Jonathan Kosgei (ipdata.co),Ben Dowling (ipinfo.io), andPol Nisenblat (bigdatacloud.com). For an amazing number of helpful reviews, we thankJob Snijders, who also found an ASN.1 'inherit' issue,Adrian Farrel,Antonio Prado,Francesca Palombini,Jean-Michel Combes (INTDIR),John Scudder,Kyle Rose (SECDIR),Martin Duke,Mohamed Boucadair,Murray Kucherawy,Paul Kyzivat (GENART),Rob Wilton,Roman Danyliw, andTies de Kock.¶

Authors' Addresses