| RFC 9155 | Signature Hashes in (D)TLS 1.2 | December 2021 |
| Velvindron, et al. | Standards Track | [Page] |
The MD5 and SHA-1 hashing algorithms are increasingly vulnerable to attack, and this document deprecates their use in TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 digital signatures. However, this document does not deprecate SHA-1 with Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC), as used in record protection. This document updates RFC 5246.¶
This is an Internet Standards Track document.¶
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.¶
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttps://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9155.¶
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
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The usage of MD5 and SHA-1 for signature hashing in (D)TLS 1.2 is specified in[RFC5246]. MD5 and SHA-1 have been proven to be insecure, subject to collision attacks[Wang]. In 2011,[RFC6151] detailed the security considerations, including collision attacks for MD5. NIST formally deprecated use of SHA-1 in 2011[NISTSP800-131A-R2] and disallowed its use for digital signatures at the end of 2013, based on both the attack described in[Wang] and the potential for brute-force attack. In 2016, researchers from the National Institute for Research in Digital Science and Technology (INRIA) identified a new class of transcript collision attacks on TLS (and other protocols) that relies on efficient collision-finding algorithms on the underlying hash constructions[Transcript-Collision]. Further, in 2017, researchers from Google and Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica (CWI) Amsterdam[SHA-1-Collision] proved SHA-1 collision attacks were practical. This document updates[RFC5246] in such a way that MD5 and SHA-1MUST NOT be used for digital signatures. However, this document does not deprecate SHA-1 with HMAC, as used in record protection. Note that the CA/Browser Forum (CABF) has also deprecated use of SHA-1 for use in certificate signatures[CABF].¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14[RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
ClientsMUST include the signature_algorithms extension. ClientsMUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in this extension.¶
ServersSHOULD NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in CertificateRequest messages.¶
ServersMUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in ServerKeyExchange messages. If the client receives a ServerKeyExchange message indicating MD5 or SHA-1, then itMUST abort the connection with an illegal_parameter alert.¶
ClientsMUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in CertificateVerify messages. If a server receives a CertificateVerify message with MD5 or SHA-1, itMUST abort the connection with an illegal_parameter alert.¶
IANA has updated the "TLS SignatureScheme" registry by changing the recommended status of SHA-1-based signature schemes to "N" (not recommended), as defined by[RFC8447]. The following entries have been updated; other entries in the registry remain the same.¶
| Value | Description | Recommended | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0x0201 | rsa_pkcs1_sha1 | N | [RFC8446] [RFC9155] |
| 0x0203 | ecdsa_sha1 | N | [RFC8446] [RFC9155] |
IANA has also updated the reference for the "TLS SignatureAlgorithm" and "TLSHashAlgorithm" registries to refer to this document in addition to RFCs 5246 and8447.¶
Concerns with (D)TLS 1.2 implementations falling back to SHA-1 is an issue. This document updates the TLS 1.2 specification[RFC5246] to deprecate support for MD5 and SHA-1 for digital signatures. However, this document does not deprecate SHA-1 with HMAC, as used in record protection.¶
The authors would like to thankHubert Kario for his help in writing the initial draft version of this document. We are also grateful toDaniel Migault,Martin Thomson,Sean Turner,Christopher Wood, andDavid Cooper for their feedback.¶