Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.¶

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.¶

Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttps://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8997.¶

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.¶

Table of Contents

1.Introduction

[RFC8314] defines the minimum recommended version of TLS as version 1.1. Due to the deprecation of TLS 1.1 in[RFC8996], this recommendation is no longer valid. Therefore, this document updates[RFC8314] so that the minimum version for TLS is TLS 1.2.¶

3.Updates to RFC 8314

OLD:¶

4.1. Deprecation of Services Using Cleartext and TLS Versions Less Than 1.1¶

NEW:¶

4.1. Deprecation of Services Using Cleartext and TLS Versions Less Than 1.2¶

OLD:¶

As soon as practicable, MSPs currently supporting Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) 2.x, SSL 3.0, or TLS 1.0SHOULD transition their users to TLS 1.1 or later and discontinue support for those earlier versions of SSL and TLS.¶

NEW:¶

As soon as practicable, MSPs currently supporting Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) 2.x, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, or TLS 1.1SHOULD transition their users to TLS 1.2 or later and discontinue support for those earlier versions of SSL and TLS.¶

InSection 4.1 of [RFC8314], the text should be revised from:¶

OLD:¶

One way is for the server to refuse a ClientHello message from any client sending a ClientHello.version field corresponding to any version of SSL or TLS 1.0.¶

NEW:¶

One way is for the server to refuse a ClientHello message from any client sending a ClientHello.version field corresponding to any version of SSL or TLS earlier than TLS 1.2.¶

OLD:¶

It isRECOMMENDED that new users be required to use TLS version 1.1 or greater from the start. However, an MSP may find it necessary to make exceptions to accommodate some legacy systems that support only earlier versions of TLS or only cleartext.¶

NEW:¶

It isRECOMMENDED that new users be required to use TLS version 1.2 or greater from the start. However, an MSP may find it necessary to make exceptions to accommodate some legacy systems that support only earlier versions of TLS or only cleartext.¶

OLD:¶

If, however, an MUA provides such an indication, itMUST NOT indicate confidentiality for any connection that does not at least use TLS 1.1 with certificate verification and also meet the minimum confidentiality requirements associated with that account.¶

NEW:¶

If, however, an MUA provides such an indication, itMUST NOT indicate confidentiality for any connection that does not at least use TLS 1.2 with certificate verification and also meet the minimum confidentiality requirements associated with that account.¶

OLD¶

MUAsMUST implement TLS 1.2[RFC5246] or later. Earlier TLS and SSL versionsMAY also be supported, so long as the MUA requires at least TLS 1.1[RFC4346] when accessing accounts that are configured to impose minimum confidentiality requirements.¶

NEW:¶

MUAsMUST implement TLS 1.2[RFC5246] or later, e.g., TLS 1.3[RFC8446]. Earlier TLS and SSL versionsMAY also be supported, so long as the MUA requires at least TLS 1.2[RFC5246] when accessing accounts that are configured to impose minimum confidentiality requirements.¶

OLD:¶

The default minimum expected level of confidentiality for all new accountsMUST require successful validation of the server's certificate andSHOULD require negotiation of TLS version 1.1 or greater. (Future revisions to this specification may raise these requirements or impose additional requirements to address newly discovered weaknesses in protocols or cryptographic algorithms.)¶

NEW:¶

The default minimum expected level of confidentiality for all new accountsMUST require successful validation of the server's certificate andSHOULD require negotiation of TLS version 1.2 or greater. (Future revisions to this specification may raise these requirements or impose additional requirements to address newly discovered weaknesses in protocols or cryptographic algorithms.)¶

4.IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions.¶

5.Security Considerations

The purpose of this document is to document updated recommendations for using TLS with email services. Those recommendations are based on[RFC8996].¶

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thankVittorio Bertola andViktor Dukhovni for their feedback.¶

Authors' Addresses