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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                          T. ReddyRequest for Comments: 8094                                         CiscoCategory: Experimental                                           D. WingISSN: 2070-1721                                                                P. Patil                                                                   Cisco                                                           February 2017DNS over Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)Abstract   DNS queries and responses are visible to network elements on the path   between the DNS client and its server.  These queries and responses   can contain privacy-sensitive information, which is valuable to   protect.   This document proposes the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security   (DTLS) for DNS, to protect against passive listeners and certain   active attacks.  As latency is critical for DNS, this proposal also   discusses mechanisms to reduce DTLS round trips and reduce the DTLS   handshake size.  The proposed mechanism runs over port 853.Status of This Memo   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is   published for examination, experimental implementation, and   evaluation.   This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet   community.  This document is a product of the Internet Engineering   Task Force (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF   community.  It has received public review and has been approved for   publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not   all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of   Internet Standard; seeSection 2 of RFC 7841.   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttp://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8094.Reddy, et al.                 Experimental                      [Page 1]

RFC 8094                      DNS over DTLS                February 2017Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of   publication of this document.  Please review these documents   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as   described in the Simplified BSD License.Table of Contents1. Introduction ....................................................31.1. Relationship to TCP Queries and to DNSSEC ..................31.2. Document Status ............................................42. Terminology .....................................................43. Establishing and Managing DNS over DTLS Sessions ................53.1. Session Initiation .........................................53.2. DTLS Handshake and Authentication ..........................53.3. Established Sessions .......................................64. Performance Considerations ......................................75. Path MTU (PMTU) Issues ..........................................76. Anycast .........................................................87. Usage ...........................................................98. IANA Considerations .............................................99. Security Considerations .........................................910. References ....................................................1010.1. Normative References .....................................1010.2. Informative References ...................................11   Acknowledgements ..................................................13   Authors' Addresses ................................................13Reddy, et al.                 Experimental                      [Page 2]

RFC 8094                      DNS over DTLS                February 20171.  Introduction   The Domain Name System is specified in [RFC1034] and [RFC1035].  DNS   queries and responses are normally exchanged unencrypted; thus, they   are vulnerable to eavesdropping.  Such eavesdropping can result in an   undesired entity learning domain that a host wishes to access, thus   resulting in privacy leakage.  The DNS privacy problem is further   discussed in [RFC7626].   This document defines DNS over DTLS, which provides confidential DNS   communication between stub resolvers and recursive resolvers, stub   resolvers and forwarders, and forwarders and recursive resolvers.   DNS over DTLS puts an additional computational load on servers.  The   largest gain for privacy is to protect the communication between the   DNS client (the end user's machine) and its caching resolver.  DNS   over DTLS might work equally between recursive clients and   authoritative servers, but this application of the protocol is out of   scope for the DNS PRIVate Exchange (DPRIVE) working group per its   current charter.  This document does not change the format of DNS   messages.   The motivations for proposing DNS over DTLS are that:   o  TCP suffers from network head-of-line blocking, where the loss of      a packet causes all other TCP segments not to be delivered to the      application until the lost packet is retransmitted.  DNS over      DTLS, because it uses UDP, does not suffer from network head-of-      line blocking.   o  DTLS session resumption consumes one round trip, whereas TLS      session resumption can start only after the TCP handshake is      complete.  However, with TCP Fast Open [RFC7413], the      implementation can achieve the same RTT efficiency as DTLS.   Note: DNS over DTLS is an experimental update to DNS, and the   experiment will be concluded when the specification is evaluated   through implementations and interoperability testing.1.1.  Relationship to TCP Queries and to DNSSEC   DNS queries can be sent over UDP or TCP.  The scope of this document,   however, is only UDP.  DNS over TCP can be protected with TLS, as   described in [RFC7858].  DNS over DTLS alone cannot provide privacy   for DNS messages in all circumstances, specifically when the DTLS   record size is larger than the path MTU.  In such situations, the DNS   server will respond with a truncated response (seeSection 5).Reddy, et al.                 Experimental                      [Page 3]

RFC 8094                      DNS over DTLS                February 2017   Therefore, DNS clients and servers that implement DNS over DTLS MUST   also implement DNS over TLS in order to provide privacy for clients   that desire Strict Privacy as described in [DTLS].   DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [RFC4033] provide object integrity   of DNS resource records, allowing end users (or their resolver) to   verify the legitimacy of responses.  However, DNSSEC does not provide   privacy for DNS requests or responses.  DNS over DTLS works in   conjunction with DNSSEC, but DNS over DTLS does not replace the need   or value of DNSSEC.1.2.  Document Status   This document is an Experimental RFC.  One key aspect to judge   whether the approach is usable on a large scale is by observing the   uptake, usability, and operational behavior of the protocol in large-   scale, real-life deployments.   This DTLS solution was considered by the DPRIVE working group as an   option to use in case the TLS-based approach specified in [RFC7858]   turns out to have some issues when deployed.  At the time of writing,   it is expected that [RFC7858] is what will be deployed, and so this   specification is mainly intended as a backup.   The following guidelines should be considered when performance   benchmarking DNS over DTLS:   1.  DNS over DTLS can recover from packet loss and reordering, and       does not suffer from network head-of-line blocking.  DNS over       DTLS performance, in comparison with DNS over TLS, may be better       in lossy networks.   2.  The number of round trips to send the first DNS query over DNS       over DTLS is less than the number of round trips to send the       first DNS query over TLS.  Even if TCP Fast Open is used, it only       works for subsequent TCP connections between the DNS client and       server (Section 3 in [RFC7413]).   3.  If the DTLS 1.3 protocol [DTLS13] is used for DNS over DTLS, it       provides critical latency improvements for connection       establishment over DTLS 1.2.2.  Terminology   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in   [RFC2119] .Reddy, et al.                 Experimental                      [Page 4]

RFC 8094                      DNS over DTLS                February 20173.  Establishing and Managing DNS over DTLS Sessions3.1.  Session Initiation   By default, DNS over DTLS MUST run over standard UDP port 853 as   defined inSection 8, unless the DNS server has mutual agreement with   its clients to use a port other than 853 for DNS over DTLS.  In order   to use a port other than 853, both clients and servers would need a   configuration option in their software.   The DNS client should determine if the DNS server supports DNS over   DTLS by sending a DTLS ClientHello message to port 853 on the server,   unless it has mutual agreement with its server to use a port other   than port 853 for DNS over DTLS.  Such another port MUST NOT be port   53 but MAY be from the "first-come, first-served" port range (User   Ports [RFC6335], range 1024-49151).  This recommendation against the   use of port 53 for DNS over DTLS is to avoid complications in   selecting use or non-use of DTLS and to reduce risk of downgrade   attacks.   A DNS server that does not support DNS over DTLS will not respond to   ClientHello messages sent by the client.  If no response is received   from that server, and the client has no better round-trip estimate,   the client SHOULD retransmit the DTLS ClientHello according toSection 4.2.4.1 of [RFC6347].  After 15 seconds, it SHOULD cease   attempts to retransmit its ClientHello.  The client MAY repeat that   procedure to discover if DNS over DTLS service becomes available from   the DNS server, but such probing SHOULD NOT be done more frequently   than every 24 hours and MUST NOT be done more frequently than every   15 minutes.  This mechanism requires no additional signaling between   the client and server.   DNS clients and servers MUST NOT use port 853 to transport cleartext   DNS messages.  DNS clients MUST NOT send and DNS servers MUST NOT   respond to cleartext DNS messages on any port used for DNS over DTLS   (including, for example, after a failed DTLS handshake).  There are   significant security issues in mixing protected and unprotected data;   therefore, UDP connections on a port designated by a given server for   DNS over DTLS are reserved purely for encrypted communications.3.2.  DTLS Handshake and Authentication   The DNS client initiates the DTLS handshake as described in   [RFC6347], following the best practices specified in [RFC7525].   After DTLS negotiation completes, if the DTLS handshake succeeds   according to [RFC6347], the connection will be encrypted and would   then be protected from eavesdropping.Reddy, et al.                 Experimental                      [Page 5]

RFC 8094                      DNS over DTLS                February 2017   DNS privacy requires encrypting the query (and response) from passive   attacks.  Such encryption typically provides integrity protection as   a side effect, which means on-path attackers cannot simply inject   bogus DNS responses.  However, to provide stronger protection from   active attackers pretending to be the server, the server itself needs   to be authenticated.  To authenticate the server providing DNS   privacy, DNS client MUST use the authentication mechanisms discussed   in [DTLS].  This document does not propose new ideas for   authentication.3.3.  Established Sessions   In DTLS, all data is protected using the same record encoding and   mechanisms.  When the mechanism described in this document is in   effect, DNS messages are encrypted using the standard DTLS record   encoding.  When a DTLS user wishes to send a DNS message, the data is   delivered to the DTLS implementation as an ordinary application data   write (e.g., SSL_write()).  A single DTLS session can be used to send   multiple DNS requests and receive multiple DNS responses.   To mitigate the risk of unintentional server overload, DNS over DTLS   clients MUST take care to minimize the number of concurrent DTLS   sessions made to any individual server.  For any given client/server   interaction, it is RECOMMENDED that there be no more than one DTLS   session.  Similarly, servers MAY impose limits on the number of   concurrent DTLS sessions being handled for any particular client IP   address or subnet.  These limits SHOULD be much looser than the   client guidelines above because the server does not know, for   example, if a client IP address belongs to a single client, is   representing multiple resolvers on a single machine, or is   representing multiple clients behind a device performing Network   Address Translation (NAT).   In between normal DNS traffic, while the communication to the DNS   server is quiescent, the DNS client MAY want to probe the server   using DTLS heartbeat [RFC6520] to ensure it has maintained   cryptographic state.  Such probes can also keep alive firewall or NAT   bindings.  This probing reduces the frequency of needing a new   handshake when a DNS query needs to be resolved, improving the user   experience at the cost of bandwidth and processing time.   A DTLS session is terminated by the receipt of an authenticated   message that closes the connection (e.g., a DTLS fatal alert).  If   the server has lost state, a DTLS handshake needs to be initiated   with the server.  For the server, to mitigate the risk of   unintentional server overload, it is RECOMMENDED that the default DNS   over DTLS server application-level idle time be set to several   seconds and not set to less than a second, but no particular value isReddy, et al.                 Experimental                      [Page 6]

RFC 8094                      DNS over DTLS                February 2017   specified.  When no DNS queries have been received from the client   after idle timeout, the server MUST send a DTLS fatal alert and then   destroy its DTLS state.  The DTLS fatal alert packet indicates the   server has destroyed its state, signaling to the client that if it   wants to send a new DTLS message, it will need to re-establish   cryptographic context with the server (via full DTLS handshake or   DTLS session resumption).  In practice, the idle period can vary   dynamically, and servers MAY allow idle connections to remain open   for longer periods as resources permit.4.  Performance Considerations   The DTLS protocol profile for DNS over DTLS is discussed in   Section 11 of [DTLS].  To reduce the number of octets of the DTLS   handshake, especially the size of the certificate in the ServerHello   (which can be several kilobytes), DNS clients and servers can use raw   public keys [RFC7250] or Cached Information Extension [RFC7924].   Cached Information Extension avoids transmitting the server's   certificate and certificate chain if the client has cached that   information from a previous TLS handshake.  TLS False Start [RFC7918]   can reduce round trips by allowing the TLS second flight of messages   (ChangeCipherSpec) to also contain the (encrypted) DNS query.   It is highly advantageous to avoid server-side DTLS state and reduce   the number of new DTLS sessions on the server that can be done with   TLS Session Resumption without server state [RFC5077].  This also   eliminates a round trip for subsequent DNS over DTLS queries, because   with [RFC5077] the DTLS session does not need to be re-established.   Since responses within a DTLS session can arrive out of order,   clients MUST match responses to outstanding queries on the same DTLS   connection using the DNS Message ID.  If the response contains a   question section, the client MUST match the QNAME, QCLASS, and QTYPE   fields.  Failure by clients to properly match responses to   outstanding queries can have serious consequences for   interoperability (Section 7 of [RFC7766]).5.  Path MTU (PMTU) Issues   Compared to normal DNS, DTLS adds at least 13 octets of header, plus   cipher and authentication overhead to every query and every response.   This reduces the size of the DNS payload that can be carried.  The   DNS client and server MUST support the Extension Mechanisms for DNS   (EDNS0) option defined in [RFC6891] so that the DNS client can   indicate to the DNS server the maximum DNS response size it can   reassemble and deliver in the DNS client's network stack.  If the DNS   client does set the EDNS0 option defined in [RFC6891], then the   maximum DNS response size of 512 bytes plus DTLS overhead will beReddy, et al.                 Experimental                      [Page 7]

RFC 8094                      DNS over DTLS                February 2017   well within the Path MTU.  If the Path MTU is not known, an IP MTU of   1280 bytes SHOULD be assumed.  The client sets its EDNS0 value as if   DTLS is not being used.  The DNS server MUST ensure that the DNS   response size does not exceed the Path MTU, i.e., each DTLS record   MUST fit within a single datagram, as required by [RFC6347].  The DNS   server must consider the amount of record expansion expected by the   DTLS processing when calculating the size of DNS response that fits   within the path MTU.  The Path MTU MUST be greater than or equal to   the DNS response size + DTLS overhead of 13 octets + padding size   ([RFC7830]) + authentication overhead of the negotiated DTLS cipher   suite + block padding (Section 4.1.1.1 of [RFC6347]).  If the DNS   server's response were to exceed that calculated value, the server   MUST send a response that does fit within that value and sets the TC   (truncated) bit.  Upon receiving a response with the TC bit set and   wanting to receive the entire response, the client behavior is   governed by the current Usage Profile [DTLS].  For Strict Privacy,   the client MUST only send a new DNS request for the same resource   record over an encrypted transport (e.g., DNS over TLS [RFC7858]).   Clients using Opportunistic Privacy SHOULD try for the best case (an   encrypted and authenticated transport) but MAY fall back to   intermediate cases and eventually the worst case scenario (clear   text) in order to obtain a response.6.  Anycast   DNS servers are often configured with anycast addresses.  While the   network is stable, packets transmitted from a particular source to an   anycast address will reach the same server that has the cryptographic   context from the DNS over DTLS handshake.  But, when the network   configuration or routing changes, a DNS over DTLS packet can be   received by a server that does not have the necessary cryptographic   context.  Clients using DNS over DTLS need to always be prepared to   re-initiate the DTLS handshake, and in the worst case this could even   happen immediately after re-initiating a new handshake.  To encourage   the client to initiate a new DTLS handshake, DNS servers SHOULD   generate a DTLS fatal alert message in response to receiving a DTLS   packet for which the server does not have any cryptographic context.   Upon receipt of an unauthenticated DTLS fatal alert, the DTLS client   validates the fatal alert is within the replay window   (Section 4.1.2.6 of [RFC6347]).  It is difficult for the DTLS client   to validate that the DTLS fatal alert was generated by the DTLS   server in response to a request or was generated by an on- or off-   path attacker.  Thus, upon receipt of an in-window DTLS fatal alert,   the client SHOULD continue retransmitting the DTLS packet (in the   event the fatal alert was spoofed), and at the same time it SHOULD   initiate DTLS session resumption.  When the DTLS client receives an   authenticated DNS response from one of those DTLS sessions, the other   DTLS session should be terminated.Reddy, et al.                 Experimental                      [Page 8]

RFC 8094                      DNS over DTLS                February 20177.  Usage   Two Usage Profiles, Strict and Opportunistic, are explained in   [DTLS].  The order of preference for DNS usage is as follows:   1.  Encrypted DNS messages with an authenticated server   2.  Encrypted DNS messages with an unauthenticated server   3.  Plaintext DNS messages8.  IANA Considerations   This specification uses port 853 already allocated in the IANA port   number registry as defined inSection 6 of [RFC7858].9.  Security Considerations   The interaction between a DNS client and a DNS server requires   Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) with a ciphersuite offering   confidentiality protection.  The guidance given in [RFC7525] MUST be   followed to avoid attacks on DTLS.  The DNS client SHOULD use the TLS   Certificate Status Request extension (Section 8 of [RFC6066]),   commonly called "OCSP stapling" to check the revocation status of the   public key certificate of the DNS server.  OCSP stapling, unlike OCSP   [RFC6960], does not suffer from scale and privacy issues.  DNS   clients keeping track of servers known to support DTLS enables   clients to detect downgrade attacks.  To interfere with DNS over   DTLS, an on- or off-path attacker might send an ICMP message towards   the DTLS client or DTLS server.  As these ICMP messages cannot be   authenticated, all ICMP errors should be treated as soft errors   [RFC1122].  If the DNS query was sent over DTLS, then the   corresponding DNS response MUST only be accepted if it is received   over the same DTLS connection.  This behavior mitigates all possible   attacks described in Measures for Making DNS More Resilient against   Forged Answers [RFC5452].  The security considerations in [RFC6347]   and [DTLS] are to be taken into account.   A malicious client might attempt to perform a high number of DTLS   handshakes with a server.  As the clients are not uniquely identified   by the protocol and can be obfuscated with IPv4 address sharing and   with IPv6 temporary addresses, a server needs to mitigate the impact   of such an attack.  Such mitigation might involve rate limiting   handshakes from a certain subnet or more advanced DoS/DDoS techniques   beyond the scope of this document.Reddy, et al.                 Experimental                      [Page 9]

RFC 8094                      DNS over DTLS                February 201710.  References10.1.  Normative References   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",              STD 13,RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and              specification", STD 13,RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,              November 1987, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate              Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119,              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.   [RFC5077]  Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,              "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without              Server-Side State",RFC 5077, DOI 10.17487/RFC5077,              January 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5077>.   [RFC5452]  Hubert, A. and R. van Mook, "Measures for Making DNS More              Resilient against Forged Answers",RFC 5452,              DOI 10.17487/RFC5452, January 2009,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5452>.   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer              Security Version 1.2",RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,              January 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.   [RFC6520]  Seggelmann, R., Tuexen, M., and M. Williams, "Transport              Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security              (DTLS) Heartbeat Extension",RFC 6520,              DOI 10.17487/RFC6520, February 2012,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6520>.   [RFC6891]  Damas, J., Graff, M., and P. Vixie, "Extension Mechanisms              for DNS (EDNS(0))", STD 75,RFC 6891,              DOI 10.17487/RFC6891, April 2013,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6891>.Reddy, et al.                 Experimental                     [Page 10]

RFC 8094                      DNS over DTLS                February 2017   [RFC7525]  Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,              "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer              Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security              (DTLS)",BCP 195,RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May              2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.   [RFC7830]  Mayrhofer, A., "The EDNS(0) Padding Option",RFC 7830,              DOI 10.17487/RFC7830, May 2016,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7830>.10.2.  Informative References   [DTLS]     Dickinson, S., Gillmor, D., and T. Reddy, "Authentication              and (D)TLS Profile for DNS-over-(D)TLS", Work in              Progress,draft-ietf-dprive-dtls-and-tls-profiles-08,              January 2017.   [DTLS13]   Rescorla, E. and H. Tschofenig, "The Datagram Transport              Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3", Work in              Progress,draft-rescorla-tls-dtls13-00, October 2016.   [RFC1122]  Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -              Communication Layers", STD 3,RFC 1122,              DOI 10.17487/RFC1122, October 1989,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1122>.   [RFC6066]  Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)              Extensions: Extension Definitions",RFC 6066,              DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6066>.   [RFC6335]  Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S.              Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)              Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and              Transport Protocol Port Number Registry",BCP 165,RFC 6335, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, August 2011,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6335>.   [RFC6960]  Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,              Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key              Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.Reddy, et al.                 Experimental                     [Page 11]

RFC 8094                      DNS over DTLS                February 2017   [RFC7250]  Wouters, P., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Gilmore, J.,              Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in              Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport              Layer Security (DTLS)",RFC 7250, DOI 10.17487/RFC7250,              June 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7250>.   [RFC7413]  Cheng, Y., Chu, J., Radhakrishnan, S., and A. Jain, "TCP              Fast Open",RFC 7413, DOI 10.17487/RFC7413, December 2014,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7413>.   [RFC7626]  Bortzmeyer, S., "DNS Privacy Considerations",RFC 7626,              DOI 10.17487/RFC7626, August 2015,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7626>.   [RFC7766]  Dickinson, J., Dickinson, S., Bellis, R., Mankin, A., and              D. Wessels, "DNS Transport over TCP - Implementation              Requirements",RFC 7766, DOI 10.17487/RFC7766, March 2016,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7766>.   [RFC7858]  Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,              and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport              Layer Security (TLS)",RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May              2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.   [RFC7918]  Langley, A., Modadugu, N., and B. Moeller, "Transport              Layer Security (TLS) False Start",RFC 7918,              DOI 10.17487/RFC7918, August 2016,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7918>.   [RFC7924]  Santesson, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Transport Layer Security              (TLS) Cached Information Extension",RFC 7924,              DOI 10.17487/RFC7924, July 2016,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7924>.Reddy, et al.                 Experimental                     [Page 12]

RFC 8094                      DNS over DTLS                February 2017Acknowledgements   Thanks to Phil Hedrick for his review comments on TCP and to Josh   Littlefield for pointing out DNS over DTLS load on busy servers (most   notably root servers).  The authors would like to thank Simon   Josefsson, Daniel Kahn Gillmor, Bob Harold, Ilari Liusvaara, Sara   Dickinson, Christian Huitema, Stephane Bortzmeyer, Alexander   Mayrhofer, Allison Mankin, Jouni Korhonen, Stephen Farrell, Mirja   Kuehlewind, Benoit Claise, and Geoff Huston for discussions and   comments on the design of DNS over DTLS.  The authors would like to   give special thanks to Sara Dickinson for her help.Authors' Addresses   Tirumaleswar Reddy   Cisco Systems, Inc.   Cessna Business Park, Varthur Hobli   Sarjapur Marathalli Outer Ring Road   Bangalore, Karnataka  560103   India   Email: tireddy@cisco.com   Dan Wing   Email: dwing-ietf@fuggles.com   Prashanth Patil   Cisco Systems, Inc.   Email: praspati@cisco.comReddy, et al.                 Experimental                     [Page 13]