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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                             J. BiRequest for Comments: 8074                           Tsinghua UniversityCategory: Standards Track                                         G. YaoISSN: 2070-1721                                Tsinghua University/Baidu                                                              J. Halpern                                                                Ericsson                                                   E. Levy-Abegnoli, Ed.                                                                   Cisco                                                           February 2017Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI)for Mixed Address Assignment Methods ScenarioAbstract   In networks that use multiple techniques for address assignment, the   spoofing of addresses assigned by each technique can be prevented   using the appropriate Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI)   methods.  This document reviews how multiple SAVI methods can coexist   in a single SAVI device and how collisions are resolved when the same   binding entry is discovered by two or more methods.Status of This Memo   This is an Internet Standards Track document.   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has   received public review and has been approved for publication by the   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on   Internet Standards is available inSection 2 of RFC 7841.   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttp://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8074.Bi, et al.                   Standards Track                    [Page 1]

RFC 8074                        SAVI-MIX                   February 2017Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of   publication of this document.  Please review these documents   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as   described in the Simplified BSD License.Table of Contents1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33.  Problem Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34.  Architecture  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45.  Recommendations for Assignment Separation . . . . . . . . . .66.  Resolving Binding Collisions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66.1.  Same Address on Different Binding Anchors . . . . . . . .66.1.1.  Basic Preference  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76.1.2.  Exceptions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76.1.3.  Multiple SAVI Device Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . .86.2.  Same Address on the Same Binding Anchor . . . . . . . . .97.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .910. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1010.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1010.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12Bi, et al.                   Standards Track                    [Page 2]

RFC 8074                        SAVI-MIX                   February 20171.  Introduction   There are currently several Source Address Validation Improvement   (SAVI) documents ([RFC6620], [RFC7513], and [RFC7219]) that describe   the different methods by which a switch can discover and record   bindings between a node's IP address and a binding anchor and use   that binding to perform source address validation.  Each of these   documents specifies how to learn on-link addresses, based on the   technique used for their assignment: StateLess Address   Autoconfiguration (SLAAC), the Dynamic Host Control Protocol (DHCP),   and Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND), respectively.  Each of these   documents describes separately how one particular SAVI method deals   with address collisions (same address but different binding anchor).   While multiple IP assignment techniques can be used in the same layer   2 domain, this means that a single SAVI device might have to deal   with a combination or mix of SAVI methods.  The purpose of this   document is to provide recommendations to avoid collisions and to   review collision handling when two or more such methods come up with   competing bindings.2.  Requirements Language   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this   document are to be interpreted as described inRFC 2119 [RFC2119].3.  Problem Scope   Three different IP address assignment techniques have been analyzed   for SAVI:   1.  StateLess Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) -- analyzed in FCFS       SAVI (First-Come, First-Served) [RFC6620]   2.  Dynamic Host Control Protocol address assignment (DHCP) --       analyzed in SAVI-DHCP [RFC7513]   3.  Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) address assignment -- analyzed       in SEND SAVI [RFC7219]   In addition, there is a fourth technique for managing (i.e.,   creation, management, and deletion) a binding on the switch, referred   to as "manual".  It is based on manual binding configuration.  How to   manage manual bindings is determined by operators, so there is not a   new SAVI method for manual addresses.Bi, et al.                   Standards Track                    [Page 3]

RFC 8074                        SAVI-MIX                   February 2017   All combinations of address assignment techniques can coexist within   a layer 2 domain.  A SAVI device MUST implement the corresponding   binding setup methods (referred to as "SAVI methods") for each such   technique that is in use if it is to provide source address   validation.   SAVI methods are normally viewed as independent from each other, each   one handling its own entries.  If multiple methods are used in the   same device without coordination, each method will attempt to reject   packets sourced with any addresses that method did not discover.  To   prevent addresses discovered by one SAVI method from being filtered   out by another method, the SAVI binding table SHOULD be shared by all   the SAVI methods in use in the device.  This in turn could create   some conflict when the same entry is discovered by two different   methods.  The purpose of this document is twofold: to provide   recommendations and methods to avoid conflicts and to resolve   conflicts when they happen.  Collisions happening within a given   method are outside the scope of this document.4.  Architecture   A SAVI device may implement and use multiple SAVI methods.  This   mechanism, called "SAVI-MIX", is proposed as an arbiter of the   binding generation algorithms from these multiple methods, generating   the final binding entries as illustrated in Figure 1.  Once a SAVI   method generates a candidate binding, it will request that SAVI-MIX   set up a corresponding entry in the binding table.  Then, SAVI-MIX   will check if there is any conflict in the binding table.  A new   binding will be generated if there is no conflict.  If there is a   conflict, SAVI-MIX will determine whether to replace the existing   binding or reject the candidate binding based on the policies   specified inSection 6.   As a result of this, the packet filtering in the SAVI device will not   be performed by each SAVI method separately.  Instead, the table   resulting from applying SAVI-MIX will be used to perform filtering.   Thus, the filtering is based on the combined results of the different   SAVI mechanisms.  It is beyond the scope of this document to describe   the details of the filtering mechanism and its use of the combined   SAVI binding table.Bi, et al.                   Standards Track                    [Page 4]

RFC 8074                        SAVI-MIX                   February 2017   +--------------------------------------------------------+   |                                                        |   |                                        SAVI Device     |   |                                                        |   |                                                        |   |     +------+    +------+    +------+                   |   |     | SAVI |    | SAVI |    | SAVI |                   |   |     |      |    |      |    |      |                   |   |     | FCFS |    | DHCP |    | SEND |                   |   |     +------+    +------+    +------+                   |   |        |            |           |   Binding            |   |        |            |           |   setup              |   |        v            v           v   requests           |   |     +------------------------------+                   |   |     |                              |                   |   |     |            SAVI-MIX          |                   |   |     |                              |                   |   |     +------------------------------+                   |   |                     |                                  |   |                     v               Final Binding      |   |             +--------------+                           |   |             |   Binding    |                           |   |             |              |                           |   |             |   Table      |                           |   |             +--------------+                           |   |                                                        |   +--------------------------------------------------------+                  Figure 1: SAVI-MIX Architecture   Each entry in the binding table will contain the following fields:   1.  IP source address   2.  Binding anchor [RFC7039]   3.  Lifetime   4.  Creation time   5.  Binding methods: the SAVI method used for this entryBi, et al.                   Standards Track                    [Page 5]

RFC 8074                        SAVI-MIX                   February 20175.  Recommendations for Assignment Separation   If each address assignment technique uses a separate portion of the   IP address space, collisions won't happen.  Using non-overlapping   address space across address assignment techniques, and thus across   SAVI methods, is therefore recommended.  To that end, one should:   1.  DHCP and SLAAC: use a non-overlapping prefix for DHCP and SLAAC.       Set the A bit in the Prefix Information option of the Router       Advertisement for the SLAAC prefix, and set the M bit in the       Router Advertisement for the DHCP prefix.  For detailed       explanations of these bits, refer to [RFC4861] and [RFC4862].   2.  SEND and non-SEND: avoid mixed environments (where SEND and non-       SEND nodes are deployed) or separate the prefixes announced to       SEND and non-SEND nodes.  One way to separate the prefixes is to       have the router(s) announcing different (non-overlapping)       prefixes to SEND and to non-SEND nodes, using unicast Router       Advertisements [RFC6085], in response to SEND/non-SEND Router       Solicit.6.  Resolving Binding Collisions   In situations where collisions cannot be avoided by assignment   separation, two cases should be considered:   1.  The same address is bound on two different binding anchors by       different SAVI methods.   2.  The same address is bound on the same binding anchor by different       SAVI methods.6.1.  Same Address on Different Binding Anchors   This would typically occur if assignment address spaces could not be   separated.  For instance, an address is assigned by SLAAC on node X,   installed in the binding table using FCFS SAVI, and anchored to   "anchor-X".  Later, the same address is assigned by DHCP to node Y,   and SAVI-DHCP will generate a candidate binding entry, anchored to   "anchor-Y".Bi, et al.                   Standards Track                    [Page 6]

RFC 8074                        SAVI-MIX                   February 20176.1.1.  Basic Preference   If there is any manually configured binding, the SAVI device SHOULD   choose the manually configured binding anchor.   For an address not covered by any manual bindings, the SAVI device   must decide to which binding anchor the address should be bound   (anchor-X or anchor-Y in this example).  Current standard documents   of address assignment methods have implied the prioritization   relationship based on order in time, i.e., First-Come, First-Served.   o  SLAAC:Section 5.4.5 of [RFC4862]   o  DHCPv4:Section 3.1, Point 5 of [RFC2131]   o  DHCPv6:Section 18.1.8 of [RFC3315]   o  SEND:Section 8 of [RFC3971]   In the absence of any configuration or protocol hint (seeSection 6.1.2), the SAVI device SHOULD choose the first-come binding   anchor, whether it was learned from SLAAC, SEND, or DHCP.6.1.2.  Exceptions   There are two identified exceptions to the general prioritization   model, one being Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)   [RFC3971] and the other controlled by the configuration of the   switch.6.1.2.1.  CGA Preference   When CGA addresses are used and a collision is detected, preference   should be given to the anchor that carries the CGA credentials once   they are verified, in particular, the CGA parameters and the RSA   options.  Note that if an attacker was trying to replay CGA   credentials, he would then compete on the base of the "First-Come,   First-Served" (FCFS) principle.6.1.2.2.  Configuration Preference   For configuration-driven exceptions, the SAVI device may allow the   configuration of a triplet ("prefix", "anchor", "method") or   ("address", "anchor", "method").  The "prefix" or "address"   represents the address or address prefix to which this preference   entry applies.  The "anchor" is the value of a known binding anchor   that this device expects to see using this address or addresses from   this prefix.  The "method" is the SAVI method that this deviceBi, et al.                   Standards Track                    [Page 7]

RFC 8074                        SAVI-MIX                   February 2017   expects to use in validating address binding entries from the address   or prefix.  At least one of "anchor" and "method" MUST be specified.   Later, if a Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) message [RFC4861] is   received with the following conditions verified:   1.  The target in the DAD message does not exist in the binding       table,   2.  The target is within the configured "prefix" (or equal to       "address"),   3.  The anchor bound to the target is different from the configured       anchor, when specified, and   4.  The configured method, if any, is different from FCFS SAVI,   then the switch SHOULD defend the address by responding to the DAD   message, with a Neighbor Advertisement (NA) message, on behalf of the   target node.  It SHOULD NOT install the entry into the binding table.   The DAD message SHOULD be discarded and not forwarded.  Forwarding it   may cause other SAVI devices to send additional defense NAs.  SEND   nodes in the network MUST disable the option to ignore unsecured   advertisements (seeSection 8 of [RFC3971]).  If the option is   enabled, the case is outside the scope of this document.  It is   suggested to limit the rate of defense NAs to reduce security threats   to the switch.  Otherwise, a malicious host could consume the   resource of the switch heavily with flooding DAD messages.   This will simply prevent the node from assigning the address and will   de facto prioritize the configured anchor.  It is especially useful   to protect well-known bindings (such as a static address of a server)   against any other host, even when the server is down.  It is also a   way to give priority to a binding learned from SAVI-DHCP over a   binding for the same address, learned from FCFS SAVI.6.1.3.  Multiple SAVI Device Scenario   A single SAVI device doesn't have the information of all bound   addresses on the perimeter.  Therefore, it is not enough to look up   local bindings to identify a collision.  However, assuming DAD is   performed throughout the security perimeter for all addresses   regardless of the assignment method, then the DAD response will   inform all SAVI devices about any collision.  In that case, "First-   Come, First-Served" will apply the same way as in a single switch   scenario.  If the admin configured a prefix (or a single static   binding) on one of the switches to defend, the DAD response generated   by this switch will also prevent the binding from being installed onBi, et al.                   Standards Track                    [Page 8]

RFC 8074                        SAVI-MIX                   February 2017   other switches on the perimeter.  The SAVI-MIX preferences of all the   SAVI devices in the same layer 2 domain should be consistent.   Inconsistent configurations may cause network breaks.6.2.  Same Address on the Same Binding Anchor   A binding may be set up on the same binding anchor by multiple   methods, typically FCFS SAVI and SAVI-DHCP.  If the binding lifetimes   obtained from the two methods are different, priority should be given   to 1) manual configuration, 2) SAVI-DHCP, 3) and FCFS SAVI as the   least authoritative.  The binding will be removed when the   prioritized lifetime expires, even if a less authoritative method had   a longer lifetime.7.  Security Considerations   Combining SAVI methods (as in SAVI-MIX) does not improve or eliminate   the security considerations associated with each individual SAVI   method.  Therefore, security considerations for each enabled SAVI   method should be addressed as described in that method's associated   RFC.  Moreover, combining methods (as in SAVI-MIX) has two additional   implications for security.  First, it may increase susceptibility to   DoS attacks, because the SAVI binding setup rate will be the sum of   the rates of all enabled SAVI methods.  Implementers must take these   added resource requirements into account.  Second, because SAVI-MIX   supports multiple binding mechanisms, it potentially reduces the   security level to that of the weakest supported method, unless   additional steps (e.g., requiring non-overlapping address spaces for   different methods) are taken.8.  Privacy Considerations   When implementing multiple SAVI methods, privacy considerations of   all methods apply cumulatively.9.  IANA Considerations   This document does not require any IANA registrations.Bi, et al.                   Standards Track                    [Page 9]

RFC 8074                        SAVI-MIX                   February 201710.  References10.1.  Normative References   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate              Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119,              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.   [RFC2131]  Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",RFC 2131, DOI 10.17487/RFC2131, March 1997,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2131>.   [RFC3315]  Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins,              C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol              for IPv6 (DHCPv6)",RFC 3315, DOI 10.17487/RFC3315, July              2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3315>.   [RFC3971]  Arkko, J., Ed., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander,              "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)",RFC 3971,              DOI 10.17487/RFC3971, March 2005,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3971>.   [RFC6085]  Gundavelli, S., Townsley, M., Troan, O., and W. Dec,              "Address Mapping of IPv6 Multicast Packets on Ethernet",RFC 6085, DOI 10.17487/RFC6085, January 2011,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6085>.   [RFC6620]  Nordmark, E., Bagnulo, M., and E. Levy-Abegnoli, "FCFS              SAVI: First-Come, First-Served Source Address Validation              Improvement for Locally Assigned IPv6 Addresses",RFC 6620, DOI 10.17487/RFC6620, May 2012,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6620>.   [RFC7219]  Bagnulo, M. and A. Garcia-Martinez, "SEcure Neighbor              Discovery (SEND) Source Address Validation Improvement              (SAVI)",RFC 7219, DOI 10.17487/RFC7219, May 2014,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7219>.   [RFC7513]  Bi, J., Wu, J., Yao, G., and F. Baker, "Source Address              Validation Improvement (SAVI) Solution for DHCP",RFC 7513, DOI 10.17487/RFC7513, May 2015,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7513>.Bi, et al.                   Standards Track                   [Page 10]

RFC 8074                        SAVI-MIX                   February 201710.2.  Informative References   [RFC4861]  Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,              "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)",RFC 4861,              DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.   [RFC4862]  Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless              Address Autoconfiguration",RFC 4862,              DOI 10.17487/RFC4862, September 2007,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4862>.   [RFC7039]  Wu, J., Bi, J., Bagnulo, M., Baker, F., and C. Vogt, Ed.,              "Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) Framework",RFC 7039, DOI 10.17487/RFC7039, October 2013,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7039>.Acknowledgments   Thanks to Christian Vogt, Eric Nordmark, Marcelo Bagnulo Braun, David   Lamparter, Scott G. Kelly, and Jari Arkko for their valuable   contributions.Bi, et al.                   Standards Track                   [Page 11]

RFC 8074                        SAVI-MIX                   February 2017Authors' Addresses   Jun Bi   Tsinghua University   Institute for Network Sciences and Cyberspace, Tsinghua University   Beijing  100084   China   Email: junbi@tsinghua.edu.cn   Guang Yao   Tsinghua University/Baidu   Baidu Science and Technology Park, Building 1   Beijing  100193   China   Email: yaoguang.china@gmail.com   Joel M. Halpern   Ericsson   Email: joel.halpern@ericsson.com   Eric Levy-Abegnoli (editor)   Cisco Systems   Village d'Entreprises Green Side - 400, Avenue Roumanille   Biot-Sophia Antipolis  06410   France   Email: elevyabe@cisco.comBi, et al.                   Standards Track                   [Page 12]

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