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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Merkle, Ed.Request for Comments: 7630 Secunet Security NetworksCategory: Standards Track M. LochterISSN: 2070-1721 BSI October 2015HMAC-SHA-2 Authentication Protocolsin the User-based Security Model (USM) for SNMPv3Abstract This memo specifies new HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocols for the User-based Security Model (USM) for SNMPv3 defined inRFC 3414.Status of This Memo This is an Internet Standards Track document. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available inSection 2 of RFC 5741. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttp://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7630.Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.Merkle & Lochter Standards Track [Page 1]

RFC 7630                   HMAC-SHA-2_Auth_USM              October 2015Table of Contents1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22.  The Internet-Standard Management Framework  . . . . . . . . .33.  Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34.  The HMAC-SHA-2 Authentication Protocols . . . . . . . . . . .3     4.1.  Deviations from the HMAC-SHA-96 Authentication Protocol .   44.2.  Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54.2.1.  Processing an Outgoing Message  . . . . . . . . . . .54.2.2.  Processing an Incoming Message  . . . . . . . . . . .65.  Key Localization and Key Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66.  Structure of the MIB Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67.  Relationship to Other MIB Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77.1.  Relationship to SNMP-USER-BASED-SM-MIB  . . . . . . . . .77.2.  Relationship to SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB  . . . . . . . . . . .77.3.  MIB Modules Required for IMPORTS  . . . . . . . . . . . .78.  Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99.1.  Use of the HMAC-SHA-2 Authentication Protocols in USM . .9     9.2.  Cryptographic Strength of the Authentication Protocols  .   99.3.  Derivation of Keys from Passwords . . . . . . . . . . . .109.4.  Access to the SNMP-USM-HMAC-SHA2-MIB  . . . . . . . . . .1110. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1111. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1211.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1211.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .141.  Introduction   This memo defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB)   for use with network management protocols.  In particular, it defines   additional authentication protocols for the User-based Security Model   (USM) for the Simple Network Management Protocol version 3 (SNMPv3)   specified inRFC 3414 [RFC3414].   InRFC 3414, two different authentication protocols, HMAC-MD5-96 and   HMAC-SHA-96, are defined based on the hash functions MD5 and SHA-1,   respectively.  This memo specifies new HMAC-SHA-2 authentication   protocols for USM using a Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)   based on the SHA-2 family of hash functions [SHA] and truncated to   128 bits for SHA-224, to 192 bits for SHA-256, to 256 bits for   SHA-384, and to 384 bits for SHA-512.  These protocols are   straightforward adaptations of the authentication protocols HMAC-   MD5-96 and HMAC-SHA-96 to the SHA-2-based HMAC.Merkle & Lochter             Standards Track                    [Page 2]

RFC 7630                   HMAC-SHA-2_Auth_USM              October 20152.  The Internet-Standard Management Framework   For a detailed overview of the documents that describe the current   Internet-Standard Management Framework, please refer tosection 7 of   RFC 3410 [RFC3410].   Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed   the Management Information Base or MIB.  MIB objects are generally   accessed through the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).   Objects in the MIB are defined using the mechanisms defined in the   Structure of Management Information (SMI).  This memo specifies a MIB   module that is compliant to the SMIv2, which is described in STD 58,RFC 2578 [RFC2578], STD 58,RFC 2579 [RFC2579] and STD 58,RFC 2580   [RFC2580].3.  Conventions   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this   document are to be interpreted as described inBCP 14,RFC 2119   [RFC2119].4.  The HMAC-SHA-2 Authentication Protocols   This section describes the HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocols, which   use the SHA-2 hash functions (described in FIPS PUB 180-4 [SHA] andRFC 6234 [RFC6234]) in the HMAC mode (described inRFC 2104 [RFC2104]   andRFC 6234), truncating the output to 128 bits for SHA-224, 192   bits for SHA-256, 256 bits for SHA-384, and 384 bits for SHA-512.RFC 6234 also provides source code for all the SHA-2 algorithms and   HMAC (without truncation).  It also includes test harness and   standard test vectors for all the defined hash functions and HMAC   examples.   The following protocols are defined:      usmHMAC128SHA224AuthProtocol: uses SHA-224 and truncates the      output to 128 bits (16 octets);      usmHMAC192SHA256AuthProtocol: uses SHA-256 and truncates the      output to 192 bits (24 octets);      usmHMAC256SHA384AuthProtocol: uses SHA-384 and truncates the      output to 256 bits (32 octets);      usmHMAC384SHA512AuthProtocol: uses SHA-512 and truncates the      output to 384 bits (48 octets).Merkle & Lochter             Standards Track                    [Page 3]

RFC 7630                   HMAC-SHA-2_Auth_USM              October 2015   Implementations conforming to this specification MUST support   usmHMAC192SHA256AuthProtocol and SHOULD support   usmHMAC384SHA512AuthProtocol.  The protocols   usmHMAC128SHA224AuthProtocol and usmHMAC256SHA384AuthProtocol are   OPTIONAL.4.1.  Deviations from the HMAC-SHA-96 Authentication Protocol   All the HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocols are straightforward   adaptations of the HMAC-MD5-96 and HMAC-SHA-96 authentication   protocols.  Specifically, they differ from the HMAC-MD5-96 and HMAC-   SHA-96 authentication protocols in the following aspects:   o  The SHA-2 hash function is used to compute the message digest in      the HMAC computation according toRFC 2104 andRFC 6234, as      opposed to the MD5 hash function [RFC1321] and SHA-1 hash function      [SHA] used in HMAC-MD5-96 and HMAC-SHA-96, respectively.      Consequently, the length of the message digest prior to truncation      is 224 bits for the SHA-224-based protocol, 256 bits for the      SHA-256-based protocol, 384 bits for the SHA-384-based protocol,      and 512 bits for the SHA-512-based protocol.   o  The resulting message digest (output of HMAC) is truncated to      *  16 octets for usmHMAC128SHA224AuthProtocol      *  24 octets for usmHMAC192SHA256AuthProtocol      *  32 octets for usmHMAC256SHA384AuthProtocol      *  48 octets for usmHMAC384SHA512AuthProtocol      as opposed to the truncation to 12 octets in HMAC-MD5-96 and HMAC-      SHA-96.   o  The user's secret key to be used when calculating a digest MUST be      *  28 octets long and derived with SHA-224 for the SHA-224-based         protocol usmHMAC128SHA224AuthProtocol      *  32 octets long and derived with SHA-256 for the SHA-256-based         protocol usmHMAC192SHA256AuthProtocol      *  48 octets long and derived with SHA-384 for the SHA-384-based         protocol usmHMAC256SHA384AuthProtocol      *  64 octets long and derived with SHA-512 for the SHA-512-based         protocol usmHMAC384SHA512AuthProtocolMerkle & Lochter             Standards Track                    [Page 4]

RFC 7630                   HMAC-SHA-2_Auth_USM              October 2015      as opposed to the keys being 16 and 20 octets long in HMAC-MD5-96      and HMAC-SHA-96, respectively.4.2.  Processing   This section describes the procedures for the HMAC-SHA-2   authentication protocols.  The descriptions are based on the   definition of services and data elements defined for HMAC-SHA-96 inRFC 3414 with the deviations listed inSection 4.1.   Values of constants M (the length of the secret key in octets) and N   (the length of the Message Authentication Code (MAC) output in   octets), and the hash function H used below are:      usmHMAC128SHA224AuthProtocol: M=28, N=16, H=SHA-224;      usmHMAC192SHA256AuthProtocol: M=32, N=24, H=SHA-256;      usmHMAC256SHA384AuthProtocol: M=48, N=32, H=SHA-384;      usmHMAC384SHA512AuthProtocol: M=64, N=48, H=SHA-512.4.2.1.  Processing an Outgoing Message   This section describes the procedure followed by an SNMP engine   whenever it must authenticate an outgoing message using one of the   authentication protocols defined above.  Values of the constants M   and N, and the hash function H are as defined inSection 4.2 and are   selected based on which authentication protocol is configured for the   given USM usmUser Table entry.   1.  The msgAuthenticationParameters field is set to the serialization       of an OCTET STRING containing N zero octets; it is serialized       according to the rules inRFC 3417 [RFC3417].   2.  Using the secret authKey of M octets, the HMAC is calculated over       the wholeMsg according toRFC 6234 with hash function H.   3.  The N first octets of the above HMAC are taken as the computed       MAC value.   4.  The msgAuthenticationParameters field is replaced with the MAC       obtained in the previous step.   5.  The authenticatedWholeMsg is then returned to the caller together       with the statusInformation indicating success.Merkle & Lochter             Standards Track                    [Page 5]

RFC 7630                   HMAC-SHA-2_Auth_USM              October 20154.2.2.  Processing an Incoming Message   This section describes the procedure followed by an SNMP engine   whenever it must authenticate an incoming message using one of the   HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocols.  Values of the constants M and   N, and the hash function H are as defined inSection 4.2 and are   selected based on which authentication protocol is configured for the   given USM usmUser Table entry.   1.  If the digest received in the msgAuthenticationParameters field       is not N octets long, then a failure and an errorIndication       (authenticationError) are returned to the calling module.   2.  The MAC received in the msgAuthenticationParameters field is       saved.   3.  The digest in the msgAuthenticationParameters field is replaced       by the N zero octets.   4.  Using the secret authKey of M octets, the HMAC is calculated over       the wholeMsg according toRFC 6234 with hash function H.   5.  The N first octets of the above HMAC are taken as the computed       MAC value.   6.  The msgAuthenticationParameters field is replaced with the MAC       value that was saved in step 2.   7.  The newly calculated MAC is compared with the MAC saved in step       2.  If they do not match, then a failure and an errorIndication       (authenticationFailure) are returned to the calling module.   8.  The authenticatedWholeMsg and statusInformation indicating       success are then returned to the caller.5.  Key Localization and Key Change   For any of the protocols defined inSection 4, key localization and   key change SHALL be performed according toRFC 3414 [RFC3414] using   the same SHA-2 hash function as in the HMAC-SHA-2 authentication   protocol.6.  Structure of the MIB Module   The MIB module specified in this memo does not define any managed   objects, subtrees, notifications, or tables; rather, it only defines   object identities (for authentication protocols) under a subtree of   an existing MIB.Merkle & Lochter             Standards Track                    [Page 6]

RFC 7630                   HMAC-SHA-2_Auth_USM              October 20157.  Relationship to Other MIB Modules7.1.  Relationship to SNMP-USER-BASED-SM-MIBRFC 3414 specifies the MIB module for USM for SNMPv3 (SNMP-USER-   BASED-SM-MIB), which defines authentication protocols for USM based   on the hash functions MD5 and SHA-1, respectively.  The following MIB   module defines new HMAC-SHA2 authentication protocols for USM based   on the SHA-2 hash functions [SHA].  The use of the HMAC-SHA2   authentication protocols requires the usage of the objects defined in   the SNMP-USER-BASED-SM-MIB.7.2.  Relationship to SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIBRFC 3411 [RFC3411] specifies the SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB, which defines a   subtree snmpAuthProtocols for SNMP authentication protocols.  The   following MIB module defines new authentication protocols in the   snmpAuthProtocols subtree.7.3.  MIB Modules Required for IMPORTS   The following MIB module IMPORTS definitions from SNMPv2-SMI   [RFC2578] and SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB [RFC3411].8.  Definitions   SNMP-USM-HMAC-SHA2-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN       IMPORTS           MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-IDENTITY,       snmpModules             FROM SNMPv2-SMI          -- [RFC2578]       snmpAuthProtocols       FROM SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB; -- [RFC3411]   snmpUsmHmacSha2MIB MODULE-IDENTITY       LAST-UPDATED    "201508130000Z"       -- 13 August 2015, midnight       ORGANIZATION    "SNMPv3 Working Group"       CONTACT-INFO    "WG email: OPSAWG@ietf.org                       Subscribe:https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsawg                       Editor:    Johannes Merkle                                  secunet Security Networks                       Postal:    Mergenthaler Allee 77                                  D-65760 Eschborn                                  Germany                       Phone:     +49 20154543091                       Email:     johannes.merkle@secunet.comMerkle & Lochter             Standards Track                    [Page 7]

RFC 7630                   HMAC-SHA-2_Auth_USM              October 2015                       Co-Editor: Manfred Lochter                                  Bundesamt fuer Sicherheit in der                                  Informationstechnik (BSI)                       Postal:    Postfach 200363                                  D-53133 Bonn                                  Germany                       Phone:     +49 228 9582 5643                       Email:     manfred.lochter@bsi.bund.de"       DESCRIPTION     "Definitions of Object Identities needed                       for the use of HMAC-SHA2 by SNMP's User-based                       Security Model.             Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified             as authors of the code.  All rights reserved.             Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with             or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and             subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified             BSD License set forth inSection 4.c of the IETF Trust's             Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents             (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info)."       REVISION    "201508130000Z"       -- 13 August 2015, midnight       DESCRIPTION "Initial version, published asRFC 7630"   ::= { snmpModules 235 }   usmHMAC128SHA224AuthProtocol OBJECT-IDENTITY       STATUS      current       DESCRIPTION "The Authentication Protocol                   usmHMAC128SHA224AuthProtocol uses HMAC-SHA-224 and                   truncates output to 128 bits."       REFERENCE   "- Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, HMAC:                   Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication,RFC 2104.                   - National Institute of Standards and Technology,                   Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-4, 2012."       ::= { snmpAuthProtocols 4 }   usmHMAC192SHA256AuthProtocol OBJECT-IDENTITY       STATUS      current       DESCRIPTION "The Authentication Protocol                   usmHMAC192SHA256AuthProtocol uses HMAC-SHA-256 and                   truncates output to 192 bits."       REFERENCE   "- Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, HMAC:                   Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication,RFC 2104.                   - National Institute of Standards and Technology,                   Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-4, 2012."       ::= { snmpAuthProtocols 5 }Merkle & Lochter             Standards Track                    [Page 8]

RFC 7630                   HMAC-SHA-2_Auth_USM              October 2015   usmHMAC256SHA384AuthProtocol OBJECT-IDENTITY       STATUS      current       DESCRIPTION "The Authentication Protocol                   usmHMAC256SHA384AuthProtocol uses HMAC-SHA-384 and                   truncates output to 256 bits."       REFERENCE   "- Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, HMAC:                   Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication,RFC 2104.                   - National Institute of Standards and Technology,                   Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-4, 2012."       ::= { snmpAuthProtocols 6 }   usmHMAC384SHA512AuthProtocol OBJECT-IDENTITY       STATUS      current       DESCRIPTION "The Authentication Protocol                   usmHMAC384SHA512AuthProtocol uses HMAC-SHA-512 and                   truncates output to 384 bits."       REFERENCE   "- Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, HMAC:                   Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication,RFC 2104.                   - National Institute of Standards and Technology,                   Secure Hash Standard (SHS), FIPS PUB 180-4, 2012."       ::= { snmpAuthProtocols 7 }   END9.  Security Considerations9.1.  Use of the HMAC-SHA-2 Authentication Protocols in USM   The security considerations ofRFC 3414 [RFC3414] also apply to the   HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocols defined in this document.9.2.  Cryptographic Strength of the Authentication Protocols   At the time of publication of this document, all of the HMAC-SHA-2   authentication protocols provide a very high level of security.  The   security of each HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocol depends on the   parameters used in the corresponding HMAC computation, which are the   length of the key (if the key has maximum entropy), the size of the   hash function's internal state, and the length of the truncated MAC.   For the HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocols, these values are as   follows (values are given in bits).Merkle & Lochter             Standards Track                    [Page 9]

RFC 7630                   HMAC-SHA-2_Auth_USM              October 2015   +------------------------------+---------+----------------+---------+   |           Protocol           |   Key   |    Size of     |   MAC   |   |                              |  length | internal state |  length |   +------------------------------+---------+----------------+---------+   | usmHMAC128SHA224AuthProtocol |   224   |      256       |   128   |   | usmHMAC192SHA256AuthProtocol |   256   |      256       |   192   |   | usmHMAC256SHA384AuthProtocol |   384   |      512       |   256   |   | usmHMAC384SHA512AuthProtocol |   512   |      512       |   384   |   +------------------------------+---------+----------------+---------+    Table 1: HMAC Parameters of the HMAC-SHA-2 Authentication Protocols   The security of the HMAC scales with both the key length and the size   of the internal state: longer keys render key guessing attacks more   difficult, and a larger internal state decreases the success   probability of MAC forgeries based on internal collisions of the hash   function.   The role of the truncated output length is more complicated:   according to [BCK], there is a trade-off in that      by outputting less bits the attacker has less bits to predict in a      MAC forgery but, on the other hand, the attacker also learns less      about the output of the compression function from seeing the      authentication tags computed by legitimate parties.   Thus, truncation weakens the HMAC against forgery by guessing but, at   the same time, strengthens it against chosen message attacks aiming   at MAC forgery based on internal collisions or at key guessing.RFC2104 and [BCK] allow truncation to any length that is not less than   half the size of the internal state.   Further discussion of the security of the HMAC construction is given   inRFC 2104.9.3.  Derivation of Keys from Passwords   If secret keys to be used for HMAC-SHA-2 authentication protocols are   derived from passwords, the derivation SHOULD be performed using the   password-to-key algorithm fromAppendix A.1 of RFC 3414 with MD5   being replaced by the SHA-2 hash function H used in the HMAC-SHA-2   authentication protocol.  Specifically, the password is converted   into the required secret key by the following steps:   o  forming a string of length 1,048,576 octets by repeating the value      of the password as often as necessary, truncating accordingly, and      using the resulting string as the input to the hash function H.      The resulting digest, termed "digest1", is used in the next step.Merkle & Lochter             Standards Track                   [Page 10]

RFC 7630                   HMAC-SHA-2_Auth_USM              October 2015   o  forming a second string by concatenating digest1, the SNMP      engine's snmpEngineID value, and digest1.  This string is used as      input to the hash function H.9.4.  Access to the SNMP-USM-HMAC-SHA2-MIB   The SNMP-USM-HMAC-SHA2-MIB module defines OBJECT IDENTIFIER values   for use in other MIB modules.  It does not define any objects that   can be accessed.  As such, the SNMP-USM-HMAC-SHA2-MIB does not, by   itself, have any effect on the security of the Internet.   The values defined in this module are expected to be used with the   usmUserTable defined in the SNMP-USER-BASED-SM-MIB [RFC3414].  The   considerations inSection 11.5 of RFC 3414 should be taken into   account.10.  IANA Considerations   IANA has assigned an OID for the MIB as follows.             +--------------------+-------------------------+             |     Descriptor     | OBJECT IDENTIFIER value |             +--------------------+-------------------------+             | snmpUsmHmacSha2MIB |   { snmpModules 235 }   |             +--------------------+-------------------------+                            Table 2: OID of MIB   Furthermore, IANA has assigned a value in the SnmpAuthProtocols   registry for each of the following protocols.           +------------------------------+-------+-----------+           |         Description          | Value | Reference |           +------------------------------+-------+-----------+           | usmHMAC128SHA224AuthProtocol |   4   |RFC 7630 |           | usmHMAC192SHA256AuthProtocol |   5   |RFC 7630 |           | usmHMAC256SHA384AuthProtocol |   6   |RFC 7630 |           | usmHMAC384SHA512AuthProtocol |   7   |RFC 7630 |           +------------------------------+-------+-----------+   Table 3: Code Points Assigned to HMAC-SHA-2 Authentication ProtocolsMerkle & Lochter             Standards Track                   [Page 11]

RFC 7630                   HMAC-SHA-2_Auth_USM              October 201511.  References11.1.  Normative References   [RFC2104]  Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-              Hashing for Message Authentication",RFC 2104,              DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate              Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119,              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.   [RFC2578]  McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.              Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Structure of Management Information              Version 2 (SMIv2)", STD 58,RFC 2578,              DOI 10.17487/RFC2578, April 1999,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2578>.   [RFC2579]  McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.              Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Textual Conventions for SMIv2",              STD 58,RFC 2579, DOI 10.17487/RFC2579, April 1999,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2579>.   [RFC2580]  McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.              Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Conformance Statements for SMIv2",              STD 58,RFC 2580, DOI 10.17487/RFC2580, April 1999,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2580>.   [RFC3414]  Blumenthal, U. and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model              (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management              Protocol (SNMPv3)", STD 62,RFC 3414,              DOI 10.17487/RFC3414, December 2002,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3414>.   [RFC6234]  Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms              (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)",RFC 6234,              DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>.   [SHA]      National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure              Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180-4,              DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4, March 2012,              <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf>.Merkle & Lochter             Standards Track                   [Page 12]

RFC 7630                   HMAC-SHA-2_Auth_USM              October 201511.2.  Informative References   [RFC1321]  Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm",RFC 1321,              DOI 10.17487/RFC1321, April 1992,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1321>.   [RFC3410]  Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D., and B. Stewart,              "Introduction and Applicability Statements for Internet-              Standard Management Framework",RFC 3410,              DOI 10.17487/RFC3410, December 2002,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3410>.   [RFC3411]  Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An              Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management              Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks", STD 62,RFC 3411,              DOI 10.17487/RFC3411, December 2002,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3411>.   [RFC3417]  Presuhn, R., Ed., "Transport Mappings for the Simple              Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62,RFC 3417,              DOI 10.17487/RFC3417, December 2002,              <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3417>.   [BCK]      Bellare, M., Canetti, R., and H. Krawczyk, "Keyed Hash              Functions for Message Authentication", Advances in              Cryptology - CRYPTO 96, Lecture Notes in Computer Science              1109, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg,              DOI 10.1007/3-540-68697-5_1, 1996.Merkle & Lochter             Standards Track                   [Page 13]

RFC 7630                   HMAC-SHA-2_Auth_USM              October 2015Authors' Addresses   Johannes Merkle (editor)   Secunet Security Networks   Mergenthaler Allee 77   65760 Eschborn   Germany   Phone: +49 201 5454 3091   Email: johannes.merkle@secunet.com   Manfred Lochter   BSI   Postfach 200363   53133 Bonn   Germany   Phone: +49 228 9582 5643   Email: manfred.lochter@bsi.bund.deMerkle & Lochter             Standards Track                   [Page 14]

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