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INFORMATIONAL
Updated by:8996Errata Exist
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                          S. KannoRequest for Comments: 6367                      NTT Software CorporationCategory: Informational                                         M. KandaISSN: 2070-1721                                                      NTT                                                          September 2011Addition of the Camellia Cipher Suites toTransport Layer Security (TLS)Abstract   This document specifies forty-two cipher suites for the Transport   Security Layer (TLS) protocol to support the Camellia encryption   algorithm as a block cipher.Status of This Memo   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is   published for informational purposes.   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has   received public review and has been approved for publication by the   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents   approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet   Standard; seeSection 2 of RFC 5741.   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttp://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6367.Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of   publication of this document.  Please review these documents   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as   described in the Simplified BSD License.Kanno & Kanda                 Informational                     [Page 1]

RFC 6367             Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS       September 2011Table of Contents1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22.  Proposed Cipher Suites  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32.1.  HMAC-Based Cipher Suites  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32.2.  GCM-Based Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32.3.  PSK-Based Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43.  Cipher Suite Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43.1.  Key Exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43.2.  Cipher  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43.3.  PRFs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53.4.  PSK Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71.  Introduction   The Camellia cipher suites are already specified inRFC 5932 [15]   with SHA-256-based Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) using   asymmetric key encryption.  This document proposes the addition of   new cipher suites to the Transport Layer Security (TLS) [8] protocol   to support the Camellia [4] cipher algorithm as a block cipher   algorithm.  The proposed cipher suites include variants using the   SHA-2 family of cryptographic hash functions [13] and Galois Counter   Mode (GCM) [14].  Elliptic curve cipher suites and pre-shared key   (PSK) [5] cipher suites are also included.1.1.  Terminology   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this   document are to be interpreted as described inRFC 2119 [3].Kanno & Kanda                 Informational                     [Page 2]

RFC 6367             Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS       September 20112.  Proposed Cipher Suites2.1.  HMAC-Based Cipher Suites   The eight cipher suites use Camellia [4] in Cipher Block Chaining   (CBC) [4] mode with a SHA-2 family HMAC using the elliptic curve   cryptosystem: CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {0xC0,0x72}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {0xC0,0x73}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  = {0xC0,0x74}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384  = {0xC0,0x75}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256   = {0xC0,0x76}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384   = {0xC0,0x77}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    = {0xC0,0x78}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    = {0xC0,0x79};2.2.  GCM-Based Cipher Suites   The twenty cipher suites use the same asymmetric key algorithms as   those in the previous section but use the authenticated encryption   modes defined in TLS 1.2 [8] with Camellia in GCM [14].CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256          = {0xC0,0x7A};CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384          = {0xC0,0x7B};CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {0xC0,0x7C};CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {0xC0,0x7D};CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256       = {0xC0,0x7E};CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384       = {0xC0,0x7F};CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {0xC0,0x80};CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {0xC0,0x81};CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256       = {0xC0,0x82};CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384       = {0xC0,0x83};CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {0xC0,0x84};CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {0xC0,0x85};CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256  = {0xC0,0x86};CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384  = {0xC0,0x87};CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256   = {0xC0,0x88};CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384   = {0xC0,0x89};CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256    = {0xC0,0x8A};CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384    = {0xC0,0x8B};CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256     = {0xC0,0x8C};CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384     = {0xC0,0x8D};Kanno & Kanda                 Informational                     [Page 3]

RFC 6367             Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS       September 20112.3.  PSK-Based Cipher Suites   The fourteen cipher suites describe PSK cipher suites.  The first six   cipher suites use Camellia with GCM, and the next eight cipher suites   use Camellia with SHA-2 family HMAC using asymmetric key encryption   or the elliptic curve cryptosystem.  CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256        = {0xC0,0x8D};  CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384        = {0xC0,0x8F};  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256    = {0xC0,0x90};  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384    = {0xC0,0x91};  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256    = {0xC0,0x92};  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384    = {0xC0,0x93};  CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256        = {0xC0,0x94};  CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384        = {0xC0,0x95};  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    = {0xC0,0x96};  CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    = {0xC0,0x97};  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    = {0xC0,0x98};  CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    = {0xC0,0x99};  CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  = {0xC0,0x9A};  CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384  = {0xC0,0x9B};3.  Cipher Suite Definitions3.1.  Key Exchange   The RSA, DHE_RSA, DH_RSA, DHE_DSS, DH_DSS, ECDH, DH_anon, and ECDHE   key exchanges are performed as defined inRFC 5246 [8].3.2.  Cipher   This document describes cipher suites based on Camellia cipher using   CBC mode and GCM.  The details are as follows.   The CAMELLIA_128_CBC cipher suites use Camellia [4] in CBC mode with   a 128-bit key and 128-bit Initialization Vector (IV); the   CAMELLIA_256_CBC cipher suites use a 256-bit key and 128-bit IV.   Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [19] authenticated encryption with   additional data algorithms, AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM,   are described inRFC 5116 [7].  AES GCM cipher suites for TLS are   described inRFC 5288 [9].  AES and Camellia share common   characteristics including key sizes and block length.   CAMELLIA_128_GCM and CAMELLIA_256_GCM are defined according to those   of AES.Kanno & Kanda                 Informational                     [Page 4]

RFC 6367             Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS       September 20113.3.  PRFs   The hash algorithms and pseudorandom function (PRF) algorithms for   TLS 1.2 [8] SHALL be as follows:   a.  The cipher suites ending with _SHA256 use HMAC-SHA-256 [1] as the       MAC algorithm.  The PRF is the TLS PRF [8] with SHA-256 [13] as       the hash function.   b.  The cipher suites ending with _SHA384 use HMAC-SHA-384 [1] as the       MAC algorithm.  The PRF is the TLS PRF [8] with SHA-384 [13] as       the hash function.   When used with TLS versions prior to 1.2 (TLS 1.0 [2] and TLS 1.1   [6]), the PRF is calculated as specified in the appropriate version   of the TLS specification.3.4.  PSK Cipher Suites   PSK cipher suites for TLS are described inRFC 5487 [11] as to SHA-   256/384 andRFC 5489 [12] as to ECDHE_PSK.4.  Security Considerations   At the time of writing this document, there are no known weak keys   for Camellia.  Additionally, no security problems with Camellia have   been found (see NESSIE [16], CRYPTREC [17], and LNCS 5867[18]).   The security considerations in previous RFCs (RFC 5116 [7],RFC 5289   [10], andRFC 5487 [11]) apply to this document as well.5.  IANA Considerations   IANA allocated the following numbers in the TLS Cipher Suite   Registry:CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256  = {0xC0,0x72};CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384  = {0xC0,0x73};CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256   = {0xC0,0x74};CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384   = {0xC0,0x75};CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    = {0xC0,0x76};CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    = {0xC0,0x77};CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256     = {0xC0,0x78};CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384     = {0xC0,0x79};CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256          = {0xC0,0x7A};CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384          = {0xC0,0x7B};CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {0xC0,0x7C};CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {0xC0,0x7D};Kanno & Kanda                 Informational                     [Page 5]

RFC 6367             Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS       September 2011CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256       = {0xC0,0x7E};CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384       = {0xC0,0x7F};CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {0xC0,0x80};CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {0xC0,0x81};CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256       = {0xC0,0x82};CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384       = {0xC0,0x83};CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {0xC0,0x84};CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {0xC0,0x85};CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256  = {0xC0,0x86};CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384  = {0xC0,0x87};CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256   = {0xC0,0x88};CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384   = {0xC0,0x89};CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256    = {0xC0,0x8A};CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384    = {0xC0,0x8B};CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256     = {0xC0,0x8C};CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384     = {0xC0,0x8D};CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256          = {0xC0,0x8E};CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384          = {0xC0,0x8F};CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {0xC0,0x90};CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {0xC0,0x91};CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256      = {0xC0,0x92};CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384      = {0xC0,0x93};CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256          = {0xC0,0x94};CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384          = {0xC0,0x95};CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256      = {0xC0,0x96};CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384      = {0xC0,0x97};CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256      = {0xC0,0x98};CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384      = {0xC0,0x99};CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256    = {0xC0,0x9A};CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384    = {0xC0,0x9B};6.  References6.1.  Normative References   [1]   Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing         for Message Authentication",RFC 2104, February 1997.   [2]   Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",RFC 2246, January 1999.   [3]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement         Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119, March 1997.   [4]   Matsui, M., Nakajima, J., and S. Moriai, "A Description of the         Camellia Encryption Algorithm",RFC 3713, April 2004.Kanno & Kanda                 Informational                     [Page 6]

RFC 6367             Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS       September 2011   [5]   Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for         Transport Layer Security (TLS)",RFC 4279, December 2005.   [6]   Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)         Protocol Version 1.1",RFC 4346, April 2006.   [7]   McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated         Encryption",RFC 5116, January 2008.   [8]   Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)         Protocol Version 1.2",RFC 5246, August 2008.   [9]   Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois Counter         Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS",RFC 5288, August 2008.   [10]  Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/         384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)",RFC 5289, August 2008.   [11]  Badra, M., "Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/         384 and AES Galois Counter Mode",RFC 5487, March 2009.   [12]  Badra, M. and I. Hajjeh, "ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for Transport         Layer Security (TLS)",RFC 5489, March 2009.   [13]  National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash         Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180, October 2008,         <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-3/fips180-3_final.pdf>.   [14]  Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of         Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for Confidentiality and         Authentication", Special Publication 800-38D, April 2006,         <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf>.6.2.  Informative References   [15]  Kato, A., Kanda, M., and S. Kanno, "Camellia Cipher Suites for         TLS",RFC 5932, June 2010.   [16]  "The NESSIE Project (New European Schemes for Signatures,         Integrity and Encryption)",         <http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/nessie/>.   [17]  "CRYPTREC (Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees)",         <http://www.cryptrec.go.jp/english/estimation.html>.Kanno & Kanda                 Informational                     [Page 7]

RFC 6367             Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS       September 2011   [18]  Mala, H., Shakiba, M., Dakhilalian, M., and G. Bagherikaram,         "New Results on Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of         Reduced Round Camellia-128", LNCS 5867, November 2009,         <http://www.springerlink.com/content/e55783u422436g77/>.   [19]  National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Advanced         Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197, November 2001,         <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf>.Authors' Addresses   Satoru Kanno   NTT Software Corporation   Phone: +81-45-212-9803   Fax:   +81-45-212-9800   EMail: kanno.satoru@po.ntts.co.jp   Masayuki Kanda   NTT   Phone: +81-422-59-3456   Fax:   +81-422-59-4015   EMail: kanda.masayuki@lab.ntt.co.jpKanno & Kanda                 Informational                     [Page 8]

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