Movatterモバイル変換

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                         D. McGrewRequest for Comments: 6188                           Cisco Systems, Inc.Category: Standards Track                                     March 2011ISSN: 2070-1721The Use of AES-192 and AES-256 in Secure RTPAbstract   This memo describes the use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)   with 192- and 256-bit keys within the Secure RTP (SRTP) protocol.  It   details counter mode encryption for SRTP and Secure Realtime   Transport Control Protocol (SRTCP) and a new SRTP Key Derivation   Function (KDF) for AES-192 and AES-256.Status of This Memo   This is an Internet Standards Track document.   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has   received public review and has been approved for publication by the   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on   Internet Standards is available inSection 2 of RFC 5741.   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttp://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6188.Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of   publication of this document.  Please review these documents   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as   described in the Simplified BSD License.McGrew                       Standards Track                    [Page 1]

RFC 6188                SRTP AES-192 and AES-256              March 2011Table of Contents1. Introduction ....................................................31.1. Conventions Used in This Document ..........................32. AES-192 and AES-256 Encryption ..................................33. The AES_192_CM_PRF and AES_256_CM_PRF Key Derivation Functions ..43.1. Usage Requirements .........................................54. Crypto Suites ...................................................65. IANA Considerations .............................................96. Security Considerations .........................................97. Test Cases .....................................................107.1. AES-256-CM Test Cases .....................................107.2. AES_256_CM_PRF Test Cases .................................117.3. AES-192-CM Test Cases .....................................137.4. AES_192_CM_PRF Test Cases .................................138. Acknowledgements ...............................................159. References .....................................................159.1. Normative References ......................................159.2. Informative References ....................................15McGrew                       Standards Track                    [Page 2]

RFC 6188                SRTP AES-192 and AES-256              March 20111.  Introduction   This memo describes the use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)   [FIPS197] with 192- and 256-bit keys within the Secure RTP (SRTP)   protocol [RFC3711].  Below, those block ciphers are referred to as   AES-192 and AES-256, respectively, and the use of AES with a 128-bit   key is referred to as AES-128.  This document describes counter mode   encryption for SRTP and SRTCP and appropriate SRTP key derivation   functions for AES-192 and AES-256.  It also defines new crypto suites   that use these new functions.   While AES-128 is widely regarded as more than adequately secure, some   users may be motivated to adopt AES-192 or AES-256 due to a perceived   need to pursue a highly conservative security strategy.  For   instance, the Suite B profile requires AES-256 for the protection of   TOP SECRET information [suiteB].  (Note that while the AES-192 and   AES-256 encryption methods defined in this document use Suite B   algorithms, the crypto suites in this document use the HMAC-SHA-1   algorithm, which is not included in Suite B.) SeeSection 6 for more   discussion of security issues.   The crypto functions described in this document are an addition to,   and not a replacement for, the crypto functions defined in [RFC3711].1.1.  Conventions Used in This Document   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].2.  AES-192 and AES-256 EncryptionSection 4.1.1 of [RFC3711] defines AES counter mode encryption, which   it refers to as AES_CM.  This definition applies to all of the AES   key sizes.  In this note, AES-192 counter mode and AES-256 counter   mode and are denoted as AES_192_CM and AES_256_CM, respectively.  In   both of these ciphers, the plaintext inputs to the block cipher are   formed as in AES_CM, and the block cipher outputs are processed as in   AES_CM.  The only difference in the processing is that AES_192_CM   uses AES-192, and AES_256_CM uses AES-256.  Both AES_192_CM and   AES_256_CM use a 112-bit salt as an input, as does AES_CM.   For the convenience of the reader, the structure of the counter   blocks in SRTP counter mode encryption is illustrated in Figure 1,   using the terminology fromSection 4.1.1 of [RFC3711].  In this   diagram, the symbol (+) denotes the bitwise exclusive-or operation,   and the AES encrypt operation uses AES-128, AES-192, or AES-256 for   AES_CM, AES_192_CM, and AES_256_CM, respectively.  The field labeledMcGrew                       Standards Track                    [Page 3]

RFC 6188                SRTP AES-192 and AES-256              March 2011   b_c contains a block counter, the value of which increments once for   each invocation of the "AES Encrypt" function.  The SSRC field is   part of the RTP header [RFC3550].        one octet         <-->          0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 11 12 13 14 15         +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+         |00|00|00|00|   SSRC    |   packet index  | b_c |---+         +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+   |                                                             |         +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+   v         |                  salt (k_s)             |00|00|->(+)         +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+   |                                                             |                                                             v                                                      +-------------+                              encryption key (k_e) -> | AES encrypt |                                                      +-------------+                                                             |         +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+   |         |                keystream block                |<--+         +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+                        Figure 1: AES Counter Mode3.  The AES_192_CM_PRF and AES_256_CM_PRF Key Derivation FunctionsSection 4.3.3 of [RFC3711] defines an AES counter mode key derivation   function, which it refers to as AES_CM PRF (and sometimes as AES-CM   PRF).  (That specification uses the term PRF, or pseudo-random   function, interchangeably with the phrase "key derivation function".)   This key derivation function can be used with any AES key size.  In   this note, the AES-192 counter mode PRF and AES-256 counter mode PRF   are denoted as AES_192_CM_PRF and AES_256_CM_PRF, respectively.  In   both of these PRFs, the plaintext inputs to the block cipher are   formed as in the AES_CM PRF, and the block cipher outputs are   processed as in the AES_CM PRF.  The only difference in the   processing is that AES_192_CM_PRF uses AES-192, and AES_256_CM_PRF   uses AES-256.  Both AES_192_CM_PRF and AES_256_CM_PRF use a 112-bit   salt as an input, as does the AES_CM PRF.   For the convenience of the reader, the structure of the counter   blocks in SRTP counter mode key derivation is illustrated in   Figure 2, using the terminology fromSection 4.3.3 of [RFC3711].  In   this diagram, the symbol (+) denotes the bitwise exclusive-or   operation, and the "AES Encrypt" operation uses AES-128, AES-192, or   AES-256 for the AES_CM PRF, AES_192_CM_PRF, and AES_256_CM_PRF,McGrew                       Standards Track                    [Page 4]

RFC 6188                SRTP AES-192 and AES-256              March 2011   respectively.  The field "LB" contains the 8-bit constant "label",   which is provided as an input to the key derivation function (and   which is distinct for each type of key generated by that function).   The field labeled b_c contains a block counter, the value of which   increments once for each invocation of the "AES Encrypt" function.   The DIV operation is defined inSection 4.3.1 of [RFC3711] as   follows.  Let "a DIV t" denote integer division of a by t, rounded   down, and with the convention that "a DIV 0 = 0" for all a.  We also   make the convention of treating "a DIV t" as a bit string of the same   length as a, and thus "a DIV t" will, in general, have leading zeros.        one octet         <-->          0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 11 12 13 14 15         +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+         |00|00|00|00|00|00|00|LB| index DIV kdr   | b_c |---+         +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+   |                                                             |         +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+   v         |               master salt               |00|00|->(+)         +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+   |                                                             |                                                             v                                                      +-------------+                                        master key -> | AES encrypt |                                                      +-------------+                                                             |         +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+   |         |                   output block                |<--+         +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+          Figure 2: The AES Counter Mode Key Derivation Function3.1.  Usage Requirements   When AES_192_CM is used for encryption, AES_192_CM_PRF SHOULD be used   as the key derivation function, and AES_128_CM_PRF MUST NOT be used   as the key derivation function.   When AES_256_CM is used for encryption, AES_256_CM_PRF SHOULD be used   as the key derivation function.  Both AES_128_CM_PRF and   AES_192_CM_PRF MUST NOT be used as the key derivation function.   AES_256_CM_PRF MAY be used as the key derivation function when AES_CM   is used for encryption, and when AES_192_CM is used for encryption.   AES_192_CM_PRF MAY be used as the key derivation function when AES_CM   is used for encryption.McGrew                       Standards Track                    [Page 5]

RFC 6188                SRTP AES-192 and AES-256              March 2011      Rationale: it is essential that the cryptographic strength of the      key derivation meets or exceeds that of the encryption method.  It      is natural to use the same function for both encryption and key      derivation.  However, it is not required to do so because it is      desirable to allow these ciphers to be used with alternative key      derivation functions that may be defined in the future.4.  Crypto Suites   This section defines SRTP crypto suites that use the ciphers and key   derivation functions defined in this document.  The parameters in   these crypto suites are described inSection 8.2 of [RFC3711].  These   suites are registered with IANA for use with the SDP Security   Descriptions attributes (Section 10.3.2.1 of [RFC4568]).  Other SRTP   key management methods that use the crypto functions defined in this   document are encouraged to also use these crypto suite definitions.      Rationale: the crypto suites use the same authentication function      that is mandatory to implement in SRTP, HMAC-SHA1 with a 160-bit      key.  HMAC-SHA1 would accept larger key sizes, but when it is used      with keys larger than 160 bits, it does not provide resistance to      cryptanalysis greater than that security level, because it has      only 160 bits of internal state.  By retaining 160-bit      authentication keys, the crypto suites in this note have more      compatibility with existing crypto suites and implementations of      them.McGrew                       Standards Track                    [Page 6]

RFC 6188                SRTP AES-192 and AES-256              March 2011   +------------------------------+------------------------------------+   | Parameter                    | Value                              |   +------------------------------+------------------------------------+   | Master key length            | 192 bits                           |   | Master salt length           | 112 bits                           |   | Key Derivation Function      | AES_192_CM_PRF (Section 3)         |   | Default key lifetime         | 2^31 packets                       |   | Cipher (for SRTP and SRTCP)  | AES_192_CM (Section 2)             |   | SRTP authentication function | HMAC-SHA1 (Section 4.2.1 of        |   |                              | [RFC3711])                         |   | SRTP authentication key      | 160 bits                           |   | length                       |                                    |   | SRTP authentication tag      | 80 bits                            |   | length                       |                                    |   | SRTCP authentication         | HMAC-SHA1 (Section 4.2.1 of        |   | function                     | [RFC3711])                         |   | SRTCP authentication key     | 160 bits                           |   | length                       |                                    |   | SRTCP authentication tag     | 80 bits                            |   | length                       |                                    |   +------------------------------+------------------------------------+             Table 1: The AES_192_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 Crypto Suite   +------------------------------+------------------------------------+   | Parameter                    | Value                              |   +------------------------------+------------------------------------+   | Master key length            | 192 bits                           |   | Master salt length           | 112 bits                           |   | Key Derivation Function      | AES_192_CM_PRF (Section 3)         |   | Default key lifetime         | 2^31 packets                       |   | Cipher (for SRTP and SRTCP)  | AES_192_CM (Section 2)             |   | SRTP authentication function | HMAC-SHA1 (Section 4.2.1 of        |   |                              | [RFC3711])                         |   | SRTP authentication key      | 160 bits                           |   | length                       |                                    |   | SRTP authentication tag      | 32 bits                            |   | length                       |                                    |   | SRTCP authentication         | HMAC-SHA1 (Section 4.2.1 of        |   | function                     | [RFC3711])                         |   | SRTCP authentication key     | 160 bits                           |   | length                       |                                    |   | SRTCP authentication tag     | 80 bits                            |   | length                       |                                    |   +------------------------------+------------------------------------+             Table 2: The AES_192_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32 Crypto SuiteMcGrew                       Standards Track                    [Page 7]

RFC 6188                SRTP AES-192 and AES-256              March 2011   +------------------------------+------------------------------------+   | Parameter                    | Value                              |   +------------------------------+------------------------------------+   | Master key length            | 256 bits                           |   | Master salt length           | 112 bits                           |   | Key Derivation Function      | AES_256_CM_PRF (Section 3)         |   | Default key lifetime         | 2^31 packets                       |   | Cipher (for SRTP and SRTCP)  | AES_256_CM (Section 2)             |   | SRTP authentication function | HMAC-SHA1 (Section 4.2.1 of        |   |                              | [RFC3711])                         |   | SRTP authentication key      | 160 bits                           |   | length                       |                                    |   | SRTP authentication tag      | 80 bits                            |   | length                       |                                    |   | SRTCP authentication         | HMAC-SHA1 (Section 4.2.1 of        |   | function                     | [RFC3711])                         |   | SRTCP authentication key     | 160 bits                           |   | length                       |                                    |   | SRTCP authentication tag     | 80 bits                            |   | length                       |                                    |   +------------------------------+------------------------------------+             Table 3: The AES_256_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 Crypto Suite   +------------------------------+------------------------------------+   | Parameter                    | Value                              |   +------------------------------+------------------------------------+   | Master key length            | 256 bits                           |   | Master salt length           | 112 bits                           |   | Key Derivation Function      | AES_256_CM_PRF (Section 3)         |   | Default key lifetime         | 2^31 packets                       |   | Cipher (for SRTP and SRTCP)  | AES_256_CM (Section 2)             |   | SRTP authentication function | HMAC-SHA1 (Section 4.2.1 of        |   |                              | [RFC3711])                         |   | SRTP authentication key      | 160 bits                           |   | length                       |                                    |   | SRTP authentication tag      | 32 bits                            |   | length                       |                                    |   | SRTCP authentication         | HMAC-SHA1 (Section 4.2.1 of        |   | function                     | [RFC3711])                         |   | SRTCP authentication key     | 160 bits                           |   | length                       |                                    |   | SRTCP authentication tag     | 80 bits                            |   | length                       |                                    |   +------------------------------+------------------------------------+             Table 4: The AES_256_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32 Crypto SuiteMcGrew                       Standards Track                    [Page 8]

RFC 6188                SRTP AES-192 and AES-256              March 20115.  IANA Considerations   IANA has assigned the following parameters in the Session Description   Protocol (SDP) Security Descriptions registry.                  +-------------------------+-----------+                  | Crypto Suite Name       | Reference |                  +-------------------------+-----------+                  | AES_192_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 | [RFC6188] |                  | AES_192_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32 | [RFC6188] |                  | AES_256_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 | [RFC6188] |                  | AES_256_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32 | [RFC6188] |                  +-------------------------+-----------+6.  Security Considerations   AES-128 provides a level of security that is widely regarded as being   more than sufficient for providing confidentiality.  It is believed   that the economic cost of breaking AES-128 is significantly higher   than the cost of more direct approaches to violating system security,   e.g., theft, bribery, wiretapping, and other forms of malfeasance.   Future advances in state-of-the art cryptanalysis could eliminate   this confidence in AES-128, and motivate the use of AES-192 or AES-   256.  AES-192 is regarded as being secure even against some   adversaries for which breaking AES-128 may be feasible.  Similarly,   AES-256 is regarded as being secure even against some adversaries for   which it may be feasible to break AES-192.  The availability of the   larger key size versions of AES provides a fallback plan in case of   unanticipated cryptanalytic results.   It is conjectured that AES-256 provides adequate security even   against adversaries that possess the ability to construct a quantum   computer that works on 256 or more quantum bits.  No such computer is   known to exist; its feasibility is an area of active speculation and   research.   Despite the apparent sufficiency of AES-128, some users are   interested in the larger AES key sizes.  For some applications, the   40% increase in computational cost for AES-256 over AES-128 is a   worthwhile bargain when traded for the security advantages outlined   above.  These applications include those with a perceived need for   very high security, e.g., due to a desire for very long-term   confidentiality.   AES-256 (as it is used in this note) provides the highest level of   security, and it SHOULD be used whenever the highest possible   security is desired.  AES-192 provides a middle ground between theMcGrew                       Standards Track                    [Page 9]

RFC 6188                SRTP AES-192 and AES-256              March 2011   128-bit and 256-bit versions of AES, and it MAY be used when security   higher than that of AES-128 is desired.  In this note, AES-192 and   AES-256 are used with keys that are generated via a strong pseudo-   random source, and thus the related-key attacks that have been   described in the theoretical literature are not applicable.   As with any cipher, the conjectured security level of AES may change   over time.  The considerations in this section reflect the best   knowledge available at the time of publication of this document.   It is desirable that AES_192_CM and AES_192_CM_PRF be used with an   authentication function that uses a 192-bit key, and that AES_256_CM   and AES_256_CM_PRF be used with an authentication function that uses   a 256-bit key.  However, this desire is not regarded as security   critical.  Cryptographic authentication is resilient against future   advances in cryptanalysis, since the opportunity for a forgery attack   against a session closes when that session closes.  For this reason,   this note defines new ciphers, but not new authentication functions.7.  Test Cases   The test cases in this section are based onAppendix B of [RFC3711].7.1.  AES-256-CM Test Cases    Keystream segment length: 1044512 octets (65282 AES blocks)    Session Key:      57f82fe3613fd170a85ec93c40b1f092                      2ec4cb0dc025b58272147cc438944a98    Rollover Counter: 00000000    Sequence Number:  0000    SSRC:             00000000    Session Salt:     f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfd0000 (already shifted)    Offset:           f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfd0000    Counter                            Keystream    f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfd0000   92bdd28a93c3f52511c677d08b5515a4    f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfd0001   9da71b2378a854f67050756ded165bac    f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfd0002   63c4868b7096d88421b563b8c94c9a31    ...                                ...    f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff   cea518c90fd91ced9cbb18c078a54711    f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff00   3dbc4814f4da5f00a08772b63c6a046d    f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff01   6eb246913062a16891433e97dd01a57fMcGrew                       Standards Track                   [Page 10]

RFC 6188                SRTP AES-192 and AES-256              March 20117.2.  AES_256_CM_PRF Test Cases   This section provides test data for the AES_256_CM_PRF key derivation   function, which uses AES-256 in counter mode.  In the following, we   walk through the initial key derivation for the AES-256 counter mode   cipher, which requires a 32-octet session encryption key and a 14-   octet session salt, and the HMAC-SHA1 authentication function, which   requires a 20-octet session authentication key.  These values are   called the cipher key, the cipher salt, and the auth key in the   following.  Since this is the initial key derivation and the key   derivation rate is equal to zero, the value of (index DIV   key_derivation_rate) is zero (actually, a six-octet string of zeros).   In the following, we shorten key_derivation_rate to kdr.   The inputs to the key derivation function are the 32-octet master key   and the 14-octet master salt:         master key:  f0f04914b513f2763a1b1fa130f10e29                      98f6f6e43e4309d1e622a0e332b9f1b6         master salt: 3b04803de51ee7c96423ab5b78d2   We first show how the cipher key is generated.  The input block for   AES-256-CM is generated by exclusive-oring the master salt with the   concatenation of the encryption key label 0x00 with (index DIV kdr),   then padding on the right with two null octets (which implements the   multiply-by-2^16 operation, seeSection 4.3.3 of RFC 3711).  The   resulting value is then AES-256-CM-encrypted using the master key to   get the cipher key.      index DIV kdr:                 000000000000      label:                       00      master salt:   3b04803de51ee7c96423ab5b78d2      -----------------------------------------------      xor:           3b04803de51ee7c96423ab5b78d2     (x, PRF input)      x*2^16:        3b04803de51ee7c96423ab5b78d20000 (AES-256-CM input)      x*2^16 + 1:    3b04803de51ee7c96423ab5b78d20001 (2nd AES input)      cipher key:    5ba1064e30ec51613cad926c5a28ef73 (1st AES output)                     1ec7fb397f70a960653caf06554cd8c4 (2nd AES output)   Next, we show how the cipher salt is generated.  The input block for   AES-256-CM is generated by exclusive-oring the master salt with the   concatenation of the encryption salt label.  That value is padded and   encrypted as above.McGrew                       Standards Track                   [Page 11]

RFC 6188                SRTP AES-192 and AES-256              March 2011      index DIV kdr:                 000000000000      label:                       02      master salt:   3b04803de51ee7c96423ab5b78d2      ----------------------------------------------      xor:           3b04803de51ee7cb6423ab5b78d2     (x, PRF input)      x*2^16:        3b04803de51ee7cb6423ab5b78d20000 (AES-256-CM input)                     fa31791685ca444a9e07c6c64e93ae6b (AES-256 ouptut)      cipher salt:   fa31791685ca444a9e07c6c64e93   We now show how the auth key is generated.  The input block for AES-   256-CM is generated as above, but using the authentication key label.       index DIV kdr:                   000000000000       label:                         01       master salt:     3b04803de51ee7c96423ab5b78d2       -----------------------------------------------       xor:             3b04803de51ee7c86423ab5b78d2     (x, PRF input)       x*2^16:          3b04803de51ee7c86423ab5b78d20000 (AES-256-CM in)    Below, the AES-256 output blocks that form the auth key are shown    on the left, while the corresponding AES-256 input blocks are shown    on the right.  Note that the final AES-256 output is truncated to a    4-byte length.  The final auth key is shown below.    auth key blocks                    AES-256 input blocks    fd9c32d39ed5fbb5a9dc96b30818454d   3b04803de51ee7c86423ab5b78d20000    1313dc05                           3b04803de51ee7c86423ab5b78d20001    auth key: fd9c32d39ed5fbb5a9dc96b30818454d1313dc05McGrew                       Standards Track                   [Page 12]

RFC 6188                SRTP AES-192 and AES-256              March 20117.3.  AES-192-CM Test Cases    Keystream segment length: 1044512 octets (65282 AES blocks)    Session Key:      eab234764e517b2d3d160d587d8c8621                      9740f65f99b6bcf7    Rollover Counter: 00000000    Sequence Number:  0000    SSRC:             00000000    Session Salt:     f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfd0000 (already shifted)    Offset:           f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfd0000    Counter                            Keystream    f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfd0000   35096cba4610028dc1b57503804ce37c    f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfd0001   5de986291dcce161d5165ec4568f5c9a    f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfd0002   474a40c77894bc17180202272a4c264d    ...                                ...    f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff   d108d1a31a00bad6367ec23eb044b415    f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff00   c8f57129fdeb970b59f917b257662d4c    f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdff01   a5dab625811034e8cebdfeb6dc158dd37.4.  AES_192_CM_PRF Test Cases   This section provides test data for the AES_192_CM_PRF key derivation   function, which uses AES-192 in counter mode.  In the following, we   walk through the initial key derivation for the AES-192 counter mode   cipher, which requires a 24-octet session encryption key and a 14-   octet session salt, and the HMAC-SHA1 authentication function, which   requires a 20-octet session authentication key.  These values are   called the cipher key, the cipher salt, and the auth key in the   following.  Since this is the initial key derivation and the key   derivation rate is equal to zero, the value of (index DIV   key_derivation_rate) is zero (actually, a six-octet string of zeros).   In the following, we shorten key_derivation_rate to kdr.   The inputs to the key derivation function are the 24-octet master key   and the 14-octet master salt:         master key:  73edc66c4fa15776fb57f9505c171365                      50ffda71f3e8e5f1         master salt: c8522f3acd4ce86d5add78edbb11   We first show how the cipher key is generated.  The input block for   AES-192-CM is generated by exclusive-oring the master salt with the   concatenation of the encryption key label 0x00 with (index DIV kdr),   then padding on the right with two null octets (which implements theMcGrew                       Standards Track                   [Page 13]

RFC 6188                SRTP AES-192 and AES-256              March 2011   multiply-by-2^16 operation, seeSection 4.3.3 of RFC 3711).  The   resulting value is then AES-192-CM encrypted using the master key to   get the cipher key.      index DIV kdr:                 000000000000      label:                       00      master salt:   c8522f3acd4ce86d5add78edbb11      -----------------------------------------------      xor:           c8522f3acd4ce86d5add78edbb11     (x, PRF input)      x*2^16:        c8522f3acd4ce86d5add78edbb110000 (AES-192-CM input)      x*2^16 + 1:    c8522f3acd4ce86d5add78edbb110001 (2nd AES input)      cipher key:    31874736a8f1143870c26e4857d8a5b2 (1st AES output)                     c4a354407faadabb                 (2nd AES output)   Next, we show how the cipher salt is generated.  The input block for   AES-192-CM is generated by exclusive-oring the master salt with the   concatenation of the encryption salt label.  That value is padded and   encrypted as above.      index DIV kdr:                 000000000000      label:                       02      master salt:   c8522f3acd4ce86d5add78edbb11      ----------------------------------------------      xor:           c8522f3acd4ce86f5add78edbb11     (x, PRF input)      x*2^16:        c8522f3acd4ce86f5add78edbb110000 (AES-192-CM input)                     2372b82d639b6d8503a47adc0a6c2590 (AES-192 ouptut)      cipher salt:   2372b82d639b6d8503a47adc0a6c   We now show how the auth key is generated.  The input block for AES-   192-CM is generated as above, but using the authentication key label.       index DIV kdr:                   000000000000       label:                         01       master salt:     c8522f3acd4ce86d5add78edbb11       -----------------------------------------------       xor:             c8522f3acd4ce86c5add78edbb11     (x, PRF input)       x*2^16:          c8522f3acd4ce86c5add78edbb110000 (AES-192-CM in)McGrew                       Standards Track                   [Page 14]

RFC 6188                SRTP AES-192 and AES-256              March 2011    Below, the AES-192 output blocks that form the auth key are shown    on the left, while the corresponding AES-192 input blocks are shown    on the right.  Note that the final AES-192 output is truncated to a    four-byte length.  The final auth key is shown below.    auth key blocks                    AES-192 input blocks    355b10973cd95b9eacf4061c7e1a7151   c8522f3acd4ce86c5add78edbb110000    e7cfbfcb                           c8522f3acd4ce86c5add78edbb110001    auth key: 355b10973cd95b9eacf4061c7e1a7151e7cfbfcb8.  Acknowledgements   Thanks are due to John Mattsson for verifying the test cases in the   document and providing comments, to Bob Bell for feedback and   encouragement, and to Richard Barnes and Hilarie Orman for   constructive review.9.  References9.1.  Normative References   [FIPS197]  "The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS-197 Federal              Information Processing Standard.   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate              Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119, March 1997.   [RFC3550]  Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.              Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time              Applications", STD 64,RFC 3550, July 2003.   [RFC3711]  Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.              Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",RFC 3711, March 2004.   [RFC4568]  Andreasen, F., Baugher, M., and D. Wing, "Session              Description Protocol (SDP) Security Descriptions for Media              Streams",RFC 4568, July 2006.9.2.  Informative References   [suiteB]   "Suite B Cryptography",http://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/index.shtml.McGrew                       Standards Track                   [Page 15]

RFC 6188                SRTP AES-192 and AES-256              March 2011Author's Address   David A. McGrew   Cisco Systems, Inc.   510 McCarthy Blvd.   Milpitas, CA  95035   US   Phone: (408) 525 8651   EMail: mcgrew@cisco.com   URI:http://www.mindspring.com/~dmcgrew/dam.htmMcGrew                       Standards Track                   [Page 16]