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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                         S. TurnerRequest for Comments: 6149                                          IECAObsoletes:1319                                                  L. ChenCategory: Informational                                             NISTISSN: 2070-1721                                               March 2011MD2 to Historic StatusAbstract   This document retires MD2 and discusses the reasons for doing so.   This document movesRFC 1319 to Historic status.Status of This Memo   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is   published for informational purposes.   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has   received public review and has been approved for publication by the   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents   approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet   Standard; seeSection 2 of RFC 5741.   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttp://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6149.Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of   publication of this document.  Please review these documents   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as   described in the Simplified BSD License.Turner & Chen                 Informational                     [Page 1]

RFC 6149                 MD2 to Historic Status               March 20111.  Introduction   MD2 [MD2] is a message digest algorithm that takes as input a message   of arbitrary length and produces as output a 128-bit "fingerprint" or   "message digest" of the input.  This document retires MD2.   Specifically, this document movesRFC 1319 [MD2] to Historic status.   The reasons for taking this action are discussed.   [HASH-Attack] summarizes the use of hashes in many protocols and   discusses how attacks against a message digest algorithm's one-way   and collision-free properties affect and do not affect Internet   protocols.  Familiarity with [HASH-Attack] is assumed.2.  Rationale   MD2 was published in 1992 as an Informational RFC.  Since its   publication, MD2 has been shown to not be collision-free [ROCH1995]   [KNMA2005] [ROCH1997], albeit successful collision attacks for   properly implemented MD2 are not that damaging.  Successful pre-image   and second pre-image attacks against MD2 have been shown [KNMA2005]   [MULL2004] [KMM2010].3.  Documents that ReferenceRFC 1319   Use of MD2 has been specified in the following RFCs:   Proposed Standard (PS):   o [RFC3279] Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public               Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation               List (CRL) Profile.   o [RFC4572] Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport               Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description               Protocol (SDP).   Informational:   o [RFC1983] Internet Users' Glossary.   o [RFC2315] PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5.   o [RFC2898] PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification               Version 2.0.   o [RFC3447] Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA               Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1.Turner & Chen                 Informational                     [Page 2]

RFC 6149                 MD2 to Historic Status               March 2011   Experimental:   o [RFC2660] The Secure HyperText Transfer Protocol.   There are other RFCs that refer to MD2, but they have been either   moved to Historic status or obsoleted by a later RFC.  References and   discussions about these RFCs are omitted.  The exceptions are:   o [RFC2313] PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Version 1.5.   o [RFC2437] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.0.4.  Impact on Moving MD2 to Historic   The impact of moving MD2 to Historic on the RFCs specified inSection3 is minimal, as described below.   Regarding PS RFCs:   o MD2 support in TLS was dropped in TLS 1.1.   o MD2 support is optional in [RFC4572], and SHA-1 is specified as the     preferred algorithm.   o MD2 is included in the original PKIX certificate profile and the     PKIX algorithm document [RFC3279] for compatibility with older     applications, but its use is discouraged.  SHA-1 is identified as     the preferred algorithm for the Internet PKI.   Regarding Informational RFCs:   o The Internet Users' Guide [RFC1983] provided a definition for     Message Digest and listed MD2 as one example.   o PKCS#1 v1.5 [RFC2313] stated that there are no known attacks     against MD2.  PKCS#1 v2.0 [RFC2437] updated this stance to indicate     that MD2 should only be supported for backward compatibility and to     mention the attacks in [ROCH1995].  PKCS#1 [RFC3447] indicates that     support of MD2 is only retained for compatibility with existing     applications.   o PKCS#5 [RFC2898] recommends that the Password-Based Encryption     Scheme (PBES) that uses MD2 not be used for new applications.   o PKCS#7 [RFC2315] was replaced by a series of Standards Track     publications, "Cryptographic Message Syntax" [RFC2630] [RFC3369]     [RFC5652] and "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Algorithms"     [RFC3370].  Support for MD2 was dropped in [RFC3370].Turner & Chen                 Informational                     [Page 3]

RFC 6149                 MD2 to Historic Status               March 2011RFC 2818, "HTTP Over TLS", which does not reference MD2, largely   supplanted implementation of [RFC2660].  [RFC2660] specified MD2 for   use both as a digest algorithm and as a MAC (Message Authentication   Code) algorithm [RFC2104].  Note that this is the only reference to   HMAC-MD2 found in the RFC repository.5.  Other Considerations   MD2 has also fallen out of favor because it is slower than both MD4   [MD4] and MD5 [MD5].  This is because MD2 was optimized for 8-bit   machines, while MD4 and MD5 were optimized for 32-bit machines.  MD2   is also slower than the Secure Hash Standard (SHS) [SHS] algorithms:   SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.6.  Security Considerations   MD2 is different from MD4 and MD5 in that is not a straight Merkle-   Damgaard design.  For a padded message with t blocks, it generates a   nonlinear checksum as its t+1 block.  The checksum is considered as   the final block input of MD2.   As confirmed in 1997 by Rogier et al. [ROCH1997], the collision   resistance property of MD2 highly depends on the nonlinear checksum.   Without the checksum, a collision can be found in 2^12 MD2   operations, while with the checksum, the best collision attack takes   2^63.3 operations with 2^50 memory complexity [MULL2004], which is   not significantly better than the birthday attack.   Even though collision attacks on MD2 are not significantly more   powerful than the birthday attack, MD2 was found not to be one-way.   In [KMM2010], a pre-image can be found with 2^104 MD2 operations.  In   an improved attack described in [KMM2010], a pre-image can be found   in 2^73 MD2 operations.  Because of this "invertible" property of   MD2, when using MD2 in HMAC, it may leak information of the keys.   Obviously, the pre-image attack can be used to find a second pre-   image.  The second pre-image attack is even more severe than a   collision attack to digital signatures.  Therefore, MD2 must not be   used for digital signatures.   Some may find the guidance for key lengths and algorithm strengths in   [SP800-57] and [SP800-131] useful.Turner & Chen                 Informational                     [Page 4]

RFC 6149                 MD2 to Historic Status               March 20117.  Recommendation   Despite MD2 seeing some deployment on the Internet, this   specification recommends obsoleting MD2.  MD2 is not a reasonable   candidate for further standardization and should be deprecated in   favor of one or more existing hash algorithms (e.g., SHA-256 [SHS]).   RSA Security considers it appropriate to move the MD2 algorithm to   Historic status.   It takes a number of years to deploy crypto and it also takes a   number of years to withdraw it.  Algorithms need to be withdrawn   before a catastrophic break is discovered.  MD2 is clearly showing   signs of weakness, and implementations should strongly consider   removing support and migrating to another hash algorithm.8.  Acknowledgements   We'd like to thank RSA for publishing MD2.  We'd also like to thank   all the cryptographers who studied the algorithm.  For their   contributions to this document, we'd like to thank Ran Atkinson,   Alfred Hoenes, John Linn, and Martin Rex.9.  Informative References   [HASH-Attack] Hoffman, P. and B. Schneier, "Attacks on Cryptographic                 Hashes in Internet Protocols",RFC 4270, November 2005.   [KMM2010]     Knudsen, L., Mathiassen, J., Muller, F., and Thomsen,                 S., "Cryptanalysis of MD2", Journal of Cryptology,                 23(1):72-90, 2010.   [KNMA2005]    Knudsen, L., and J. Mathiassen, "Preimage and Collision                 Attacks on MD2", FSE 2005.   [MD2]         Kaliski, B., "The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm",RFC1319, April 1992.   [MD4]         Rivest, R., "The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm",RFC1320, April 1992.   [MD5]         Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm",RFC1321, April 1992.   [MULL2004]    Muller, F., "The MD2 Hash Function Is Not One-Way",                 ASIACRYPT, LNCS 3329, pp. 214-229, Springer, 2004.Turner & Chen                 Informational                     [Page 5]

RFC 6149                 MD2 to Historic Status               March 2011   [RFC1983]     Malkin, G., Ed., "Internet Users' Glossary", FYI 18,RFC 1983, August 1996.   [RFC2104]     Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC:                 Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication",RFC 2104,                 February 1997.   [RFC2313]     Kaliski, B., "PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Version 1.5",RFC2313, March 1998.   [RFC2315]     Kaliski, B., "PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax                 Version 1.5",RFC 2315, March 1998.   [RFC2437]     Kaliski, B. and J. Staddon, "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography                 Specifications Version 2.0",RFC 2437, October 1998.   [RFC2630]     Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax",RFC 2630,                 June 1999.   [RFC2660]     Rescorla, E. and A. Schiffman, "The Secure HyperText                 Transfer Protocol",RFC 2660, August 1999.   [RFC2898]     Kaliski, B., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography                 Specification Version 2.0",RFC 2898, September 2000.   [RFC3279]     Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and                 Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key                 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation                 List (CRL) Profile",RFC 3279, April 2002.   [RFC3369]     Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",RFC3369, August 2002.   [RFC3370]     Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)                 Algorithms",RFC 3370, August 2002.   [RFC3447]     Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography                 Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications                 Version 2.1",RFC 3447, February 2003.   [RFC4572]     Lennox, J., "Connection-Oriented Media Transport over                 the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the                 Session Description Protocol (SDP)",RFC 4572, July                 2006.   [RFC5652]     Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD                 70,RFC 5652, September 2009.Turner & Chen                 Informational                     [Page 6]

RFC 6149                 MD2 to Historic Status               March 2011   [ROCH1995]    Rogier, N., and P. Chauvaud, "The compression function                 of MD2 is not collision free", Presented at Selected                 Areas in Cryptography '95, Carleton University, Ottawa,                 Canada.  May 18-19, 1995.   [ROCH1997]    Rogier, N. and P. Chauvaud, "MD2 is not secure without                 the checksum byte", Des. Codes Cryptogr. 12(3), 245-251                 (1997).   [SHS]         National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),                 FIPS Publication 180-3: Secure Hash Standard, October                 2008.   [SP800-57]    National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),                 Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key                 Management - Part 1 (Revised), March 2007.   [SP800-131]   National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),                 Special Publication 800-131: DRAFT Recommendation for                 the Transitioning of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key                 Sizes, June 2010.Authors' Addresses   Sean Turner   IECA, Inc.   3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106   Fairfax, VA 22031   USA   EMail: turners@ieca.com   Lily Chen   National Institute of Standards and Technology   100 Bureau Drive, Mail Stop 8930   Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930   USA   EMail: lily.chen@nist.govTurner & Chen                 Informational                     [Page 7]