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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                         S. TurnerRequest for Comments: 5940                                          IECACategory: Standards Track                                     R. HousleyISSN: 2070-1721                                           Vigil Security                                                             August 2010Additional Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)Revocation Information ChoicesAbstract   The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) allows revocation information   to be conveyed as part of the SignedData, EnvelopedData,   AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData content types.  The   preferred format for revocation information is the Certificate   Revocation List (CRL), but an extension mechanism supports other   revocation information formats.  This document defines two additional   revocation information formats for Online Certificate Status Protocol   (OCSP) responses and Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol   (SCVP) requests and responses.Status of This Memo   This is an Internet Standards Track document.   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has   received public review and has been approved for publication by the   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on   Internet Standards is available inSection 2 of RFC 5741.   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttp://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5940.Turner & Housley             Standards Track                    [Page 1]

RFC 5940      Additional CMS Revocation Information Choices  August 2010Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of   publication of this document.  Please review these documents   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as   described in the Simplified BSD License.1.  Introduction   The RevocationInfoChoices type defined in [CMS] provides a set of   revocation status information alternatives, which allows revocation   information to be conveyed as part of the SignedData, EnvelopedData,   AuthenticatedData, and AuthEnvelopedData content types.  The intent   is to provide information sufficient to determine whether the   certificates and attribute certificates carried elsewhere in the CMS-   protected content have been revoked.  There may be more revocation   status information than necessary or there may be less revocation   status information than necessary.   X.509 Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) [PROFILE] are the primary   source of revocation status information, but any other revocation   information format can be supported.  This document specifies two   other formats: Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responses   [OCSP] and Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)   requests and responses [SCVP].Section 2 discusses the RevocationInformation structure.Section 3   defines a mechanism to carry OCSP responses.Section 4 defines a   mechanism to carry SCVP requests and responses.Appendix A provides   the normative ASN.1 syntax for the two mechanisms.1.1.  Requirements Terminology   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this   document are to be interpreted as described in [WORDS].Turner & Housley             Standards Track                    [Page 2]

RFC 5940      Additional CMS Revocation Information Choices  August 20102.  Revocation Information   For convenience, the ASN.1 definition of the RevocationInfoChoices   type from [CMS] is repeated here:   RevocationInfoChoices ::= SET OF RevocationInfoChoice   RevocationInfoChoice ::= CHOICE {     crl        CertificateList,     other  [1] IMPLICIT OtherRevocationInfoFormat }   OtherRevocationInfoFormat ::= SEQUENCE {     otherRevInfoFormat  OBJECT IDENTIFIER,     otherRevInfo        ANY DEFINED BY otherRevInfoFormat }   The other CHOICE MUST be used to convey OCSP responses, SCVP   requests, and SCVP responses.   This document defines the id-ri arc under which the revocation   information formats are defined.  The id-ri object identifier is:   id-ri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)     dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) ri(16) }   NOTE: Numbers 1 and 3 were assigned to CRL and Delta CRL.  These two   numbers are not used because these formats use the   RevocationInfoChoice crl CHOICE when included in CMS [CMS].3.  OCSP Response   To carry an OCSP response, the otherRevInfoFormat is set to   id-ri-ocsp-response, which has the following ASN.1 definition:   id-ri-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 2 }   In this case, otherRevInfo MUST carry the OCSP response using the   OCSPResponse type defined in [OCSP].  The responseStatus field MUST   be successful and the responseBytes field MUST be present.4.  SCVP Request and Response   Unlike OSCP, SCVP permits unprotected and protected responses, where   protected responses can be digitally signed or include message   authentication codes.  While this provides more flexibility, it   complicates implementations when an SCVP response can be validated by   entities other than the entity that generated the SCVP request.  If a   lower layer provides authentication and integrity for the client-   server interaction and the response is not protected, then a thirdTurner & Housley             Standards Track                    [Page 3]

RFC 5940      Additional CMS Revocation Information Choices  August 2010   party cannot validate the response because there is no way to know   that the response was returned over a protected connection.  If a   message authentication code is used, then the third party will be   unable to validate the message authentication code because it does   not possess the necessary private key.  For these reasons, SCVP   responses sent to a third party MUST be signed by the SCVP server so   that the third party can validate them.   SCVP response validation requires matching it to the SCVP request.   This means that the SCVP request MUST always be included with the   response.  SCVP permits the client to retain the response, and SCVP   permits the request to be returned in the response (in the requestReq   field).  The request need not be protected for matching to be   performed; nonces and certIds can be checked.   To carry the SCVP request and response, the otherRevInfoFormat is set   to id-ri-scvp, which has the following ASN.1 definition:   id-ri-scvp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 4 }   In this case, the otherRevInfo MUST carry both the SCVP request and   response with the following structure:   SCVPReqRes ::= SEQUENCE {     request  [0] EXPLICIT ContentInfo OPTIONAL,     response     ContentInfo }   The SCVPReqRes has the following fields:   o request contains the SCVP request.  It contains the unprotected     request, authenticated request, or the signed request.  The request     MUST be present if the response does not include the requestRef     fullRequest field.   o response contains the SCVP response.  It MUST contain the signed     response.  Additionally, the responseStatus MUST be okay.     Unprotected and authenticated responses MUST NOT be included.5.  Security Considerations   The security considerations of [CMS], [CMS-ASN], [OCSP], [SCVP], and   [PROFILE-ASN] apply.   To locally store unprotected or authenticated SCVP responses, a   client can encapsulate the unprotected or authenticated SCVP response   in a SignedData.  It is a matter of local policy whether these SCVP   responses that are encapsulated and signed by the client are   considered valid by another entity.Turner & Housley             Standards Track                    [Page 4]

RFC 5940      Additional CMS Revocation Information Choices  August 20106.  IANA Considerations   This document makes use of object identifiers.  These object   identifiers are defined in an arc delegated by IANA to the PKIX   Working Group.  When the PKIX Working Group closes, this arc and its   registration procedures will be transferred to IANA.  No further   action by IANA is necessary for this document or any anticipated   updates.7.  References7.1.  Normative References   [CMS]     Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",RFC5652, September 2009.   [CMS-ASN] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for             Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and S/MIME",RFC 5911,             June 2010.   [OCSP]    Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C.             Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online             Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",RFC 2560, June 1999.   [PROFILE-ASN]             Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the             Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)",RFC 5912,             June 2010.   [SCVP]    Freeman, T., Housley, R., Malpani, A., Cooper, D., and W.             Polk, "Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol             (SCVP)",RFC 5055, December 2007.   [WORDS]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate             Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119, March 1997.   [X.680]   ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- 1:2002.             Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One.   [X.681]   ITU-T Recommendation X.681 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- 2:2002.             Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:             Information Object Specification.   [X.682]   ITU-T Recommendation X.682 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- 3:2002.             Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:             Constraint Specification.Turner & Housley             Standards Track                    [Page 5]

RFC 5940      Additional CMS Revocation Information Choices  August 2010   [X.683]   ITU-T Recommendation X.683 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8824- 4:2002.             Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One:             Parameterization of ASN.1 Specifications, 2002.7.2.  Informative References   [PROFILE] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,             Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key             Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List             (CRL) Profile",RFC 5280, May 2008.Turner & Housley             Standards Track                    [Page 6]

RFC 5940      Additional CMS Revocation Information Choices  August 2010Appendix A.  ASN.1 ModulesAppendix A.1 provides the normative ASN.1 definitions for the   structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in   [X.680] for compilers that support the 1988 ASN.1.Appendix A.2 provides informative ASN.1 definitions for the   structures described in this specification using ASN.1 as defined in   [X.680], [X.681], [X.682], and [X.683] for compilers that support the   2002 ASN.1. This appendix contains the same information asAppendixA.1 in a more recent (and precise) ASN.1 notation, howeverAppendixA.1 takes precedence in case of conflict.A.1.  1988 ASN.1 Module   CMS-Other-RIs-2009-88     { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-cms-otherRIs-2009-88(63)     }   DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=   BEGIN   -- EXPORTS ALL   IMPORTS   -- FROM CMS [CMS]   ContentInfo     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004     { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)       smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }   ;   id-ri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)     dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) ri(16) }   -- RevocationInfoChoice for OCSP response   -- OID included in otherRevInfoFormat   -- signed OCSP response included in otherRevInfo   id-ri-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 2 }   -- RevocationInfoChoice for SCVP response   -- OID included in otherRevInfoFormat   -- SCVPReqRes included in otherRevInfoTurner & Housley             Standards Track                    [Page 7]

RFC 5940      Additional CMS Revocation Information Choices  August 2010   id-ri-scvp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 4 }   SCVPReqRes ::= SEQUENCE {     request  [0] EXPLICIT ContentInfo OPTIONAL,     response     ContentInfo }   ENDA.2.  2002 ASN.1 Module   CMS-Other-RIs-2009-02     { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-cms-otherRIs-2009-93(64)     }   DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=   BEGIN   -- EXPORT ALL   IMPORTS   -- FROM [PROFILE-ASN]   OCSPResponse     FROM OCSP-2009     { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)       mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-ocsp-02(48) }   -- FROM [CMS-ASN]   ContentInfo, OTHER-REVOK-INFO     FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)         smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41) }   ;   -- Defines OCSP and SCVP formats for RevocationInfoChoice   SupportedOtherRevokInfo OTHER-REVOK-INFO ::= {     ri-ocsp-response |     ri-scvp,     ... }   ri-ocsp-response OTHER-REVOK-INFO ::= {     OCSPResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-ri-ocsp-response }Turner & Housley             Standards Track                    [Page 8]

RFC 5940      Additional CMS Revocation Information Choices  August 2010   id-ri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)     dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) ri(16) }   id-ri-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 2 }   ri-scvp OTHER-REVOK-INFO ::= {     SCVPReqRes IDENTIFIED BY id-ri-scvp }   id-ri-scvp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ri 4 }   SCVPReqRes ::= SEQUENCE {     request  [0] EXPLICIT ContentInfo OPTIONAL,     response     ContentInfo }   ENDAuthors' Addresses   Sean Turner   IECA, Inc.   3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106   Fairfax, VA 22031   USA   EMail: turners@ieca.com   Russ Housley   Vigil Security, LLC   918 Spring Knoll Drive   Herndon, VA 20170   USA   EMail: housley@vigilsec.comTurner & Housley             Standards Track                    [Page 9]

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