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EXPERIMENTAL
Errata Exist
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                         P. EronenRequest for Comments: 5739                                         NokiaCategory: Experimental                                       J. LaganierISSN: 2070-1721                                           QUALCOMM, Inc.                                                               C. Madson                                                           Cisco Systems                                                           February 2010IPv6 Configuration in Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)Abstract   When Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2) is used for   remote VPN access (client to VPN gateway), the gateway assigns the   client an IP address from the internal network using IKEv2   configuration payloads.  The configuration payloads specified inRFC4306 work well for IPv4 but make it difficult to use certain features   of IPv6.  This document specifies new configuration attributes for   IKEv2 that allows the VPN gateway to assign IPv6 prefixes to clients,   enabling all features of IPv6 to be used with the client-gateway   "virtual link".Status of This Memo   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is   published for examination, experimental implementation, and   evaluation.   This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet   community.  This document is a product of the Internet Engineering   Task Force (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF   community.  It has received public review and has been approved for   publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not   all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of   Internet Standard; seeSection 2 of RFC 5741.   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttp://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5739.Eronen, et al.                Experimental                      [Page 1]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of   publication of this document.  Please review these documents   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as   described in the Simplified BSD License.   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF   Contributions published or made publicly available before November   10, 2008.  The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling   the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified   outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other   than English.Eronen, et al.                Experimental                      [Page 2]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010Table of Contents1. Introduction and Problem Statement ..............................42. Terminology .....................................................53. Current Limitations and Goals ...................................63.1. Multiple Prefixes ..........................................63.2. Link-Local Addresses .......................................63.3. Interface Identifier Selection .............................73.4. Sharing VPN Access .........................................73.5. General Goals ..............................................83.6. Non-Goals ..................................................83.7. Additional Information .....................................94. Solution Details ................................................94.1. Initial Exchanges ..........................................94.2. Reauthentication ..........................................114.3. Creating CHILD_SAs ........................................114.4. Relationship to Neighbor Discovery ........................124.5. Relationship to Existing IKEv2 Payloads ...................135. Payload Formats ................................................135.1. INTERNAL_IP6_LINK Configuration Attribute .................135.2. INTERNAL_IP6_PREFIX Configuration Attribute ...............145.3. LINK_ID Notify Payload ....................................146. IANA Considerations ............................................157. Security Considerations ........................................158. Acknowledgments ................................................159. References .....................................................169.1. Normative References ......................................169.2. Informative References ....................................16Appendix A.  Design Rationale (Non-Normative) ...................19A.1.  Link Model ................................................20A.2.  Distributing Prefix Information ...........................20A.3.  Unique Address Allocation .................................21A.4.  Layer 3 Access Control ....................................21A.5.  Other Considerations ......................................22A.6.  Alternative Solution Sketches .............................24A.6.1.  Version -00 Sketch ..................................24A.6.2.  Router Aggregation Sketch #1 ..........................25A.6.3.  Router Aggregation Sketch #2 ..........................27A.6.4.  IPv4-Like Sketch ....................................28A.6.5.  Sketch Based onRFC 3456 ..............................30Appendix B.  Evaluation (Non-Normative) .........................31Eronen, et al.                Experimental                      [Page 3]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 20101.  Introduction and Problem Statement   In typical remote access VPN use (client to VPN gateway), the client   needs an IP address in the network protected by the security gateway.   IKEv2 includes a feature called "configuration payloads" that allows   the gateway to dynamically assign a temporary address to the client   [IKEv2].   For IPv4, the message exchange would look as follows:      Client      Gateway     --------    ---------      HDR(IKE_SA_INIT), SAi1, KEi, Ni  -->               <--  HDR(IKE_SA_INIT), SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ]      HDR(IKE_AUTH),      SK { IDi, CERT, [CERTREQ], AUTH, [IDr],           CP(CFG_REQUEST) =              { INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS(),                INTERNAL_IP4_DNS() }, SAi2,           TSi = (0, 0-65535, 0.0.0.0-255.255.255.255),           TSr = (0, 0-65535, 0.0.0.0-255.255.255.255) }  -->             <--  HDR(IKE_AUTH),                  SK { IDr, CERT, AUTH,                       CP(CFG_REPLY) =                          { INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS(192.0.2.234),                            INTERNAL_IP4_DNS(198.51.100.33) },                       SAr2,                       TSi = (0, 0-65535, 192.0.2.234-192.0.2.234),                       TSr = (0, 0-65535, 0.0.0.0-255.255.255.255) }                       Figure 1: IPv4 Configuration   The IPv4 case has been implemented by various vendors and, in   general, works well.  IKEv2 also defines almost identical   configuration payloads for IPv6:Eronen, et al.                Experimental                      [Page 4]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010      Client      Gateway     --------    ---------      HDR(IKE_AUTH),      SK { IDi, CERT, [CERTREQ], AUTH, [IDr],           CP(CFG_REQUEST) =              { INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS(),                INTERNAL_IP6_DNS() }, SAi2,           TSi = (0, 0-65535,                  0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -                  FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF),           TSr = (0,                  0-65535, 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -                  FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF) }  -->             <--  HDR(IKE_AUTH),                  SK { IDr, CERT, AUTH,                       CP(CFG_REPLY) =                          { INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS(2001:DB8:0:1:2:3:4:5,                                                 64),                            INTERNAL_IP6_DNS(2001:DB8:9:8:7:6:5:4) },                       SAr2,                       TSi = (0, 0-65535,                              2001:DB8:0:1:2:3:4:5 -                              2001:DB8:0:1:2:3:4:5),                       TSr = (0, 0-65535,                              0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -                              FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF) }                       Figure 2: IPv6 Configuration   In other words, IPv6 is basically treated as IPv4 with larger   addresses.  As noted in [RFC4718], this does not fully follow the   "normal IPv6 way of doing things", and it complicates or prevents   using certain features of IPv6.Section 3 describes the limitations   in detail.   This document specifies new configuration attributes for IKEv2 that   allows the VPN gateway to assign IPv6 prefixes to clients, enabling   all features of IPv6 to be used with the client-gateway "virtual   link".2.  Terminology   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this   document are to be interpreted as described in [KEYWORDS].Eronen, et al.                Experimental                      [Page 5]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010   When messages containing IKEv2 payloads are described, optional   payloads are shown in brackets (for instance, "[FOO]"); a plus sign   indicates that a payload can be repeated one or more times (for   instance, "FOO+").   This document uses the term "virtual interface" when describing how   the client uses the IPv6 address(es) assigned by the gateway.  While   existing IPsec documents do not use this term, it is not a new   concept.  In order to use the address assigned by the VPN gateway,   current VPN clients already create a local "virtual interface", as   only addresses assigned to interfaces can be used, e.g., as source   addresses for TCP connections.  Note that this definition of   "interface" is not necessarily identical with what some particular   implementations call "interface".3.  Current Limitations and Goals   This section describes the limitations of the current IPv6   configuration mechanism and requirements for the new solution.3.1.  Multiple Prefixes   In Figure 2, only a single IPv6 address (from a single prefix) is   assigned.  The specification does allow the client to include   multiple INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS attributes in its request, but the   gateway cannot assign more addresses than the client requested.   Multiple prefixes are useful for site renumbering, host-based site   multihoming [SHIM6], and unique local IPv6 addresses [RFC4193].  In   all of these cases, the gateway has better information on how many   different addresses (from different prefixes) the client should be   assigned.   The solution should support assigning addresses from multiple   prefixes, without requiring the client to know beforehand how many   prefixes are needed.3.2.  Link-Local Addresses   The IPv6 addressing architecture [IPv6Addr] specifies that "IPv6   addresses of all types are assigned to interfaces, not nodes. [..]   All interfaces are required to have at least one Link-Local unicast   address".   Currently, the virtual interface created by IKEv2 configuration   payloads does not have link-local addresses.  This violates the   requirements in [IPv6Addr] and prevents the use of protocols that   require link-local addresses, such as [MLDv2] and [DHCPv6].Eronen, et al.                Experimental                      [Page 6]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010   The solution should assign link-local addresses to the virtual   interfaces and allow them to be used for protocols between the VPN   client and gateway.3.3.  Interface Identifier Selection   In the message exchange shown in Figure 2, the gateway chooses the   interface ID used by the client.  It is also possible for the client   to request a specific interface ID; the gateway then chooses the   prefix part.   This approach complicates the use of Cryptographically Generated   Addresses (CGAs) [CGA].  With CGAs, the interface ID cannot be   calculated before the prefix is known.  The client could first obtain   a non-CGA address to determine the prefix and then send a separate   CFG_REQUEST to obtain a CGA address with the same prefix.  However,   this approach requires that the IKEv2 software component provide an   interface to the component managing CGAs; an ugly implementation   dependency that would be best avoided.   Similar concerns apply to other cases where the client has some   interest in what interface ID is being used, such as Hash-Based   Addresses [HBA] and privacy addresses [RFC4941].   Without CGAs and HBAs, VPN clients are not able to fully use IPv6   features such as [SHIM6] or enhanced Mobile IPv6 route optimization   [RFC4866].   The solution should allow the VPN client to easily obtain several   addresses from a given prefix, where the interface IDs are selected   by the client and may depend on the prefix.3.4.  Sharing VPN Access   Some VPN clients may want to share the VPN connection with other   devices (e.g., from a cell phone to a laptop or vice versa) via some   local area network connection (such as Wireless LAN or Bluetooth), if   allowed by the security policy.   Quite obviously, sharing of VPN access requires more than one address   (unless NAT is used).  However, the current model where each address   is requested separately is probably complex to integrate with a local   area network that uses stateless address autoconfiguration   [AUTOCONF].  Thus, obtaining a whole prefix for the VPN client and   advertising that to the local link (something resembling [NDProxy])   would be preferable.  With DHCPv6 prefix delegation [RFC3633], even   [NDProxy] and associated multi-link subnet issues would be avoided.Eronen, et al.                Experimental                      [Page 7]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010   The solution should support sharing the VPN access over a local area   network connection when the other hosts are using stateless address   autoconfiguration.3.5.  General Goals   o  The solution should avoid periodic messages over the VPN tunnel.   o  Reauthentication should work, where the client can start a new IKE      Security Association (SA) and continue using the same addresses as      before.   o  There should be compatibility with other IPsec uses.  Configuring      a virtual IPv6 link (with addresses assigned in IKEv2) should not      prevent the same peers from using IPsec/IKEv2 for other uses (with      other addresses).  In particular, the peers may have Security      Policy Database (SPD) entries and Peer Authorization Database      (PAD) Child SA Authorization Data entries that are not related to      the virtual link; when a CHILD_SA is created, it should be      unambiguous which entries are used.   o  There should be compatibility with current IPv6 configuration.      Although the current IPv6 mechanism is not widely implemented, new      solutions should not preclude its use (e.g., by defining      incompatible semantics for the existing payloads).   o  The solution should have clean implementation dependencies.  In      particular, it should not require significant modifications to the      core IPv6 stack (typically part of the operating system) or      require the IKEv2 implementor to re-implement parts of the IPv6      stack (e.g., to have access or control to functionality that is      currently not exposed by interfaces of the IPv6 stack).   o  Re-use existing mechanisms as much as possible, as described in      [IPConfig].Appendix A describes the rationale of why this      document nevertheless uses IKEv2 configuration payloads for      configuring the addresses.  However,Section 4.1 recommends using      a DHCPv6 Information-Request message for obtaining other      configuration information (such as DNS server addresses).3.6.  Non-Goals   Mobile IPv6 already defines how it interacts with IPsec/IKEv2   [RFC4877], and the intent of this document is not to change that   interaction in any way.Eronen, et al.                Experimental                      [Page 8]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 20103.7.  Additional Information   If the VPN client is assigned IPv6 address(es) from prefix(es) that   are shared with other VPN clients, this results in some kind of   multi-link subnet.  [Multilink] describes issues associated with   multi-link subnets and recommends that they be avoided.   The original 3GPP specifications for IPv6 assigned a single IPv6   address to each mobile phone, resembling current IKEv2 payloads.   [RFC3314] describes the problems with this approach and caused 3GPP   to change the specifications to assign unique /64 prefix(es) for each   phone.   Due to similar concerns, the IEEE 802.16 IPv6 Convergence Sublayer   [RFC5121] and Proxy Mobile IPv6 [RFC5213] also assign unique   prefixes.4.  Solution Details4.1.  Initial Exchanges   During IKE_AUTH, the client sends a new configuration attribute,   INTERNAL_IP6_LINK, which requests a virtual link to be configured.   The attribute contains the client's interface ID for the link-local   address (other addresses may use other interface IDs).  Typically,   the client would also ask for the DHCPv6 server address; this is used   only for configuration (such as DNS server addresses), not address   assignment.       CP(CFG_REQUEST) =          { INTERNAL_IP6_LINK(Client's Link-Local Interface ID)            INTERNAL_IP6_DHCP() }       TSi = (0, 0-65535, 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -              FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)       TSr = (0, 0-65535, 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -              FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)  -->   If the client has sent the INTERNAL_IP6_LINK configuration attribute,   the VPN gateway SHOULD ignore any INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS configuration   attribute present in the request.   The VPN gateway MUST choose for itself a link-local interface   identifier different than the client's, i.e., accept the link-local   interface identifier proposed by the client.  In case the VPN gateway   cannot accept the link-local interface identifier the client   proposed, the VPN gateway MUST fail the IPv6 address assignment by   including a NOTIFY payload with the INTERNAL_ADDRESS_FAILURE message.Eronen, et al.                Experimental                      [Page 9]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010   The VPN gateway then replies with an INTERNAL_IP6_LINK configuration   attribute that contains the IKEv2 Link ID (an identifier selected by   the VPN gateway, treated as an opaque octet string by the client --   this will be used for reauthentication and CREATE_CHILD_SA messages),   the gateway's link-local interface identifier, and zero or more   INTERNAL_IP6_PREFIX attributes.  The traffic selectors proposed by   the initiator are also narrowed to contain only the assigned prefixes   and the client link-local address (FE80::<Client's Interface ID>)   identifier.       CP(CFG_REPLY) =          { INTERNAL_IP6_LINK(Gateway's Link-Local Interface ID,                              IKEv2 Link ID)            INTERNAL_IP6_PREFIX(Prefix1/64),            [INTERNAL_IP6_PREFIX(Prefix2/64),...],            INTERNAL_IP6_DHCP(Address) }       TSi = ((0, 0-65535,               FE80::<Client's Interface ID> -               FE80::<Client's Interface ID>)              (0, 0-65535,               Prefix1::0 -               Prefix1::FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF),              [(0, 0-65535,                Prefix2::0 -                Prefix2::FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF), ...])       TSr = (0, 0-65535,              0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -              FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)   At this point, the client can configure its link-local address   (FE80::<Client's Interface ID>) and other non-link-local unicast   addresses from the assigned prefixes (with any proper interface   identifier [IPv6Addr]).  The VPN gateway MUST NOT simultaneously   assign the same prefixes to any other client and MUST NOT itself   configure addresses from these prefixes.  Thus, the client does not   have to perform Duplicate Address Detection (DAD).  (This approach is   based on [IPv6PPP].)   The prefixes remain valid through the lifetime of the IKE SA (and its   continuations via rekeying).  If the VPN gateway needs to remove a   prefix it has previously assigned, or assign a new prefix, it can do   so with reauthentication (either starting reauthentication itself or   requesting the client to reauthenticate using [RFC4478]).   The client also contacts the DHCPv6 server.  This is the RECOMMENDED   way to obtain additional configuration parameters (such as DNS server   addresses), as it allows easier extensibility and more options (such   as the domain search list for DNS).Eronen, et al.                Experimental                     [Page 10]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 20104.2.  Reauthentication   When the client performs reauthentication (and wants to continue   using the same "virtual link"), it includes the IKEv2 Link ID given   by the gateway in the INTERNAL_IP6_LINK attribute.      CP(CFG_REQUEST) =         { INTERNAL_IP6_LINK(Client's Link Local Interface ID,                             IKEv2 Link ID)           INTERNAL_IP6_DHCP() }      TSi = (0, 0-65535, 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -             FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)      TSr = (0, 0-65535, 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -             FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)  -->   At this point, the gateway MUST verify that the client is indeed   allowed to use the link identified by the IKEv2 Link ID.  The same   situation occurs in [IKEv2] when the client wants to continue using   the same IPv4 address with the INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS configuration   attribute.  Typically, the gateway would use the Link ID to look up   relevant local state and compare the authenticated peer identity of   the IKE_SA with the local state.   If the client is allowed to continue using this link, the gateway   replies (seeSection 4.1) with the same gateway's link-local   interface ID and IKEv2 Link ID as used earlier and sends the IPv6   prefix(es) associated with this link.  Usually, the IPv6 prefix(es)   will also be the same as earlier, but this is not required.   If the client is not allowed to continue using this link, the gateway   treats it as a request for a new virtual link, selects a different   IKEv2 Link ID value, and replies as inSection 4.1.4.3.  Creating CHILD_SAs   When a CHILD_SA is created, the peers need to determine which SPD   entries and PAD Child SA Authorization Data entries are used for this   CHILD_SA.  In the basic client-to-VPN-gateway uses, the situation is   simple: all the matching SPD entries and Child SA Authorization Data   entries are related to the "virtual link" between the VPN client and   the VPN gateway.  However, if the same peers are also using IPsec/   IKEv2 for other uses (with addresses not assigned inside IKEv2), they   would also have SPD entries and PAD Child SA Authorization Data that   is not related to the virtual link.   If one of the peers requests a CHILD_SA and proposes traffic   selectors covering everything (like in Figure 2), should those be   narrowed to the prefixes configured with INTERNAL_IP6_PREFIX or toEronen, et al.                Experimental                     [Page 11]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010   the other SPD/PAD entries?  While some kind of heuristics are   possible (seeAppendix A for discussion), this document specifies an   explicit solution:   The peers MUST include a LINK_ID notification, containing the IKEv2   Link ID, in all CREATE_CHILD_SA requests (including rekeys) that are   related to the virtual link.  The LINK_ID notification is not   included in the CREATE_CHILD_SA response or when doing IKE_SA   rekeying.4.4.  Relationship to Neighbor Discovery   Neighbor Discovery [IPv6ND] specifies the following mechanisms:   Router Discovery, Prefix Discovery, Parameter Discovery, and address   autoconfiguration are not used, as the necessary functionality is   implemented in IKEv2.   Address Resolution, Next-hop Determination, and Redirect are not   used, as the virtual link does not have link-layer addresses and is a   point-to-point link.   Neighbor Unreachability Detection could be used but is a bit   redundant given IKEv2 Dead Peer Detection.   Duplicate Address Detection is not needed because this is a point-to-   point link, where the VPN gateway does not assign any addresses from   the global unicast prefixes, and the link-local interface identifier   is negotiated separately.   Duplicate Address Detection is not needed for global unicast   addresses formed from the global unicast prefix(es) configured as   part of the IKEv2 exchange, because this is a point-to-point link,   where the VPN gateway does not assign any addresses from the global   unicast prefixes.  Duplicate Address Detection may be needed for   link-local addresses, e.g., when the client configures a link-local   address as per [RFC4941].   Thus, Duplicate Address Detection MAY be skipped for global unicast   addresses formed from the global unicast prefix(es) configured as   part of the IKEv2 exchange.  However, Duplicate Address Detection for   link-local unicast addresses MUST be performed as required per some   other specifications, e.g., [RFC4941].Eronen, et al.                Experimental                     [Page 12]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 20104.5.  Relationship to Existing IKEv2 Payloads   The mechanism described in this document is not intended to be used   at the same time as the existing INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS attribute.  For   compatibility with gateways implementing only INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS,   the VPN client MAY include attributes for both mechanisms in   CFG_REQUEST.  The capabilities and preferences of the VPN gateway   will then determine which is used.   All other attributes except INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS (and   INTENAL_ADDRESS_EXPIRY) from [IKEv2] remain valid, including the   somewhat confusingly named INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET (seeSection 6.3 of   [RFC4718] for discussion).5.  Payload Formats5.1.  INTERNAL_IP6_LINK Configuration Attribute   The INTERNAL_IP6_LINK configuration attribute is formatted as   follows:                        1                   2                   3    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   !R|         Attribute Type      !            Length             |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   |                          Link-Local                           |   |                         Interface ID                          |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   |                                                               |   ~                        IKEv2 Link ID                          ~   |                                                               |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   o  Reserved (1 bit) - See [IKEv2].   o  Attribute Type (15 bits) - INTERNAL_IP6_LINK (17).   o  Length (2 octets) - Length in octets of the Value field (Link-      Local Interface ID and IKEv2 Link ID); 8 or more.   o  Link-Local Interface ID (8 octets) - The Interface ID used for      link-local address (by the party that sent this attribute).   o  IKEv2 Link ID (variable length) - The Link ID (may be empty when      the client does not yet know the Link ID).  The Link ID is      selected by the VPN gateway and is treated as an opaque octet      string by the client.Eronen, et al.                Experimental                     [Page 13]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 20105.2.  INTERNAL_IP6_PREFIX Configuration Attribute   The INTERNAL_IP6_PREFIX configuration attribute is formatted as   follows:                        1                   2                   3    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   !R|         Attribute Type      !            Length             |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   |                                                               |   |                            Prefix                             |   |                                                               |   |                                                               |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   | Prefix Length |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   o  Reserved (1 bit) - See [IKEv2].   o  Attribute Type (15 bits) - INTERNAL_IP6_PREFIX (18).   o  Length (2 octets) - Length in octets of the Value field; in this      case, 17.   o  Prefix (16 octets) - An IPv6 prefix assigned to the virtual link.      The low-order bits of the prefix field that are not part of the      prefix MUST be set to zero by the sender and MUST be ignored by      the receiver.   o  Prefix Length (1 octet) - The length of the prefix in bits;      usually 64.5.3.  LINK_ID Notify Payload   The LINK_ID notification is included in CREATE_CHILD_SA requests to   indicate that the SA being created is related to the virtual link.   If this notification is not included, the CREATE_CHILD_SA requests   are related to the real interface.   The Notify Message Type for LINK_ID is 16414.  The Protocol ID and   SPI Size fields are set to zero.  The data associated with this   notification is the IKEv2 Link ID returned in the INTERNAL_IP6_LINK   configuration attribute.Eronen, et al.                Experimental                     [Page 14]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 20106.  IANA Considerations   This document defines two new IKEv2 configuration attributes, whose   values have been allocated from the "IKEv2 Configuration Payload   Attribute Types" namespace [IKEv2]:                                       Multi-      Value    Attribute Type          Valued  Length         Reference      ------   ----------------------  ------  -------------  ---------      17       INTERNAL_IP6_LINK       NO      8 or more      [RFC5739]      18       INTERNAL_IP6_PREFIX     YES     17 octets      [RFC5739]   This document also defines one new IKEv2 notification, whose value   has been allocated from the "IKEv2 Notify Message Types - Status   Types" namespace [IKEv2]:      Value   Notify Messages - Status Types   Reference      ------  -------------------------------  ---------      16414   LINK_ID                          [RFC5739]   This document does not create any new namespaces to be maintained by   IANA.7.  Security Considerations   Since this document is an extension to IKEv2, the security   considerations in [IKEv2] apply here as well.   The mechanism described in this document assigns each client a unique   prefix, which makes using randomized interface identifiers [RFC4941]   ineffective from a privacy point of view: the client is still   uniquely identified by the prefix.  In some environments, it may be   preferable to assign a VPN client the same prefix each time a VPN   connection is established; other environments may prefer assigning a   different prefix every time for privacy reasons.  (This is basically   a similar trade-off as in Mobile IPv6 -- using the same Home Address   forever is simpler than changing it often, but has privacy   implications.)8.  Acknowledgments   The authors would like to thank Patrick Irwin, Tero Kivinen, Chinh   Nguyen, Mohan Parthasarathy, Yaron Sheffer, Hemant Singh, Dave   Thaler, Yinghzhe Wu, and Fan Zhao for their valuable comments.   Many of the challenges associated with IPsec-protected "virtual   interfaces" have been identified before, for example, in the context   of protecting IPv6-in-IPv4 tunnels with IPsec [RFC4891], ProviderEronen, et al.                Experimental                     [Page 15]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010   Provisioned VPNs ([VLINK], [RFC3884]), and Mobile IPv6 [RFC4877].   Some of the limitations of assigning a single IPv6 address were   identified in [RFC3314].9.  References9.1.  Normative References   [IKEv2]      Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",RFC 4306, December 2005.   [IPv6Addr]   Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing                Architecture",RFC 4291, February 2006.   [KEYWORDS]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate                Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119, March 1997.9.2.  Informative References   [AUTOCONF]   Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless                Address Autoconfiguration",RFC 4862, September 2007.   [CGA]        Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",RFC 3972, March 2006.   [DHCPv6]     Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C.,                and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for                IPv6 (DHCPv6)",RFC 3315, July 2003.   [HBA]        Bagnulo, M., "Hash-Based Addresses (HBA)",RFC 5535,                June 2009.   [IPConfig]   Aboba, B., Thaler, D., Andersson, L., and S. Cheshire,                "Principles of Internet Host Configuration",RFC 5505,                May 2009.   [IPv6ND]     Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,                "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)",RFC 4861,                September 2007.   [IPv6PPP]    Varada, S., Haskins, D., and E. Allen, "IP Version 6                over PPP",RFC 5072, September 2007.   [MLDv2]      Vida, R. and L. Costa, "Multicast Listener Discovery                Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6",RFC 3810, June 2004.   [MOBIKE]     Eronen, P., "IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol                (MOBIKE)",RFC 4555, June 2006.Eronen, et al.                Experimental                     [Page 16]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010   [Multilink]  Thaler, D., "Multi-Link Subnet Issues",RFC 4903,                June 2007.   [NDProxy]    Thaler, D., Talwar, M., and C. Patel, "Neighbor                Discovery Proxies (ND Proxy)",RFC 4389, April 2006.   [RFC3314]    Wasserman, M., "Recommendations for IPv6 in Third                Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Standards",RFC 3314, September 2002.   [RFC3456]    Patel, B., Aboba, B., Kelly, S., and V. Gupta, "Dynamic                Host Configuration Protocol (DHCPv4) Configuration of                IPsec Tunnel Mode",RFC 3456, January 2003.   [RFC3633]    Troan, O. and R. Droms, "IPv6 Prefix Options for Dynamic                Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) version 6",RFC 3633,                December 2003.   [RFC3884]    Touch, J., Eggert, L., and Y. Wang, "Use of IPsec                Transport Mode for Dynamic Routing",RFC 3884,                September 2004.   [RFC4193]    Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast                Addresses",RFC 4193, October 2005.   [RFC4478]    Nir, Y., "Repeated Authentication in Internet Key                Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",RFC 4478, April 2006.   [RFC4718]    Eronen, P. and P. Hoffman, "IKEv2 Clarifications and                Implementation Guidelines",RFC 4718, October 2006.   [RFC4866]    Arkko, J., Vogt, C., and W. Haddad, "Enhanced Route                Optimization for Mobile IPv6",RFC 4866, May 2007.   [RFC4877]    Devarapalli, V. and F. Dupont, "Mobile IPv6 Operation                with IKEv2 and the Revised IPsec Architecture",RFC 4877, April 2007.   [RFC4891]    Graveman, R., Parthasarathy, M., Savola, P., and H.                Tschofenig, "Using IPsec to Secure IPv6-in-IPv4                Tunnels",RFC 4891, May 2007.   [RFC4941]    Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy                Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in                IPv6",RFC 4941, September 2007.Eronen, et al.                Experimental                     [Page 17]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010   [RFC5121]    Patil, B., Xia, F., Sarikaya, B., Choi, JH., and S.                Madanapalli, "Transmission of IPv6 via the IPv6                Convergence Sublayer over IEEE 802.16 Networks",RFC 5121, February 2008.   [RFC5213]    Gundavelli, S., Leung, K., Devarapalli, V., Chowdhury,                K., and B. Patil, "Proxy Mobile IPv6",RFC 5213,                August 2008.   [SHIM6]      Nordmark, E. and M. Bagnulo, "Shim6: Level 3 Multihoming                Shim Protocol for IPv6",RFC 5533, June 2009.   [VLINK]      Duffy, M., "Framework for IPsec Protected Virtual Links                for PPVPNs", Work in Progress, October 2002.Eronen, et al.                Experimental                     [Page 18]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010Appendix A.  Design Rationale (Non-Normative)   This appendix describes some of the reasons why the solution inSection 4 was selected and lists some alternative designs that were   considered but were ultimately rejected.   Assigning a new IPv6 address to the client creates a new "virtual   IPv6 interface" and "virtual link" between the client and the   gateway.  We will assume that the virtual link has the following   properties:   o  The link and its interfaces are created and destroyed by the IKEv2      process.   o  The link is not an IPsec SA; at any time, there can be zero or      more IPsec SAs covering traffic on this link.   o  The link is not a single IKE SA; to support reauthentication, it      must be possible to identify the same link in another IKE SA.   o  Not all IPsec-protected traffic between the peers is necessarily      related to the virtual link (although in the simplest VPN client-      to-gateway scenario, it will be).   Given these assumptions and the goals described inSection 3, it   seems that the most important design choices to be made are the   following:   o  What link/subnet model is used; in other words, how relationships      between VPN clients, IPv6 subnet prefixes, and link-local traffic      (especially link-local multicast) are organized.   o  How information about the IPv6 prefix(es) is distributed from the      gateway to the clients.   o  How to ensure unique IPv6 addresses for each client and keep      forwarding state up-to-date accordingly.   o  How layer 3 access control is done; in other words, where the      mechanisms for preventing address spoofing by clients are placed      architecturally.   Each of these is discussed next in turn.Eronen, et al.                Experimental                     [Page 19]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010A.1.  Link Model   There are at least three main choices for how to organize the   relationships between VPN clients, IPv6 subnet prefixes, and link-   local traffic:   o  Point-to-point link model: each VPN client is assigned one or more      IPv6 prefixes.  These prefixes are not shared with other clients,      and there is no link-local traffic between different VPN clients      connected to the same gateway.   o  Multi-access link model: multiple VPN clients share the same IPv6      prefix.  Link-local multicast packets sent by one VPN client will      be received by other VPN clients (VPN gateway will forward the      packets, possibly with Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) snooping      to remove unnecessary packets).   o  "Router aggregation" link model: one form of "multi-link" subnet      [Multilink] where multiple VPN clients share the same IPv6 prefix.      Link-local multicast will not be received by other VPN clients.   In the multi-access link model, VPN clients who are idle (i.e., not   currently sending or receiving application traffic) could receive   significant amounts of multicast packets from other clients   (depending on how many other clients are connected).  This is   especially undesirable when the clients are battery-powered such as a   PDA that keeps the VPN connection to corporate intranet active 24/7.   For this reason, using the multi-access link model was rejected.   The configuration attributes specified inSection 4 use the point-to-   point link model.A.2.  Distributing Prefix Information   Some types of addresses, such as CGAs, require knowledge about the   prefix before an address can be generated.  The prefix information   could be distributed to clients in the following ways:   o  IKEv2 messages (configuration payloads)   o  Router Advertisement messages (sent over the IPsec tunnel)   o  DHCPv6 messages (sent over the IPsec tunnel)   InSection 4, the prefix information is distributed in IKEv2   messages.Eronen, et al.                Experimental                     [Page 20]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010A.3.  Unique Address Allocation   In the "multi-access" and "router aggregation" link models (where a   single IPv6 prefix is shared between multiple VPN clients),   mechanisms are needed to ensure that one VPN client does not use an   address already used by some other client.  Also, the VPN gateway has   to know which client is using which addresses in order to correctly   forward traffic.   The main choices seem to be the following:   o  Clients receive the address(es) they are allowed to use in IKEv2      messages (configuration payloads).  In this case, keeping track of      which client is using which address is trivial.   o  Clients receive the address(es) they are allowed to use in DHCPv6      messages sent over the IPsec tunnel.  In case the DHCPv6 server is      not integrated with the VPN gateway, the gateway may need to work      as a relay agent to keep track of which client is using which      address (and update its forwarding state accordingly).   o  Clients can use stateless address autoconfiguration to configure      addresses and perform Duplicate Address Detection (DAD).  This is      easy to do in a multi-access link model and can be made to work      with a router aggregation link model if the VPN gateway traps      Neighbor Solicitation (NS) messages and spoofs Neighbor      Advertisement (NA) replies.  The gateway keeps track of which      client is using which address (and updates its forwarding state      accordingly) by trapping these NS/NA messages.   In the point-to-point link model, the client can simply use any   address from the prefix, and the VPN gateway only needs to know which   client is using which prefix in order to forward packets correctly.A.4.  Layer 3 Access Control   It is almost always desirable to prevent one VPN client from sending   packets with a source address that is used by another VPN client.  In   order to correctly forward packets destined to clients, the VPN   gateway obviously has to know which client is using which address;   the question is therefore where, architecturally, the mechanisms for   ingress filtering are placed.   o  Layer 3 access control could be enforced by IPsec Security      Association Database (SAD) / SPD; the addresses/prefixes assigned      to a VPN client would be reflected in the traffic selectors used      in IPsec Security Association and Security Policy Database      entries, as negotiated in IKEv2.Eronen, et al.                Experimental                     [Page 21]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010   o  The ingress filtering capability could be placed outside IPsec;      the traffic selectors in SAD/SPD entries would cover traffic that      would be dropped later by ingress filtering.   The former approach is used by the current IPv4 solution and the   mechanism specified inSection 4.A.5.  Other Considerations   VPN gateway state      In some combinations of design choices, the amount of state      information required in the VPN gateway depends not only on the      number of clients but also on the number of addresses used by one      client.  With privacy addresses and potentially some uses of      Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGAs), a single client      could have a large number of different addresses (especially if      different privacy addresses are used with different destinations).   Virtual link identifier      Reauthentication requires a way to uniquely identify the virtual      link when a second IKE SA is created.  Some possible alternatives      are the IKE Security Parameter Indexes (SPIs) of the IKE SA where      the virtual link was "created" (assuming we can't have multiple      virtual links within the same IKE SA), a new identifier assigned      when the link is created, or any unique prefix or address that      remains assigned to the link for its entire lifetime.Section 4      specifies that the gateway assigns a new IKEv2 Link ID when the      link is created.  The client treats the Link ID as an opaque octet      string; the gateway uses it to identify relevant local state when      reauthentication is done.      Note that the link is not uniquely identified by the IKE peer      identities (because IDi is often a user identity that can be used      on multiple hosts at the same time) or the outer IP addresses of      the peers (due to NAT Traversal and [MOBIKE]).Eronen, et al.                Experimental                     [Page 22]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010   Prefix lifetime      Prefixes could remain valid either for the lifetime of the IKE SA,      until explicitly cancelled, or for an explicitly specified time.      InSection 4, the prefixes remain valid for the lifetime of the      IKE SA (and its continuations via rekeying but not via      reauthentication).  If necessary, the VPN gateway can thus add or      remove prefixes by triggering reauthentication.  It is assumed      that adding or removing prefixes is a relatively rare situation,      and thus this document does not specify more complex solutions      (such as explicit prefix lifetimes or use of CFG_SET/CFG_ACK).   Compatibility with other IPsec uses      Compatibility with other IPsec uses probably requires that when a      CHILD_SA is created, both peers can determine whether the CHILD_SA      applies to the virtual interface (at the end of the virtual link)      or the real interfaces over which IKEv2 messages are being sent.      This is required to select the correct SPD to be used for traffic-      selector narrowing and SA authorization in general.      One straight-forward solution is to add an extra payload to      CREATE_CHILD_SA requests, containing the virtual link identifier.      Requests not containing this payload would refer to the real link      (over which IKEv2 messages are being sent).      Another solution is to require that the peer requesting a CHILD_SA      proposes traffic selectors that identify the link.  For example,      if TSi includes the peer's "outer" IP address, it's probably      related to the real interface, not the virtual one.  Or if TSi      includes any of the prefixes assigned by the gateway (or the link-      local or multicast prefix), it is probably related to the virtual      interface.      These heuristics can work in many situations but have proved      inadequate in the context of IPv6-in-IPv4 tunnels [RFC4891],      Provider Provisioned VPNs ([VLINK], [RFC3884]), and Mobile IPv6      [RFC4877].  Thus,Section 4 includes the virtual link identifier      in all CREATE_CHILD_SA requests that apply to the virtual      interface.   Example of other IPsec uses:      If a VPN gateway receives a CREATE_CHILD_SA request associated      with a physical Ethernet interface, requesting an SA for      (TSi=FE80::something, dst=*), it would typically reject theEronen, et al.                Experimental                     [Page 23]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010      request (or, in other words, narrow it to an empty set) because it      doesn't have SPD/PAD entries that would allow joe.user@example.com      to request such CHILD_SAs.      (However, it might have SPD/PAD entries that would allow      "neighboring-router.example.com" to create such SAs to protect,      for example, some routing protocol that uses link-local      addresses.)      However, the virtual interface created when joe.user@example.com      authenticated and sent INTERNAL_IP6_LINK would have a different      SPD/PAD, which would allow joe.user@example.com to create this SA.A.6.  Alternative Solution SketchesA.6.1.  Version -00 Sketch   The -00 version of this document contained the following solution   sketch, which is basically a combination of (1) a point-to-point link   model, (2) prefix information distributed in Neighbor Advertisements,   and (3) access control enforced outside IPsec.   1.  During IKE_AUTH, the client sends a new configuration attribute,       INTERNAL_IP6_LINK, which requests a virtual link to be created.       The attribute contains the client's interface ID for the link-       local address (other addresses may use other interface IDs).       CP(CFG_REQUEST) =          { INTERNAL_IP6_LINK(Link-Local Interface ID) }       TSi = (0, 0-65535, 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -              FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)       TSr = (0, 0-65535, 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -              FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)  -->   The VPN gateway replies with its own link-local interface ID (which   has to be different from the client's) and an IKEv2 Link ID (which   will be used for reauthentication).       CP(CFG_REPLY) =         { INTERNAL_IP6_LINK(Link-Local Interface ID, IKEv2 Link ID) }       TSi = (0, 0-65535, 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -              FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)       TSr = (0, 0-65535, 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -              FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)   At this point, both peers configure the virtual interface with the   link-local addresses.Eronen, et al.                Experimental                     [Page 24]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010   2.  The next step is IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration, that       is, Router Solicitation and Router Advertisement messages sent       over the IPsec SA.       ESP(Router Solicitation:           src=::,           dst=FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:2)  -->       <-- ESP(Router Advertisement:               src=FE80::<Gateway's Interface ID>               dst=FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:1,               Prefix1, [Prefix2...])   After receiving the Router Advertisement, the client can configure   unicast addresses from the advertised prefixes, using any proper   interface ID.  The VPN gateway does not simultaneously assign the   same prefixes to any other client and does not itself configure   addresses from these prefixes.  Thus, the client does not have to   perform Duplicate Address Detection (DAD).   3.  Reauthentication works basically the same way as inSection 4;       the client includes the IKEv2 Link ID in the INTERNAL_IP6_LINK       attribute.   4.  Creating and rekeying IPsec SAs works basically the same way as       inSection 4.3; the client includes the IKEv2 Link ID in those       CHILD_SA requests that are related to the virtual link.   Comments: This was changed in the -01 version of this document based   on feedback from VPN vendors; while the solution looks nice on paper,   it is claimed to be unnecessarily complex to implement when the IKE   implementation and IPv6 stack are from different companies.   Furthermore, enforcing access control outside IPsec is a significant   architectural change compared to current IPv4 solutions.A.6.2.  Router Aggregation Sketch #1   Hemant Singh helped sketch the following solution during the IETF 70   meeting in Vancouver.  It combines (1) the router aggregation link   model, (2) prefix information distributed in IKEv2 messages, (3)   unique address allocation with stateless address autoconfiguration   (with VPN gateway trapping NS messages and spoofing NA replies), and   (4) access control enforced (partly) outside IPsec.   1.  During IKE_AUTH, the client sends a new configuration attribute,       INTERNAL_IP6_LINK, which requests a virtual link to be created.       The attribute contains the client's interface ID for the link-       local address (other addresses may use other interface IDs).Eronen, et al.                Experimental                     [Page 25]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010       CP(CFG_REQUEST) =          { INTERNAL_IP6_LINK(Link-Local Interface ID) }       TSi = (0, 0-65535, 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -              FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)       TSr = (0, 0-65535, 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -              FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)  -->   The VPN gateway replies with its own Link-Local Interface ID (which   has to be different from the client's), an IKEv2 Link ID (which will   be used for reauthentication and CREATE_CHILD_SA messages), and zero   or more INTERNAL_IP6_PREFIX attributes.  The traffic selectors   proposed by the initiator are also narrowed to contain only the   assigned prefixes (and the link-local prefix).       CP(CFG_REPLY) =          { INTERNAL_IP6_LINK(Link-Local Interface ID, IKEv2 Link ID),            INTERNAL_IP6_PREFIX(Prefix1/64),            [INTERNAL_IP6_PREFIX(Prefix2/64),...] }       TSi = ((0, 0-65535,               FE80::<Client's Interface ID> -               FE80::<Client's Interface ID>)              (0, 0-65535,               Prefix1::0 -               Prefix1::FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF),              [(0, 0-65535,                Prefix2::0 -                Prefix2::FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF), ...])       TSr = (0, 0-65535,              0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -              FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)   2.  The client now configures tentative unicast addresses from the       prefixes given by the gateway, and performs Duplicate Address       Detection (DAD) for them.       The Neighbor Solicitation messages are processed by the VPN       gateway; if the target address is already in use by some other       VPN client, the gateway replies with a Neighbor Advertisement.       If the target address is not already in use, the VPN gateway       notes that it is now being used by this client and updates its       forwarding state accordingly.Eronen, et al.                Experimental                     [Page 26]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010   Comments: The main disadvantages of this solution are non-standard   processing of NS messages (which are used to update the gateway's   forwarding state), and performing access control partly outside   IPsec.A.6.3.  Router Aggregation Sketch #2   This is basically similar to the version -00 sketch described above   but uses the router aggregation link model.  In other words, it   combines (1) the router aggregation link model, (2) prefix   information distributed in Neighbor Advertisements, (3) unique   address allocation with stateless address autoconfiguration (with the   VPN gateway trapping NS messages and spoofing NA replies), and (4)   access control enforced outside IPsec.   1.  During IKE_AUTH, the client sends a new configuration attribute,       INTERNAL_IP6_LINK, which requests a virtual link to be created.       The attribute contains the client's interface ID for the link-       local address (other addresses may use other interface IDs).       CP(CFG_REQUEST) =          { INTERNAL_IP6_LINK(Link-Local Interface ID) }       TSi = (0, 0-65535, 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -              FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)       TSr = (0, 0-65535, 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -              FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)  -->   The VPN gateway replies with its own Link-Local Interface ID (which   has to be different from the client's) and an IKEv2 Link ID (which   will be used for reauthentication).       CP(CFG_REPLY) =         { INTERNAL_IP6_LINK(Link-Local Interface ID, IKEv2 Link ID) }       TSi = (0, 0-65535, 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -              FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)       TSr = (0, 0-65535, 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -              FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)   At this point, both peers configure the virtual interface with the   link-local addresses.   2.  The next step is IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration, that       is, Router Solicitation and Router Advertisement messages sent       over the IPsec SA.Eronen, et al.                Experimental                     [Page 27]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010       ESP(Router Solicitation:           src=::,           dst=FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:2)  -->       <-- ESP(Router Advertisement:               src=FE80::<Gateway's Interface ID>               dst=FF02:0:0:0:0:0:0:1,               Prefix1, [Prefix2...])   3.  The client now configures tentative unicast addresses from the       prefixes given by the gateway and performs Duplicate Address       Detection (DAD) for them.       The Neighbor Solicitation messages are processed by the VPN       gateway; if the target address is already in use by some other       VPN client, the gateway replies with a Neighbor Advertisement.       If the target address is not already in use, the VPN gateway       notes that it is now being used by this client and updates its       forwarding state accordingly.   Comments: The main disadvantages of this solution are non-standard   processing of NS messages (which are used to update the gateway's   forwarding state) and performing access control outside IPsec.A.6.4.  IPv4-Like Sketch   This sketch resembles the current IPv4 configuration payloads and   combines (1) the router aggregation link model, (2) prefix   information distributed in IKEv2 messages, (3) unique address   allocation with IKEv2 messages, and (4) access control enforced by   IPsec SAD/SPD.   1.  During IKE_AUTH, the client sends a new configuration attribute,       INTERNAL_IP6_LINK, which requests a virtual link to be created.       The attribute contains the client's interface ID for the link-       local address (other addresses may use other interface IDs).       CP(CFG_REQUEST) =          { INTERNAL_IP6_LINK(Link-Local Interface ID) }       TSi = (0, 0-65535,              0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -              FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)       TSr = (0, 0-65535,              0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -              FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)  -->Eronen, et al.                Experimental                     [Page 28]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010   The VPN gateway replies with its own Link-Local Interface ID (which   has to be different from the client's), an IKEv2 Link ID (which will   be used for reauthentication and CREATE_CHILD_SA messages), and zero   or more INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS2 attributes.  Each attribute contains   one address from a particular prefix.       CP(CFG_REPLY) =          { INTERNAL_IP6_LINK(Link-Local Interface ID, IKEv2 Link ID),            INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS2(Prefix1+Client's Interface ID1),            [INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS2(Prefix2+Client's Interface ID2),...],       TSi = ((0, 0-65535,               FE80::<Client's Link-Local Interface ID> -               FE80::<Client's Link-Local Interface ID>)              (0, 0-65535,               Prefix1::<Client's Interface ID1> -               Prefix1::<Client's Interface ID1>),              [(0, 0-65535,                Prefix2::<Client's Interface ID2> -                Prefix2::<Client's Interface ID2>), ...])       TSr = (0, 0-65535,              0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -              FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)   Since the VPN gateway keeps track of address uniqueness, there is no   need to perform Duplicate Address Detection.   2.  If the client wants additional addresses later (for example, with       a specific interface ID), it requests them in a separate       CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange.  For example:       CP(CFG_REQUEST) =          { INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS2(Prefix1+Client's Interface ID3) }       TSi = (0, 0-65535,              Prefix1::0 -              Prefix1::FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF>),       TSr = (0, 0-65535,              0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -              FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)  -->   If the requested address is not currently in use by some other   client, the VPN gateway simply returns the same address and the   appropriately narrowed traffic selectors.Eronen, et al.                Experimental                     [Page 29]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010       CP(CFG_REQUEST) =          { INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS2(Prefix1+Client's Interface ID3) }       TSi = ((0, 0-65535,               Prefix1::<Client's Interface ID3> -               Prefix1::<Client's Interface ID3>),       TSr = (0, 0-65535,              0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 -              FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF:FFFF)   Comments: The main advantage of this solution is that it's quite   close to the current IPv4 way of doing things.  By adding explicit   link creation (with Link ID for reauthentication/SPD selection and   link-local addresses) and slightly changing the semantics (and also   name) of the INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS attribute (which can return more   attributes than was asked), we get much of the needed functionality.   The biggest disadvantages are probably potentially complex   implementation dependency for interface ID selection (seeSection 3.3) and the multi-link subnet model.A.6.5.  Sketch Based onRFC 3456   For completeness: a solution modeled after [RFC3456] would combine   (1) the router aggregation link model, (2) prefix information   distribution and unique address allocation with DHCPv6, and (3)   access control enforced by IPsec SAD/SPD.Eronen, et al.                Experimental                     [Page 30]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010Appendix B.  Evaluation (Non-Normative)Section 3 describes the goals and requirements for IPv6 configuration   in IKEv2.  This appendix briefly summarizes how the solution   specified in Sections4 and5 meets these goals.   o  (3.1) Assigning addresses from multiple prefixes is supported,      without requiring the client to know beforehand how many prefixes      are needed.   o  (3.2) Link-local addresses are assigned and can be used for      protocols between the VPN client and gateway.   o  (3.3) The entire prefix is assigned to a single client, so the      client can freely select any number of interface IDs (which may      depend on the prefix).   o  (3.4) This document does not specify how the VPN client would      share the VPN connection with other devices.  However, since the      entire prefix is assigned to a single client, the client could      further assign addresses from it without requiring coordination      with the VPN gateway.   o  (3.5) The solution does not add any new periodic messages over the      VPN tunnel.   o  (3.5) Reauthentication works (seeSection 4.2).   o  (3.5) The solution is compatible with other IPsec uses since the      LINK_ID notification makes it unambiguous which CHILD_SAs are      related to the virtual link and which are not (see Sections4.3      and 5.3).   o  (3.5) The new mechanisms do not prevent the VPN client and/or      gateway from implementing the INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS configuration      attribute as well; however, the two mechanisms are not intended to      be used simultaneously (seeSection 4.5).   o  (3.5) Implementation dependencies are, obviously, implementation      dependent (and their cleanliness somewhat subjective).  Possible      drawbacks of some alternative solutions are discussed inAppendix A.6.   o  (3.5) The mechanism for configuring the prefixes (configuration      payloads) is specific to IKEv2, for reasons described inAppendix A.  However,Section 4.1 recommends using DHCPv6      Information-Request message for obtaining other configuration      information (such as DNS server addresses).Eronen, et al.                Experimental                     [Page 31]

RFC 5739               IPv6 Configuration in IKEv2         February 2010Authors' Addresses   Pasi Eronen   Nokia Research Center   P.O. Box 407   FIN-00045 Nokia Group   Finland   EMail: pasi.eronen@nokia.com   Julien Laganier   QUALCOMM Incorporated   5775 Morehouse Drive   San Diego, CA  92121   USA   Phone: +1 858 658 3538   EMail: julienl@qualcomm.com   Cheryl Madson   Cisco Systems, Inc.   510 MacCarthy Drive   Milpitas, CA   USA   EMail: cmadson@cisco.comEronen, et al.                Experimental                     [Page 32]

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