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INFORMATIONAL
Network Working Group                                        G. GiarettaRequest for Comments: 5637                                      QualcommCategory: Informational                                      I. Guardini                                                              E. Demaria                                                          Telecom Italia                                                            J. Bournelle                                                             Orange Labs                                                                R. Lopez                                                    University of Murcia                                                          September 2009Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) Goalsfor Mobile IPv6Abstract   In commercial and enterprise deployments, Mobile IPv6 can be a   service offered by a Mobility Services Provider (MSP).  In this case,   all protocol operations may need to be explicitly authorized and   traced, requiring the interaction between Mobile IPv6 and the AAA   infrastructure.  Integrating the Authentication, Authorization, and   Accounting (AAA) infrastructure (e.g., Network Access Server and AAA   server) also offers a solution component for Mobile IPv6   bootstrapping.  This document describes various scenarios where a AAA   interface for Mobile IPv6 is required.  Additionally, it lists design   goals and requirements for such an interface.Status of This Memo   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does   not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this   memo is unlimited.Copyright Notice   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the   document authors.  All rights reserved.   This document is subject toBCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of   publication of this document.  Please review these documents   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as   described in the BSD License.Giaretta, et al.             Informational                      [Page 1]

RFC 5637               AAA Goals for Mobile IPv6          September 2009   This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF   Contributions published or made publicly available before November   10, 2008.  The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this   material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow   modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.   Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling   the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified   outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may   not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format   it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other   than English.Table of Contents1. Introduction ....................................................32. Terminology .....................................................33. Motivation ......................................................44. Bootstrapping Scenarios .........................................44.1. Split Scenario .............................................54.2. Integrated Scenario ........................................65. Goals for AAA-HA Interface ......................................65.1. General Goals ..............................................65.2. Service Authorization ......................................75.3. Accounting .................................................85.4. Mobile Node Authentication .................................85.5. Provisioning of Configuration Parameters ...................86. Goals for the AAA-NAS Interface .................................97. Security Considerations .........................................98. Acknowledgements ................................................99. References .....................................................109.1. Normative References ......................................109.2. Informative References ....................................10Giaretta, et al.             Informational                      [Page 2]

RFC 5637               AAA Goals for Mobile IPv6          September 20091.  Introduction   Mobile IPv6 [1] provides the basic IP mobility functionality for   IPv6.  When Mobile IPv6 is used in tightly managed environments with   the use of the AAA (Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting)   infrastructure, an interface between Mobile IPv6 and AAA protocols   needs to be defined.  Also, two scenarios for bootstrapping Mobile   IPv6 service [2], i.e., split [3] and integrated [6] scenarios,   require the specification of a message exchange between the Home   Agent (HA) and AAA infrastructure for authentication and   authorization purposes and a message exchange between the AAA server   and the NAS in order to provide the visited network with the   necessary configuration information (e.g., Home Agent address).   This document describes various scenarios where a AAA interface is   required.  Additionally, it lists design goals and requirements for   the communication between the HA and the AAA server and between the   NAS and the AAA server needed in the split and integrated scenarios.   Requirements are listed in case either IPsec orRFC 4285 [4] is used   for Mobile IPv6 authentication.   This document only describes requirements, goals, and scenarios.  It   does not provide solutions.   Notice that this document builds on the security model of the AAA   infrastructure.  As such, the end host/user shares credentials with   the home AAA server and the communication between the AAA server and   the AAA client may be protected.  If the AAA server and the AAA   client are not part of the same administrative domain, then some sort   of contractual relationship between the involved administrative   domains is typically in place in the form of roaming agreements.2.  Terminology   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this   document are to be interpreted as described inRFC 2119 [5], with the   qualification that, unless otherwise stated, these words apply to the   design of the AAA protocol extension, not its implementation or its   usage.   The following terms are extracted from [2].   o  Access Service Authorizer (ASA).  A network operator that      authenticates a Mobile Node and establishes the Mobile Node's      authorization to receive Internet service.Giaretta, et al.             Informational                      [Page 3]

RFC 5637               AAA Goals for Mobile IPv6          September 2009   o  Access Service Provider (ASP).  A network operator that provides      direct IP packet forwarding to and from the end host.   o  Mobility Service Authorizer (MSA).  A service provider that      authorizes Mobile IPv6 service.   o  Mobility Service Provider (MSP).  A service provider that provides      Mobile IPv6 service.  In order to obtain such service, the Mobile      Node must be authenticated and prove authorization to obtain the      service.3.  Motivation   Mobile IPv6 specification [1] requires that Mobile Nodes (MNs) are   provisioned with a set of configuration parameters -- namely, the   Home Address and the Home Agent Address, in order to accomplish a   home registration.  Moreover, MNs and Home Agents (HAs) must share   the cryptographic material needed in order to set up IPsec security   associations to protect Mobile IPv6 signaling (e.g., shared keys or   certificates).  This is referred as the bootstrapping problem: as   described in [2], the AAA infrastructure can be used as the central   element to enable dynamic Mobile IPv6 bootstrapping.  In this case,   the AAA infrastructure can be exploited to offload the end host's   authentication to the AAA server as well as to deliver the necessary   configuration parameters to the visited network (e.g., Home Agent   address as specified in [6]).   Moreover, in case Mobile IPv6 is a service offered by a Mobility   Service Provider (MSP), all protocol operations (e.g., home   registrations) may need to be explicitly authorized and monitored   (e.g., for accounting purposes).  This can be accomplished relying on   the AAA infrastructure of the Mobility Service Authorizer (MSA) that   stores user profiles and credentials.4.  Bootstrapping Scenarios   This section describes some bootstrapping scenarios in which   communication between the AAA infrastructure of the Mobility Service   Provider and the Home Agent is needed.  The need of MIPv6-aware   communication between the AAA server and the Network Access Server   (NAS) is also described.  The purpose of this section is only to   explain the situation where bootstrapping is required.  The actual   mechanisms and additional details are specified elsewhere or are left   for future work (see, e.g., [2], [3], and [6]).Giaretta, et al.             Informational                      [Page 4]

RFC 5637               AAA Goals for Mobile IPv6          September 20094.1.  Split Scenario   In the split scenario [3], there is the assumption that the mobility   service and network access service are not provided by the same   administrative entity.  This implies that the mobility service is   authorized by the MSA that is a different entity from the ASA.   In this scenario, the Mobile Node discovers the Home Agent Address   using the Domain Name Service (DNS).  It queries the address based on   the Home Agent name or by service name.  In the former case, the   Mobile Node is configured with the Fully Qualified Domain Name (FDQN)   of the Home Agent.  In the latter case, [3] defines a new service   resource record (SRV RR).   Then the Mobile Node performs an IKEv2 [7] exchange with the HA to   set up IPsec Security Associations (SAs) to protect Mobile IPv6   signaling and to configure its Home Address (HoA).  Mutual   authentication for IKEv2 between Mobile Node and Home Agent can be   done with or without use of the Extensible Authentication Protocol   (EAP).   If EAP is used for authentication, the operator can choose any   available EAP methods.  Use of EAP with the AAA infrastructure allows   the HA to check the validity of each MN's credentials with the AAA   infrastructure, rather than having to maintain credentials for each   MN itself.  It also allows roaming in terms of Mobile IPv6 service   where the MSP and MSA belong to different administrative domains.  In   this case, the HA in the MSP can check the validity of the   credentials provided by the MN with the AAA infrastructure of MSA,   receiving the relevant authorization information.   The Mobile Node may also want to update its FQDN in the DNS with the   newly allocated Home Address. [3] recommends that the HA performs the   DNS entry update on behalf of the Mobile Node.  For that purpose, the   Mobile Node indicates its FDQN in the IKEv2 exchange (in the IDi   field in IKE_AUTH) and adds a DNS Update Option in the Binding Update   message sent to the HA.   When the Mobile Node uses a Home Agent belonging to a different   administrative domain (MSP != MSA), the local HA may not share a   security association with the home DNS server.  In this case, [3]   suggests that the home AAA server is responsible for the update.   Thus, the HA should send to the home AAA server the (FDQN, HoA) pair.Giaretta, et al.             Informational                      [Page 5]

RFC 5637               AAA Goals for Mobile IPv6          September 20094.2.  Integrated Scenario   In the integrated scenario, the assumption is that the Access Service   Authorizer (ASA) is the same as the Mobility Service Authorizer   (MSA).  Further details of this type of a scenario are being worked   on separately [6].   The Home Agent can be assigned either in the Access Service   Provider's network or in the separate network.  In the former case,   the MSP is the same entity as the ASP, whereas in the latter case the   MSP and ASP are different entities.   In this scenario, the Mobile Node discovers the Home Agent Address   using DHCPv6.  If the user is authorized for Mobile IPv6 service,   during the network access authentication the AAAH (the AAA server in   the home network) sends the information about the assigned Home Agent   to the NAS where the Mobile Node is currently attached.  To request   Home Agent data, the Mobile Node sends a DHCPv6 Information Request   to the All_DHCP_Relay_Agents_and_Servers multicast address.  With   this request, the Mobile Node can specify if it wants a Home Agent   provided by the visited domain (ASP/MSP) or by the home domain   (ASA/MSA).  In both cases, the NAS acts a DHCPv6 relay.  When the NAS   receives the DHCPv6 Information Request, it passes Home Agent   information received from the AAAH server to the DHCP server, for   instance using mechanisms defined in [6].   In case the Mobile Node cannot acquire Home Agent information via   DHCPv6, it can try the default mechanism based on DNS described in   [3].  After the Mobile Node has acquired the Home Agent information,   the mechanisms used to bootstrap the HoA, the IPsec Security   Association, and the authentication and authorization with the MSA   are the same as described in the bootstrapping solution for the split   scenario [3].5.  Goals for AAA-HA InterfaceSection 4 raises the need to define extensions for the AAA protocol   used between the AAA server of the MSA and the HA.  The following   sections list the goals for such an interface.  This communication is   needed for both the split and integrated scenarios.5.1.  General Goals   G1.1  The communication between the AAAH server and the HA MUST reuse         existing AAA security mechanisms with regard to authentication,         replay, integrity, and confidentiality protection.  These         communication security mechanisms prevent a number of classicalGiaretta, et al.             Informational                      [Page 6]

RFC 5637               AAA Goals for Mobile IPv6          September 2009         threats, including the alteration of exchanged data (e.g.,         Mobile IPv6 configuration parameters) and the installation of         unauthorized state.5.2.  Service Authorization   G2.1  The AAA-HA interface MUST allow the use of a Network Access         Identifier (NAI) to identify the user.   G2.2  The HA MUST be able to query the AAAH server to verify Mobile         IPv6 service authorization for the Mobile Node.   G2.3  The AAAH server MAY assign explicit operational limitations and         authorization restrictions on the HA (e.g., packet filters, QoS         parameters).   G2.4  The AAAH server MUST be able to send an authorization lifetime         to the HA to limit Mobile IPv6 session duration for the MN.   G2.5  The HA MUST be able to request that the AAAH server grant an         extension of the authorization lifetime to the MN.   G2.6  The AAAH server MUST be able to force the HA to terminate an         active Mobile IPv6 session for authorization policy reasons         (e.g., credit exhaustion).   G2.7  The HA MUST be able to indicate to the AAAH server the IPv6 HoA         that will be assigned to the MN.   G2.8  The AAAH server MUST be able to authorize the MN to use an IPv6         HoA and MUST indicate that to the HA.   G2.9  The AAAH server MUST be able to indicate to the HA whether or         not the return routability test (HoT (Home Test) and HoTi (Home         Test Init)) shall be permitted via the HA for a given MN.   G2.10 The AAAH server MUST be able to support different levels of         Mobile IPv6 authorization.  For example, the AAAH server may         authorize the MN to use MIPv6 (as defined in [1]) or may         authorize the MN to utilize an IPv4 HoA assigned for Dual Stack         MIPv6 [8].   G2.11 The AAAH server MUST be able to indicate to the HA whether the         bearer traffic for the MN needs to receive IPsec Encapsulating         Security Payload (ESP) protection.Giaretta, et al.             Informational                      [Page 7]

RFC 5637               AAA Goals for Mobile IPv6          September 2009   G2.12 The HA MUST be able to authenticate the MN through the AAAH         server in case a pre-shared key is used in IKEv2 for user         authentication.  The exact procedure is part of the solution         space.5.3.  Accounting   G3.1  The AAA-HA interface MUST support the transfer of accounting         records needed for service control and charging.  These include         (but may not be limited to): time of binding cache entry         creation and deletion, octets sent and received by the Mobile         Node in bi-directional tunneling, etc.5.4.  Mobile Node Authentication   G4.1  The AAA-HA interface MUST allow the HA to act as a pass-through         EAP authenticator.   G4.2  The AAA-HA interface MUST support authentication based on the         Mobility Message Authentication Options defined in [4].   G4.3  The AAAH server MUST be able to provide a MN-HA key (or data         used for subsequent key derivation of the MN-HA key by the HA)         to the HA if requested.  Additional data, such as the Security         Parameter Index (SPI) or lifetime parameters, are sent along         with the keying material.   G4.4  The HA supporting the Authentication Protocol MUST be able to         request that the AAAH server authenticate the MN with the value         in the MN-AAA Mobility Message Authentication Option.   G4.5  The HA MUST include an identifier of the Mobile Node in the AAA         transactions with the AAAH server.5.5.  Provisioning of Configuration Parameters   o  The HA SHOULD be able to communicate to the AAAH server the Home      Address allocated to the MN and the FQDN of the MN (e.g., for      allowing the AAAH server to perform a DNS update on behalf of the      MN).   o The AAAH server SHOULD be able to indicate to the HA if the MN is      authorized to autoconfigure its Home Address.  If the AAAH does      not indicate to the HA if a MN is authorized to autoconfigure its      address, the MN is not authorized.Giaretta, et al.             Informational                      [Page 8]

RFC 5637               AAA Goals for Mobile IPv6          September 20096.  Goals for the AAA-NAS Interface   In the integrated scenario, the AAA server provides the HA   information to the NAS as part of the whole AAA operation for network   access.   G6.1  The AAAH server MUST be able to communicate the Home Agent         Information (IP address or FQDN) to the NAS.   G6.2  The NAS MUST be able to notify the AAAH server if it supports         the AAA extensions designed to receive the HA assignment         information.   G6.3  The ASP/MSP supporting the allocation of a Home Agent MUST be         able to indicate to the MSA if it can allocate a Home Agent to         the MN.  Therefore, the NAS MUST be able to include a suggested         HA address in the ASP in the AAA-NAS interaction.   G6.4  The AAA server of the MSA MUST be able to indicate to the NAS         whether the MN is authorized to use a local Home Agent (i.e., a         Home Agent in the ASP/MSP).   G6.5  The overall AAA solution for the integrated scenario MUST         support the scenario where the AAA server of the ASA/MSA used         for network access authentication is different from the AAA         server used for mobility service authentication and         authorization.7.  Security Considerations   As stated inSection 5.1, the AAA-HA interface must provide mutual   authentication, integrity, and replay protection.  Furthermore, if   security parameters (e.g., IKE pre-shared key) are transferred   through this interface, confidentiality is strongly recommended to be   supported.  In this case, the links between the HA and the AAA server   of the MSA and between the NAS and the AAA server MUST be secure.8.  Acknowledgements   The authors would like to thank James Kempf, Alper Yegin, Vijay   Devarapalli, Basavaraj Patil, Gopal Dommety, Marcelo Bagnulo, and   Madjid Nakhjiri for their comments and feedback.  Moreover, the   authors would like to thank Hannes Tschofenig for his deep technical   and editorial review of the document.  Finally the authors would like   to thank Kuntal Chowdhury who contributed by identifying the goals   related toRFC 4285 authentication.Giaretta, et al.             Informational                      [Page 9]

RFC 5637               AAA Goals for Mobile IPv6          September 20099.  References9.1.  Normative References   [1]  Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support in        IPv6",RFC 3775, June 2004.   [2]  Patel, A. and G. Giaretta, "Problem Statement for bootstrapping        Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6)",RFC 4640, September 2006.   [3]  Giaretta, G., Kempf, J., and V. Devarapalli, "Mobile IPv6        Bootstrapping in Split Scenario",RFC 5026, October 2007.   [4]  Patel, A., Leung, K., Khalil, M., Akhtar, H., and K. Chowdhury,        "Authentication Protocol for Mobile IPv6",RFC 4285, January        2006.   [5]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement        Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119, March 1997.9.2.  Informative References   [6]  Chowdhury, K., Ed., and A. Yegin, "MIP6-bootstrapping for the        Integrated Scenario", Work in Progress, April 2008.   [7]  Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",RFC 4306,        December 2005.   [8]  Soliman, H., Ed., "Mobile IPv6 Support for Dual Stack Hosts and        Routers",RFC 5555, June 2009.Giaretta, et al.             Informational                     [Page 10]

RFC 5637               AAA Goals for Mobile IPv6          September 2009Authors' Addresses   Gerardo Giaretta   Qualcomm   5775 Morehouse Drive   San Diego, CA  92109   USA   EMail: gerardo@qualcomm.com   Ivano Guardini   Telecom Italia Lab   via G. Reiss Romoli, 274   TORINO  10148   Italy   EMail: ivano.guardini@telecomitalia.it   Elena Demaria   Telecom Italia Lab   via G. Reiss Romoli, 274   TORINO  10148   Italy   EMail: elena.demaria@telecomitalia.it   Julien Bournelle   Orange Labs   EMail: julien.bournelle@gmail.com   Rafa Marin Lopez   University of Murcia   30071 Murcia   Spain   EMail: rafa@dif.um.esGiaretta, et al.             Informational                     [Page 11]

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