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EXPERIMENTAL
Updated by:8996
Network Working Group                                        K. ZeilengaRequest for Comments: 4531                           OpenLDAP FoundationCategory: Experimental                                         June 2006Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)Turn OperationStatus of This Memo   This memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet   community.  It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.   Discussion and suggestions for improvement are requested.   Distribution of this memo is unlimited.Copyright Notice   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).Abstract   This specification describes a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol   (LDAP) extended operation to reverse (or "turn") the roles of client   and server for subsequent protocol exchanges in the session, or to   enable each peer to act as both client and server with respect to the   other.Table of Contents1. Background and Intent of Use ....................................21.1. Terminology ................................................22. Turn Operation ..................................................22.1. Turn Request ...............................................32.2. Turn Response ..............................................33. Authentication ..................................................33.1. Use with TLS and Simple Authentication .....................43.2. Use with TLS and SASL EXTERNAL .............................43.3. Use of Mutual Authentication and SASL EXTERNAL .............44. TLS and SASL Security Layers ....................................55. Security Considerations .........................................66. IANA Considerations .............................................66.1. Object Identifier ..........................................66.2. LDAP Protocol Mechanism ....................................77. References ......................................................77.1. Normative References .......................................77.2. Informative References .....................................8Zeilenga                      Experimental                      [Page 1]

RFC 4531                  LDAP Turn Operation                  June 20061.  Background and Intent of Use   The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [RFC4510][RFC4511]   is a client-server protocol that typically operates over reliable   octet-stream transports, such as the Transport Control Protocol   (TCP).  Generally, the client initiates the stream by connecting to   the server's listener at some well-known address.   There are cases where it is desirable for the server to initiate the   stream.  Although it certainly is possible to write a technical   specification detailing how to implement server-initiated LDAP   sessions, this would require the design of new authentication and   other security mechanisms to support server-initiated LDAP sessions.   Instead, this document introduces an operation, the Turn operation,   which may be used to reverse the client-server roles of the protocol   peers.  This allows the initiating protocol peer to become the server   (after the reversal).   As an additional feature, the Turn operation may be used to allow   both peers to act in both roles.  This is useful where both peers are   directory servers that desire to request, as LDAP clients, that   operations be performed by the other.  This may be useful in   replicated and/or distributed environments.   This operation is intended to be used between protocol peers that   have established a mutual agreement, by means outside of the   protocol, that requires reversal of client-server roles, or allows   both peers to act both as client and server.1.1.  Terminology   Protocol elements are described using ASN.1 [X.680] with implicit   tags.  The term "BER-encoded" means the element is to be encoded   using the Basic Encoding Rules [X.690] under the restrictions   detailed inSection 5.1 of [RFC4511].2.  Turn Operation   The Turn operation is defined as an LDAP-Extended Operation   [Protocol,Section 4.12] identified by the 1.3.6.1.1.19 OID.  The   function of the Turn Operation is to request that the client-server   roles be reversed, or, optionally, to request that both protocol   peers be able to act both as client and server in respect to the   other.Zeilenga                      Experimental                      [Page 2]

RFC 4531                  LDAP Turn Operation                  June 20062.1.  Turn Request   The Turn request is an ExtendedRequest where the requestName field   contains the 1.3.6.1.1.19 OID and the requestValue field is a BER-   encoded turnValue:        turnValue ::= SEQUENCE {             mutual         BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,             identifier     LDAPString        }   A TRUE mutual field value indicates a request to allow both peers to   act both as client and server.  A FALSE mutual field value indicates   a request to reserve the client and server roles.   The value of the identifier field is a locally defined policy   identifier (typically associated with a mutual agreement for which   this turn is be executed as part of).2.2.  Turn Response   A Turn response is an ExtendedResponse where the responseName and   responseValue fields are absent.  A resultCode of success is returned   if and only if the responder is willing and able to turn the session   as requested.  Otherwise, a different resultCode is returned.3.  Authentication   This extension's authentication model assumes separate authentication   of the peers in each of their roles.  A separate Bind exchange is   expected between the peers in their new roles to establish identities   in these roles.   Upon completion of the Turn, the responding peer in its new client   role has an anonymous association at the initiating peer in its new   server role.  If the turn was mutual, the authentication association   of the initiating peer in its pre-existing client role is left intact   at the responding peer in its pre-existing server role.  If the turn   was not mutual, this association is void.   The responding peer may establish its identity in its client role by   requesting and successfully completing a Bind operation.   The remainder of this section discusses some authentication   scenarios.  In the protocol exchange illustrations, A refers to the   initiating peer (the original client) and B refers to the responding   peer (the original server).Zeilenga                      Experimental                      [Page 3]

RFC 4531                  LDAP Turn Operation                  June 20063.1.  Use with TLS and Simple Authentication       A->B: StartTLS Request       B->A: StartTLS(success) Response       A->B: Bind(Simple(cn=B,dc=example,dc=net,B's secret)) Request       B->A: Bind(success) Response       A->B: Turn(TRUE,"XXYYZ") Request       B->A: Turn(success) Response       B->A: Bind(Simple(cn=A,dc=example,dc=net,A's secret)) Request       A->B: Bind(success) Response   In this scenario, TLS (Transport Layer Security) [RFC4346] is started   and the initiating peer (the original client) establishes its   identity with the responding peer prior to the Turn using the   DN/password mechanism of the Simple method of the Bind operation.   After the turn, the responding peer, in its new client role,   establishes its identity with the initiating peer in its new server   role.3.2.  Use with TLS and SASL EXTERNAL       A->B: StartTLS Request       B->A: StartTLS(success) Response       A->B: Bind(SASL(EXTERNAL)) Request       B->A: Bind(success) Response       A->B: Turn(TRUE,"XXYYZ") Request       B->A: Turn(success) Response       B->A: Bind(SASL(EXTERNAL)) Request       A->B: Bind(success) Response   In this scenario, TLS is started (with each peer providing a valid   certificate), and the initiating peer (the original client)   establishes its identity through the use of the EXTERNAL mechanism of   the SASL (Simple Authentication and Security Layer) [RFC4422] method   of the Bind operation prior to the Turn.  After the turn, the   responding peer, in its new client role, establishes its identity   with the initiating peer in its new server role.3.3.  Use of Mutual Authentication and SASL EXTERNAL   A number of SASL mechanisms, such as GSSAPI [SASL-K5], support mutual   authentication.  The initiating peer, in its new server role, may use   the identity of the responding peer, established by a prior   authentication exchange, as its source for "external" identity in   subsequent EXTERNAL exchange.       A->B: Bind(SASL(GSSAPI)) Request       <intermediate messages>Zeilenga                      Experimental                      [Page 4]

RFC 4531                  LDAP Turn Operation                  June 2006       B->A: Bind(success) Response       A->B: Turn(TRUE,"XXYYZ") Request       B->A: Turn(success) Response       B->A: Bind(SASL(EXTERNAL)) Request       A->B: Bind(success) Response   In this scenario, a GSSAPI mutual-authentication exchange is   completed between the initiating peer (the original client) and the   responding server (the original server) prior to the turn.  After the   turn, the responding peer, in its new client role, requests that the   initiating peer utilize an "external" identity to establish its LDAP   authorization identity.4.  TLS and SASL Security Layers   As described in [RFC4511], LDAP supports both Transport Layer   Security (TLS) [RFC4346] and Simple Authentication and Security Layer   (SASL) [RFC4422] security frameworks.  The following table   illustrates the relationship between the LDAP message layer, SASL   layer, TLS layer, and transport connection within an LDAP session.                  +----------------------+                  |  LDAP message layer  |                  +----------------------+ > LDAP PDUs                  +----------------------+ < data                  |      SASL layer      |                  +----------------------+ > SASL-protected data                  +----------------------+ < data                  |       TLS layer      |      Application +----------------------+ > TLS-protected data      ------------+----------------------+ < data        Transport | transport connection |                  +----------------------+   This extension does not alter this relationship, nor does it remove   the general restriction against multiple TLS layers, nor does it   remove the general restriction against multiple SASL layers.   As specified in [RFC4511], the StartTLS operation is used to initiate   negotiation of a TLS layer.  If a TLS is already installed, the   StartTLS operation must fail.  Upon establishment of the TLS layer,   regardless of which peer issued the request to start TLS, the peer   that initiated the LDAP session (the original client) performs the   "server identity check", as described inSection 3.1.5 of [RFC4513],   treating itself as the "client" and its peer as the "server".   As specified in [RFC4422], a newly negotiated SASL security layer   replaces the installed SASL security layer.  Though the client/serverZeilenga                      Experimental                      [Page 5]

RFC 4531                  LDAP Turn Operation                  June 2006   roles in LDAP, and hence SASL, may be reversed in subsequent   exchanges, only one SASL security layer may be installed at any   instance.5.  Security Considerations   Implementors should be aware that the reversing of client/server   roles and/or allowing both peers to act as client and server likely   introduces security considerations not foreseen by the authors of   this document.  In particular, the security implications of the   design choices made in the authentication and data security models   for this extension (discussed in Sections3 and4, respectively) are   not fully studied.  It is hoped that experimentation with this   extension will lead to better understanding of the security   implications of these models and other aspects of this extension, and   that appropriate considerations will be documented in a future   document.  The following security considerations are apparent at this   time.   Implementors should take special care to process LDAP, SASL, TLS, and   other events in the appropriate roles for the peers.  Note that while   the Turn reverses the client/server roles with LDAP, and in SASL   authentication exchanges, it does not reverse the roles within the   TLS layer or the transport connection.   The responding server (the original server) should restrict use of   this operation to authorized clients.  Client knowledge of a valid   identifier should not be the sole factor in determining authorization   to turn.   Where the peers except to establish TLS, TLS should be started prior   to the Turn and any request to authenticate via the Bind operation.   LDAP security considerations [RFC4511][RFC4513] generally apply to   this extension.6.  IANA Considerations   The following values [RFC4520] have been registered by the IANA.6.1.  Object Identifier   The IANA has assigned an LDAP Object Identifier to identify the LDAP   Turn Operation, as defined in this document.Zeilenga                      Experimental                      [Page 6]

RFC 4531                  LDAP Turn Operation                  June 2006       Subject: Request for LDAP Object Identifier Registration       Person & email address to contact for further information:            Kurt Zeilenga <kurt@OpenLDAP.org>       Specification:RFC 4531       Author/Change Controller: Author       Comments:            Identifies the LDAP Turn Operation6.2.  LDAP Protocol Mechanism   The IANA has registered the LDAP Protocol Mechanism described in this   document.       Subject: Request for LDAP Protocol Mechanism Registration       Object Identifier: 1.3.6.1.1.19       Description: LDAP Turn Operation       Person & email address to contact for further information:            Kurt Zeilenga <kurt@openldap.org>       Usage: Extended Operation       Specification:RFC 4531       Author/Change Controller: Author       Comments: none7.  References7.1.  Normative References   [RFC4346]     Dierks, T. and, E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer                 Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1",RFC 4346, April                 2006.   [RFC4422]     Melnikov, A., Ed. and K. Zeilenga, Ed., "Simple                 Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)",RFC 4422,                 June 2006.   [RFC4510]     Zeilenga, K., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access                 Protocol (LDAP): Technical Specification Road Map",RFC4510, June 2006.   [RFC4511]     Sermersheim, J., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access                 Protocol (LDAP): The Protocol",RFC 4511, June 2006.   [RFC4513]     Harrison, R., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access                 Protocol (LDAP): Authentication Methods and Security                 Mechanisms",RFC 4513, June 2006.Zeilenga                      Experimental                      [Page 7]

RFC 4531                  LDAP Turn Operation                  June 2006   [X.680]       International Telecommunication Union -                 Telecommunication Standardization Sector, "Abstract                 Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) - Specification of Basic                 Notation", X.680(2002) (also ISO/IEC 8824-1:2002).   [X.690]       International Telecommunication Union -                 Telecommunication Standardization Sector,                 "Specification of ASN.1 encoding rules: Basic Encoding                 Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER), and                 Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", X.690(2002) (also                 ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002).7.2.  Informative References   [RFC4520]     Zeilenga, K., "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority                 (IANA) Considerations for the Lightweight Directory                 Access Protocol (LDAP)",BCP 64,RFC 4520, June 2006.   [SASL-K5]     Melnikov, A., Ed., "The Kerberos V5 ("GSSAPI") SASL                 Mechanism", Work in Progress, May 2006.Author's Address   Kurt D. Zeilenga   OpenLDAP Foundation   EMail: Kurt@OpenLDAP.orgZeilenga                      Experimental                      [Page 8]

RFC 4531                  LDAP Turn Operation                  June 2006Full Copyright Statement   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).   This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions   contained inBCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors   retain all their rights.   This document and the information contained herein are provided on an   "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS   OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET   ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,   INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE   INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED   WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.Intellectual Property   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any   Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights   might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has   made any independent effort to identify any such rights.  Information   on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be   found inBCP 78 andBCP 79.   Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any   assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an   attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of   such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this   specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository athttp://www.ietf.org/ipr.   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary   rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF at   ietf-ipr@ietf.org.Acknowledgement   Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF   Administrative Support Activity (IASA).Zeilenga                      Experimental                      [Page 9]

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