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PROPOSED STANDARD
Network Working Group                                           C. MetzRequest for Comments: 2243                                The Inner NetCategory: Standards Track                                 November 1997OTP Extended ResponsesStatus of this Memo   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.Copyright Notice   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1997).  All Rights Reserved.Abstract   This document provides a specification for a type of response to an   OTP [RFC 1938] challenge that carries explicit indication of the   response's encoding. Codings for the two mandatory OTP data formats   using this new type of response are presented.   This document also provides a specification for a response that   allows an OTP generator to request that a server re-initialize a   sequence and change parameters such as the secret pass phrase.1. Conventions, Terms, and Notation   This document specifies the data formats and software behaviors   needed to use OTP extended responses. The data formats are described   three ways: using an ad-hoc UNIX manual page style syntax, using   augmented BNF described in sections two and three ofRFC 822, and by   examples. Should there be any conflict between these descriptions,   the augmented BNF takes precedence. The software behaviors are   described in words, and specific behavior compliance requirements are   itemized using the requirements terminology (specifically, the words   MUST, SHOULD, and MAY) defined inRFC 2119.Metz                        Standards Track                     [Page 1]

RFC 2243                 OTP Extended Responses            November 19972. Extended Challenges and Extended Responses   This document builds on the protocol and terminology specified inRFC1938 and assumes that you have already read this document and   understand its contents.   An extended challenge is a single line of printable text terminated   by either a new line sequence appropriate for the context of its use   (e.g., ASCII CR followed by ASCII LF) or a whitespace character. It   contains a standard OTP challenge, a whitespace character, and a list   that generators use to determine which extended responses are   supported by a server.   An extended response is a single line of printable text terminated by   a new line sequence appropriate for the context of its use. It   contains two or more tokens that are separated with a single colon   (':') character. The first token contains a type specifier that   indicates the format of the rest of the response. The tokens that   follow are argument data for the OTP extended response. At least one   token of data MUST be present.2.1. Syntax   In UNIX manual page like syntax, the general form of an extended   challenge could be described as:      <standard OTP challenge> ext[,<extension set id>[, ...]]   And the general form of an extended response could be described as:      <type-specifier>:<arg1>[:<arg2>[:...]]   In augmented BNF syntax, the syntax of the general form of an   extended challenge and an extended response is:   extended-challenge = otp-challenge 1*LWSP-char capability-list                        (NL / *LWSP-char)   otp-challenge     = <a standard OTP challenge>   capability-list   = "ext" *("," extension-set-id)   extension-set-id  = *<any CHAR except LWSP, CTLs, or ",">   extended-response = type 1*(":" argument) NL   type              = token   argument          = token   token             = 1*<any CHAR except ":" and CTLs>   NL                = <new line sequence appropriate for the context                        in which OTP is being used>Metz                        Standards Track                     [Page 2]

RFC 2243                 OTP Extended Responses            November 1997   An example of an extended challenge indicating support for OTP   extended responses and for a mythical response set "foo" is:      otp-md5 123 mi1234 ext,foo   An example of an extended response using a mythical type named "foo"   is:      foo:some data:some more data:123452.2. Requirements   A server compliant with this specification:      1. MUST be able to receive and parse the general form of an         extended response      2. MUST be able to receive, parse, and correctly process all         extended responses specified in this document      3. MUST process the type field in a case-insensitive manner      4. MUST reject any authentication attempt using an extended         response if it does not support that type of response      5. SHOULD provide an appropriate indication to the generator         if the response was rejected because of (4)      6. MUST limit the length of the input reasonably      7. MUST accept otherwise arbitrary amounts of whitespace         wherever a response allows it      8. MUST be able to receive and correctly process standard OTP         responses   A generator compliant with this specification:      1. MUST be able to generate standard OTP responses      2. MUST use standard responses unless an extended challenge         has been received for the particular server AND seed      3. MUST generate the type field in lower case      4. MUST NOT send a response type for which the server has not         indicated support through an extended challenge   Extension set identifiers and extension type identifiers named with   the prefix "x-" are reserved for private use among mutually   consenting implementations. Implementations that do not recognise a   particular "x-" extension MUST ignore that extension. This means that   all "x-" extensions are likely to be non-interoperable with other   extensions. Careful consideration should be given to the possibility   of a server interacting with with a generator implementation which,   although it recognizes a given "x-" extension, uses it for a   different purpose. All of the remaining extension namespace is   reserved to IANA, which will only officially assign the extensionMetz                        Standards Track                     [Page 3]

RFC 2243                 OTP Extended Responses            November 1997   into this namespace after the IESG approves of such an assignment.   During the lifetime of the OTP WG, it is recommended that the IESG   consult with the OTP WG prior to approving such an assignment.3. The "hex" and "word" Responses   There exists a very rare case in which a standard OTP response could   be a valid coding in both the hexadecimal and six-word formats. An   example of this is the response "ABE ACE ADA ADD BAD A."  The   solution to this problem mandated by the OTP specification is that   compliant servers MUST attempt to parse and verify a standard   response in both hexadecimal and six-word formats and must consider   the authentication successful if either succeeds.   This problem can be solved easily using extended responses. The "hex"   response and the "word" response are two response types that encode   an OTP in an extended response that explicitly describes the   encoding. These responses start with a type label of "hex" for a   hexadecimal OTP and "word" for a six-word coded OTP. These responses   contain one argument field that contains a standard OTP response   coded in the indicated format.3.1. Syntax   In UNIX manual page like syntax, the format of these responses could   be described as:      hex:<hexadecimal number>      word:<six dictionary words>   In augmented BNF syntax and with the definitions already provided,   the syntax of these responses is:      hex-response  = "hex:" hex-64bit NL      hex-64bit     = 16(hex-char *LWSP-char)      hex-char      = ("A" / "B" / "C" / "D" / "E" / "F" /                       "a" / "b" / "c" / "d" / "e" / "f" /                       "0" / "1" / "2" / "3" / "4" / "5" /                       "6" / "7" / "8" / "9")      word-response = "word:" word-64bit NL      word-64bit    = 6(otp-word 1*LWSP-char)      otp-word      = <any valid word in the standard OTP coding                      dictionary>Metz                        Standards Track                     [Page 4]

RFC 2243                 OTP Extended Responses            November 1997   Examples of these responses are:      hex:8720 33d4 6202 9172      word:VAST SAUL TAKE SODA SUCH BOLT3.2. Requirements   A server compliant with this specification:      1. MUST process all arguments in a case-insensitive manner   A generator compliant with this specification:      1. SHOULD generate otp-word tokens in upper case with single         spaces separating them      2. SHOULD generate hexadecimal numbers using only lower case         for letters4. The "init-hex" and "init-word" Responses   The OTP specification requires that implementations provide a means   for a client to re-initialize or change its OTP information with a   server but does not require any specific protocol for doing it.   Implementations that support the OTP extended responses described in   this document MUST support the response with the "init-hex" and   "init-word" type specifiers, which provide a standard way for a   client to re-initialize its OTP information with a server. This   response is intended to be used only by automated clients. Because of   this, the recommended form of this response uses the hexadecimal   encoding for binary data. It is possible for a user to type an "init-   hex" or "init-word" response.4.1. Syntax   In UNIX manual page like syntax, the format of these responses could   be described as:      init-hex:<current-OTP>:<new-params>:<new-OTP>      init-word:<current-OTP>:<new-params>:<new-OTP>   In augmented BNF syntax and with the definitions already provided,   the syntax of the "init-hex" response is:   init-hex-response = "init-hex:" current-OTP ":" new-params ":"                        new-OTP NL   current-OTP     = hex-64bit   new-OTP         = hex-64bitMetz                        Standards Track                     [Page 5]

RFC 2243                 OTP Extended Responses            November 1997   new-params      = algorithm SPACE sequence-number SPACE seed   algorithm       = "md4" / "md5" / "sha1"   sequence-number = 4*3DIGIT   seed            = 16*1(ALPHA / DIGIT)   In augmented BNF syntax and with the definitions already provided,   the syntax of the "init-word" response is:   init-word-response = "init-word:" current-OTP ":" new-params ":"                        new-OTP NL   current-OTP     = word-64bit   new-OTP         = word-64bit   new-params      = algorithm SPACE sequence-number SPACE seed   algorithm       = "md4" / "md5" / "sha1"   sequence-number = 4*3DIGIT   seed            = 16*1(ALPHA / DIGIT)   Note that all appropriate fields for the "init-hex" response MUST be   hexadecimally coded and that all appropriate fields for the "init-   word" response MUST be six-word coded.   Examples of these responses are:   init-hex:f6bd 6b33 89b8 7203:md5 499 ke6118:23d1 b253 5ae0 2b7e   init-hex:c9b2 12bb 6425 5a0f:md5 499 ke0986:fd17 cef1 b4df 093e   init-word:MOOD SOFT POP COMB BOLO LIFE:md5 499 ke1235:   ARTY WEAR TAD RUG HALO GIVE   init-word:END KERN BALM NICK EROS WAVY:md5 499 ke1235:   BABY FAIN OILY NIL TIDY DADE   (Note that all of these responses are one line. Due to their length,   they had to be split into multiple lines in order to be included   here. These responses MUST NOT span more than one line in actual use)4.2. Description of Fields   The current-OTP field contains the (RFC 1938) response to the OTP   challenge.  The new-params field contains the parameters for the   client's new requested challenge and the new-OTP field contains a   response to that challenge. If the re-initialization is successful, a   server MUST store the new OTP in its database as the last successful   OTP received and the sequence number in the next challenge presented   by the server MUST be one less than the sequence number specified in   the new-params field.Metz                        Standards Track                     [Page 6]

RFC 2243                 OTP Extended Responses            November 1997   The new-params field is hashed as a string the same way that a seed   or secret pass phrase would be. All other field values are hashed in   their uncoded binary forms, in network byte order and without any   padding.4.3. Requirements   A server compliant with this specification:      1. SHOULD NOT allow a user to use the same value for their         seed and secret pass phrase.      2. MUST disable all OTP access to any principal whose         sequence number would be less than one      3. MUST decrement the sequence number if a reinitialization         response includes a valid current-OTP, but the server is         unable to successfully process the new-params or new-OTP for         any reason.   A generator compliant with this specification:      1. SHOULD NOT allow a user to use the same value for their         seed and secret pass phrase      2. MUST take specific steps to prevent infinite loops of         re-initialization attempts in case of failure      3. SHOULD provide the user with some indication that the         re-initialization is taking place      4. SHOULD NOT do a re-initialization without the user's         permission, either for that specific instance or as a         configuration option      5. SHOULD NOT retry a failed re-initialization without a user's         permission      6. SHOULD warn the user if the sequence number falls below ten      7. MUST refuse to generate OTPs with a sequence number below one5. Security Considerations   All of the security considerations for the OTP system also apply to   the OTP system with extended responses.   These extended responses, like OTP itself, do not protect the user   against active attacks. The IPsec Authentication Header (RFC-1826)   (or another technique with at least as much strength as IPsec AH)   SHOULD be used to protect against such attacks.   The consequences of a successful active attack on the re-   initialization response may be more severe than simply hijacking a   single session. An attacker could substitute his own response forMetz                        Standards Track                     [Page 7]

RFC 2243                 OTP Extended Responses            November 1997   that of a legitimate user. The attacker may then be able to use the   OTP system to authenticate himself as the user at will (at least   until detected).   Failure to implement server requirement 3 insection 4.3 opens an   implementation to an attack based on replay of the current-OTP part   of the response.6. Acknowledgments   LikeRFC 1938, the protocol described in this document was created by   contributors in the IETF OTP working group. Specific contributions   were made by Neil Haller, who provided input on the overall design   requirements of a re-initialization protocol, Denis Pinkas, who   suggested several modifications to the originally proposed re-   initialization protocol, and Phil Servita, who opened the debate with   the first real protocol proposal and provided lots of specific input   on the design of this and earlier protocols. The extensions to the   OTP challenge were suggested by Chris Newman and John Valdes.   Randall Atkinson and Ted T'so also contributed their views to   discussions about details of the protocol extensions in this   document.References   [RFC 822]   Crocker, D., "Standard for the Format of ARPA Internet               Text Messages,"RFC 822, August 1982.   [RFC 1825]  Atkinson, R., "Security Architecture for the Internet               Protocol,"RFC 1825, August 1995.   [RFC 1938]  Haller, N. and C. Metz, "A One-Time Password System,"RFC 1938, May 1996.   [RFC 2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to               Indicate Requirement Level,"RFC 2119,               March 1997.Author's Address   Craig Metz   The Inner Net   Box 10314-1936   Blacksburg, VA 24062-0314   (DSN) 354-8590   cmetz@inner.netMetz                        Standards Track                     [Page 8]

RFC 2243                 OTP Extended Responses            November 1997Appendix: Reference Responses   The following responses were generated by a development version of   the One-Time Passwords in Everything (OPIE) implementation of this   specification.   All of these are responses to the challenge:        otp-md5 499 ke1234 ext   Note that the re-initialization responses use the same secret pass   phrase for new and current and a new seed of "ke1235". Also, these   responses have been split for formatting purposes into multiple   lines; they MUST NOT be multiple lines in actual use.   The secret pass phrase for these responses is:        This is a test.   The OTP standard hexadecimal response is:        5bf0 75d9 959d 036f   The OTP standard six-word response is:        BOND FOGY DRAB NE RISE MART   The OTP extended "hex" response is:        hex:5Bf0 75d9 959d 036f   The OTP extended "word" response is:        word:BOND FOGY DRAB NE RISE MART   The OTP extended "init-hex" response is:        init-hex:5bf0 75d9 959d 036f:md5 499 ke1235:3712 dcb4 aa53 16c1   The OTP extended "init-word" response is:        init-word:BOND FOGY DRAB NE RISE MART:md5 499 ke1235:  RED HERD        NOW BEAN PA BURGMetz                        Standards Track                     [Page 9]

RFC 2243                 OTP Extended Responses            November 1997Full Copyright Statement   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1997).  All Rights Reserved.   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are   included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other   Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of   developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for   copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be   followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than   English.   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be   revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.   This document and the information contained herein is provided on an   "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING   TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING   BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION   HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF   MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.Metz                        Standards Track                    [Page 10]

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