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RFC 9847TLS and DTLS IANA Registry UpdatesDecember 2025
Salowey & TurnerStandards Track[Page]
Stream:
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
RFC:
9847
Updates:
8447
Category:
Standards Track
Published:
ISSN:
2070-1721
Authors:
J. Salowey
CyberArk
S. Turner
sn3rd

RFC 9847

IANA Registry Updates for TLS and DTLS

Abstract

This document updates the changes to the TLS and DTLS IANA registriesmade in RFC 8447. It adds a new value, "D" for discouraged,to the "Recommended" column of the selected TLS registries andadds a "Comment" column to all active registries that do notalready have a "Comment" column. Finally, it updates theregistration request instructions.

This document updates RFC 8447.

Status of This Memo

This is an Internet Standards Track document.

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained athttps://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9847.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

1.Introduction

This document instructs IANA to make changes to a number of the IANAregistries related to Transport Layer Security (TLS) and DatagramTransport Layer Security (DTLS). These changes update the changes madein[RFC8447].

This specification adds a new value, "D" for discouraged, to the "Recommended"column of the selected TLS registries and adds a "Comment" column to allactive registries that do not already have a "Comment" column.

This specification also updates the registration request instructions.

2.Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED","MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted asdescribed in BCP 14[RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, theyappear in all capitals, as shown here.

3.Updating "Recommended" Column's Values

The instructions in this document update the "Recommended" column,originally added in[RFC8447] to add a third value, "D",indicating that a value is discouraged. The permitted valuesof the "Recommended" column are:

Y:

Indicates that the IETF has consensus that the item isRECOMMENDED. This only means that the associated mechanism is fit for the purpose for which it was defined. Careful reading of the documentation for the mechanism is necessary to understand the applicability of that mechanism. The IETF could recommend mechanisms that have limited applicability but will provide applicability statements that describe any limitations of the mechanism or necessary constraints on its use.

N:

Indicates that the item has not been evaluated by the IETF and that the IETF has made no statement about the suitability of the associated mechanism. This does not necessarily mean that the mechanism is flawed, only that no consensus exists. The IETF might have consensus to leave an item marked as "N" on the basis of the item having limited applicability or usage constraints.

D:

Indicates that the item is discouraged. This marking could be used to identify mechanisms that might result in problems if they are used, such as a weak cryptographic algorithm or a mechanism that might cause interoperability problems in deployment. When marking a registry entry as "D", either the "Reference" or the "Comment" columnMUST include sufficient information to determine why the marking has been applied. Implementers and usersSHOULD consult the linked references associated with the item to determine the conditions under which the itemSHOULD NOT orMUST NOT be used.

Setting a value to "Y" or "D" or transitioning the value from "Y" or "D" in the "Recommended" column requiresIETF Standards Action with Expert Review or IESG Approval[RFC8126]. Not all items definedin Standards Track RFCs need to be setto "Y" or "D". Any item not otherwise specified is set to "N". The column isblank for values that are unassigned or reserved unless specifically set.

3.1.Recommended Note

Existing registries have a note on the meaning of the "Recommended" column. For theregistries discussed in the subsequent sections, this note is updatedwith a sentence describing the "D" value as follows:

Note: If the "Recommended" column is set to "N", it does not necessarily meanthat it is flawed; rather, it indicates that the item has notbeen through the IETF consensus process, has limited applicability, oris intended only for specific use cases. If the "Recommended" columnis set to "D", the item is discouraged andSHOULD NOT orMUST NOT be used,depending upon the situation; consult the item's references for clarity.

4.TLS ExtensionType Values Registry

In order to reflect the changes in the "Recommended" column allocation,IANA has updated the "TLS ExtensionType Values" registry as follows:

Table 1
ValueExtension NameRecommended
4truncated_hmacD
40ReservedD
46ReservedD
53connection_id (deprecated)D

5.TLS Cipher Suites Registry

Several categories of cipher suites are discouraged for general use andare marked as "D".

Cipher suites that use NULL encryption do not provide the confidentialitynormally expected of TLS. Protocols and applications are often designedto require confidentiality as a security property. Thesecipher suitesMUST NOT be used in those cases.

Cipher suites marked as EXPORT use weak ciphers and were deprecated inTLS 1.1[RFC4346].

Cipher suites marked as anon do not provide any authentication, arevulnerable to on-path attacks, and were deprecated in TLS 1.1[RFC4346].

RC4 is a weak cipher and is deprecated in[RFC7465].

DES and the International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) are not considered secure for general use and were deprecated in[RFC5469]. MD5 and SHA-1 are also not secure for general use and were deprecated in[RFC9155].

In order to reflect the changes in the "Recommended" column allocation,IANA has updated the "TLS Cipher Suites" registry as follows:

Table 2
ValueDescriptionRecommended
0x00,0x1ETLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_SHAD
0x00,0x20TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHAD
0x00,0x21TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_SHAD
0x00,0x22TLS_KRB5_WITH_DES_CBC_MD5D
0x00,0x24TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_MD5D
0x00,0x25TLS_KRB5_WITH_IDEA_CBC_MD5D
0x00,0x26TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_SHAD
0x00,0x27TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_SHAD
0x00,0x28TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_SHAD
0x00,0x29TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_DES_CBC_40_MD5D
0x00,0x2ATLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC2_CBC_40_MD5D
0x00,0x2BTLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5D
0x00,0x2CTLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHAD
0x00,0x8ATLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHAD
0x00,0xB0TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256D
0x00,0xB1TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384D
0xC0,0x06TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHAD
0xC0,0x07TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHAD
0xC0,0x10TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHAD
0xC0,0x11TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHAD
0xC0,0x33TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHAD
0xC0,0x39TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHAD
0xC0,0x3ATLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256D
0xC0,0x3BTLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384D
0xC0,0xB4TLS_SHA256_SHA256D
0xC0,0xB5TLS_SHA384_SHA384D

6.TLS Supported Groups Registry

In order to reflect the changes in the "Recommended" column allocation,IANA has updated the "TLS Supported Groups" registry as follows:

Table 3
ValueDescriptionRecommended
1sect163k1D
2sect163r1D
3sect163r2D
4sect193r1D
5sect193r2D
6sect233k1D
7sect233r1D
8sect239k1D
15secp160k1D
16secp160r1D
17secp160r2D
18secp192k1D
19secp192r1D
20secp224k1D
21secp224r1D

7.TLS Exporter Labels Registry

This document updates the registration procedure for the "TLS ExporterLabels" registry and updates the "Recommended" column allocation.IANA has updated the "TLS Exporter Labels" registry as follows:

Note: The role of the designated expert is described inSection 17 of [RFC8447].Even though this registry does not require a specification, thedesignated expert[RFC8126] will strongly encourage registrantsto provide a link to a publicly available specification. AnInternet-Draft (that is posted and never published as an RFC)or a document from another standards body, industry consortium,university site, etc. is suitable for these purposes.The expert may provide more in-depth reviews, but their approvalshould not be taken as an endorsement of the exporter label. Theexpert also verifies that the label is a string consisting ofprintable ASCII characters beginning with "EXPORTER". IANAMUSTalso verify that one label is not a prefix of any other label.For example, labels "key" or "master secretary" are forbidden.

8.TLS Certificate Types Registry

In order to reflect the changes in the "Recommended" column allocation,IANA has updated the "TLS Certificate Types" registry as follows:

9.TLS HashAlgorithm Registry

TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 were deprecated[RFC8996]; TLS 1.2 willbe in use for some time. In order to reflect the changes in the "Recommended"column allocation, IANA has updated the "TLS HashAlgorithm" registryas follows:

Table 4
ValueDescriptionRecommended
0noneY
1md5D
2sha1D
3sha224D
4sha256Y
5sha384Y
6sha512Y
8IntrinsicY

10.TLS SignatureAlgorithm Registry

TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 were deprecated[RFC8996], TLS 1.2 willbe in use for some time. In order to reflect the changes in the "Recommended"column allocation, IANA has updated the "TLS SignatureAlgorithm" registryas follows:

Table 5
ValueDescriptionRecommended
0anonymousN
1rsaY
2dsaN
3ecdsaY
7ed25519Y
8ed448Y
64gostr34102012_256N
65gostr34102012_512N

11.TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers Registry

TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 were deprecated[RFC8996], TLS 1.2 willbe in use for some time. In order to reflect the changes in the "Recommended"column allocation, IANA has updated the "TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers"registry as follows:

Table 6
ValueDescriptionRecommended
1rsa_signY
2dss_signN
3rsa_fixed_dhN
4dss_fixed_dhN
5rsa_ephemeral_dh_RESERVEDD
6dss_ephemeral_dh_RESERVEDD
20fortezza_dms_RESERVEDD
64ecdsa_signY
65rsa_fixed_ecdhN
66ecdsa_fixed_ecdhN
67gost_sign256N
68gost_sign512N

12.TLS PskKeyExchangeMode Registry

In order to reflect the changes in the "Recommended" column allocation,IANA has updated the "TLS PskKeyExchangeMode" registry as follows:

13.TLS SignatureScheme Registry

In order to reflect the changes in the "Recommended" column allocation,IANA has updated the "TLS SignatureScheme" registry as follows:

14.Adding "Comment" Column

IANA has added a "Comment" column to the following registries:

This list of registries is all registries that do not already have a"Comment" or "Note" column or that were not orphaned by TLS 1.3.

15.Expert Review of Current and Potential IETF and IRTF Documents

The intent of the Specification Required choice for TLS codepointsis to allow for easy registration for codepoints associated withprotocols and algorithms that are not being actively developed insidethe IETF or IRTF. When TLS-based technologies are being developed insidethe IETF or IRTF, they should be done in coordination with the TLS WG inorder to provide appropriate review. For this reason, unless the TLS WGChairs indicate otherwise via email, designatedexperts should decline codepoint registrations for documents thathave already been adopted or are being proposed for adoption by IETFworking groups or IRTF research groups.

16.Registration Requests

Registration requestsMUST be submitted in one of two ways:

  1. By sending email to iana@iana.org; this emailSHOULDuse an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register value in TLSbar registry").

  2. Using the online form athttps://www.iana.org/form/protocol-assignment.

Specification Required[RFC8126] registry requests are registered aftera three-week review period on the advice of one or more designatedexperts. However, to allow for the allocation of values prior topublication, the designated experts may approve registration once theyare satisfied that such a specification will be published.

17.Security Considerations

Recommended algorithms are regarded as secure for general use at thetime of registration; however, cryptographic algorithms and parameterswill be broken or weakened over time. It is possible that the"Recommended" status in the registry lags behind the most recent advancesin cryptanalysis. Implementers and users need to check that thecryptographic algorithms listed continue to provide the expected levelof security.

Designated experts ensure the specification is publicly available. They mayprovide more in-depth reviews. Their review should not be taken as anendorsement of the cipher suite, extension, supported group, etc.

18.IANA Considerations

This document is entirely about changes to TLS-related IANA registries.

19.Normative References

[RFC2119]
Bradner, S.,"Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels",BCP 14,RFC 2119,DOI 10.17487/RFC2119,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4346]
Dierks, T. andE. Rescorla,"The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1",RFC 4346,DOI 10.17487/RFC4346,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4346>.
[RFC5469]
Eronen, P., Ed.,"DES and IDEA Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",RFC 5469,DOI 10.17487/RFC5469,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5469>.
[RFC7465]
Popov, A.,"Prohibiting RC4 Cipher Suites",RFC 7465,DOI 10.17487/RFC7465,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7465>.
[RFC8126]
Cotton, M.,Leiba, B., andT. Narten,"Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs",BCP 26,RFC 8126,DOI 10.17487/RFC8126,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B.,"Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words",BCP 14,RFC 8174,DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8447]
Salowey, J. andS. Turner,"IANA Registry Updates for TLS and DTLS",RFC 8447,DOI 10.17487/RFC8447,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8447>.
[RFC8996]
Moriarty, K. andS. Farrell,"Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1",BCP 195,RFC 8996,DOI 10.17487/RFC8996,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8996>.
[RFC9155]
Velvindron, L.,Moriarty, K., andA. Ghedini,"Deprecating MD5 and SHA-1 Signature Hashes in TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2",RFC 9155,DOI 10.17487/RFC9155,,<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9155>.

Authors' Addresses

Joe Salowey
CyberArk
Email:joe@salowey.net
Sean Turner
sn3rd
Email:sean@sn3rd.com

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