The unexpected siren which sounded on the afternoon of Yom Kippur, October 6th, 1973, was a seminal moment, signaling a turning point for the nation and the State. In honor of the 40th anniversary of the Yom Kippur War, we gathered a selection of archival material from the National Library of Israel examining the war and its repercussions for the Israeli public during and after the events of 1973.
From the strong statements of the war's military commanders, to a 10 year old girl wondering how the animals in the zoo were being cared for during the crisis; from the wailing sirens that pierced the air to a protest movement that started with just one man and changed Israel's political reality. The fear, the feelings of isolation, as well as the mass enlistment on the part of the entire nation. An entire country was forced to look in the mirror and examine what had happened. Naomi Shemer'sLu Yehi ("All We Pray For") is a song often associated with this period - a song that became a prayer, and a nationwide hit.
The printed material from the Yom Kippur War reflects a preoccupation with censorship and the danger that the enemy was listening, gathering intelligence, maybe even present among us. It's possible that this stemmed from the severe intelligence failure that enabled the surprise attack by the Syrian and Egyptian armies. The fact that two Arab armies managed to invade Israeli-held territories in the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula, certainly contributed to the atmosphere. The feeling that the enemy had crossed the lines, and that its agents could be anywhere, was one of the reasons that warnings were printed or stamped on every military mail item, on every official piece of paper, on every published order, reminding soldiers to keep quiet.
A postcard of instructions for soldiers clearly states: "Secrecy: A Weapon against the Enemy". The postcard also warns: "… it is important to thwart the enemy's intelligence efforts; the enemy is trying to gather information about the IDF in any possible way in order to hamper our campaigns. Therefore, dealing with reporters correctly and wisely is of the upmost importance, specifically with foreign reporters. Foreign reporters are a potential threat. They wander around in the field and some of them may work for the enemy, or could leak information to the enemy. Please, be careful with what you say. Maintain secrecy!" Post office postcards also warn: "Chatter MIGHT cause our downfall". And in an even more dire version: "Keep a secret – save a life!"
The Yom Kippur War was a breaking point for the Israeli public. It was abundantly clear that "something wasn't right", or as in an Israeli saying of the time, "the business didn't run as it should have." When the ceasefire was reached on the 24th of October, 1973, the criticism from the public sphere intensified. The turmoil among the Israeli public gradually came to a boil. The reservists remained at their posts and on the Syrian border, occasional flare-ups required the mobilization of substantial IDF forces. In the meantime, in December, 1973, elections for the Knesset, postponed due to the war, were finally held. Their results left Golda Meir at the head of the government. This was perceived as a continuation of the status quo.
In February of 1974, Captain Motti Ashkenazi, a commander at the "Budapest" IDF outpost on the Suez Canal, was released from reserve duty. Ashkenazi had experienced the terrible conditions there on the eve of the war. The neglect, indifference and the lack of preparation for the possibility of an Egyptian attack had worried Ashkenazi greatly. He had alerted his superiors to this, but his warnings weren't taken seriously. When the war broke out, Ashkenazi found himself leading his men under heavy, sustained fire throughout the whole war. The outpost withstood the onslaught but paid a heavy price in dead, wounded and prisoners of war. When Ashkenazi returned to civilian life he was steadfast in publicizing his criticisms. He began a one-man protest demanding the resignation of the Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan, and called for the administration to take responsibility for what was referred to as "The Fiasco". Ashkenazi announced a 48 hour hunger strike and stood in protest in front of the Prime Minister's Office in the cold and rainy Jerusalem winter.
In the meantime, as early as the 21st of November, 1973, a governmental investigative commission, led by the President of the Supreme Court, Justice Agranat, began to investigate the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War. The commission was tasked with investigating the IDF's readiness for the war, the use of information on the eve of the war and the military movements before the holding action was implemented, on the third day of the war. Public opinion was divided. There were those who thought that the blame should be placed on the military alone. However, the bulk of public opinion tended to place the blame on the Minister of Defense, or even the whole government.
Motti Ashkenazi saw all the leaders as responsible for the "The Fiasco". His one-man protest began to draw others: reservists who had been released from the army as well as citizens from all walks of life. What began as the protest of one reserve officer became a huge public movement that couldn't be ignored. The word "failure", which connoted blame, abandonment, indifference and mockery, was still in the air. In addition, there were unending calls for the ministers to begin to take political responsibility for the failures.
On the 1st of April 1974, the Agranat Commission presented an interim report which placed heavy blame on the head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, Eli Zeira, and the commander of the Intelligence Directorate's Research Department, Aryeh Shalev, as well as the head of IDF Southern Command, Shmuel Gonen and IDF Chief of Staff, David Elazar. The Agranat Commission didn't find fault with Moshe Dayan and even praised the Prime Minister, Golda Meir. The public protest didn't die down, though; it just got stronger. Ashkenazi's insistence that the responsibility for "The Fiasco" was political seemed more relevant than ever.
The protest did what it set out to do. According to the demands of the Agranat Commission, IDF Chief of Staff Elazar resigned and Generals Zeira and Gonen were dismissed from their posts in the IDF. The protest even brought about the fall of Golda Meir's government. The government that was established afterwards, headed by Yitzhak Rabin, did not include Moshe Dayan.
It should be noted that while the protest against the political sector and the high command of the IDF was indeed the most widespread and prominent response to the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli public was also up in arms for other reasons. For instance, a few days after the declaration of the ceasefire, a protest began against the early release of prisoners of war captured by the IDF. The protesters were concerned that if Israel gave up its bargaining chips too early, the captured IDF soldiers would be mistreated. In addition, there was a feeling among the Israeli public that, due to the internal unrest, Israel was in grave danger. These feelings gave rise to a number of political and public organizations that demanded to investigate the events of the war, and were part of the widespread turmoil in Israeli society in the weeks and days after the ceasefire. Looking back, it seems that the Yom Kippur War was a watershed moment in relation to public opinion and public protest in the State of Israel. The voice of the public – a voice bearing questions and criticism, demands and protests – was now being heard.
Immediately after the war broke out, on the 6th of October, the military command began to publish daily orders and printed messages meant for the newspapers that were distributed on the fronts and in the various outposts. These included a mixture of encouragements, expressions of exuberance for battle and massive efforts made to lift the morale of the soldiers. With every day that passed, these missives began to also include supportive information, updates and publicity material. The publicity campaign was wide ranging and dynamic, and had a number of targets. On the one hand, the publicity was meant to encourage the soldiers, update them and to give them a feeling that they were part of a bigger picture. On the other hand, as the publications widened, they were clearly also meant to be read by the non-combat units and the general public.
In the daily manifestoes from the Northern and Southern Commands, the language was sharp and the words were strong: "The Syrian tanks are being turned into bonfires, their cannons are shattered and their outposts are besieged… we are the wall that protects the nation of Israel and on it we will smash the evil arm of the enemy… when the order is given, we will spring forward, strike and destroy," says the head of the Northern Command, Major General Yitzhak Hofi in Military Manifesto No. 1. He doesn't describe an exact reality, but instead expresses leadership and strength of spirit. His comrade at Southern Command, Major General Shmuel Gonen ("Gorodish") did not mince words either: "We require quick and decisive action. We must strike the enemy, we must chew him up, drag his forces into the desert and finish him there… after, we will reach the decisive stage, in which we will bring the battle to his country, his land, to his courtyard and his heart."
Meanwhile, at Central Command, on the 8th of October, the military manifestoes hurried to depict an image of success during some of the most difficult moments of the war: "…the Egyptian bridges over the Suez have been blown up and the Egyptian army in Sinai is surrounded and has been hit hard... the first stage is coming to an end, the holding action was carried out bravely, and, as of now, the initiative is totally in our hands. Our forces are striking the enemy and crushing it, as is fitting. This is the devastating blow that the Minister of Defense promised the enemy when the fighting broke out." The manifesto ends with "gmar chatima tova" (the traditional blessing for a good judgment on Yom Kippur) and a quotation from II Samuel, 22: 38: "I have pursued mine enemies, and destroyed them; neither did I turn back till they were consumed."
In the same publication from Central Command, on the parallel page, next to an illustration of a lion – the symbol of the command – defeating an Arab soldier, two warnings from the Information Security Department appear, alongside several jokes. A mocking tone towards Arabs in the spirit of the period that followed the Six-Day War stands out in the cheerful writing. The arrogance of the powerful victory in 1967 was transformed into encouragement in an attempt to raise morale.
If the beginning of the war saw short telegraphic messages that mostly expressed stubbornness, decisiveness and a helping, encouraging spirit, as the war went on, the official publications became more varied, aiming in different directions. Information, encouragement, news from the front, a bit of humor, caricatures, information about the enemy's airplanes, pictures of the IDF forces bringing the war to enemy territory, and warnings against revealing information to the enemy are all present. Towards the end of the war, explanations regarding the ceasefire, pats on the back of the soldiers and condolences to the families of the fallen began to appear.
Read the stories behind the war on our blog: "The Librarians"
