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| A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z |
Objection 1. It would seem that inChrist there are not twowills, one Divine, the otherhuman. For thewill is the first mover and first commander in whoever wills. But inChrist the first mover and commander was the Divine will, since inChrist everythinghuman was moved by the Divine will. Hence it seems that inChrist there was only one will, viz. the Divine.
Objection 2. Further, an instrument is not moved by its own will but by thewill of its mover. Now thehumannature ofChrist was the instrument of His Godhead. Hence thehumannature ofChrist was not moved by its own will, but by the Divine will.
Objection 3. Further, that alone is multiplied inChrist which belongs to thenature. But thewill does not seem to pertain tonature: fornatural things are ofnecessity; whereas what isvoluntary is not ofnecessity. Therefore there is but one will inChrist.
Objection 4. Further,Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) that "to will in this or that way belongs not to ournature but to ourintellect," i.e. our personalintellect. But everywill is this or that will, since there is nothing in a genus which is not at the same time in some one of itsspecies. Therefore all will belongs to theperson. But inChrist there was and is but oneperson. Therefore inChrist there is only one will.
On the contrary,our Lord says (Luke 22:42): "Father, if Thou wilt, remove thischalice from Me. But yet not My will but Thine be done." AndAmbrose, quoting this to the Emperor Gratian (De Fide ii, 7) says: "As He assumed my will, He assumed my sorrow;" and onLuke 22:42 he says: "Hiswill, He refers to the Man—the Father's, to the Godhead. For thewill ofman is temporal, and thewill of the Godheadeternal."
I answer that, Some placed only one will inChrist; but they seem to have had different motives for holding this. For Apollinaris did not hold anintellectualsoul inChrist, but maintained that the Word was in place of thesoul, or even in place of theintellect. Hence since "thewill is in the reason," as thePhilosopher says (De Anima iii, 9), it followed that inChrist there was nohuman will; and thus there was only one will in Him. So, too, Eutyches and all who held one compositenature inChrist were forced to place one will in Him.Nestorius, too, who maintained that the union ofGod andman was one of affection and will, held only one will inChrist. But later on, Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch, Cyrus of Alexandria, and Sergius of Constantinople and some of their followers, held that there is one will inChrist, although they held that inChrist there are two natures united in a hypostasis; because theybelieved thatChrist'shumannature never moved with its own motion, but only inasmuch as it was moved by the Godhead, as is plain from the synodical letter of Pope Agatho [Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 4].
And hence in the sixth Council held at Constantinople [Act. 18] it was decreed that it must be said that there are two wills inChrist, in the following passage: "In accordance with what the Prophets of old taught us concerningChrist, and as He taught us Himself, and the Symbol of the Holy Fathers has handed down to us, we confess twonatural wills in Him and twonatural operations." And this much it wasnecessary to say. For it is manifest that theSon of God assumed a perfecthumannature, as was shown above (Article 5;III:9:1). Now thewill pertains to the perfection ofhumannature, being one of itsnatural powers, even as theintellect, as was stated inI:79 andI:80. Hence we must say that theSon of God assumed ahuman will, together withhumannature. Now by the assumption ofhumannature theSon of God suffered no diminution of what pertains to His Divine Nature, to which it belongs to have a will, as was said in theI:19:1. Hence it must be said that there are two wills inChrist, i.e. onehuman, the other Divine.
Reply to Objection 1. Whatever was in thehumannature ofChrist was moved at the bidding of the Divine will; yet it does not follow that inChrist there was no movement of thewill proper tohumannature, for thegood wills of othersaints are moved byGod's will, "Who worketh" in them "both to will and to accomplish," as is writtenPhilippians 2:13. For although thewill cannot be inwardly moved by any creature, yet it can be moved inwardly byGod, as was said inI:105:4. And thus, too,Christ by Hishuman will followed the Divine will according toPsalm 39:9; "That I should do Thy will, O myGod, I have desired it." HenceAugustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 20): "Where the Son says to the Father, 'Not what I will, but what Thou willest,' what do you gain by adding your own words and saying 'He shows that Hiswill wastruly subject to His Father,' as if we denied thatman's will ought to be subject toGod's will?"
Reply to Objection 2. It is proper to an instrument to be moved by the principal agent, yet diversely, according to the property of itsnature. For an inanimate instrument, as an axe or a saw, is moved by the craftsman with only a corporeal movement; but an instrument animated by a sensitivesoul is moved by the sensitiveappetite, as a horse by its rider; and an instrument animated with a rationalsoul is moved by its will, as by the command of his lord the servant is moved to act, the servant being like an animate instrument, as thePhilosopher says (Polit. i, 2,4; Ethic. viii, 11). And hence it was in this manner that thehumannature ofChrist was the instrument of the Godhead, and was moved by its own will.
Reply to Objection 3. The power of thewill isnatural, andnecessarily follows upon thenature; but the movement or act of this power—which is also called will—is sometimesnatural andnecessary, e.g. with respect to beatitude; and sometimes springs fromfree-will and is neithernecessary nornatural, as is plain from what has been stated inI-II:10:1;I-II:10:2 [Cf.I:82:2]. And yet even reason itself, which is the principle of this movement, isnatural. Hence besides the Divine will it isnecessary to place inChrist ahuman will, not merely as anatural power, or anatural movement, but even as a rational movement.
Reply to Objection 4. When we say "to will in a certain way," we signify a determinate mode of willing. Now a determinate mode regards the thing of which it is the mode. Hence since thewill pertains to thenature, "to will in a certain way" belongs to thenature, not indeed considered absolutely, but as it is in the hypostasis. Hence thehuman will ofChrist had a determinate mode from the fact of being in a Divine hypostasis, i.e. it was always moved in accordance with the bidding of the Divine will.
Objection 1. It would seem that inChrist there was no will of sensuality besides thewill of reason. For thePhilosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42) that "thewill is in the reason, and in the sensitiveappetite are the irascible andconcupiscible parts." Now sensuality signifies the sensitiveappetite. Hence inChrist there was no will of sensuality.
Objection 2. Further, according toAugustine (De Trin. xii, 12,13) the sensuality is signified by the serpent. But there was nothing serpent-like inChrist; for He had the likeness of a venomous animal without the venom, asAugustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 32). Hence inChrist there was no will of sensuality.
Objection 3. Further,will is consequent uponnature, as was said (Article 1). But inChrist there was only onenature besides the Divine. Hence inChrist there was only onehuman will.
On the contrary,Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 7): "Mine is thewill which He calls His own; because as Man He assumed my sorrow." From this we are given to understand that sorrow pertains to thehuman will ofChrist. Now sorrow pertains to the sensuality, as was said inI-II:23:1;I-II:25:1. Therefore, seemingly, inChrist there is a will of sensuality besides thewill of reason.
I answer that, As was said (III:9:1), theSon of God assumedhumannature together with everything pertaining to the perfection ofhumannature. Now inhumannature is included animalnature, as the genus in itsspecies. Hence theSon of God must have assumed together with thehumannature whatever belongs to animalnature; one of which things is the sensitiveappetite, which is called the sensuality. Consequently it must be allowed that inChrist there was a sensualappetite, or sensuality. But it must be borne in mind that sensuality or the sensualappetite, inasmuch as itnaturally obeys reason, is said to be "rational by participation," as is clear from thePhilosopher (Ethic. i, 13). And because "thewill is in the reason," as stated above, it may equally be said that the sensuality is "a will by participation."
Reply to Objection 1. This argument is based on thewill,essentially so called, which is only in theintellectual part; but thewill by participation can be in the sensitive part, inasmuch as it obeys reason.
Reply to Objection 2. The sensuality is signified by the serpent—not as regards thenature of the sensuality, whichChrist assumed, but as regards the corruption of the "fomes," which was not inChrist.
Reply to Objection 3. "Where there is one thing on account of another, there seems to be only one" (Aristotle, Topic. iii); thus a surface which is visible by color is one visible thing with the color. So, too, because the sensuality is called thewill, only because it partakes of the rational will, there is said to be but onehuman will inChrist, even as there is but onehumannature.
Objection 1. It would seem that inChrist there were two wills as regards the reason. ForDamascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that there is a double will inman, viz. thenatural will which is calledthelesis, and the rational will which is calledboulesis. NowChrist in Hishumannature had whatever belongs to the perfection ofhumannature. Hence both the foregoing wills were inChrist.
Objection 2. Further, theappetitive power is diversified inman by the difference of the apprehensive power, and hence according to the difference of sense andintellect is the difference of sensitive andintellectiveappetite inman. But in the same way as regardsman's apprehension, we hold the difference of reason andintellect; both of which were inChrist. Therefore there was a double will in Him, oneintellectual and the other rational.
Objection 3. Further, some [Hugh of St. Victor, De Quat. Volunt.Christ.] ascribe toChrist "a will of piety," which can only be on the part of reason. Therefore inChrist on the part of reason there are several wills.
On the contrary, In every order there is one first mover. But thewill is the first mover in the genus ofhuman acts. Therefore in oneman there is only onewill, properly speaking, which is thewill of reason. ButChrist is oneman. Therefore inChrist there is only onehuman will.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1, Reply to Objection 3), thewill is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the act. Hence if thewill is taken for the act, it isnecessary to place twowills, i.e. twospecies of acts of thewill inChrist on the part of the reason. For thewill, as was said inI-II:8:2;I-II:8:3, regards both the end and the means; and is affected differently towards both. For towards the end it is borne simply and absolutely, as towards what isgood in itself; but towards the means it is borne under a certain relation, as thegoodness of the means depends on something else. Hence the act of thewill, inasmuch as it is drawn to anything desired of itself, as health, which act is called byDamascenethelesis—i.e. simple will, and by the masters "will asnature," is different from the act of thewill as it is drawn to anything that is desired only in order to something else, as to take medicine; and this act of thewillDamascene callsboulesis—i.e. counseling will, and the masters, "will as reason." But this diversity of acts does not diversify the power, since both acts regard the one common ratio of the object, which isgoodness. Hence we must say that if we are speaking of the power of thewill, inChrist there is but onehuman will,essentially so called and not by participation; but if we are speaking of thewill as an act, we thus distinguish inChrist a will asnature, which is calledthelesis, and a will as reason, which is calledboulesis.
Reply to Objection 1. These two wills do not diversify the power but only the act, as we have said.
Reply to Objection 2. Theintellect and the reason are not distinct powers, as was said inI:79:8.
Reply to Objection 3. The "will of piety" would not seem to be distinct from thewill considered asnature, inasmuch as it shrinks from another'sevil, absolutely considered.
Objection 1. It would seem that inChrist there was nofree-will. ForDamascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) thatgnome, i.e. opinion, thinking or cogitation, andproairesis, i.e. choice, "cannot possibly be attributed toour Lord, if we wish to speak with propriety." But in the things offaith especially we must speak with propriety. Therefore there was no choice inChrist and consequently nofree-will, of which choice is the act.
Objection 2. Further, thePhilosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is "a desire of something after taking counsel." Now counsel does not appear to be inChrist, because we do not take counsel concerning such things as we are certain of. ButChrist was certain of everything. Hence there was no counsel and consequently nofree-will inChrist.
Objection 3. Further,free-will is indifferent. ButChrist's will was determined togood, since He could notsin; as stated above (III:15:2). Hence there was nofree-will inChrist.
On the contrary, It is written (Isaiah 7:15): "He shall eat butter and honey, that He mayknow to refuse theevil and to choose thegood," which is an act of thefree-will. Therefore there wasfree-will inChrist.
I answer that, As was said above (Article 3), there was a twofold act of thewill inChrist; one whereby He was drawn to anything willed in itself, which implies thenature of an end; the other whereby Hiswill was drawn to anything willed on account of its being ordained to another—which pertains to thenature of means. Now, as thePhilosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) choice differs from will in this, that will of itself regards the end, while choice regards the means. And thus simplewill is the same as the "will asnature"; but choice is the same as the "will as reason," and is the proper act offree-will, as was said inI:83:3. Hence, since "will as reason" is placed inChrist, we must also place choice, and consequentlyfree-will, whose act is choice, as was said inI:83:3;I-II:13:1.
Reply to Objection 1.Damascene excludes choice fromChrist, in so far as he considers thatdoubt is implied in the word choice. Neverthelessdoubt is notnecessary to choice, since it belongs even toGod Himself to choose, according toEphesians 1:4: "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world," although inGod there is nodoubt. Yetdoubt isaccidental to choice when it is in anignorantnature. We may also say the same of whatever else is mentioned in the passage quoted.
Reply to Objection 2. Choice presupposes counsel; yet it follows counsel only as determined by judgment. For what we judge to be done, we choose, after the inquiry of counsel, as is stated (Ethic. iii, 2,3). Hence if anything is judgednecessary to be done, without any precedingdoubt or inquiry, this suffices for choice. Therefore it is plain thatdoubt or inquiry belong to choice notessentially, but only when it is in anignorantnature.
Reply to Objection 3. The will ofChrist, though determined togood, is not determined to this or thatgood. Hence it pertains toChrist, even as to the blessed, to choose with afree-will confirmed ingood.
Objection 1. It would seem that thehuman will inChrist did not will anything except whatGod willed. For it is written (Psalm 39:9) in theperson of Christ: "That I should do Thy will: O myGod, I have desired it." Now he who desires to do another's will, wills what the other wills. Hence it seems thatChrist'shuman will willed nothing but what was willed by His Divine will.
Objection 2. Further,Christ'ssoul had most perfectcharity, which, indeed, surpasses the comprehension of all ourknowledge, according toEphesians 3:19, "thecharity ofChrist, which surpasseth allknowledge." Nowcharity makes men will whatGod wills; hence thePhilosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that one mark of friendship is "to will and choose the same." Therefore thehuman will inChrist willed nothing else than was willed by His Divine will.
Objection 3. Further,Christ was atrue comprehensor. But the Saints who are comprehensors inheaven will only whatGod wills, otherwise they would not behappy, because they would not obtain whatever they will, for "blessed is he who has what he wills, and wills nothing amiss," asAugustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5). Hence in Hishuman will Christ wills nothing else than does the Divine will.
On the contrary,Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 20): "WhenChrist says 'Not what I will, but what Thou wilt' He shows Himself to have willed something else than did His Father; and this could only have been by Hishuman heart, since He did not transfigure our weakness into His Divine but into Hishuman will."
I answer that, As was said (Articles2 and3), inChrist according to Hishumannature there is a twofold will, viz. thewill of sensuality, which is called will by participation, and the rational will, whether considered after the manner ofnature, or after the manner of reason. Now it was said above (III:13:3 ad 1;III:14:1 ad 2) that by a certain dispensation theSon of God before HisPassion "allowed His flesh to do and suffer what belonged to it." And in like manner He allowed all the powers of Hissoul to do what belonged to them. Now it is clear that thewill of sensualitynaturally shrinks from sensible pains and bodily hurt. In like manner, thewill asnature turns from what is againstnature and what isevil in itself, as death and the like; yet thewill as reason may at time choose these things in relation to an end, as in a mereman the sensuality and thewill absolutely considered shrink from burning, which, nevertheless, thewill as reason may choose for the sake of health. Now it was thewill ofGod thatChrist should undergo pain, suffering, and death, not that these of themselves were willed byGod, but for the sake ofman'ssalvation. Hence it is plain that in Hiswill of sensuality and in His rational will considered asnature,Christ could will whatGod did not; but in Hiswill as reason He always willed the same asGod, which appears from what He says (Matthew 26:39): "Not as I will, but as Thou wilt." For He willed in His reason that the Divine will should be fulfilled although He said that He willed something else by another will.
Reply to Objection 1. By His rational will Christ willed the Divine will to be fulfilled; but not by Hiswill of sensuality, the movement of which does not extend to thewill ofGod—nor by Hiswill considered asnature which regards things absolutely considered and not in relation to the Divine will.
Reply to Objection 2. The conformity of thehuman will to the Divine regards thewill of reason: according to which the wills even of friends agree, inasmuch as reason considers something willed in its relation to thewill of a friend.
Reply to Objection 3.Christ was at once comprehensor and wayfarer, inasmuch as He was enjoyingGod in His mind and had a passible body. Hence things repugnant to Hisnatural will and to His sensitiveappetite could happen to Him in His passible flesh.
Objection 1. It would seem that there was contrariety of wills inChrist. For contrariety of wills regards contrariety of objects, as contrariety of movements springs from contrariety of termini, as is plain from thePhilosopher (Phys. v, text. 49, seq.). NowChrist in His different wills wished contrary things. For in His Divine will He wished for death, from which He shrank in Hishuman will, henceAthanasius says [De Incarnat. et Cont. Arianos, written against Apollinarius]: "WhenChrist says 'Father, if it be possible, let thischalice pass from Me; yet not My will, but Thine be done,' and again, 'The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh weak,' He denotes twowills—thehuman, which through the weakness of the flesh shrank from the passion—and His Divine will eager for the passion." Hence there was contrariety of wills inChrist.
Objection 2. Further, it is written (Galatians 5:17) that "the fleshlusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh." Now when the spirit desires one thing, and the flesh another, there is contrariety of wills. But this was inChrist; for by thewill ofcharity which theHoly Spirit wascausing in His mind, He willed the passion, according toIsaiah 53:7: "He was offered because it was His own will," yet in His flesh He shrank from the passion. Therefore there was contrariety of wills in Him.
Objection 3. Further, it is written (Luke 22:43) that "being in an agony, Heprayed the longer." Now agony seems to imply a certain struggle [Greek,agonia] in asoul drawn to contrary things. Hence it seems that there was contrariety of will inChrist.
On the contrary, In the decisions of the Sixth Council [Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 18] it is said: "We confess twonatural wills, not in opposition, as evil-mindedheretics assert, but following Hishuman will, and neither withstanding nor striving against, but rather being subject to, His Divine andomnipotent will."
I answer that, Contrariety canexist only where there is opposition in the same and as regards the same. For if the diversityexists as regards diverse things, and in diverse subjects, this would not suffice for thenature of contrariety, nor even for thenature of contradiction, e.g. if a man were well formed or healthy as regards his hand, but not as regards his foot. Hence for there to be contrariety of wills in anyone it isnecessary, first, that the diversity of wills should regard the same. For if thewill of one regards the doing of something with reference to some universal reason, and thewill of another regards the not doing the same with reference to some particular reason, there is not complete contrariety of will, e.g. when a judge wishes a brigand to be hanged for thegood of the commonwealth, and one of the latter's kindred wishes him not to be hanged on account of a private love, there is no contrariety of wills; unless, indeed, the desire of the privategood went so far as to wish to hinder the publicgood for the privategood—in that case the opposition of wills would regard the same.
Secondly, for contrariety of wills it isnecessary that it should be in the same will. For if a man wishes one thing with his rationalappetite, and wishes another thing with his sensitiveappetite, there is no contrariety, unless the sensitiveappetite so far prevailed as to change or at least keep back the rationalappetite; for in this case something of the contrary movement of the sensitiveappetite would reach the rational will.
And hence it must be said that although thenatural and the sensitive will inChrist wished what the Divine will did not wish, yet there was no contrariety of wills in Him. First, because neither thenatural will nor thewill of sensuality rejected the reason for which the Divine will and thewill of thehumanreason inChrist wished the passion. For the absolute will ofChrist wished thesalvation of thehuman race, although it did not pertain to it to will this for the sake of something further; but the movement of sensuality could nowise extend so far. Secondly, because neither the Divine will nor thewill of reason inChrist was impeded or retarded by thenatural will or theappetite of sensuality. So, too, on the other hand, neither the Divine will nor thewill of reason inChrist shrank from or retarded the movement of thenaturalhuman will and the movement of the sensuality inChrist. For it pleasedChrist, in His Divine will, and in Hiswill ofreason, that Hisnatural will and will of sensuality should be moved according to the order of theirnature. Hence it is clear that inChrist there was no opposition or contrariety of wills.
Reply to Objection 1. The fact of any will inChrist willing something else than did the Divine will, proceeded from the Divine will, by whose permission thehumannature inChrist was moved by its proper movements, asDamascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15,18,19).
Reply to Objection 2. In us the desires of the spirit are impeded or retarded by the desires of the flesh: this did not occur inChrist. Hence inChrist there was no contrariety of flesh and spirit, as in us.
Reply to Objection 3. The agony inChrist was not in the rationalsoul, in as far as it implies a struggle in thewill arising from a diversity of motives, as when anyone, on hisreason considering one, wishes one thing, and on its considering another, wishes the contrary. For this springs from the weakness of the reason, which is unable to judge which is the best simply. Now this did not occur inChrist, since by His reason He judged it best that the Divine will regarding thesalvation of thehuman race should be fulfilled by Hispassion. Nevertheless, there was an agony inChrist as regards the sensitive part, inasmuch as it implied a dread of coming trial, asDamascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15; iii, 18,23).