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| A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z |
Objection 1. It would seem thatoriginal sin is not ahabit. Fororiginal sin is the absence of originaljustice, asAnselm states (De Concep. Virg. ii, iii, xxvi), so thatoriginal sin is a privation. But privation is opposed tohabit. Thereforeoriginal sin is not ahabit.
Objection 2. Further, actualsin has thenature of fault more thanoriginal sin, in so far as it is morevoluntary. Now thehabit of actualsin has not thenature of a fault, else it would follow that a man while asleep, would be guilty ofsin. Therefore no originalhabit has thenature of a fault.
Objection 3. Further, inwickedness act always precedeshabit, becauseevilhabits are not infused, but acquired. Noworiginal sin is not preceded by an act. Thereforeoriginal sin is not ahabit.
On the contrary,Augustine says in his book on theBaptism of infants (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 39) that on account oforiginal sin little children have the aptitude ofconcupiscence though they have not the act. Now aptitude denotes some kind ofhabit. Thereforeoriginal sin is ahabit.
I answer that, As stated above (I-II:49:4;I-II:50:1),habit is twofold. The first is ahabit whereby power is inclined to an act: thus science andvirtue are calledhabits. In this wayoriginal sin is not ahabit. The second kind ofhabit is the disposition of a complexnature, whereby thatnature is well or ill disposed to something, chiefly when such a disposition has become like a secondnature, as in the case of sickness or health. In this senseoriginal sin is ahabit. For it is an inordinate disposition, arising from the destruction of the harmony which wasessential to originaljustice, even as bodily sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body, by reason of the destruction of that equilibrium which isessential to health. Hence it is thatoriginal sin is called the "languor ofnature" [Cf.Augustine, In Ps. 118, serm. iii].
Reply to Objection 1. As bodily sickness is partly a privation, in so far as it denotes the destruction of the equilibrium of health, and partly something positive, viz. the very humors that are inordinately disposed, so toooriginal sin denotes the privation of originaljustice, and besides this, the inordinate disposition of the parts of thesoul. Consequently it is not a pure privation, but a corrupthabit.
Reply to Objection 2. Actualsin is an inordinateness of an act: whereasoriginal sin, being thesin ofnature, is an inordinate disposition ofnature, and has the character of fault through being transmitted from ourfirst parent, as stated above (I-II:81:1). Now this inordinate disposition ofnature is a kind ofhabit, whereas the inordinate disposition of an act is not: and for this reasonoriginal sin can be ahabit, whereas actualsin cannot.
Reply to Objection 3. This objection considers thehabit which inclines a power to an act: butoriginal sin is not this kind ofhabit. Nevertheless a certain inclination to an inordinate act does follow fromoriginal sin, not directly, but indirectly, viz. by the removal of the obstacle, i.e. originaljustice, which hindered inordinate movements: just as an inclination to inordinate bodily movements results indirectly from bodily sickness. Nor is itnecessary to says thatoriginal sin is ahabit "infused," or ahabit "acquired" (except by the act of ourfirst parent, but not by our own act): but it is ahabit "inborn" due to our corrupt origin.
Objection 1. It would seem that there are manyoriginal sins in oneman. For it is written (Psalm 1:7): "Behold I was conceived in iniquities, and insins did my mother conceive me." But thesin in which a man is conceived isoriginal sin. Therefore there are severaloriginal sins inman.
Objection 2. Further, one and the samehabit does not incline its subject to contraries: since the inclination ofhabit is like that ofnature which tends to one thing. Noworiginal sin, even in oneman, inclines to various and contrarysins. Thereforeoriginal sin is not onehabit; but several.
Objection 3. Further,original sin infects every part of thesoul. Now the different parts of thesoul are different subjects ofsin, as shown above (Article 74). Since then onesin cannot be in different subjects, it seems thatoriginal sin is not one but several.
On the contrary, It is written (John 1:29): "Behold theLamb ofGod, behold Him Who taketh away thesin of the world": and the reason for the employment of the singular is that the "sin of the world" isoriginal sin, as agloss expounds this passage.
I answer that, In oneman there is oneoriginal sin. Two reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of thecause oforiginal sin. For it has been stated (I-II:81:2, that the firstsin alone of ourfirst parent was transmitted to his posterity. Wherefore in onemanoriginal sin is one in number; and in allmen, it is one in proportion, i.e. in relation to its first principle. The second reason may be taken from the veryessence oforiginal sin. Because in every inordinate disposition, unity ofspecies depends on thecause, while the unity of number is derived from the subject. For example, take bodily sickness: variousspecies of sickness proceed from differentcauses, e.g. from excessive heat or cold, or from a lesion in the lung or liver; while one specific sickness in oneman will be one in number. Now thecause of this corrupt disposition that is calledoriginal sin, is one only, viz. the privation of originaljustice, removing the subjection ofman's mind toGod. Consequentlyoriginal sin is specifically one, and, in oneman, can be only one in number; while, in different men, it is one inspecies and in proportion, but is numerically many.
Reply to Objection 1. The employment of the plural—"insins"—may be explained by the custom of theDivine Scriptures in the frequent use of the plural for the singular, e.g. "They are dead that sought the life of the child"; or by the fact that all actualsins virtually pre-exist inoriginal sin, as in a principle so that it is virtually many; or by the fact of there being many deformities in thesin of ourfirst parent, viz.pride, disobedience,gluttony, and so forth; or by several parts of thesoul being infected byoriginal sin.
Reply to Objection 2. Of itself and directly, i.e. by its own form, onehabit cannot incline its subject to contraries. But there is no reason why it should not do so, indirectly andaccidentally, i.e. by the removal of an obstacle: thus, when the harmony of a mixed body is destroyed, the elements have contrary local tendencies. In like manner, when the harmony of originaljustice is destroyed, the various powers of thesoul have various opposite tendencies.
Reply to Objection 3.Original sin infects the different parts of thesoul, in so far as they are the parts of one whole; even as originaljustice held all thesoul's parts together in one. Consequently there is but oneoriginal sin: just as there is but one fever in oneman, although the various parts of the body are affected.
Objection 1. It would seem thatoriginal sin is notconcupiscence. For everysin is contrary tonature, according toDamascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30). Butconcupiscence is in accordance withnature, since it is the proper act of theconcupiscible faculty which is anatural power. Thereforeconcupiscence is notoriginal sin.
Objection 2. Further, throughoriginal sin "thepassions ofsins" are in us, according to theApostle (Romans 7:5). Now there are several otherpassions besidesconcupiscence, as stated above (I-II:23:4). Thereforeoriginal sin is notconcupiscence any more than another passion.
Objection 3. Further, byoriginal sin, all the parts of thesoul are disordered, as stated above (Article 2, Objection 3). But theintellect is the highest of thesoul's parts, as thePhilosopher states (Ethic. x, 7). Thereforeoriginal sin isignorance rather thanconcupiscence.
On the contrary,Augustine says (Retract. i, 15): "Concupiscence is the guilt oforiginal sin."
I answer that, Everything takes itsspecies from itsform: and it has been stated (Article 2) that thespecies oforiginal sin is taken from itscause. Consequently the formal element oforiginal sin must be considered in respect of thecause oforiginal sin. But contraries have contrarycauses. Therefore thecause oforiginal sin must be considered with respect to thecause of originaljustice, which is opposed to it. Now the whole order of originaljustice consists inman's will being subject toGod: which subjection, first and chiefly, was in thewill, whose function it is to move all the other parts to the end, as stated above (I-II:9:1), so that thewill being turned away fromGod, all the other powers of thesoul become inordinate. Accordingly the privation of originaljustice, whereby thewill was made subject toGod, is the formal element inoriginal sin; while every other disorder of thesoul's powers, is a kind of material element in respect oforiginal sin. Now the inordinateness of the other powers of thesoul consists chiefly in their turning inordinately to mutablegood; which inordinateness may be called by the general name ofconcupiscence. Henceoriginal sin isconcupiscence, materially, but privation of originaljustice, formally.
Reply to Objection 1. Since, inman, theconcupiscible power isnaturally governed by reason, the act ofconcupiscence is so farnatural toman, as it is in accord with the order of reason; while, in so far as it trespasses beyond the bounds ofreason, it is, for a man, contrary toreason. Such is theconcupiscence oforiginal sin.
Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (I-II:25:1), all the irasciblepassions are reducible toconcupisciblepassions, as holding the principle place: and of these,concupiscence is the most impetuous in moving, and is felt most, as stated above (I-II:25:2 ad 1). Thereforeoriginal sin is ascribed toconcupiscence, as being the chief passion, and as including all the others, in a fashion.
Reply to Objection 3. As, ingood things, theintellect and reason stand first, so conversely inevil things, the lower part of thesoul is found to take precedence, for it clouds and draws the reason, as stated above (Question 77, Articles 1 and 2;I-II:80:2). Henceoriginal sin is calledconcupiscence rather thanignorance, althoughignorance is comprised among the material defects oforiginal sin.
Objection 1. It would seem thatoriginal sin is not equally in all. Becauseoriginal sin is inordinateconcupiscence, as stated above (Article 3). Now all are not equally prone to acts ofconcupiscence. Thereforeoriginal sin is not equally in all.
Objection 2. Further,original sin is an inordinate disposition of thesoul, just as sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body. But sickness is subject to degrees. Thereforeoriginal sin is subject to degrees.
Objection 3. Further,Augustine says (De Nup. et Concep. i, 23) that "lust transmitsoriginal sin to the child." But the act of generation may be morelustful in one than in another. Thereforeoriginal sin may be greater in one than in another.
On the contrary,Original sin is thesin ofnature, as stated above (I-II:81:1). Butnature is equally in all. Thereforeoriginal sin is too.
I answer that, There are two things inoriginal sin: one is the privation of originaljustice; the other is the relation of this privation to thesin of ourfirst parent, from whom it is transmitted toman through his corrupt origin. As to the first,original sin has no degrees, since thegift of originaljustice is taken away entirely; and privations that remove something entirely, such as death and darkness, cannot be more or less, as stated above (I-II:73:2). In like manner, neither is this possible, as to the second: since all are related equally to the first principle of our corrupt origin, from which principleoriginal sin takes thenature of guilt; for relations cannot be more or less. Consequently it is evident thatoriginal sin cannot be more in one than in another.
Reply to Objection 1. Through the bond of originaljustice being broken, which held together all the powers of thesoul in a certain order, each power of thesoul tends to its own proper movement, and the more impetuously, as it is stronger. Now it happens that some of thesoul's powers are stronger in oneman than in another, on account of the different bodily temperaments. Consequently if oneman is more prone than another to acts ofconcupiscence, this is not due tooriginal sin, because the bond of originaljustice is equally broken in all, and the lower parts of thesoul are, in all, left to themselves equally; but it is due to the various dispositions of the powers, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2. Sickness of the body, even sickness of the samespecies, has not an equalcause in all; for instance if a fever becaused by corruption of the bile, the corruption may be greater or less, and nearer to, or further from a vital principle. But thecause oforiginal sin is equal to all, so that there is not comparison.
Reply to Objection 3. It is not the actuallust that transmitsoriginal sin: for, supposingGod were to grant to a man to feel no inordinatelust in the act of generation, he would still transmitoriginal sin; we must understand this to behabituallust, whereby the sensitiveappetite is not kept subject to reason by the bonds of originaljustice. Thislust is equally in all.