Sin

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The subject is treated under these heads:

Nature of sin

Since sin is amoralevil, it isnecessary in the first place to determine what is meant byevil, and in particular bymoralevil.Evil is defined bySt. Thomas (De malo, 2:2) as a privation ofform or order or due measure. In the physical order a thing is good in proportion as it possesses being.God alone is essentially being, and He alone is essentially and perfectly good. Everything else possesses but a limited being, and, in so far as it possesses being, it is good. When it has its due proportion ofform and order and measure it is, in its own order and degree, good. (SeeGOOD.)Evil implies a deficiency in perfection, hence it cannotexist inGod who is essentially and bynature good; it is found only in finite beings which, because of their origin from nothing, are subject to the privation ofform or order or measure due them, and, through the opposition they encounter, are liable to an increase or decrease of the perfection they have: "forevil, in a large sense, may be described as the sum of opposition, which experience shows toexist in theuniverse, to the desires and needs ofindividuals; whence arises, amonghuman beings at least, the suffering in which life abounds" (seeEVIL).

According to thenature of the perfection which it limits,evil ismetaphysical, physical, ormoral.Metaphysicalevil is notevil properly so called; it is but the negation of a greater good, or the limitation of finite beings by other finite beings. Physicalevil deprives the subject affected by it of some natural good, and is adverse to the well-being of the subject, as pain and suffering.Moralevil is found only in intelligent beings; it deprives them of somemoral good. Here we have to deal withmoralevil only. This may be defined as a privation of conformity to rightreason and to thelaw of God. Since themorality of ahuman act consists in its agreement or non-agreement with rightreason and theeternallaw, anact isgood orevil in themoral order according as it involves this agreement or non-agreement. When the intelligent creature, knowingGod and Hislaw, deliberately refuses toobey,moralevil results.

Sin is nothing else than amorally badact (St. Thomas, "De malo", 7:3), anact not in accord withreason informed by theDivine law.God has endowed us withreason andfree-will, and a sense of responsibility; He has made us subject to Hislaw, which isknown to us by the dictates ofconscience, and our acts must conform with these dictates, otherwise we sin (Romans 14:23). In every sinfulact two things must be considered, thesubstance of theact and the want of rectitude or conformity (St. Thomas,I-II:72:1). Theact is something positive. The sinnerintends here and now toact in some determined matter, inordinately electing that particular good in defiance ofGod's law and the dictates of rightreason. The deformity is not directly intended, nor is it involved in theact so far as this is physical, but in theact as coming from the will which has power over its acts and is capable of choosing this or that particular good contained within the scope of its adequate object, i.e. universal good (St. Thomas, "De malo", Q. 3, a. 2, ad 2um).God, the firstcause of all reality, is thecause of the physicalact as such, thefree-will of the deformity (St. ThomasI-II:89:2; "De malo", 3:2). Theevilact adequately considered has for itscause thefree-will defectively electing some mutable good in place of theeternal good,God, and thus deviating from itstrue last end.

In every sin a privation of due order or conformity to themorallaw is found, but sin is not a pure, or entire privation of allmoral good (St. Thomas, "De malo", 2:9;I-II:73:2). There is a twofold privation; one entire which leaves nothing of its opposite, as for instance, darkness which leaves no light; another, not entire, which leaves something of the good to which it is opposed, as for instance, disease which does not entirely destroy the even balance of the bodily functionsnecessary for health. A pure or entire privation of good could occur in amoralact only on the supposition that the will could incline toevil as such for an object. This is impossible becauseevil as such is not contained within the scope of the adequate object of the will, which is good. The sinner'sintention terminates at some object in which there is a participation ofGod'sgoodness, and this object is directly intended by him. The privation of due order, or the deformity, is not directly intended, but is accepted in as much as the sinner's desire tends to an object in which this want of conformity is involved, so that sin is not a pure privation, but ahuman act deprived of its due rectitude. From the defect arises theevil of theact, from the fact that it isvoluntary, its imputability.

Division of sin

As regards the principle from which it proceeds sin is original or actual. The will of Adam acting as head of thehuman race for the conservation or loss of originaljustice is thecause and source oforiginal sin. Actual sin is committed by a free personalact of the individual will. It is divided into sins of commission andomission. A sin of commission is a positiveact contrary to some prohibitoryprecept; a sin ofomission is a failure to do what is commanded. A sin ofomission, however, requires a positiveact whereby one wills to omit the fulfilling of aprecept, or at least wills something incompatible with its fulfillment (I-II:72:5). As regards theirmalice, sins are distinguished into sins ofignorance, passion or infirmity, andmalice; as regards the activities involved, into sins of thought, word, or deed (cordis, oris, operis); as regards their gravity, into mortal and venial. This last named division is indeed the most important of all and it calls for special treatment. But before taking up the details, it will be useful to indicate some further distinctions which occur intheology or in general usage.

Material and formal sin

This distinction is based upon the difference between the objective elements (object itself, circumstances) and the subjective (advertence to the sinfulness of theact). An action which, as a matter of fact, is contrary to theDivine law but is notknown to be such by the agent constitutes a material sin; whereas formal sin is committed when the agent freely transgresses thelaw as shown him by hisconscience, whether suchlaw really exists or is only thought to exist by him who acts. Thus, aperson who takes theproperty of another whilebelieving it to be his own commits a material sin; but the sin would be formal if he took theproperty in thebelief that it belonged to another, whether hisbelief were correct or not.

Internal sins

That sin may be committed not only by outward deeds but also by the inner activity of themind apart from any external manifestation, is plain from theprecept of theDecalogue: "Thou shalt notcovet", and fromChrist's rebuke of thescribes andpharisees whom he likens to "whited sepulchres... full of all filthiness" (Matthew 23:27). Hence theCouncil of Trent (Sess. XIV, c. v), in declaring that all mortal sins must beconfessed, makes special mention of those that are most secret and that violate only the last twoprecepts of theDecalogue, adding that they "sometimes more grievously wound thesoul and are more dangerous than sins which are openly committed". Three kinds of internal sin are usually distinguished:

Anefficacious desire, i.e. one that includes the deliberateintention to realize or gratify the desire, has the samemalice, mortal or venial, as the action which it has in view. An inefficacious desire is one that carries acondition, in such a way that the will is prepared to perform the action in case thecondition were verified. When thecondition is such as to eliminate all sinfulness from the action, the desire involves no sin: e.g. I would gladly eat meat on Friday, if I had adispensation; and in general this is the case whenever the action is forbidden by positivelaw only. When the action is contrary tonatural law and yet is permissible in given circumstances or in a particular state of life, the desire, if it include those circumstances or that state asconditions, is not in itself sinful: e.g. I wouldkill so-and-so if I had to do it in self-defence. Usually, however, such desires are dangerous and therefore to be repressed. If, on the other hand, thecondition does not remove the sinfulness of the action, the desire is also sinful. This is clearly the case where the action is intrinsically and absolutelyevil, e.g.blasphemy: one cannot without committing sin, have the desire — I wouldblasphemeGod if it were not wrong; thecondition is an impossible one and therefore does not affect the desire itself. The pleasure taken in a sinful thought (delectatio, gaudium) is, generally speaking, a sin of the same kind and gravity as the action which is thought of. Much, however, depends on the motive for which one thinks of sinful actions. The pleasure, e.g. which one may experience in studying thenature ofmurder or any other crime, in getting clearideas on the subject, tracing its causes, determining the guilt etc., is not a sin; on the contrary, it is often bothnecessary and useful. The case is different of course where the pleasure means gratification in the sinful object or action itself. And it is evidently a sin when one boasts of hisevil deeds, the more so because of thescandal that is given.

The capital sins or vices

According toSt. Thomas (II-II:153:4) "a capitalvice is that which has an exceedingly desirable end so that in his desire for it a man goes on to the commission of many sins all of which are said to originate in thatvice as their chief source". It is not then the gravity of thevice in itself that makes it capital but rather the fact that it gives rise to many other sins. These are enumerated bySt. Thomas (I-II:84:4) as vainglory (pride),avarice,gluttony,lust,sloth,envy,anger.St. Bonaventure (Brevil., III, ix) gives the same enumeration. Earlier writers had distinguished eight capital sins: soSt. Cyprian (De mort., iv);Cassian (Institutes 5,Conferences 5);Columbanus ("Instr. de octo vitiis princip." in "Bibl. max. vet. patr.", XII, 23);Alcuin (De virtut. et vitiis, xxvii sqq.). The number seven, however, had been given bySt. Gregory the Great (Lib. mor. in Job. XXXI, xvii), and it was retained by the foremosttheologians of theMiddle Ages.

It is to be noted that "sin" is not predicated univocally of all kinds of sin. "The division of sin into venial and mortal is not a division of genus intospecies which participate equally thenature of the genus, but the division of an analogue into things of which it is predicated primarily and secondarily" (St. Thomas,I-II:88:1, ad 1um). "Sin is not predicated univocally of all kinds of sin, but primarily of actual mortal sin ... and therefore it is notnecessary that the definition of sin in general should be verified except in that sin in which thenature of the genus is found perfectly. The definition of sin may be verified in other sins in a certain sense" (St. Thomas, II, d. 33, Q. i, a. 2, ad 2um). Actual sin primarily consists in avoluntary act repugnant to the order of rightreason. Theact passes, but thesoul of the sinner remains stained, deprived of grace, in a state of sin, until the disturbance of order has been restored by penance. This state is called habitual sin,macula peccati. reatus culpæ (I-II:87:6).

The division of sin into original and actual, mortal and venial, is not a division of genus intospecies because sin has not the same signification when applied to original and personal sin, mortal and venial. Mortal sin cuts us off entirely from ourtrue last end; venial sin only impedes us in its attainment. Actual personal sin isvoluntary by a properact of the will.Original sin isvoluntary not by a personalvoluntary act of ours, but by anact of the will of Adam. Original and actual sin are distinguished by the manner in which they arevoluntary (ex parte actus); mortal and venial sin by the way in which they affect our relation toGod (ex parte deordinationis). Since avoluntary act and its disorder are of theessence of sin, it is impossible that sin should be a generic term in respect to original and actual, mortal and venial sin. Thetruenature of sin is found perfectly only in a personal mortal sin, in other sins imperfectly, so that sin is predicated primarily of actual sin, only secondarily of the others. Therefore we shall consider: first, personal mortal sin; second, venial sin.

Mortal sin

Mortal sin is defined bySt. Augustine (Reply to Faustus XXII.27) as "Dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem æternam", i.e. something said, done or desired contrary to theeternallaw, or a thought, word, or deed contrary to theeternallaw. This is a definition of sin as it is avoluntary act. As it is a defect or privation it may be defined as an aversion fromGod, ourtrue last end, by reason of the preference given to some mutable good. The definition ofSt. Augustine is accepted generally bytheologians and is primarily a definition of actual mortal sin. It explains well the material and formal elements of sin. The words "dictum vel factum vel concupitum" denote the material element of sin, ahuman act: "contra legem æternam", the formal element. Theact is bad because it transgresses theDivine law.St. Ambrose (De paradiso, viii) defines sin as a "prevarication of theDivine law". The definition ofSt. Augustine strictly considered, i.e. as sin averts us from ourtrue ultimate end, does not comprehend venial sin, but in as much as venial sin is in a manner contrary to theDivine law, although not averting us from our last end, it may be said to be included in the definition as it stands. While primarily a definition of sins of commission, sins ofomission may be included in the definition because they presuppose some positiveact (St. Thomas,I-II:71:5) and negation and affirmation are reduced to the same genus. Sins that violate the human or thenatural law are also included, for what is contrary to the human ornatural law is also contrary to theDivine law, in as much as every just humanlaw is derived from theDivine law, and is not just unless it is in conformity with theDivine law.

Biblical description of sin

In theOld Testament sin is set forth as anact of disobedience (Genesis 2:16-17;3:11;Isaiah 1:2-4;Jeremiah 2:32); as an insult toGod (Numbers 27:14); as something detested and punished byGod (Genesis 3:14-19;Genesis 4:9-16); as injurious to the sinner (Tobit 12:10); to be expiated by penance (Psalm 51:19). In theNew Testament it is clearly taught inSt. Paul that sin is a transgression of thelaw (Romans 2:23;5:12-20); a servitude from which we are liberated by grace (Romans 6:16-18); a disobedience (Hebrews 2:2) punished byGod (Hebrews 10:26-31). St. John describes sin as an offence toGod, a disorder of the will (John 12:43), an iniquity (1 John 3:4-10). Christ in many of His utterances teaches thenature and extent of sin. He came topromulgate a newlaw more perfect than the old, which would extend to the ordering not only of external but also of internal acts to a degree unknown before, and, in His Sermon on the Mount, He condemns as sinful many acts which were judged honest and righteous by thedoctors and teachers of theOld Law. He denounces in a special mannerhypocrisy andscandal, infidelity and the sin against theHoly Ghost. In particular He teaches that sins come from the heart (Matthew 15:19-20).

Systems which deny sin or distort its true notion

All systems, religious andethical, which either deny, on the one hand, theexistence of a personal creator and lawgiver distinct from and superior to hiscreation, or, on the other, theexistence offree will and responsibility inman, distort or destroy thetruebiblico-theological notion of sin. In the beginning of theChristian era theGnostics, although their doctrines varied in details, denied theexistence of a personal creator. Theidea of sin in theCatholic sense is not contained in their system. There is no sin for them, unless it be the sin ofignorance, nonecessity for anatonement;Jesus is notGod (seeGNOSTICISM).Manichaeism with its twoeternal principles,good andevil, at perpetualwar with each other, is also destructive of thetrue notion of sin. Allevil, and consequently sin, is from the principle ofevil. TheChristian concept ofGod as a lawgiver is destroyed. Sin is not aconsciousvoluntaryact of disobedience to the Divine will.Pantheistic systems which deny the distinction betweenGod and Hiscreation make sin impossible. Ifman andGod are one,man is not responsible to anyone for his acts,morality is destroyed. If he is his own rule of action, he cannot deviate fromright asSt. Thomas teaches (I:63:1). The identification ofGod and the world byPantheism leaves no place for sin.

There must be somelaw to whichman is subject, superior to and distinct from him, which can beobeyed and transgressed, before sin can enter into his acts. Thislaw must be the mandate of a superior, because the notions of superiority and subjection are correlative. This superior can be onlyGod, who alone is the author and lord ofman.Materialism, denying as it does the spirituality and theimmortality of thesoul, theexistence of any spirit whatsoever, and consequently ofGod, does not admit sin. There is nofree will, everything is determined by the inflexiblelaws of motion. "Virtue" and "vice" are meaningless qualifications of action.Positivism placesman's last end in some sensible good. His supremelaw of action is to seek the maximum of pleasure. Egotism oraltruism is the supreme norm and criterion of thePositivistic systems, not theeternal law of God as revealed by Him, and dictated byconscience. For thematerialistic evolutionistsman is but a highly-developed animal,conscience a product of evolution. Evolution has revolutionizedmorality, sin is no more.

Kant in his "Critique of Pure Reason" having rejected all theessential notions oftruemorality, namely, liberty, thesoul,God and a future life, attempted in his "Critique of the Practical Reason" to restore them in the measure in which they arenecessary formorality. The practicalreason, he tells us, imposes on us theidea oflaw andduty. The fundamental principle of themorality ofKant is "duty forduty's sake", notGod and Hislaw.Duty cannot be conceived of alone as an independent thing. It carries with it certain postulates, the first of which is liberty. "I ought, therefore I can", is hisdoctrine.Man by virtue of his practicalreason has aconsciousness ofmoralobligation (categorical imperative). Thisconsciousness supposes three things:free will, theimmortality of thesoul, theexistence of God, otherwiseman would not be capable of fulfilling hisobligations, there would be no sufficient sanction for theDivine law, no reward or punishment in a future life.Kant's moral system labours in obscurities and contradictions and is destructive of much that pertains to the teaching of Christ. Personal dignity is the supreme rule ofman's actions. The notion of sin as opposed toGod is suppressed. According to the teaching ofmaterialisticMonism, now so widespread, there is, and can be, nofree will. According to thisdoctrine but one thing exists and this one being produces all phenomena, thought included; we are but puppets in its hands, carried hither an thither as it wills, and finally are cast back into nothingness. There is no place forgood andevil, a free observance or a wilful transgression oflaw, in such a system. Sin in thetrue sense is impossible. Withoutlaw and liberty and a personalGod there is no sin.

ThatGod exists and can beknown from His visiblecreation, that He has revealed the decrees of Hiseternal will toman, and is distinct from His creatures (Denzinger-Bannwart, "Enchiridion", nn. 1782, 1785, 1701), are matters ofCatholicfaith and teaching.Man is acreated being endowed withfree will (ibid., 793), which fact can beproved fromScripture andreason (ibid., 1041-1650). TheCouncil of Trent declares in Sess. VI, c. i (ibid., 793) thatman by reason of the prevarication of Adam has lost his primeval innocence, and that whilefree will remains, its powers are lessened (seeORIGINAL SIN).

Protestant errors

Luther andCalvin taught as their fundamentalerror that nofree will properly so called remained inman after the fall of ourfirst parents; that the fulfillment ofGod's precepts is impossible even with the assistance of grace, and thatman in all his actions sins.Grace is not an interiorgift, but something external. To some sin is not imputed, because they are covered as with a cloak by themerits of Christ.Faith alonesaves, there is nonecessity for goodworks. Sin inLuther'sdoctrine cannot be a deliberate transgression of theDivine law.Jansenius, in his "Augustinus", taught that according to the present powers ofman some ofGod's precepts are impossible of fulfilment, even to the just who strive to fulfil them, and he further taught that grace by means of which the fulfilment becomes possible is wanting even to the just. His fundamentalerror consists in teaching that the will is notfree but is necessarily drawn either byconcupiscence or grace. Internal liberty is not required formerit or demerit. Liberty from coercion suffices. Christ did not die for allmen.Baius taught a semi-Lutherandoctrine. Liberty is not entirely destroyed, but is so weakened that without grace it can do nothing but sin. True liberty is not required for sin. A badact committed involuntarily rendersman responsible (propositions 50-51 inDenzinger-Bannwart, "Enchiridion", nn. 1050-1). All acts done without charity are mortal sins andmeritdamnation because they proceed fromconcupiscence. Thisdoctrine denies that sin is avoluntary transgression ofDivine law. Ifman is notfree, aprecept is meaningless as far as he is concerned.

Philosophical sin

Those who would construct amoral system independent ofGod and Hislaw distinguish betweentheological andphilosophical sin.Philosophical sin is amorally badact which violates the natural order ofreason, not theDivine law. Theological sin is a transgression of theeternallaw. Those who are ofatheistic tendencies and contend for this distinction, either deny theexistence of God or maintain that He exercises noprovidence in regard tohuman acts. This position is destructive of sin in thetheological sense, asGod and Hislaw, reward and punishment, are done away with. Those who admit theexistence of God, Hislaw, human liberty and responsibility, and still contend for a distinction betweenphilosophical andtheological sin, maintain that in the present order ofGod's providence there aremorally bad acts, which, while violating the order ofreason, are not offensive toGod, and they base their contention on this that the sinner can beignorant of theexistence of God, or not actually think of Him and Hislaw when he acts. Without theknowledge ofGod and consideration of Him, it is impossible to offend Him. Thisdoctrine was censured asscandalous, temerarious, anderroneous byAlexander VIII (24 Aug., 1690) in his condemnation of the following proposition: "Philosophical or moral sin is ahuman act not in agreement with rational nature and rightreason,theological and mortal sin is a free transgression of theDivine law. However grievous it may be,philosophical sin in one who is eitherignorant ofGod or does not actually think ofGod, is indeed a grievous sin, but not an offense toGod, nor a mortal sin dissolving friendship withGod, nor worthy ofeternal punishment" (Denzinger-Bannwart, 1290).

This proposition is condemned because it does not distinguish between vincible and invincibleignorance, and further supposes invincibleignorance ofGod to be sufficiently common, instead of only metaphysically possible, and because in the presentdispensation ofGod's providence we are clearly taught inScripture thatGod will punish allevil coming from thefree will ofman (Romans 2:5-11). There is nomorally badact that does not include a transgression ofDivine law. From the fact that an action is conceived of asmorallyevil it is conceived of as prohibited. A prohibition is unintelligible without the notion of some one prohibiting. The one prohibiting in this case and binding theconscience ofman can be onlyGod, Who alone has power overman'sfree will and actions, so that from the fact that anyact is perceived to bemorally bad and prohibited byconscience,God and Hislaw are perceived at least confusedly, and a wilful transgression of the dictate ofconscience is necessarily also a transgression ofGod's law.Cardinal de Lugo (De incarnat., disp. 5, lect. 3) admits the possibility ofphilosophical sin in those who are inculpablyignorant ofGod, but he holds that it does not actually occur, because in the present order ofGod's providence there cannot be invincibleignorance ofGod and Hislaw. This teaching does not necessarily fall under the condemnation ofAlexander VIII, but it is commonly rejected bytheologians for the reason that a dictate ofconscience necessarily involves aknowledge of theDivine law as a principle ofmorality.

Conditions of mortal sin: knowledge, free will, grave matter

Contrary to the teaching ofBaius (prop. 46, Denzinger-Bannwart, 1046) and theReformers, a sin must be avoluntaryact. Those actions alone are properly calledhuman ormoral actions which proceed from thehuman will deliberately acting withknowledge of the end for which it acts.Man differs from all irrational creatures in this precisely that he is master of his actions by virtue of hisreason andfree will (I-II:1:1). Since sin is ahuman act wanting in due rectitude, it must have, in so far as it is ahuman act, theessential constituents of ahuman act. Theintellect must perceive and judge of the morality of theact, and the will must freely elect. For a deliberate mortal sin there must be full advertence on the part of theintellect and fullconsent on the part of the will in a gravematter. An involuntary transgression of thelaw even in a gravematter is not a formal but a material sin. The gravity of thematter is judged from the teaching ofScripture, the definitions of councils andpopes, and also fromreason. Those sins are judged to be mortal which contain in themselves some grave disorder in regard toGod, our neighbour, ourselves, orsociety. Some sins admit of no lightness ofmatter, as for example,blasphemy,hatred ofGod; they are always mortal (ex toto genere suo), unless rendered venial by want of full advertence on the part of theintellect or fullconsent on the part of the will. Other sins admit lightness ofmatter: they are grave sins (ex genere suo) in as much as theirmatter in itself is sufficient to constitute a grave sin without the addition of any othermatter, but is of such anature that in a given case, owing to its smallness, the sin may be venial, e.g.theft.

Imputability

That theact of the sinner may be imputed to him it is notnecessary that the object which terminates and specifies hisact should be directly willed as an ends or means. It suffices that it be willed indirectly or in itscause, i.e. if the sinner foresees, at least confusedly, that it will follow from theact which he freely performs or from hisomission of anact. When thecause produces a twofold effect, one of which is directly willed, the other indirectly, the effect which follows indirectly ismorally imputable to the sinner when these threeconditions are verified:

Error andignorance in regard to the object or circumstances of theact to be placed, affect the judgment of theintellect and consequently themorality and imputability of theact. Invincibleignorance excuses entirely from sin. Vincibleignorance does not, although it renders theact less free (seeIGNORANCE). Thepassions, while they disturb the judgment of theintellect, more directly affect the will. Antecedent passion increases the intensity of theact, the object is more intensely desired, although less freely, and the disturbancecaused by thepassions may be so great as to render a free judgment impossible, the agent being for the moment beside himself (I-II:6:7, ad 3um). Consequent passion, which arises from a command of the will, does not lessen liberty, but is rather a sign of an intenseact of volition.Fear,violence,heredity, temperament and pathological states, in so far as they affect free volition, affect the malice and imputability of sin. From the condemnation of theerrors ofBaius andJansenius (Denz.-Bann., 1046, 1066, 1094, 1291-2) it is clear that for an actual personal sin aknowledge of thelaw and a personalvoluntary act, free from coercion andnecessity, are required. No mortal sin is committed in a state of invincibleignorance or in a half-conscious state. Actual advertence to the sinfulness of theact is not required, virtual advertence suffices. It is notnecessary that the explicitintention to offendGod and break Hislaw be present, the full and freeconsent of the will to anevilact suffices.

Malice

Thetrue malice of mortal sin consists in aconscious andvoluntary transgression of theeternallaw, and implies a contempt of the Divine will, a complete turning away fromGod, ourtrue last end, and a preferring of somecreated thing to which we subject ourselves. It is an offence offered toGod, and an injury done Him; not that it effects any change inGod, who is immutable bynature, but that the sinner by hisact deprivesGod of thereverence andhonor due Him: it is not any lack ofmalice on the sinner's part, butGod's immutability that prevents Him from suffering. As an offence offered toGod mortal sin is in a wayinfinite in itsmalice, since it is directed against aninfinite being, and the gravity of the offence is measured by the dignity of the one offended (St. Thomas,III:1:2, ad 2um). As anact sin is finite, the will ofman not being capable ofinfinitemalice. Sin is an offence against Christ Who hasredeemedman (Philippians 3:18); against theHoly Ghost Who sanctifies us (Hebrews 10:29), an injury toman himself, causing the spiritual death of thesoul, and makingman the servant of thedevil. The first and primary malice of sin is derived from the object to which the will inordinately tends, and from the object considered morally, not physically. The end for which the sinner acts and the circumstances which surround theact are also determining factors of itsmorality. Anact which, objectively considered, is morally indifferent, may be renderedgood orevil by circumstances, or by the intention of the sinner. Anact that is good objectively may be rendered bad, or a newspecies ofgood orevil may be added, or a new degree. Circumstances can change the character of a sin to such a degree that it becomes specifically different from what it is objectively considered; or they may merely aggravate the sin while not changing its specific character; or they may lessen its gravity. That they may exercise this determining influence two things arenecessary: they must contain in themselves somegood orevil, and must be apprehended, at least confusedly, in theirmoral aspect. The externalact, in so far as it is a mere execution of avoluntary efficacious internalact, does not, according to the commonThomistic opinion, add anyessentialgoodness or malice to the internal sin.

Gravity

While every mortal sin averts us from ourtrue last end, all mortal sins are not equally grave, as is clear fromScripture (John 19:11;Matthew 11:22;Luke 6), and also fromreason. Sins are specifically distinguished by their objects, which do not all equally avertman from his last end. Then again, since sin is not a pure privation, but a mixed one, all sins do not equally destroy the order ofreason. Spiritual sins, other things being equal, are graver than carnal sins. (St. Thomas, "De malo", Q. ii, a. 9;I-II.73.5).

Specific and numeric distinction of sin

Sins are distinguished specifically by their formally diverse objects; or from their opposition to differentvirtues, or tomorally differentprecepts of the samevirtue. Sins that are specifically distinct are also numerically distinct. Sins within the samespecies are distinguished numerically according to the number of complete acts of the will in regard to total objects. A total object is one which, either in itself or by theintention of the sinner, forms a complete whole and is not referred to another action as a part of the whole. When the completed acts of the will relate to the same object there are as many sins as there aremorally interrupted acts.

Subject causes of sin

Since sin is avoluntary act lacking in due rectitude, sin is found, as in a subject, principally in the will. But, since not only acts elicited by the will arevoluntary, but also those that are elicited by otherfaculties at the command of the will, sin may be found in thesefaculties in so far as they are subject in their actions to the command of the will, and are instruments of the will, and move under its guidance (I-II:74).

The external members of the body cannot be effective principles of sin (I-II:74:2, ad 3um). They are mere organs which are set in activity by thesoul; they do not initiate action. The appetitive powers on the contrary can be effective principles of sin, for they possess, through their immediate conjunction with the will and their subordination to it, a certain though imperfect liberty (I-II:56:4, ad 3um). The sensualappetites have their own proper sensible objects to which they naturally incline, and sinceoriginal sin has broken the bond which held them in complete subjection to the will, they may antecede the will in their actions and tend to their own proper objects inordinately. Hence they may be proximate principles of sin when they move inordinately contrary to the dictates of rightreason.

It is theright ofreason to rule the lowerfaculties, and when the disturbance arises in the sensual part thereason may do one of two things: it may eitherconsent to the sensible delectation or it may repress and reject it. If itconsents, the sin is no longer one of the sensual part ofman, but of theintellect and will, and consequently, if thematter is grave, mortal. If rejected, no sin can be imputed. There can be no sin in the sensual part ofman independently of the will. The inordinate motions of the sensualappetite which precede the advertence ofreason, or which are suffered unwillingly, are not even venial sins. Thetemptations of the flesh notconsented to are not sins.Concupiscence, which remains after the guilt oforiginal sin is remitted inbaptism, is not sinful so long asconsent is not given to it (Council of Trent, sess. V, can. v). The sensualappetite of itself cannot be the subject of mortal sin, for the reason that it can neither grasp the notion ofGod as an ultimate end, nor avert us from Him, without which aversion there cannot be mortal sin. The superiorreason, whose office it is to occupy itself with Divine things, may be the proximate principle of sin both in regard to its own properact, toknowtruth, and as it is directive of the inferiorfaculties: in regard to its own properact, in so far as itvoluntarily neglects toknow what it can and ought toknow; in regard to theact by which it directs the inferiorfaculties, to the extent that it commands inordinate acts or fails to repress them (I-II:74:7, ad 2um).

The will neverconsents to a sin that is not at the same time a sin of the superiorreason as directing badly, by either actually deliberating and commanding theconsent, or by failing to deliberate and impede theconsent of the will when it could and should do so. The superiorreason is the ultimate judge ofhuman acts and has anobligation of deliberating and deciding whether theact to be performed is according to thelaw of God. Venial sin may also be found in the superiorreason when it deliberatelyconsents to sins that are venial in theirnature, or when there is not a fullconsent in the case of a sin that is mortal considered objectively.

Causes of sin

Under this head, it is needful to distinguish between the efficientcause, i.e. the agent performing the sinful action, and those other agencies, influences or circumstances, which incite to sin and consequently involve a danger, more or less grave, for one who is exposed to them. These inciting causes are explained in special articles onOCCASIONS OF SIN andTEMPTATION. Here we have to consider only the efficientcause or causes of sin. These are interior and exterior. The complete and sufficientcause of sin is the will, which is regulated in its actions by thereason, and acted upon by the sensitiveappetites. The principal interior causes of sin areignorance, infirmity or passion, and malice.Ignorance on the part of thereason, infirmity and passion on the part of the sensitiveappetite, and malice on the part of the will. A sin is from certainmalice when the will sins of its own accord and not under the influence ofignorance or passion.

The exterior causes of sin are thedevil andman, who move to sin by means of suggestion, persuasion,temptation and bad example.God is not thecause of sin (Council of Trent, sess. VI, can. vi, in Denz.-Bann., 816). He directs all things to Himself and is the end of all His actions, and could not be thecause ofevil without self-contradiction. Of whatever entity there is in sin as an action, He is thecause. Theevil will is thecause of the disorder (I-II:79:2). One sin may be thecause of another inasmuch as one sin may beordained to another as an end. The seven capital sins, so called, may be considered as the source from which other sins proceed. They are sinful propensities which reveal themselves in particular sinful acts.Original sin by reason of its dire effects is thecause and source of sin in so far as by reason of it our natures are left wounded and inclined toevil.Ignorance, infirmity, malice, andconcupiscence are the consequences oforiginal sin.

Effects of sin

The first effect of mortal sin inman is to avert him from histrue last end, and deprive hissoul ofsanctifying grace. The sinfulact passes, and the sinner is left in a state of habitual aversion fromGod. The sinful state isvoluntary and imputable to the sinner, because it necessarily follows from theact of sin he freely placed, and it remains until satisfaction is made (see PENANCE). This state of sin is called bytheologians habitual sin, not in the sense that habitual sin implies avicious habit, but in the sense that it signifies a state of aversion fromGod depending on the preceding actual sin, consequentlyvoluntary and imputable. This state of aversion carries with it necessarily in the present order ofGod's providence the privation of grace and charity by means of whichman is ordered to hissupernatural end. The privation of grace is the "macula peccati" (St. Thomas,I-II.86), the stain of sin spoken of inScripture (Joshua 22:17;Isaiah 4:4;1 Corinthians 6:11). It is not anything positive, aquality or disposition, anobligation to suffer, an extrinsic denomination coming from sin, but is solely the privation ofsanctifying grace. There is not a real but only a conceptual distinction between habitual sin (reatus culpæ) and the stain of sin (macula peccati). One and the same privation considered as destroying the due order ofman toGod is habitual sin, considered as depriving thesoul of the beauty of grace is the stain or "macula" of sin.

The second effect of sin is to entail the penalty of undergoing suffering (reatus pænæ). Sin (reatus culpæ) is thecause of thisobligation (reatus pænæ ). The suffering may be inflicted in this life through the medium of medicinal punishments, calamities, sickness, temporal evils, which tend to withdraw from sin; or it may be inflicted in the life to come by thejustice ofGod as vindictive punishment. The punishments of the future life are proportioned to the sin committed, and it is theobligation of undergoing this punishment for unrepented sin that is signified by the "reatus poenæ" of thetheologians. The penalty to be undergone in the future life is divided into the pain of loss (pæna damni) and the pain of sense (pæna sensus). The pain of loss is the privation of thebeatific vision of God in punishment of turning away from Him. The pain of sense is suffering in punishment of the conversion to somecreated thing in place ofGod. This two-fold pain in punishment of mortal sin iseternal (1 Corinthians 6:9;Matthew 25:41;Mark 9:45). One mortal sin suffices to incur punishment. (SeeHELL.) Other effects of sins are: remorse ofconscience (Wisdom 5:2-13); an inclination towardsevil, as habits are formed by a repetition of similar acts; a darkening of theintelligence, a hardening of the will (Matthew 13:14-15;Romans 11:8); a general vitiating ofnature, which does not however totally destroy thesubstance andfaculties of thesoul but merely weakens the right exercise of itsfaculties.

Venial sin

Venial sin is essentially different from mortal sin. It does not avert us from our true last end, it does not destroy charity, the principle of union withGod, nor deprive thesoul ofsanctifying grace, and it is intrinsically reparable. It is called venial precisely because, considered in its own propernature, it is pardonable; in itself meriting, noteternal, but temporal punishment. It is distinguished from mortal sin on the part of the disorder. By mortal sinman is entirely averted fromGod, histrue last end, and, at least implicitly, he places his last end in somecreated thing. By venial sin he is not averted fromGod, neither does he place his last end in creatures. He remains united withGod by charity, but does not tend towards Him as he ought. Thetruenature of sin as it is contrary to theeternal law, repugnant namely to the primary end of thelaw, is found only in mortal sin. Venial sin is only in an imperfect way contrary to thelaw, since it is not contrary to the primary end of thelaw, nor does it avertman from the end intended by thelaw. (St. Thomas,I-II.88.1; and Cajetan, I-II, Q. lxxxviii, a. 1, for the sense of thepræter legem andcontra legem ofSt. Thomas).

Definition

Since avoluntary act and its disorder are of theessence of sin, venial sin as it is avoluntary act may be defined as a thought, word or deed at variance with thelaw of God. It retardsman in the attainment of his last end while not averting him from it. Its disorder consists either in the not fully deliberate choosing of some object prohibited by thelaw of God, or in the deliberate adhesion to somecreated object not as an ultimate end but as a medium, which object does not avert the sinner fromGod, but is not, however, referable to Him as an end.Man cannot be averted fromGod except by deliberately placing his last end in somecreated thing, and in venial sin he does not adhere to any temporal good, enjoying it as a last end, but as a medium referring it toGod not actually but habitually inasmuch as he himself is ordered toGod by charity. "Ille qui peccat venialiter, inhæret bono temporali non ut fruens, quia non constituit in eo finem, sed ut utens, referens in Deum non actu sed habitu" (I-II:88:1, ad 3). For a mortal sin, somecreated good must be adhered to as a last end at least implicitly. This adherence cannot be accomplished by a semi-deliberateact. By adhering to an object that is at variance with thelaw of God and yet not destructive of the primary end of theDivine law, atrue opposition is not set up betweenGod and that object. Thecreated good is not desired as an end. The sinner is not placed in the position of choosing betweenGod and creature as ultimate ends that are opposed, but is in such acondition ofmind that if the object to which he adheres were prohibited as contrary to histrue last end he would not adhere to it, but would prefer to keep friendship withGod. An example may be had inhuman friendship. A friend will refrain from doing anything that of itself will tend directly to dissolve friendship while allowing himself at times to do what is displeasing to his friends without destroying friendship.

The distinction between mortal and venial sin is set forth inScripture. From St. John (1 John 5:16-17) it is clear there are some sins "unto death" and some sins not "unto death", i.e. mortal and venial. The classic text for the distinction of mortal and venial sin is that ofSt. Paul (1 Corinthians 3:8-15), where he explains in detail the distinction between mortal and venial sin. "For other foundation no man can lay, but that which is laid; which isChrist Jesus. Now if any man build upon this foundation gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble: every man's work shall be manifest; for the day of the Lord shall declare it; because it shall be revealed in fire; and the fire shall try every man's work, of what sort it is. If any man's work abide, which he hath built thereupon, he shall receive a reward. If any man's work burn, he shall suffer loss; but he himself shall besaved, yet so as by fire." By wood, hay, and stubble are signified venial sins (St. Thomas,I-II:89:2) which, built on the foundation of a livingfaith inChrist, do not destroy charity, and from their verynature do not meriteternal but temporal punishment. "Just as", saysSt. Thomas, [wood, hay, and stubble] "are gathered together in a house and do not pertain to the substance of the edifice, so also venial sins are multiplied inman, the spiritual edifice remaining, and for these he suffers either the fire of temporal tribulations in this life, or ofpurgatory after this life and nevertheless obtainseternalsalvation." (I-II:89:2)

The suitableness of the division into wood, hay, and stubble is explained bySt. Thomas (iv, dist. 21, Q. i, a. 2). Some venial sins are graver than others and less pardonable, and this difference is well signified by the difference in the inflammability of wood, hay, and stubble. That there is a distinction between mortal and venial sins is offaith (Council of Trent, sess. VI, c. xi and canons 23-25; sess. XIV, de poenit., c. v). This distinction is commonly rejected by allheretics ancient and modern. In the fourth centuryJovinian asserted that all sins are equal in guilt and deserving of the same punishment (St. Aug., "Ep. 167", ii, n. 4);Pelagius, that every sin deprivesman ofjustice and therefore is mortal;Wyclif, that there is no warrant inScripture for differentiating mortal from venial sin, and that the gravity of sin depends not on thequality of the action but on thedecree ofpredestination or reprobation so that the worst crime of thepredestined isinfinitely less than the slightest fault of the reprobate;Hus, that all the actions of the vicious are mortal sins, while all the acts of the good arevirtuous (Denz.-Bann., 642);Luther, that all sins of unbelievers are mortal and all sins of theregenerate, with the exception of infidelity, are venial;Calvin, likeWyclif, bases the difference between mortal sin and venial sin onpredestination, but adds that a sin is venial because of thefaith of the sinner. The twentieth among the condemned propositions ofBaius reads: "There is no sin venial in itsnature, but every sin meritseternal punishment" (Denz.-Bann., 1020).Hirscher in more recent times taught that all sins which are fully deliberate are mortal, thus denying the distinction of sins by reason of their objects and making the distinction rest on the imperfection of theact (Kleutgen, 2nd ed., II, 284, etc.).

Malice of venial sin

The difference in the malice of mortal and venial sin consists in this: that mortal sin is contrary to the primary end of theeternal law, that it attacks the verysubstance of thelaw which commands that nocreated thing should be preferred toGod as an end, or equalled to Him, while venial sin is only at variance with thelaw, not in contrary opposition to it, not attacking itssubstance. Thesubstance of thelaw remaining, its perfect accomplishment is prevented by venial sin.

Conditions

Venial sin is committed when thematter of the sin is light, even though the advertence of theintellect andconsent of the will are full and deliberate, and when, even though thematter of the sin be grave, there is not full advertence on the part of theintellect and fullconsent on the part of the will. Apreceptobligessub gravi when it has for its object an important end to be attained, and its transgression is prohibited under penalty of losingGod's friendship. Apreceptobligessub levi when it is not so directly imposed.

Effects

Venial sin does not deprive thesoul ofsanctifying grace, or diminish it. It does not produce amacula, or stain, as does mortal sin, but it lessens the lustre ofvirtue — "In anima duplex est nitor, unus quiden habitualis, ex gratia sanctificante, alter actualis ex actibus virtutem, jamvero peccatum veniale impedit quidem fulgorem qui ex actibus virtutum oritur, non autem habitualem nitorem, quia non excludit nec minuit habitum charitatis" (I-II:89:1). Frequent and deliberate venial sin lessens the fervour of charity, disposes to mortal sin (I-II:88:3), and hinders the reception ofgracesGod would otherwise give. It displeasesGod (Revelation 2:4-5) andobliges the sinner to temporal punishment either in this life or inPurgatory. We cannot avoid all venial sin in this life. "Although the most just andholy occasionally during this life fall into some slight and daily sins, known as venial, they cease not on that account to be just" (Council of Trent, sess. VI, c. xi). And canon xxiii says: "If any one declare that a man oncejustified cannot sin again, or that he can avoid for the rest of his life every sin, even venial, let him beanathema", but according to the common opinion we can avoid all such as are fully deliberate. Venial sin may coexist with mortal sin in those who are averted fromGod by mortal sin. This fact does not change itsnature or intrinsic reparability, and the fact that it is not coexistent with charity is not the result of venial sin, but of mortal sin. It isper accidens, for an extrinsic reason, that venial sin in this case is irreparable, and is punished inhell. That venial sin may appear in itstruenature as essentially different from mortal sin it is considered asde facto coexisting with charity (1 Corinthians 3:8-15). Venial sins do not need the grace ofabsolution. They can be remitted byprayer,contrition, fervent communion, and otherpious works. Nevertheless it is laudable to confess them (Denz.-Bann., 1539).

Permission of sin and remedies

Since it is offaith thatGod isomnipotent, omniscient, and all good it is difficult to account for sin in Hiscreation. Theexistence ofevil is the underlying problem in alltheology. Various explanations to account for itsexistence have been offered, differing according to thephilosophical principles and religious tenets of their authors. AnyCatholic explanation must take into account thedefinedtruths of theomnipotence, omniscience, andgoodness ofGod;free will on the part ofman; and the fact that suffering is the penalty of sin. Ofmetaphysicalevil, the negation of a greater good,God is thecause inasmuch as he hascreated beings with limited forms. Of physicalevil (malum pænæ) He is also thecause. Physicalevil, considered as it proceeds fromGod and is inflicted in punishment of sin in accordance with the decrees of Divinejustice, is good, compensating for the violation of order by sin. It is only in the subject affected by it that it isevil.

Of moralevil (malum culpæ)God is not thecause (Council of Trent, sess. VI, can. vi), either directly or indirectly. Sin is a violation of order, andGod orders all things to Himself, as an ultimate end, consequently He cannot be the directcause of sin.God's withdrawal of grace which would prevent the sin does not make Him the indirectcause of sin inasmuch as this withdrawal is affected according to the decrees of His Divine wisdom andjustice in punishment of previous sin. He is under noobligation of impeding the sin, consequently it cannot be imputed to Him as acause (I-II:79:1). When we read inScripture and the Fathers thatGod inclinesmen to sin the sense is, either that in His just judgment He permitsmen to fall into sin by a punitive permission, exercising Hisjustice in punishment of past sin; or that He directly causes, not sin, but certain exterior works, good in themselves, which are so abused by theevil wills ofmen that here and now they commitevil; or that He gives them the power of accomplishing theirevil designs. Of the physicalact in sinGod is thecause inasmuch as it is an entity and good. Of the malice of sinman'sevil will is the sufficientcause.God could not be impeded in thecreation ofman by the fact that He foresaw his fall. This would mean the limiting of Hisomnipotence by a creature, and would be destructive of Him. He was free to createman even though He foresaw his fall, and Hecreated him, endowed him withfree will, and gave him sufficient means of persevering in good had he so willed. We must sum up ourignorance of the permission ofevil by saying in the words ofSt. Augustine, thatGod would not have permittedevil had He not been powerful enough to bring good out ofevil.God's end in creating thisuniverse is Himself, not the good ofman, and somehow or othergood andevil serve His ends, and there shall finally be a restoration of violated order by Divinejustice. No sin shall be without its punishment. Theevilmen do must be atoned for either in this world by penance (see PENANCE) or in the world to come inpurgatory orhell, according as the sin that stains thesoul, and is not repented of, is mortal or venial, and meritseternal or temporal punishment. (SeeEVIL.)God has provided a remedy for sin and manifested Hislove andgoodness in the face ofman's ingratitude by theIncarnation of HisDivine Son (seeINCARNATION); by the institution of HisChurch to guidemen and interpret to them Hislaw, and administer to them thesacraments, seven channels of grace, which, rightly used, furnish an adequate remedy for sin and a means to union withGod inheaven, which is the end of Hislaw.

Sense of sin

The understanding of sin, as far as it can be understood by our finiteintelligence, serves to uniteman more closely toGod. It impresses him with a salutaryfear, afear of his own powers, afear, if left to himself, of falling from grace; with thenecessity he lies under of seekingGod's help and grace to stand firm in thefear andlove ofGod, and make progress in the spiritual life. Without the acknowledgment that the presentmoral state ofman is not that in whichGodcreated him, that his powers are weakened; that he has asupernatural end to attain, which is impossible of attainment by his own unaided efforts, without grace there being no proportion between the end and the means; that the world, the flesh, and thedevil are in reality active agents fighting against him and leading him to serve them instead ofGod, sin cannot be understood. The evolutionary hypothesis would have it that physical evolution accounts for the physical origin ofman, thatscience knows nocondition ofman in whichman exhibited the characteristics of the state of originaljustice, no state of sinlessness. The fall ofman in this hypothesis is in reality a rise to a higher grade of being. "A fall it might seem, just as aviciousman sometimes seems degraded below the beasts, but in promise and potency, a rise it really was" (Sir O. Lodge, "Life and Matter", p. 79). This teaching is destructive of the notion of sin as taught by theCatholicChurch. Sin is not a phase of an upward struggle, it is rather a deliberate, wilful refusal to struggle. If there has been no fall from a higher to a lower state, then the teaching ofScripture in regard toRedemption and thenecessity of abaptismalregeneration is unintelligible. TheCatholic teaching is the one that places sin in itstrue light, that justifies the condemnation of sin we find inScripture.

TheChurch strives continually to impress her children with a sense of the awfulness of sin that they mayfear it and avoid it. We are fallen creatures, and our spiritual life on earth is awarfare. Sin is our enemy, and while of our own strength we cannot avoid sin, withGod's grace we can. If we but place no obstacle to the workings of grace we can avoid all deliberate sin. If we have the misfortune to sin, and seekGod's grace and pardon with acontrite andhumble heart, He will not repel us. Sin has its remedy in grace, which is given us byGod, through themerits of His only-begotten Son, Who hasredeemed us, restoring by His passion and death the order violated by the sin of ourfirst parents, and making us once again children ofGod and heirs ofheaven. Where sin is looked on as anecessary and unavoidablecondition of thingshuman, where inability to avoid sin is conceived asnecessary, discouragement naturally follows. Where theCatholic doctrine of thecreation ofman in a superior state, his fall by a wilful transgression, the effects of which fall are by Divinedecree transmitted to his posterity, destroying the balance of thehumanfaculties and leavingman inclined toevil; where thedogmas ofredemption and grace in reparation of sin are kept in mind, there is no discouragement. Left to ourselves we fall, by keeping close toGod and continually seeking His help we can stand and struggle against sin, and if faithful in the battle we must wage shall becrowned inheaven. (SeeCONSCIENCE;JUSTIFICATION;SCANDAL.)

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