Account Security Technically enforcing that all sensitive user rights are secured by 2FA
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As theProduct Safety and Integrity team, we want to strengthen the security of user accounts on the wikis. We are particularly focused on users with sensitive permissions. Compared to other internet platforms, an exceptionally high number of users are able to take security- or privacy-sensitive actions: stewards, checkusers, oversighters, interface administrators, and bureaucrats, to name a few groups. While these are generally trusted and competent members of the community, anyone can bephished or have their passwords stolen. If an account with such rights is taken over, it could be misused to hurt other users.
The end goal of this initiative is to technically enforce that all privileges that enable users to take security- or privacy-sensitive actions can only be performed by accounts that have enabledtwo-factor authentication (2FA). In 2025, we have alreadyexpanded 2FA enforcement to interface administrators, checkusers, and oversighters, and we will be expanding this further in 2026.
There are three main areas of technical development that will allow us to meet this goal:
We will continue to improve theSpecial:AccountSecurity page and add features to it. We are targeting the end of 2025 for most major improvements to this page.
Historically, we have supported only one-time codes through a single authenticator app (likeGoogle Authenticator) for two-factor authentication, with some limited experimental support for security keys (likeYubiKeys).
After our recent improvements, users can now use any combination of multiple authenticator apps and multiple security keys.
We are next planning to add support forpasskeys. This will allow users to store a passkey on their device or in theirpassword manager, and then use that during login. Passkeys will generally be both the simplest and most secure way to log in to a user account, and we will encourage users to register as many passkeys as possible.
While some passkeys can be synced across multiple devices, not all devices support this and not all users will want this. So for the time being, we will be supporting passkeys conservatively, and treating them as always stored only in the device with which the user is registering the passkey.
To reduce the risk of users locking themselves out as they change devices, we will not support having a passkey as the only registered 2FA method. Users must first set up another method (an authenticator app or a security key) before they can register a passkey.
Some users who don't have 2FA are asked for a code from their email when they log in (see alsothis FAQ entry). This isn't the same as 2FA, but it's similar, and it can cause users to be locked out of their account if they have lost access to their email address. Previously, users in this situation could only ask for help recovering their account by sending an email. We now direct these users to an on-wiki form instead. This makes it easier for users to submit account recovery requests, and allows WMF staff to process these requests more quickly.
Only users with certain kinds of extended rights, or those who have been specifically added to a particular group, can consistently see an option in their settings to manage two-factor devices. We are now gradually testing allowing more users to enable 2FA, while closely monitoring the enablement rate, to maintain confidence that any increase to the rate of recovery requests can be handled by our support desk.
[To be filled out later - we are just starting this work]
We have not finalized the set of roles for which we expect to enforce 2FA. We have been consulting with stewards and other users with extended rights, and we will remain sensitive to the impact on the user experience of our volunteers.
In ourannouncement of enforcing 2FA for checkusers and oversighters, we specifically mentioned bureaucrats as a role that we believe likely needs 2FA enforcement, given its ability to grant and revoke rights to other users.We also acknowledged the need to improve our 2FA system before enforcing it further, which is what we’re currently focused on doing before we make decisions on additional roles.
Starting in 2025, following thecompromise of ~36,000 user accounts, we introduced an email confirmation step when we need additional confidence in a user login. While the conditions for when this happens may change over time, this typically occurs when logging in from unknown devices and/or network locations.
For most users, confirming a code from your email should be very infrequent. Users who clear their cookies and rotate network addresses will experience it more frequently.
If this is causing you issues, here are some options to make it easier:
loginnotify_prevlogins cookie forauth.wikimedia.org. This cookie is not your session cookie and is much less sensitive. Leaving it present helps the platform know that you’ve used this device to successfully login before.Users cannot opt out of this security protection. It is a necessary baseline for the security of Wikipedia in the current day.
Every human, no matter how experienced or technically capable, can have their passwords stolen, and the risk of user account takeover is not just borne by individual users. The integrity and reputation of Wikipedia as an encyclopedia written by and for human beings depends on keeping a tolerably high bar for authorized use of its user accounts.