Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung
May 1938
[This series of lectures was delivered by Comrade Mao Tse-tung from May26 to June 3, 1938, at the Yenan Association for the Study of the War ofResistance Against Japan.]
1. It will soon be July 7, the first anniversary of the great War of ResistanceAgainst Japan. Rallying in unity, persevering in resistance and perseveringin the united front, the forces of the whole nation have been valiantly fightingthe enemy for almost a year. The people of the whole world are attentivelyfollowing this war, which has no precedent in the history of the East, andwhich will go down as a great war in world history too. Every Chinese sufferingfrom the disasters of the war and fighting for the survival of his nationdaily yearns for victory. But what actually will be the course of the war?Can we win? Can we win quickly? Many people are talking about a protractedwar, but why is it a protracted war? How to carry on a protracted war? Manypeople are talking about Final victory, but why will final victory be ours?How shall we strive for final victory? Not everyone has found answers tothese questions; in fact, to this day most people have not done so. Thereforethe defeatist exponents of the theory of national subjugation have come forwardto tell people that China will be subjugated, that final victory will notbe China's. On the other hand, some impetuous friends have come forward totell people that China will win very quickly without having to exert anygreat effort. But are these views correct? We have said all along they arenot. However, most people have not yet grasped what we have been saying.This is partly because we did not do enough propaganda and explanatory work,and partly because the development of objective events had not yet fullyand clearly revealed their inherent nature and their features to the people,who were thus not in a position to foresee the over-all trend and the outcomeand hence to decide on a complete set of policies and tactics. Now thingsare better, the experience of ten months of war has been quite sufficientto explode the utterly baseless theory of national subjugation and to dissuadeour impetuous friends from their theory of quick victory. In these circumstancesmany people are asking for a comprehensive explanation. All the more so withregard to protracted war, not only because of the opposing theories of nationalsubjugation and quick victory but also because of the shallow understandingof its nature. "Our four hundred million people have been making a concertedeffort since the Lukouchiao Incident, and the final victory will belong toChina." This formula has a wide currency. It is a correct formula but needsto be given more content. Our perseverance in the War of Resistance and inthe united front has been possible because of many factors. Internally, theycomprise all the political parties in the country from the Communist Partyto the Kuomintang, all the people from the workers and peasants to thebourgeoisie, and all the armed forces from the regular forces to the guerrillas;internationally, they range from the land of socialism to justice-lovingpeople in all countries; in the camp of the enemy, they range from thosepeople in Japan who are against the war to those Japanese soldiers at thefront who are against the war. In short, all these forces have contributedin varying degrees to our War of Resistance. Every man with a conscienceshould salute them. We Communists, together with all the other ant-Japanesepolitical parties and the whole people, have no other course than to striveto unite all forces for the defeat of the diabolical Japanese aggressors.July 1 this year will be the 17th anniversary of the foundingof the Communist Party of China. A serious study of protracted war is necessaryin order to enable every Communist to play a better and greater part in theWar of Resistance. Therefore my lectures will be devoted to such a study.I shall try to speak on all the problems relevant to the protracted war,but I cannot possibly go into everything in one series of lectures.
2. All the experience of the ten months of war proves the error both of thetheory of China's inevitable subjugation and of the theory of China's quickvictory. The former gives rise to the tendency to compromise and the latterto the tendency to underestimate the enemy. Both approaches to the problemare subjective and one-sided, or, in a word, unscientific.
3. Before the War of Resistance, there was a great deal of talk about nationalsubjugation. Some said, "China is inferior in arms and is bound to lose ina war." Others said, "If China offers armed resistance, she is sure to becomeanother Abyssinia." Since the beginning of the war, open talk of nationalsubjugation has disappeared, but secret talk, and quite a lot of it too,still continues. For instance, from time to time an atmosphere of compromisearises and the advocates of compromise argue that "the continuance of thewar spells subjugation".[1] In a letter from Hunana student has written:
In the countryside everything seems difficult. Doing propaganda work on my own, I have to talk to people when and where I find them. The people I have talked to are by no means ignoramuses; they all have some understanding of what is going on and are very interested in what I have to say. But when I run into my own relatives, they always say: "China cannot win; she is doomed." They make one sick ! Fortunately, they do not go around spreading their views, otherwise things would really be bad. The peasants would naturally put more stock in what they say.
Such exponents of the theory of China's inevitable subjugation form the socialbasis of the tendency to compromise. They are to be found everywhere in China,and therefore the problem of compromise is liable to crop up within theanti-Japanese front at any time and will probably remain with us right untilthe end of the war. Now that Hsuchow has fallen and Wuhan is in danger, itwill not be unprofitable, I think, to knock the bottom out of the theoryof national subjugation.
4. During these ten months of war all kinds of views which are indicativeof impetuosity have also appeared. For instance, at the outset of the warmany people were groundlessly optimistic, underestimating Japan and evenbelieving that the Japanese could not get as far as Shansi. Some belittledthe strategic role of guerrilla warfare in the War of Resistance and doubtedthe proposition, "With regard to the whole, mobile warfare is primary andguerrilla warfare supplementary; with regard to the parts, guerrilla warfareis primary and mobile warfare supplementary." They disagreed with the EighthRoute Army's strategy, "Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance formobile warfare under favourable conditions", which they regarded as a"mechanical" approach.[2] During the battle ofShanghai some people said: "If we can fight for just three months, theinternational situation is bound to change, the Soviet Union is bound tosend troops, and the war will be over." They pinned their hopes for the futureof the War of Resistance chiefly on foreignaid.[3] After the Taierhchuangvictory,[4] some people maintained that the Hsuchowcampaign should be fought as a "quasi-decisive campaign" and that the policyof protracted war should be changed. They said such things as, "This campaignmarks the last desperate struggle of the enemy," or, "If we win, the Japanesewarlords will be demoralized and able only to await their Day ofJudgement."[5] The victory at Pinghsingkuan turnedsome people's heads, and further victory at Taierhchuang has turned morepeople's heads. Doubts have arisen as to whether the enemy will attack Wuhan.Many people think "probably not", and many others "definitely not". Suchdoubts may affect all major issues. For instance, is our anti-Japanese strengthalready sufficient? Some people may answer affirmatively, for our presentstrength is already sufficient to check the enemy's advance, so why increaseit? Or, for instance, is the slogan "Consolidate and expand the Anti-JapaneseNational United Front" still correct? Some people may answer negatively,for the united front in its present state is already strong enough to repulsethe enemy, so why consolidate and expand it? Or, for instance, should ourefforts in diplomacy and international propaganda be intensified? Here againthe answer may be in the negative. Or, for instance, should we proceed inearnest to reform the army system and the system of government, develop themass movement, enforce education for national defence, suppress traitorsand Trotskyites, develop war industries and improve the people's livelihood?Or, for instance, are the slogans calling for the defence of Wuhan, of Cantonand of the Northwest and for the vigorous development of guerrilla warfarein the enemy's rear still correct? The answers might all be in the negative.There are even some people who, the moment a slightly favourable turn occursin the war situation, are prepared to intensify the "friction" between theKuomintang and the Communist Party, diverting attention from external tointernal matters. This almost invariably occurs whenever a comparativelybig battle is won or the enemy's advance comes to a temporary halt. All theabove can be termed political and military short-sightedness. Such talk,however plausible, is actually specious and groundless. To sweep away suchverbiage should help the victorious prosecution of the War of Resistance.
5. The question now is: Will China be subjugated? The answer is, No,she will not be subjugated, but will win final victory. Can China win quickly?The answer is, No, she cannot win quickly, and the War of Resistance willbe a protracted war.
6. As early as two years ago, we broadly indicated the main arguments onthese questions. On July 16, 1936, five months before the Sian Incident andtwelve months before the Lukouchiao Incident, in an interview with the Americancorrespondent, Mr. Edgar Snow, I made a general estimate of the situationwith regard to war between China and Japan and advanced various principlesfor winning victory. The following excerpts may serve as a reminder:
Question:Under what conditions do you think China can defeat and destroy the forces of Japan?
Answer:Three conditions are required: first, the establishment of an anti-Japanese united front in China; second, the formation of an international anti-Japanese united front; third, the rise of the revolutionary movement of the people in Japan and the Japanese colonies. From the standpoint of the Chinese people, the unity of the people of China is the most important of the three conditions.
Question:How long do you think such a war would last?
Answer:That depends on the strength of China's anti-Japanese united front and many other conditioning factors involving China and Japan. That is to say, apart from China's own strength, which is the main thing, international help to China and the help rendered by the revolution in Japan are also important. If China's anti-Japanese united front is greatly expanded and effectively organized horizontally and vertically, if the necessary help is given to China by those governments and peoples which recognize the Japanese imperialist menace to their own interests and if revolution comes quickly in Japan, the war will speedily be brought to an end and China will speedily win victory. If these conditions are not realized quickly, the war will be prolonged. But in the end, just the same, Japan will certainly be defeated and China will certainly be victorious. Only the sacrifices will be great and there will be a very painful period.
Question:What is your opinion of the probable course of development of such a war, politically and militarily?
Answer:Japan's continental policy is already fixed, and those who think they can halt the Japanese advance by making compromises with Japan at the expense of more Chinese territory and sovereign rights are indulging in mere fantasy. We definitely know that the lower Yangtse valley and our southern seaports are already included in the continental programme of Japanese imperialism. Moreover, Japan wants to occupy the Philippines, Siam, Indo-China, the Malay Peninsula and the Dutch East Indies in order to cut off other countries from China and monopolize the southwestern Pacific. This is Japan's maritime policy. In such a period, China will undoubtedly be in an extremely difficult position. But the majority of the Chinese people believe that such difficulties can be overcome; only the rich in the big port cities are defeatists because they are afraid of losing their property. Many people think it would be impossible for China to continue the war, once her coastline is blockaded by Japan. This is nonsense. To refute them we need only cite the war history of the Red Army. In the present War of Resistance Against Japan, China's position is much superior to that of the Red Army in the civil war. China is a vast country, and even if Japan should succeed in occupying a section of China with as many as 100 to 200 million people, we would still be far from defeated. We would still have ample strength to fight against Japan, while the Japanese would have to fight defensive battles in their rear throughout the war. The heterogeneity and uneven development of China's economy are rather advantageous in the war of resistance. For example, to sever Shanghai from the rest of China would definitely not be as disastrous to China as would be the severance of New York from the rest of the United States. Even if Japan blockades the Chinese coastline, it is impossible for her to blockade China's Northwest, Southwest and West. Thus, once more the central point of the problem is the unity of the entire Chinese people and the building up of a nation-wide anti-Japanese front. This is what we have long been advocating.
Question:If the war drags on for a long time and Japan is not completely defeated, would the Communist Party agree to the negotiation of a peace with Japan and recognize her rule in northeastern China?
Answer:No. Like the people of the whole country, the Chinese Communist Party will not allow Japan to retain an inch of Chinese territory.
Question:What, in your opinion, should be the main strategy and tactics to be followed in this "war of liberation"?
Answer:Our strategy should be to employ our main forces to operate over an extended and fluid front. To achieve success, the Chinese troops must conduct their warfare with a high degree of mobility on extensive battlefields, making swift advances and withdrawals, swift concentrations and dispersals. This means large-scale mobile warfare, and not positional warfare depending exclusively on defence works with deep trenches, high fortresses and successive rows of defensive positions. It does not mean the abandonment of all the vital strategic points, which should be defended by positional warfare as long as profitable. But the pivotal strategy must be mobile warfare. Positional warfare is also necessary, but strategically it is auxiliary and secondary. Geographically the theatre of the war is so vast that it is possible for us to conduct mobile warfare most effectively. In the face of the vigorous actions of our forces, the Japanese army will have to be cautious. Its war-machine is ponderous and slow-moving, with limited efficiency. If we concentrate our forces on a narrow front for a defensive war of attrition, we would be throwing away the advantages of our geography and economic organization and repeating the mistake of Abyssinia. In the early period of the war, we must avoid any major decisive battles, and must first employ mobile warfare gradually to break the morale and combat effectiveness of the enemy troops.
Besides employing trained armies to carry on mobile warfare, we must organize great numbers of guerrilla units among the peasants. One should know that the anti-Japanese volunteer units in the three northeastern provinces are only a minor demonstration of the latent power of resistance that can be mobilized from the peasants of the whole country. The Chinese peasants have very great latent power; properly organized and directed, they can keep the Japanese army busy twenty-four hours a day and worry it to death. It must be remembered that the war will be fought in China, that is to say, the Japanese army will be entirely surrounded by the hostile Chinese people, it will be forced to move in all its provisions and guard them, it must use large numbers of troops to protect its lines of communications and constantly guard against attacks and it needs large forces to garrison Manchuria and Japan as well.
In the course of the war, China will be able to capture many Japanese soldiers and seize many weapons and munitions with which to arm herself; at the same time China will win foreign aid to reinforce the equipment of her troops gradually. Therefore China will be able to conduct positional warfare in the latter period of the war and make positional attacks on the Japanese-occupied areas. Thus Japan's economy will crack under the strain of China's long resistance and the morale of the Japanese forces will break under the trial of innumerable battles. On the Chinese side, however, the growing latent power of resistance will be constantly brought into play and large numbers of revolutionary people will be pouring into the front lines to fight for their freedom. The combination of all these and other factors will enable us to make the final and decisive attacks on the fortifications and bases in the Japanese-occupied areas and drive the Japanese forces of aggression out of China.
The above views have been proved correct in the light of the experience ofthe ten months of war and will also be borne out in the future.
7. As far back as August 25, 1937, less than two months after the LukouchiaoIncident, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party clearly pointedout in its "Resolution on the Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party":
The military provocation by the Japanese aggressors at Lukouchiao and their occupation of Peiping and Tientsin represent only the beginning of their large-scale invasion of China south of the Great Wall. They have already begun their national mobilization for war. Their propaganda that they have "no desire to aggravate the situation" is only a smokescreen for further attacks.
The resistance at Lukouchiao on July 7 marked the starting point of China's national War of Resistance.
Thus a new stage has opened in China's political situation, the stage of actual resistance. The stage of preparation for resistance is over. In the present stage the central task is to mobilize all the nation's forces for victory in the War of Resistance.
The key to victory in the war now lies in developing the resistance that has already begun into a war of total resistance by the whole nation. Only through such a war of total resistance can final victory be won.
The existence of serious weaknesses in the War of Resistance may lead to many setbacks, retreats, internal splits, betrayals, temporary and partial compromises and other such reverses. Therefore it should be realized that the war will be an arduous and protracted war. But we are confident that, through the efforts of our Party and the whole people, the resistance already started will sweep aside all obstacles and continue to advance and develop.
The above thesis, too, has been proved correct in the light of the experienceof the ten months of war and will also be borne out in the future.
8. Epistemologically speaking, the source of all erroneous views on war liesin idealist and mechanistic tendencies on the question. People with suchtendencies are subjective and one-sided in their approach to problems. Theyeither indulge in groundless and purely subjective talk, or, basing themselvesupon a single aspect or a temporary manifestation, magnify it with similarsubjectivity into the whole of the problem. But there are two categoriesof erroneous views, one comprising fundamental, and therefore consistent,errors which are hard to correct, and the other comprising accidental, andtherefore temporary, errors which are easy to correct. Since both are wrong,both need to be corrected. Therefore, only by opposing idealist and mechanistictendencies and taking an objective and all-sided view in making a study ofwar can we draw correct conclusions on the question of war.
9. Why is the War of Resistance Against Japan a protracted war? Why willthe final victory be China's? What is the basis for these statements?
The war between China and Japan is not just any war, it is specifically awar of life and death between semi-colonial and semi-feudal China and imperialistJapan, fought in the Nineteen Thirties. Herein lies the basis of the wholeproblem. The two sides in the war have many contrasting features, which willbe considered in turn below.
10. The Japanese side.First, Japan is a powerful imperialist country,which ranks first in the East in military, economic and political-organizationalpower, and is one of the five or six foremost imperialist countries of theworld. These are the basic factors in Japan's war of aggression. Theinevitability of the war and the impossibility of quick victory for Chinaare due to Japan's imperialist system and her great military, economic andpolitical-organizational power. Secondly, however, the imperialist characterof Japan's social economy determines the imperialist character of her war,a war that is retrogressive and barbarous. In the Nineteen Thirties, theinternal and external contradictions of Japanese imperialism have drivenher not only to embark on an adventurist war unparalleled in scale but alsoto approach her final collapse. In terms of social development, Japan isno longer a thriving country; the war will not lead to the prosperity soughtby her ruling classes but to the very reverse, the doom of Japanese imperialism.This is what we mean by the retrogressive nature of Japan's war. It is thisreactionary quality, coupled with the military-feudal character of Japaneseimperialism, that gives rise to the peculiar barbarity of Japan's war. Allof which will arouse to the utmost the class antagonisms within Japan, theantagonism between the Japanese and the Chinese nations, and the antagonismbetween Japan and most other countries of the world. The reactionary andbarbarous character of Japan's war constitutes the primary reason for herinevitable defeat. Thirdly, Japan's war is conducted on the basis of hergreat military, economic and political-organizational power, but at the sametime it rests on an inadequate natural endowment. Japan's military, economicand political-organizational power is great but quantitatively inadequate.Japan is a comparatively small country, deficient in manpower and in military,financial and material resources, and she cannot stand a long war. Japan'srulers are endeavouring to resolve this difficulty through war, but againthey will get the very reverse of what they desire; that is to say, the warthey have launched to resolve this difficulty will eventually aggravate itand even exhaust Japan's original resources. Fourthly and lastly, while Japancan get international support from the fascist countries, the internationalopposition she is bound to encounter will be greater than her internationalsupport. This opposition will gradually grow and eventually not only cancelout the support but even bear down upon Japan herself. Such is the law thatan unjust cause finds meagre support, and such is the consequence of thevery nature of Japan's war. To sum up, Japan's advantage lies in her greatcapacity to wage war, and her disadvantages lie in the reactionary and barbarousnature of her war, in the inadequacy of her manpower and material resources,and in her meagre international support. These are the characteristics onthe Japanese side.
11.The Chinese side.First, we are a semi-colonial and semi-feudalcountry. The Opium War, [6] the Taiping Revolution,[7] the Reform Movement of 1898,[8] the Revolution of 1911[9] and the Northern Expedition[10]--the revolutionary or reform movements whichaimed at extricating China from her semi-colonial and semi-feudal state--allmet with serious setbacks, and China remains a semi-colonial and semi-feudalcountry. We are still a weak country and manifestly inferior to the enemyin military, economic and political-organizational power. Here again onecan find the basis for the inevitability of the war and the impossibilityof quick victory for China. Secondly, however, China's liberation movement,with its cumulative development over the last hundred years, is now differentfrom that of any previous period. Although the domestic and foreign forcesopposing it have caused it serious setbacks, at the same time they have temperedthe Chinese people. Although China today is not so strong as Japan militarily,economically, politically and culturally, yet there are factors in Chinamore progressive than in any other period of her history. The Communist Partyof China and the army under its leadership represent these progressive factors.It is on the basis of this progress that China's present war of liberationcan be protracted and can achieve final victory. By contrast with Japaneseimperialism, which is declining, China is a country rising like the morningsun. China's war is progressive, hence its just character. Because it isa just war, it is capable of arousing the nation to unity, of evoking thesympathy of the people in Japan and of winning the support of most countriesin the world. Thirdly, and again by contrast with Japan, China is a verybig country with vast territory, rich resources, a large population and plentyof soldiers, and is capable of sustaining a long war. Fourthly and lastly,there is broad international support for China stemming from the progressiveand just character of her war, which is again exactly the reverse of themeagre support for Japan's unjust cause. To sum up, China's disadvantagelies in her military weakness, and her advantages lie in the progressiveand just character of her war, her great size and her abundant internationalsupport. These are China's characteristics.
12. Thus it can be seen that Japan has great military, economic andpolitical-organizational power, but that her war is reactionary and barbarous,her manpower and material resources are inadequate, and she is in an unfavourableposition internationally. China, on the contrary, has less military, economicand political-organizational power, but she is in her era of progress, herwar is progressive and just, she is moreover a big country, a factor whichenables her to sustain a protracted war, and she will be supported by mostcountries. The above are the basic, mutually contradictory characteristicsof the Sino-Japanese war. They have determined and are determining all thepolitical policies and military strategies and tactics of the two sides;they have determined and are determining the protracted character of thewar and its outcome, namely, that the final victory will go to Chinaand not to Japan. The war is a contest between these characteristics. Theywill change in the course of the war, each according to its own nature; andfrom this everything else will follow. These characteristics exist objectivelyand are not invented to deceive people; they constitute all the basic elementsof the war, and are not incomplete fragments; they permeate all major andminor problems on both sides and all stages of the war, and they are notmatters of no consequence. If anyone forgets these characteristics in studyingthe Sino-Japanese war, he will surely go wrong; and even though some of hisideas win credence for a time and may seem right, they will inevitably beproved wrong by the course of the war. On the basis of these characteristicswe shall now proceed to explain the problems to be dealt with.
13. The theorists of national subjugation, who see nothing but the contrastbetween the enemy's strength and our weakness, used to say, "Resistance willmean subjugation," and now they are saying, "The continuance of the war spellssubjugation." We shall not be able to convince them merely by stating thatJapan, though strong; is small, while China, though weak, is large. Theycan adduce historical instances, such as the destruction of the Sung Dynastyby the Yuan and the destruction of the Ming Dynasty by the Ching, to provethat small but strong country can vanquish a large but weak one and, moreover,that a backward country can vanquish an advanced one. If we say these eventsoccurred long ago and do not prove the point, they can cite the Britishsubjugation of India to prove that a small but strong capitalist countrycan vanquish a large but weak and backward country. Therefore, we have toproduce other grounds before we can silence and convince all the subjugationists,and supply everyone engaged in propaganda with adequate arguments to persuadethose who are still confused or irresolute and so strengthen their faithin the War of Resistance.
14. What then are the grounds we should advance? The characteristics of theepoch. These characteristics are concretely reflected in Japan's retrogressionand paucity of support and in China's progress and abundance of support.
15. Our war is not just any war, it is specifically a war between China andJapan fought in the Nineteen Thirties. Our enemy, Japan, is first of alla moribund imperialist power; she is already in her era of decline and isnot only different from Britain at the time of the subjugation of India,when British capitalism was still in the era of its ascendancy, but alsodifferent from what she herself was at the time of World War I twenty yearsago. The present war was launched on the eve of the general collapse of worldimperialism and, above all, of the fascist countries; that is the very reasonthe enemy has launched this adventurist war, which is in the nature of alast desperate struggle. Therefore, it is an inescapable certainty that itwill not be China but the ruling circles of Japanese imperialism which willbe destroyed as a result of the war. Moreover, Japan has undertaken thiswar at a time when many countries have been or are about to be embroiledin war, when we are all fighting or preparing to fight against barbarousaggression, and China's fortunes are linked with those of most of the countriesand peoples of the world. This is the root cause of the opposition Japanhas aroused and will increasingly arouse among those countries and peoples.
16. What about China? The China of today cannot be compared with the Chinaof any other historical period. She is a semi-colony and a semi-feudal society,and she is consequently considered a weak country. But at the same time,China is historically in her era of progress; this is the primary reasonfor her ability to defeat Japan. When we say that the War of Resistance AgainstJapan is progressive we do not mean progressive in the ordinary or generalsense, nor do we mean progressive in the sense that the Abyssinian war againstItaly, or the Taiping Revolution or the Revolution of 1911 were progressive,we mean progressive in the sense that China is progressive today. In whatway is the China of today progressive? She is progressive because she isno longer a completely feudal country and because we already have some capitalismin China, we have a bourgeoisie and a proletariat, we have vast numbers ofpeople who have awakened or are awakening, we have a Communist Party, wehave a politically progressive army--the Chinese Red Army led by the CommunistParty--and we have the tradition and the experience of many decades ofrevolution, and especially the experience of the seventeen years since thefounding of the Chinese Communist Party. This experience has schooled thepeople and the political parties of China and forms the very basis for thepresent unity against Japan. If it is said that without the experience of1905 the victory of 1917 would have been impossible in Russia, then we canalso say that without the experience of the last seventeen years it wouldbe impossible to win our War of Resistance. Such is the internal situation.
In the existing international situation, China is not isolated in the war,and this fact too is without precedent in history. In the past, China's wars,and India's too, were wars fought in isolation. It is only today that wemeet with world-wide popular movements, extraordinary in breadth and depth,which have arisen or are arising and which are supporting China. The RussianRevolution of 1917 also received international support, and thus the Russianworkers and peasants won; but that support was not so broad in scale anddeep in nature as ours today. The popular movements in the world today aredeveloping on a scale and with a depth that are unprecedented. The existenceof the Soviet Union is a particularly vital factor in present-day internationalpolitics, and the Soviet Union will certainly support China with the greatestenthusiasm; there was nothing like this twenty years ago. All these factorshave created and are creating important conditions indispensable to China'sfinal victory. Large-scale direct assistance is as yet lacking and will comeonly in the future, but China is progressive and is a big country, and theseare the factors enabling her to protract the war and to promote as well asawait international help.
17. There is the additional factor that while Japan is a small country witha small territory, few resources, a small population and a limited numberof soldiers, China is a big country with vast territory, rich resources,a large population and plenty of soldiers, so that, besides the contrastbetween strength and weakness, there is the contrast between a small country,retrogression and meagre support and a big country, progress and abundantsupport. This is the reason why China will never be subjugated. It followsfrom the contrast between strength and weakness that Japan can ride roughshodover China for a certain time and to a certain extent, that China mustunavoidably travel a hard stretch of road, and that the War of Resistancewill be a protracted war and not a war of quick decision; nevertheless, itfollows from the other contrast--a small country, retrogression and meagresupport versus a big country, progress and abundant support--that Japan cannotride roughshod over China indefinitely but is sure to meet final defeat,while China can never be subjugated but is sure to win final victory.
18. Why was Abyssinia vanquished? First, she was not only weak but also small.Second, she was not as progressive as China; she was an old country passingfrom the slave to the serf system, a country without any capitalism or bourgeoispolitical parties, let alone a Communist Party, and with no army such asthe Chinese army, let alone one like the Eighth Route Army. Third, she wasunable to hold out and wait for international assistance and had to fighther war in isolation. Fourth, and most important of all, there were mistakesin the direction of her war against Italy. Therefore Abyssinia was subjugated.But there is still quite extensive guerrilla warfare in Abyssinia, which,if persisted in, will enable the Abyssinians to recover their country whenthe world situation changes.
19. If the subjugationists quote the history of the failure of liberationmovements in modern China to prove their assertions first that "resistancewill mean subjugation", and then that "the continuance of the war spellssubjugation", here again our answer is, "Times are different." China herself,the internal situation in Japan and the international environment are alldifferent now. It is a serious matter that Japan is stronger than beforewhile China in her unchanged semi-colonial and semi-feudal position is stillfairly weak. It is also a fact that for the time being Japan can still controlher people at home and exploit international contradictions in order to invadeChina. But during a long war, these things are bound to change in the oppositedirection. Such changes are not yet accomplished facts, but they will becomeso in future. The subjugationists dismiss this point. As for China, we alreadyhave new people, a new political party, a new army and a new policy of resistanceto Japan, a situation very different from that of over a decade ago, andwhat is more, all these will inevitably make further progress. It is truethat historically the liberation movements met with repeated setbacks withthe result that China could not accumulate greater strength for the presentWar of Resistance--this is a very painful historical lesson, and never againshould we destroy any of our revolutionary forces. Yet even on the presentbasis, by exerting great efforts we can certainly forge ahead gradually andincrease the strength of our resistance. All such efforts should convergeon the great Anti-Japanese National United Front. As for international support,though direct and large-scale assistance is not yet in sight, it is in themaking, the international situation being fundamentally different from before.The countless failures in the liberation movement of modern China had theirsubjective and objective causes, but the situation today is entirely different.Today, although there are many difficulties which make the War of Resistancearduous--such as the enemy's strength and our weakness, and the fact thathis difficulties are just starting, while our own progress is far fromsufficient--nevertheless many favourable conditions exist for defeating theenemy; we need only add our subjective efforts, and we shall be able to overcomethe difficulties and win through to victory. These are favourable conditionssuch as never existed before in any period of our history, and that is whythe War of Resistance Against Japan, unlike the liberation movements of thepast, will not end in failure.
20. It has been fully explained above that the theory of national subjugationis groundless. But there are many people who do not subscribe to this theory;they are honest patriots, who are nevertheless deeply worried about the presentsituation. Two things are worrying them, fear of a compromise with Japanand doubts about the possibility of political progress. These two vexingquestions are being widely discussed and no key has been found to their solution.Let us now examine them.
21. As previously explained, the question of compromise has its social roots,and as long as these roots exist the question is bound to arise. But compromisewill not avail. To prove the point, again we need only look for substantiationto Japan, China, and the international situation. First take Japan. At thevery beginning of the War of Resistance, we estimated that the time wouldcome when an atmosphere conducive to compromise would arise, in other words,that after occupying northern China, Kiangsu and Chekiang, Japan would probablyresort to the scheme of inducing China to capitulate. True enough, she didresort to the scheme, but the crisis soon passed, one reason being that theenemy everywhere pursued a barbarous policy and practiced naked plunder.Had China capitulated, every Chinese would have become a slave without acountry. The enemy's predatory policy, the policy of subjugating China, hastwo aspects, the material and the spiritual, both of which are being applieduniversally to all Chinese, not only to the people of the lower strata butalso to members of the upper strata; of course the latter are treated a littlemore politely, but the difference is only one of degree, not of principle.In the main the enemy is transplanting into the interior of China the sameold measures he adopted in the three northeastern provinces. Materially,he is robbing the common people even of their food and clothing, making themcry out in hunger and cold; he is plundering the means of production, thusruining and enslaving China's national industries. Spiritually, he is workingto destroy the national consciousness of the Chinese people. Under the flagof the "Rising Sun" all Chinese are forced to be docile subjects, beastsof burden forbidden to show the slightest trace of Chinese national spirit.This barbarous enemy policy will be carried deeper into the interior of China.Japan with her voracious appetite is unwilling to stop the war. As wasinevitable, the policy set forth in the Japanese cabinet's statement of January16, 1938[11] is still being obstinately carriedout, which has enraged all strata of the Chinese people. This rage is engenderedby the reactionary and barbarous character of Japan's war--"there is no escapefrom fate", and hence an absolute hostility has crystallized. It is to beexpected that on some future occasion the enemy will once again resort tothe scheme of inducing China to capitulate and that certain subjugationistswill again crawl out and most probably collude with certain foreign elements(to be found in Britain, the United States and France, and specially amongthe upper strata in Britain) as partners in crime. But the general trendof events will not permit capitulation; the obstinate and peculiarly barbarouscharacter of Japan's war has decided this aspect of the question.
22. Second, let us take China. There are three factors contributing to China'sperseverance in the War of Resistance. In the first place the Communist Party,which is the reliable force leading the people to resist Japan. Next, theKuomintang, which depends on Britain and the United States and hence willnot capitulate to Japan unless they tell it to. Finally, the other politicalparties and groups, most of which oppose compromise and support the War ofResistance. With unity among these three, whoever compromises will be standingwith the traitors, and anybody will have the right to punish him. All thoseunwilling to be traitors have no choice but to unite and carry on the Warof Resistance to the end; therefore compromise can hardly succeed.
23. Third, take the international aspect. Except for Japan's allies and certainelements in the upper strata of other capitalist countries, the whole worldis in favour of resistance, and not of compromise by China. This factorreinforces China's hopes. Today the people throughout the country cherishthe hope that international forces will gradually give China increasing help.It is not a vain hope; the existence of the Soviet Union in particular encouragesChina in her War of Resistance. The socialist Soviet Union, now strong asnever before, has always shared China's joys and sorrows. In direct contrastto all the members of the upper strata in the capitalist countries who seeknothing but profits, the Soviet Union considers it its duty to help all weaknations and all revolutionary wars. That China is not fighting her war inisolation has its basis not only in international support in general butin Soviet support in particular. China and the Soviet Union are in closegeographical proximity, which aggravates Japan's crisis and facilitates China'sWar of Resistance. Geographical proximity to Japan increases the difficultiesof China's resistance. Proximity to the Soviet Union, on the other hand,is a favourable condition for the War of Resistance.
24. Hence we may conclude that the danger of compromise exists but can beovercome. Even if the enemy can modify his policy to some extent, he cannotalter it fundamentally. In China the social roots of compromise are present,but the opponents of compromise are in the majority. Internationally, also,some forces favour compromise but the main forces favour resistance. Thecombination of these three factors makes it possible to overcome the dangerof compromise and persist to the end in the War of Resistance.
25. Let us now answer the second question. Political progress at home andperseverance in the War of Resistance are inseparable. The greater the politicalprogress, the more we can persevere in the war, and the more we perseverein the war, the greater the political progress. But, fundamentally, everythingdepends on our perseverance in the War of Resistance. The unhealthy phenomenain various herds under the Kuomintang regime are very serious, and theaccumulation of these undesirable factors over the years has caused greatanxiety and vexation among the broad ranks of our patriots. But there isno ground for pessimism, since experience in the War of Resistance has alreadyproved that the Chinese people have made as much progress in the last tenmonths as in many years in the past. Although the cumulative effects of longyears of corruption are seriously retarding the growth of the people's strengthto resist Japan, thus reducing the extent of our victories and causing uslosses in the war, yet the over-all situation in China, in Japan and in theworld is such that the Chinese people cannot but make progress. This progresswill be slow because of the factor of corruption, which impedes progress.Progress and the slow pace of progress are two characteristics of the presentsituation, and the second ill accords with the urgent needs of the war, whichis a source of great concern to patriots. But we are in the midst of arevolutionary war, and revolutionary war is an antitoxin which not onlyeliminates the enemy's poison but also purges us of our own filth. Everyjust, revolutionary war is endowed with tremendous power, which can transformmany things or clear the way for their transformation. The Sino-Japanesewar will transform both China and Japan; provided China perseveres in theWar of Resistance and in the united front, the old Japan will surely betransformed into a new Japan and the old China into a new China, and peopleand everything else in both China and Japan will be transformed during andafter the war. It is proper for us to regard the anti-Japanese war and ournational reconstruction as interconnected. To say that Japan can also betransformed is to say that the war of aggression by her rulers will end indefeat and may lead to a revolution by the Japanese people. The day of triumphof the Japanese people's revolution will be the day Japan is transformed.All this is closely linked with China's War of Resistance and is a prospectwe should take into account.
26. In our comparative study of the enemy and ourselves with respect to thebasic contradictory characteristics, such as relative strength, relativesize, progress or reaction, and the relative extent of support, we have alreadyrefuted the theory of national subjugation, and we have explained why compromiseis unlikely and why political progress is possible. The subjugationists stressthe contradiction between strength and weakness and puff it up until it becomesthe basis of their whole argument on the question, neglecting all the othercontradictions. Their preoccupation with the contrast in strength shows theirone-sidedness, and their exaggeration of this one side of the matter intothe whole shows their subjectivism. Thus, if one looks at the matter as awhole, it will be seen that they have no ground to stand on and are wrong.As for those who are neither subjugationists nor confirmed pessimists, butwho are in a pessimistic frame of mind for the moment simply because theyare confused by the disparity between our strength and that of the enemyat a given time and in certain respects or by the corruption in the country,we should point out to them that their approach also tends to be one-sidedand subjective. But in their case correction is relatively easy; once theyare alerted, they will understand, for they are patriots and their errors only momentary.
27. The exponents of quick victory are likewise wrong. Either they completelyforget the contradiction between strength and weakness, remembering onlythe other contradictions, or they exaggerate China's advantages beyond allsemblance of reality and beyond recognition, or they presumptuously takethe balance of forces at one time and place for the whole situation, as inthe old saying, "A leaf before the eye shuts out Mount Tail" In a word, theylack the courage to admit that the enemy is strong while we are weak. Theyoften deny this point and consequently deny one aspect of the truth. Nordo they have the courage to admit the limitations of our advantages, andthus they deny another aspect of the truth. The result is that they makemistakes, big and small, and here again it is subjectivism and one-sidednessthat are doing the mischief. These friends have their hearts in the rightplace, and they, too, are patriots. But while "the gentlemen aspirationsare indeed lofty", their views are wrong, and to act according to them wouldcertainly be to run into a brick wall. For if appraisal does not conformto reality, action cannot attain its objective; and to act notwithstandingwould mean the army's defeat and the nation's subjugation, so that the resultwould be the same as with the defeatists. Hence this theory of quick victorywill not do either.
28. Do we deny the danger of national subjugation? No, we do not. We recognizethat China faces two possible prospects, liberation or subjugation, and thatthe two are in violent conflict. Our task is to achieve liberation and toavert subjugation. The conditions for liberation are China's progress, whichis basic, the enemy's difficulties, and international support. We differfrom the subjugationists. Taking an objective and all-sided view, we recognizethe two possibilities of national subjugation and liberation, stress thatliberation is the dominant possibility, point out the conditions for itsachievement, and strive to secure them. The subjugationists, on the otherhand, taking a subjective and one-sided view, recognize only one possibility,that of subjugation; they do not admit the possibility of liberation, andstill less point out the conditions necessary for liberation or strive tosecure them. Moreover, while acknowledging the tendency to compromise andthe corruption, we see other tendencies and phenomena which, we indicate,will gradually prevail and are already in violent conflict with the former;in addition, we point out the conditions necessary for the healthy tendenciesand phenomena to prevail, and we strive to overcome the tendency to compromiseand to change the state of corruption. Therefore, contrary to the pessimists,we are not at all down-hearted.
29. Not that we would not like a quick victory; everybody would be in favourof driving the "devils" out overnight. But we point out that, in the absenceof certain definite conditions, quick victory is something that exists onlyin one's mind and not in objective reality, and that it is a mere illusion,a false theory. Accordingly, having made an objective and comprehensive appraisalof all the circumstances concerning both the enemy and ourselves, we pointout that the only way to final victory is the strategy of protracted war,and we reject the groundless theory of quick victory. We maintain that wemust strive to secure all the conditions indispensable to final victory,and the more fully and the earlier these conditions are secured, the surerwe shall be of victory and the earlier we shall win it. We believe that onlyin this way can the course of the war be shortened, and we reject the theoryof quick victory, which is just idle talk and an effort to get things onthe cheap.
30. Let us now examine the problem of protracted war. A correct answer tothe question "Why a protracted war?" can be arrived at only on the basisof all the fundamental contrasts between China and Japan. For instance, ifwe say merely that the enemy is a strong imperialist power while we are aweak semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, we are in danger of falling intothe theory of national subjugation. For neither in theory nor in practicecan a struggle become protracted by simply pitting the weak against the strong.Nor can it become protracted by simply pitting the big against the small,the progressive against the reactionary, or abundant support against meagresupport. The annexation of a small country by a big one or of a big countryby a small one is a common occurrence. It often happens that a progressivecountry which is not strong is destroyed by a big, reactionary country, andthe same holds for everything that is progressive but not strong. Abundantor meagre support is an important but a subsidiary factor, and the degreeof its effect depends upon the fundamental factors on both sides. Thereforewhen we say that the War of Resistance Against Japan is a protracted war,our conclusion is derived from the interrelations of all the factors at workon both sides. The enemy is strong and we are weak, and the danger of subjugationis there. But in other respects the enemy has shortcomings and we haveadvantages. The enemy's advantage can be reduced and his shortcomings aggravatedby our efforts. On the other hand, our advantages can be enhanced and ourshortcoming remedied by our efforts. Hence, we can win final victory andavert subjugation, while the enemy will ultimately be defeated and will beunable to avert the collapse of his whole imperialist system.
31. Since the enemy has advantages only in one respect but shortcomings inall others and we have shortcomings in only one respect but advantages inall others, why has this produced not a balance, but, on the contrary, asuperior position for him and an inferior position for us at the presenttime? Quite clearly, we cannot consider the question in such a formal way.The fact is that the disparity between the enemy's strength and our own isnow so great that the enemy's shortcomings have not developed, and for thetime being cannot develop, to a degree sufficient to offset his strength,while our advantages have not developed, and for the time being cannot develop,to a degree sufficient to compensate for our weakness. Therefore there canas yet be no balance, only imbalance.
32. Although our efforts in persevering in the War of Resistance and theunited front have somewhat changed the enemy's strength and superiority asagainst our weakness and inferiority, there has as yet been no basic change.Hence during a certain stage of the war, to a certain degree the enemy willbe victorious and we shall suffer defeat. But why is it that in this stagethe enemy's victories and our defeats are definitely restricted in degreeand cannot be transcended by complete victory or complete defeat? The reasonis that, first, from the very beginning the enemy's strength and our weaknesshave been relative and not absolute, and that, second, our efforts in perseveringin the War of Resistance and in the united front have further accentuatedthis relativeness. In comparison with the original situation, the enemy isstill strong, but unfavourable factors have reduced his strength, althoughnot yet to a degree sufficient to destroy his superiority, and similarlywe are still weak, but favourable factors have compensated for our weakness,although not yet to a degree sufficient to transform our inferiority. Thusit turns out that the enemy is relatively strong and we are relatively weak,that the enemy is in a relatively superior and we are in a relatively inferiorposition. On both sides, strength and weakness, superiority and inferiority,have never been absolute, and besides, our efforts in persevering in resistanceto Japan and in the united front during the war have brought about furtherchanges in the original balance of forces between us and the enemy. Therefore,in this stage the enemy's victory and our defeat are definitely restrictedin degree, and hence the war becomes protracted.
33. But circumstances are continually changing. In the course of the war,provided we employ correct military and political tactics, make no mistakesof principle and exert our best efforts, the enemy's disadvantages and China'sadvantages will both grow as the war is drawn out, with the inevitable resultthat there will be a continual change in the difference in comparative strengthand hence in the relative position of the two sides. When a new stageis reached, a great change will take place in the balance of forces, resultingin the enemies defeat and our victory.
34. At present the enemy can still manage to exploit his strength, and ourWar of Resistance has not yet fundamentally weakened him. The insufficiencyin his manpower and material resources is not yet such as to prevent hisoffensive; on the contrary, they can still sustain his offensive to a certainextent. The reactionary and barbarous nature of his war, a factor whichintensifies both class antagonisms within Japan and the resistance of theChinese nation, has not yet brought about a situation which radically impedeshis advance. The enemy's international isolation is increasing but is notyet complete. In many countries which have indicated they will help us, thecapitalists dealing in munitions and war materials and bent solely on profitare still furnishing Japan with large quantities of war supplies,[12] and their governments[13] are still reluctant to join the Soviet Unionin practical sanctions against Japan. From all this it follows that our Warof Resistance cannot be won quickly and can only be a protracted war. Asfor China, although there has been some improvement with regard to her weaknessin the military, economic, political and cultural spheres in the ten monthsof resistance, it is still a long way from what is required to prevent theenemy's offensive and prepare our counteroffensive. Moreover, quantitativelyspeaking, we have had to sustain certain losses. Although all the factorsfavourable to us are having a positive effect, it will not be sufficientto halt the enemy's offensive and to prepare for our counter-offensive unlesswe make an immense effort. Neither the abolition of corruption and theacceleration of progress at home, nor the curbing of the pro-Japanese forcesand the expansion of the anti-Japanese forces abroad, are yet accomplishedfacts. From all this it follows that our war cannot be won quickly but canonly be a protracted war.
35. Since the Sino-Japanese war is a protracted one and final victory willbelong to China, it can reasonably be assumed that this protracted war willpass through three stages. The first stage covers the period of the enemy'sstrategic offensive and our strategic defensive. The second stage will bethe period of the enemy's strategic consolidation and our preparation forthe counter-offensive. The third stage will be the period of our strategiccounter-offensive and the enemy's strategic retreat. It is impossible topredict the concrete situation in the three stages, but certain main trendsin the war may be pointed out in the light of present conditions. The objectivecourse of events will be exceedingly rich and varied, with many twists andturns, and nobody can cast a horoscope for the Sino-Japanese war; neverthelessit is necessary for the strategic direction of the war to make a rough sketchof its trends. Although our sketch may not be in full accord with the subsequentfacts and will be amended by them, it is still necessary to make it in orderto give firm and purposeful strategic direction to the protracted war.
36. The first stage has not yet ended. The enemy's design is to occupy Canton,Wuhan and Lanchow and link up these three points. To accomplish this aimthe enemy will have to use at least fifty divisions, or about one and a halfmillion men, spend from one and a half to two years, and expend more thanten thousand million yen. In penetrating so deeply, he will encounter immensedifficulties, with consequences disastrous beyond imagination. As for attemptingto occupy the entire length of the Canton-Hankow Railway and the Sian-LanchowRailway, he will have to fight perilous battles and even so may not fullyaccomplish his design. But in drawing up our operational plan we should baseourselves on the assumption that the enemy may occupy the three points andeven certain additional areas, as well as link them up, and we should makedispositions for a protracted war, so that even if he does so, we shall beable to cope with him. In this stage the form of fighting we should adoptis primarily mobile warfare, supplemented by guerrilla and positional warfare.Through the subjective errors of the Kuomintang military authorities, positionalwarfare was assigned the primary role in the first phase of this stage, butit is nevertheless supplementary from the point of view of the stage as awhole. In this stage, China has already built up a broad united front andachieved unprecedented unity. Although the enemy has used and will continueto use base and shameless means to induce China to capitulate in the attemptto realize his plan for a quick decision and to conquer the whole countrywithout much effort, he has failed so far, nor is he likely to succeed inthe future. In this stage, in spite of considerable losses, China will makeconsiderable progress, which will become the main basis for her continuedresistance in the second stage. In the present stage the Soviet Union hasalready given substantial aid to China. On the enemy side, there are alreadysigns of flagging morale, and his army's momentum of attack is less in themiddle phase of this stage than it was in the initial phase, and it willdiminish still further in the concluding phase. Signs of exhaustion are beginningto appear in his finances and economy; war-weariness is beginning to setin among his people and troops and within the clique at the helm of the war,"war frustrations" are beginning to manifest themselves and pessimism aboutthe prospects of the war is growing.
37. The second stage may be termed one of strategic stalemate. At the tailend of the first stage, the enemy will be forced to fix certain terminalpoints to his strategic offensive owing to his shortage of troops and ourfirm resistance, and upon reaching them he will stop his strategic offensiveand enter the stage of safeguarding his occupied areas. In the second stage,the enemy will attempt to safeguard the occupied areas and to make them hisown by the fraudulent method of setting up puppet governments, while plunderingthe Chinese people to the limit; but again he will be confronted with stubbornguerrilla warfare. Taking advantage of the fact that the enemy's rear isunguarded, our guerrilla warfare will develop extensively in the first stage,and many base areas will be established, seriously threatening the enemy'sconsolidation of the occupied areas, and so in the second stage there willstill be widespread fighting. In this stage, our form of fighting will beprimarily guerrilla warfare, supplemented by mobile warfare. China will stillretain a large regular army, but she will find it difficult to launchthe strategic counter-offensive immediately because, on the one hand, theenemy will adopt a strategically defensive position in the big cities andalong the main lines of communication under his occupation and, on the otherhand, China will not yet be adequately equipped technically. Except for thetroops engaged in frontal defence against the enemy, our forces will be switchedin large numbers to the enemy's rear in comparatively dispersed dispositions,and, basing themselves on all the areas not actually occupied by the enemyand co-ordinating with the people's local armed forces, they will launchextensive, fierce guerrilla warfare against enemy-occupied areas, keepingthe enemy on the move as far as possible in order to destroy him in mobilewarfare, as is now being done in Shansi Province. The fighting in the secondstage will be ruthless, and the country will suffer serious devastation.But the guerrilla warfare will be successful, and if it is well conductedthe enemy may be able to retain only about one-third of his occupied territory,with the remaining two-thirds in our hands, and this will constitute a greatdefeat for the enemy and a great victory for China. By then the enemy-occupiedterritory as a whole will fall into three categories: first, the enemy baseareas; second, our base areas for guerrilla warfare; and, third, the guerrillaareas contested by both sides. The duration of this stage will depend onthe degree of change in the balance of forces between us and the enemy andon the changes in the international situation; generally speaking, we shouldbe prepared to see this stage last a comparatively long time and to weatherits hardships. It will be a very painful period for China; the two big problemswill be economic difficulties and the disruptive activities of the traitors.The enemy will go all out to wreck China's united front, and the traitororganizations in all the occupied areas will merge into a so-called "unifiedgovernment". Owing to the loss of big cities and the hardships of war,vacillating elements within our ranks will clamour for compromise, and pessimismwill grow to a serious extent. Our tasks will then be to mobilize the wholepeople to unite as one man and carry on the war with unflinching perseverance,to broaden and consolidate the united front, sweep away all pessimism andideas of compromise, promote the will to hard struggle and apply new wartimepolicies, and so to weather the hardships. In the second stage, we will haveto call upon the whole country resolutely to maintain a united government,we will have to oppose splits and systematically improve fighting techniques,reform the armed forces, mobilize the entire people and prepare for thecounter-offensive. The international situation will become still moreunfavourable to Japan and the main international forces will incline towardsgiving more help to China, even though there may be talk of "realism" ofthe Chamberlain type which accommodates itself tofaits accomplis.Japan's threat to Southeast Asia and Siberia will become greater, andthere may even be another war. As regards Japan, scores of her divisionswill be inextricably bogged down in China. Widespread guerrilla warfare andthe people's anti-Japanese movement will wear down this big Japanese force,greatly reducing it and also disintegrating its morale by stimulating thegrowth of homesickness, war-weariness and even anti-war sentiment. Thoughit would be wrong to say that Japan will achieve no results at all in herplunder of China, yet, being short of capital and harassed by guerrilla warfare,she cannot possibly achieve rapid or substantial results. This second stagewill be the transitional stage of the entire war; it will be the most tryingperiod but also the pivotal one. Whether China becomes an independent countryor is reduced to a colony will be determined not by the retention or lossof the big cities in the first stage but by the extent to which the wholenation exerts itself in the second. If we can persevere in the War of Resistance,in the united front and in the protracted war, China will in that stage gainthe power to change from weakness to strength. It will be the second actin the three-act drama of China's War of Resistance. And through the effortsof the entire cast it will become possible to perform a most brilliant lastact.
38. The third stage will be the stage of the counter-offensive to recoverour lost territories. Their recovery will depend mainly upon the strengthwhich China has built up in the preceding stage and which will continue togrow in the third stage. But China's strength alone will not be sufficient,and we shall also have to rely on the support of international forces andon the changes that will take place inside Japan, or otherwise we shall notbe able to win; this adds to China's tasks in international propaganda anddiplomacy. In the third stage, our war will no longer be one of strategicdefensive, but will turn into a strategic counter-offensive manifesting itselfin strategic offensives; and it will no longer be fought on strategicallyinterior lines, but will shift gradually to strategically exterior lines.Not until we fight our way to the Yalu River can this war be considered over.The third stage will be the last in the protracted war, and when we talkof persevering in the war to the end, we mean going all the way throughthis stage. Our primary form of fighting will still be mobile warfare,but positional warfare will rise to importance. While positional defencecannot be regarded as important in the first stage because of the prevailingcircumstances, positional attack will become quite important in the thirdstage because of the changed conditions and the requirements of the task.In the third stage guerrilla warfare will again provide strategic supportby supplementing mobile and positional warfare, but it will not be the primaryform as in the second stage.
39. It is thus obvious that the war is protracted and consequently ruthlessin nature. The enemy will not be able to gobble up the whole of China butwill be able to occupy many places for a considerable time. China will notbe able to oust the Japanese quickly, but the greater part of her territorywill remain in her hands. Ultimately the enemy will lose and we will win,but we shall have a hard stretch of road to travel.
40. The Chinese people will become tempered in the course of this long andruthless war. The political parties taking part in the war will also be steeledand tested. The united front must be persevered in; only by persevering inthe united front can we persevere in the war; and only by persevering inthe united front and in the war can we win final victory. Only thus can alldifficulties be overcome. After travelling the hard stretch of road we shallreach the highway to victory. This is the natural logic of the war.
41. In the three stages the changes in relative strength will proceed alongthe following lines. In the first stage, the enemy is superior and we areinferior in strength. With regard to our inferiority we must reckon on changesof two different kinds from the eve of the War of Resistance to the end ofthis stage. The first kind is a change for the worse. China's originalinferiority will be aggravated by war losses, namely, decreases in territory,population, economic strength, military strength and cultural institutions.Towards the end of the first stage, the decrease will probably be considerable,especially on the economic side. This point will be exploited by some peopleas a basis for their theories of national subjugation and of compromise.But the second kind of change, the change for the better, must also be noted.It includes the experience gained in the war, the progress made by the armedforces, the political progress, the mobilization of the people, the developmentof culture in a new direction, the emergence of guerrilla warfare, the increasein international support, etc. What is on the downgrade in the first stageis the old quantity and the old quality, the manifestations being mainlyquantitative. What is on the upgrade is the new quantity and the new quality,the manifestations being mainly qualitative. It is the second kind of changethat provides a basis for our ability to fight a protracted war and win finalvictory.
42. In the first stage, changes of two kinds are also occurring on the enemiesside. The first kind is a change for the worse and manifests itself in hundredsof thousands of casualties, the drain on arms and ammunition, deteriorationof troop morale, popular discontent at home, shrinkage of trade, the expenditureof over ten thousand million yen, condemnation by world opinion, etc. Thistrend also provides a basis for our ability to fight a protracted war andwin final victory. But we must likewise reckon with the second kind of changeon the enemy's side, a change for the better, that is, his expansion interritory, population and resources. This too is a basis for the protractednature of our War of Resistance and the impossibility of quick victory, butat the same time certain people will use it as a basis for their theoriesof national subjugation and of compromise. However, we must take into accountthe transitory and partial character of this change for the better on theenemy's side. Japan is an imperialist power heading for collapse, and heroccupation of China's territory is temporary. The vigorous growth of guerrillawarfare in China will restrict her actual occupation to narrow zones. Moreover,her occupation of Chinese territory has created and intensified contradictionsbetween Japan and other foreign countries. Besides, generally speaking, suchoccupation involves a considerable period in which Japan will make capitaloutlays without drawing any profits, as is shown by the experience in thethree northeastern provinces. All of which again gives us a basis for demolishingthe theories of national subjugation and of compromise and for establishingthe theories of protracted war and of final victory.
43. In the second stage, the above changes on both sides will continue todevelop. While the situation cannot be predicted in detail, on the wholeJapan will continue on the downgrade and China on theupgrade.[14] For example, Japan's military andfinancial resources will be seriously drained by China's guerrilla warfare,popular discontent will grow in Japan, the morale of her troops will deterioratefurther, and she will become more isolated internationally. As for China,she will make further progress in the political, military and cultural spheresand in the mobilization of the people; guerrilla warfare will develop further;there will be some new economic growth on the basis of the small industriesand the widespread agriculture in the interior; international support willgradually increase; and the whole picture will be quite different from whatit is now. This second stage may last quite a long time, during which therewill be a great reversal in the balance of forces, with China gradually risingand Japan gradually declining. China will emerge from her inferior position,and Japan will lose her superior position; first the two countries will becomeevenly matched, and then their relative positions will be reversed. Thereupon,China will in general have completed her preparations for the strategiccounter-offensive and will enter the stage of the counter-offensive and theexpulsion of the enemy. It should be reiterated that the change from inferiorityto superiority and the completion of preparations for the counter-offensivewill involve three things, namely, an increase in China's own strength, anincrease in Japan's difficulties, and an increase in international support;it is the combination of all these forces that will bring about China'ssuperiority and the completion of her preparations for the counter-offensive.
44. Because of the unevenness in China's political and economic development,the strategic counter-offensive of the third stage will not present a uniformand even picture throughout the country in its initial phase but will beregional in character, rising here and subsiding there. During this stage,the enemy will not relax his divisive tricks to break China's united front,hence the task of maintaining internal unity in China will become still moreimportant, and we shall have to ensure that the strategic counter-offensivedoes not collapse halfway through internal dissension. In this period theinternational situation will become very favourable to China. China's taskwill be to take advantage of it in order to attain complete liberation andestablish an independent democratic state, which at the same time will meanhelping the world anti-fascist movement.
45. China moving from inferiority to parity and then to superiority, Japanmoving from superiority to parity and then to inferiority; China moving fromthe defensive to stalemate and then to the counter-offensive, Japan movingfrom the offensive to the safeguarding of her gains and then to retreat--suchwill be the course of the Sino-Japanese war and its inevitable trend.
46. Hence the questions and the conclusions are as follows: Will China besubjugated? The answer is, No, she will not be subjugated, but will win finalvictory. Can China win quickly? The answer is, No, she cannot win quickly,and the war must be a protracted one. Are these conclusions correct? I thinkthey are.
47. At this point, the exponents of national subjugation and of compromisewill again rush in and say, "To move from inferiority to parity China needsa military and economic power equal to Japan's, and to move from parity tosuperiority she will need a military and economic power greater than Japan's.But this is impossible, hence the above conclusions are not correct."
48. This is the so-called theory that "weapons decideeverything",[15] which constitutes a mechanicalapproach to the question of war and a subjective and one-sided view. Ourview is opposed to this; we see not only weapons but also people. Weaponsare an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people,not things, that are decisive. The contest of strength is not only a contestof military and economic power, but also a contest of human power and morale.Military and economic power is necessarily wielded by people. If the greatmajority of the Chinese, of the Japanese and of the people of other countriesare on the side of our War of Resistance Against Japan, how can Japan's militaryand economic power, wielded as it is by a small minority through coercion,count as superiority? And if not, then does not China, though wielding relativelyinferior military and economic power, become the superior? There is no doubtthat China will gradually grow in military and economic power, provided sheperseveres in the War of Resistance and in the united front. As for our enemy,weakened as he will be by the long war and by internal and externalcontradictions, his military and economic power is bound to change in thereverse direction. In these circumstances, is there any reason why Chinacannot become the superior? And that is not all. Although we cannot as yetcount the military and economic power of other countries as being openlyand to any great extent on our side, is there any reason why we will notbe able to do so in the future? If Japan's enemy is not just China, if infuture one or more other countries make open use of their considerable militaryand economic power defensively or offensively against Japan and openly helpus, then will not our superiority be still greater? Japan is a small country,her war is reactionary and barbarous, and she will become more and more isolatedinternationally; China is a large country, her war is progressive and just,and she will enjoy more and more support internationally. Is there any reasonwhy the long-term development of these factors should not definitely changethe relative position between the enemy and ourselves?
49. The exponents of quick victory, however, do not realize that war is acontest of strength, and that before a certain change has taken place inthe relative strength of the belligerents, there is no basis for trying tofight strategically decisive battles and shorten the road to liberation.Were their ideas to be put into practice, we should inevitably run our headsinto a brick wall. Or perhaps they are just talking for their own pleasurewithout really intending to put their ideas into practice. In the end Mr.Reality will come and pour a bucket of cold water over these chatterers,showing them up as mere windbags who want to get things on the cheap, tohave gains without pains. We have had this kind of idle chatter before andwe have it now, though not very much so far; but there may be more as thewar develops into the stage of stalemate and then of counter-offensive. Butin the meantime, if China's losses in the first stage are fairly heavy andthe second stage drags on very long, the theories of national subjugationand of compromise will gain great currency. Therefore, our fire should bedirected mainly against them and only secondarily against the idle chatterabout quick victory.
50. That the war will be protracted is certain, but nobody can predict exactlyhow many months or years it will last, as this depends entirely upon thedegree of the change in the balance of forces. All those who wish to shortenthe war have no alternative but to work hard to increase our own strengthand reduce that of the enemy. Specifically, the only way is to strive towin more battles and wear down the enemy's forces, develop guerrilla warfareto reduce enemy-occupied territory to a minimum, consolidate and expand theunited front to rally the forces of the whole nation, build up new armiesand develop new war industries, promote political, economic and culturalprogress, mobilize the workers, peasants, businessmen, intellectuals andother sections of the people, disintegrate the enemy forces and win overtheir soldiers, carry on international propaganda to secure foreign support,and win the support of the Japanese people and other oppressed peoples. Onlyby doing all this can we reduce the duration of the war. There is no magicshort-cut.
51. We can say with certainty that the protracted War of Resistance AgainstJapan will write a splendid page unique in the war history of mankind. Oneof the special features of this war is the interlocking "jig-saw" patternwhich arises from such contradictory factors as the barbarity of Japan andher shortage of troops on the one hand, and the progressiveness of Chinaand the extensiveness of her territory on the other. There have been otherwars of jig-saw pattern in history, the three years' civil war in Russiaafter the October Revolution being a case in point. But what distinguishesthis war in China is its especially protracted and extensive character, whichwill set a record in history. Its jig-saw pattern manifests itself as follows.
52. Interior and exterior lines.The anti-Japanese war as a wholeis being fought on interior lines; but as far as the relation between themain forces and the guerrilla units is concerned, the former are on the interiorlines while the latter are on the exterior lines, presenting a remarkablespectacle of pincers around the enemy. The same can be said of the relationshipbetween the various guerrilla areas. From its own viewpoint each guerrillaarea is on interior lines and the other areas are on exterior lines; togetherthey form many battle fronts, which hold the enemy in pincers. In the firststage of the war, the regular army operating strategically on interior linesis withdrawing but the guerrilla units operating strategically on exteriorlines will advance with great strides over wide areas to the rear of theenemy-- they will advance even more fiercely in the second stage--therebypresenting a remarkable picture of both withdrawal and advance.
53. Possession and non-possession of a rear area.The main forces,which extend the front lines to the outer limits of the enemy's occupiedareas, are operating from the rear area of the country as a whole. The guerrillaunits, which extend the battle lines into the enemy rear, are separated fromthe rear area of the country as a whole. But each guerrilla area has a smallrear of its own, upon which it relies to establish its fluid battle lines.The case is different with the guerrilla detachments which are dispatchedby a guerrilla area for short-term operations in the rear of the enemy inthe same area; such detachments have no rear, nor do they have a battle line."Operating without a rear area" is a special feature of revolutionary warin the new era, wherever a vast territory, a progressive people, and an advancedpolitical party and army are to be found; there is nothing to fear but muchto gain from it, and far from having doubts about it we should promote it.
54. Encirclement and counter-encirclement.Taking the war as a whole,there is no doubt that we are strategically encircled by the enemy becausehe is on the strategic offensive and operating on exterior lines while weare on the strategic defensive and operating on interior lines. This is thefirst form of enemy encirclement. We on our part can encircle one or moreof the enemy columns advancing on us along separate routes, because we applythe policy of fighting campaigns and battles from tactically exterior linesby using numerically preponderant forces against these enemy columns advancingon us from strategically exterior lines. This is the first form of ourcounter-encirclement of the enemy. Next, if we consider the guerrilla baseareas in the enemy's rear, each area taken singly is surrounded by the enemyon all sides, like the Wutai Mountains, or on three sides, like the northwesternShansi area. This is the second form of enemy encirclement. However, if oneconsiders all the guerrilla base areas together and in their relation tothe positions of the regular forces, one can see that we in turn surrounda great many enemy forces. In Shansi Province, for instance, we have surroundedthe Tatung-puchow Railway on three sides (the east and west flanks and thesouthern end) and the city of Taiyuan on all sides; and there are many similarinstances in Hopei and Shantung Provinces. This is the second form of ourcounter-encirclement of the enemy. Thus there are two forms of encirclementby the enemy forces and two forms of encirclement by our own--rather likea game ofweichi. [16]Campaignsand battles fought by the two sides resemble the capturing of each other'spieces, and the establishment of enemy strongholds (such as Talyuan) andour guerrilla base areas (such as the Wutai Mountains) resembles moves todominate spaces on the board. If the game ofweichi isextendedto include the world, there is yet a third form of encirclement as betweenus and the enemy, namely, the interrelation between the front of aggressionand the front of peace. The enemy encircles China, the Soviet Union, Franceand Czechoslovakia with his front of aggression, while we counter-encircleGermany, Japan and Italy with our front of peace. But our encirclement, likethe hand of Buddha, will turn into the Mountain of Five Elements lying athwartthe Universe, and the modern Sun Wu-kungs[17]--the fascist aggressors--will finally be buriedunderneath it, never to rise again. Therefore, if on the international planewe can create an anti-Japanese front in the Pacific region, with China asone strategic unit, with the Soviet Union and other countries which may joinit as other strategic units, and with the Japanese people's movement as stillanother strategic unit, and thus form a gigantic net from which the fascistSun Wu-kungs can find no escape, then that will be our enemy's day of doom.Indeed, the day when this gigantic net is formed will undoubtedly be theday of the complete overthrow of Japanese imperialism. We are not jesting;this is the inevitable trend of the war.
55. Big areas and little areas.There is a possibility that theenemy will occupy the greater part of Chinese territory south of the GreatWall, and only the smaller part will be kept intact. That is one aspect ofthe situation. But within this greater part, which does not include the threenortheastern provinces, the enemy can actually hold only the big cities,the main lines of communication and some of the plains--which may rank firstin importance, but will probably constitute only the smaller part of theoccupied territory in size and population, while the greater part will betaken up by the guerrilla areas that will grow up everywhere. That is anotheraspect of the situation. If we go beyond the provinces south of the GreatWall and include Mongolia, Sinkiang, Chinghai and Tibet, then the unoccupiedarea will constitute the greater part of China's territory, and theenemy-occupied area will become the smaller part, even with the threenortheastern provinces. That is yet another aspect of the situation. Thearea kept intact is undoubtedly important, and we should devote great effortsto developing it, not only politically, militarily and economically but,what is also important, culturally. The enemy has transformed our formercultural centres into culturally backward areas, and we on our part musttransform the former culturally backward areas into cultural centres. Atthe same time, the work of developing extensive guerrilla areas behind theenemy lines is also extremely important, and we should attend to every aspectof this work, including the cultural. All in all, big pieces of China'sterritory, namely, the rural areas, will be transformed into regions of progressand light, while the small pieces, namely, the enemy-occupied areas andespecially the big cities, will temporarily become regions of backwardnessand darkness.
56. Thus it can be seen that the protracted and far-flung War of ResistanceAgainst Japan is a war of a jig-saw pattern militarily, politically, economicallyand culturally. It is a marvellous spectacle in the annals of war, a heroicundertaking by the Chinese nation, a magnificent and earth-shaking feat.This war will not only affect China and Japan, strongly impelling both toadvance, but will also affect the whole world, impelling all nations, especiallythe oppressed nations such as India, to march forward. Every Chinese shouldconsciously throw himself into this war of a jig-saw pattern, for this isthe form of war by which the Chinese nation is liberating itself, the specialform of war of liberation waged by a big semi-colonial country in the NineteenThirties and the Nineteen Forties.
57. The protracted nature of China's anti-Japanese war is inseparably connectedwith the fight for perpetual peace in China and the whole world. Never hasthere been a historical period such as the present in which war is so closeto perpetual peace. For several thousand years since the emergence of classes,the life of mankind has been full of wars; each nation has fought countlesswars, either internally or with other nations. In the imperialist epoch ofcapitalist society, wars are waged on a particularly extensive scale andwith a peculiar ruthlessness. The first great imperialist war of twenty yearsago was the first of its kind in history, but not the last. Only the warwhich has now begun comes close to being the final war, that is, comes closeto the perpetual peace of mankind. By now one-third of the world's populationhas entered the war. Look ! Italy, then Japan; Abyssinia, then Spain, thenChina. The population of the countries at war now amounts to almost 600 million,or nearly a third of the total population of the world. The characteristicsof the present war are its uninterruptedness and its proximity to perpetualpeace. Why is it uninterrupted? After attacking Abyssinia, Italy attackedSpain, and Germany joined in; then Japan attacked China. What will come next?Undoubtedly Hitler will fight the great powers. "Fascism is war"[18]--this is perfectly true. There will be nointerruption in the development of the present war into a world war; mankindwill not be able to avoid the calamity of war. Why then do we say the presentwar is near to perpetual peace? The present war is the result of the developmentof the general crisis of world capitalism which began with World War I; thisgeneral crisis is driving the capitalist countries into a new war and, aboveall, driving the fascist countries into new war adventures. This war, wecan foresee, will not save capitalism, but will hasten its collapse. It willbe greater in scale and more ruthless than the war of twenty years ago, allnations will inevitably be drawn in, it will drag on for a very long time,and mankind will suffer greatly. But, owing to the existence of the SovietUnion and the growing political consciousness of the people of the world,great revolutionary wars will undoubtedly emerge from this war to opposeall counter-revolutionary wars, thus giving this war the character of a strugglefor perpetual peace. Even if later there should be another period of war,perpetual world peace will not be far off. Once man has eliminated capitalism,he will attain the era of perpetual peace, and there will be no more needfor war. Neither armies, nor warships, nor military aircraft, nor poisongas will then be needed. Thereafter and for all time, mankind will neveragain know war. The revolutionary wars which have already begun are partof the war for perpetual peace. The war between China and Japan, two countrieswhich have a combined population of over 500 million, will take an importantplace in this war for perpetual peace, and out of it will come the liberationof the Chinese nation. The liberated new China of the future will be inseparablefrom the liberated new world of the future. Hence our War of Resistance AgainstJapan takes on the character of a struggle for perpetual peace.
58. History shows that wars are divided into two kinds, just and unjust.All wars that are progressive are just, and all wars that impede progressare unjust. We Communists oppose all unjust wars that impede progress, butwe do not oppose progressive, just wars. Not only do we Communists not opposejust wars, we actively participate in them. As for unjust wars, World WarI is an instance in which both sides fought for imperialist interests; thereforethe Communists of the whole world firmly opposed that war. The way to opposea war of this kind is to do everything possible to prevent it before it breaksout and, once it breaks out, to oppose war with war, to oppose unjust warwith just war, whenever possible. Japan's war is an unjust war that impedesprogress, and the peoples of the world, including the Japanese people, shouldoppose it and are opposing it. In our country the people and the government,the Communist Party and the Kuomintang, have all raised the banner ofrighteousness in the national revolutionary war against aggression. Our waris sacred and just, it is progressive and its aim is peace. The aim is peacenot just in one country but throughout the world, not just temporary butperpetual peace. To achieve this aim we must wage a life-and-death struggle,be prepared for any sacrifice, persevere to the end and never stop shortof the goal. However great the sacrifice and however long the time neededto attain it, a new world of perpetual peace and brightness already liesclearly before us. Our faith in waging this war is based upon the new Chinaand the new world of perpetual peace and brightness for which we are striving.Fascism and imperialism wish to perpetuate war, but we wish to put an endto it in the not too distant future. The great majority of mankind shouldexert their utmost efforts for this purpose. The 450 million people of Chinaconstitute one quarter of the world's population, and if by their concertedefforts they overthrow Japanese imperialism and create a new China of freedomand equality, they will most certainly be making a tremendous contributionto the struggle for perpetual world peace. This is no vain hope, for thewhole world is approaching this point in the course of its social and economicdevelopment, and provided that the majority of mankind work together, ourgoal will surely be attained in several decades.
59.We have so far explained why the war is a protracted war and why the finalvictory will be China's, and in the main dealt with what protracted war isand what it is not. Now we shall turn to the question of what to do and whatnot to do. How to conduct protracted war and how to win the final victory?These are the questions answered below. We shall therefore successively discussthe following problems: man's dynamic role in war, war and politics, politicalmobilization for the War of Resistance, the object of war, offence withindefence, quick decisions within a protracted war, exterior lines within interiorlines, initiative, flexibility, planning, mobile warfare, guerrilla warfare,positional warfare, war of annihilation, war of attrition, the possibilitiesof exploiting the enemy's mistakes, the question of decisive engagementsin the anti-Japanese war, and the army and the people as the foundation ofvictory. Let us start with the problem of man's dynamic role.
60. When we say we are opposed to a subjective approach to problems, we meanthat we must oppose ideas which are not based upon or do not correspond toobjective facts, because such ideas are fanciful and fallacious and willlead to failure if acted on. But whatever is done has to be done by humanbeings; protracted war and final victory will not come about without humanaction. For such action to be effective there must be people who derive ideas,principles or views from the objective facts, and put forward plans, directives,policies, strategies and tactics. Ideas, etc. are subjective, while deedsor actions are the subjective translated into the objective, but both representthe dynamic role peculiar to human beings. We term this kind of dynamic role"man's conscious dynamic role", and it is a characteristic that distinguishesman from all other beings. All ideas based upon and corresponding to objectivefacts are correct ideas, and all deeds or actions based upon correct ideasare correct actions. We must give full scope to these ideas and actions,to this dynamic role. The anti-Japanese war is being waged to drive outimperialism and transform the old China into a new China; this can be achievedonly when the whole Chinese people are mobilized and full scope is givento their conscious dynamic role in resisting Japan. If we just sit by andtake no action, only subjugation awaits us and there will be neither protractedwar nor final victory.
61. It is a human characteristic to exercise a conscious dynamic role. Manstrongly displays this characteristic in war. True, victory or defeat inwar is decided by the military, political, economic and geographical conditionson both sides, the nature of the war each side is waging and the internationalsupport each enjoys, but it is not decided by these alone; in themselves,all these provide only the possibility of victory or defeat but do not decidethe issue. To decide the issue, subjective effort must be added, namely,the directing and waging of war, man's conscious dynamic role in war.
62. In seeking victory, those who direct a war cannot overstep the limitationsimposed by the objective conditions; within these limitations, however, theycan and must play a dynamic role in striving for victory. The stage of actionfor commanders in a war must be built upon objective possibilities, but onthat stage they can direct the performance of many a drama, full of soundand colour, power and grandeur. Given the objective material foundations,the commanders in the anti-Japanese war should display their prowess andmarshal all their forces to crush the national enemy, transform the presentsituation in which our country and society are suffering from aggressionand oppression, and create a new China of freedom and equality; here is whereour subjective faculties for directing war can and must be exercised. Wedo not want any of our commanders in the war to detach himself from the objectiveconditions and become a blundering hothead, but we decidedly want every commanderto become a general who is both bold and sagacious. Our commanders shouldhave not only the boldness to overwhelm the enemy but also the ability toremain masters of the situation throughout the changes and vicissitudes ofthe entire war. Swimming in the ocean of war, they must not flounder butmake sure of reaching the opposite shore with measured strokes. Strategyand tactics, as the laws for directing war, constitute the art of swimmingin the ocean of war.
63. "War is the continuation of politics." In this sense war is politicsand war itself is a political action; since ancient times there has neverbeen a war that did not have a political character. The anti-Japanese waris a revolutionary war waged by the whole nation, and victory is inseparablefrom the political aim of the war--to drive out Japanese imperialism andbuild a new China of freedom and equality--inseparable from the general policyof persevering in the War of Resistance and in the united front, from themobilization of the entire people, and from the political principles of theunity between officers and men, the unity between army and people and thedisintegration of the enemy forces, and inseparable from the effectiveapplication of united front policy, from mobilization on the cultural front,and from the efforts to win international support and the support of thepeople inside Japan. In a word, war cannot for a single moment be separatedfrom politics. Any tendency among the anti-Japanese armed forces to belittlepolitics by isolating war from it and advocating the idea of war as an absoluteis wrong and should be corrected.
64. But war has its own particular characteristics and in this sense it cannotbe equated with politics in general. "War is the continuation of politicsby other . . . means."[19] When politics developsto a certain stage beyond which it cannot proceed by the usual means, warbreaks out to sweep the obstacles from the way. For instance, thesemi-independent status of China is an obstacle to the political growth ofJapanese imperialism, hence Japan has unleashed a war of aggression to sweepaway that obstacle. What about China? Imperialist oppression has long beenan obstacle to China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, hence many wars ofliberation have been waged in the effort to sweep it away. Japan is now usingwar for the purpose of oppressing China and completely blocking the advanceof the Chinese revolution, and therefore China is compelled to wage the Warof Resistance in her determination to sweep away this obstacle. When theobstacle is removed, our political aim will be attained and the war concluded.But if the obstacle is not completely swept away, the war will have to continuetill the aim is fully accomplished. Thus anyone who seeks a compromise beforethe task of the anti-Japanese war is fulfilled is bound to fail, becauseeven if a compromise were to occur for one reason or another, the war wouldbreak out again, since the broad masses of the people would certainly notsubmit but would continue the war until its political objective was achieved.It can therefore be said that politics is war without bloodshed while waris politics with bloodshed.
65. From the particular characteristics of war there arise a particular setof organizations, a particular series of methods and a particular kind ofprocess. The organizations are the armed forces and everything that goeswith them. The methods are the strategy and tactics for directing war. Theprocess is the particular form of social activity in which the opposing armedforces attack each other or defend themselves against one another, employingstrategy and tactics favourable to themselves and unfavourable to the enemy.Hence war experience is a particular kind of experience. All who take partin war must rid themselves of their customary ways and accustom themselvesto war before they can win victory.
66. A national revolutionary war as great as ours cannot be won without extensiveand thoroughgoing political mobilization. Before the anti-Japanese war therewas no political mobilization for resistance to Japan, and this was a greatdrawback, as a result of which China has already lost a move to the enemy.After the war began, political mobilization was very far from extensive,let alone thoroughgoing. It was the enemy's gunfire and the bombs droppedby enemy airplanes that brought news of the war to the great majority ofthe people. That was also a kind of mobilization, but it was done for usby the enemy, we did not do it ourselves. Even now the people in the remoterregions beyond the noise of the guns are carrying on quietly as usual. Thissituation must change, or otherwise we cannot win in our life-and-death struggle.We must never lose another move to the enemy; on the contrary, we must makefull use of this move, political mobilization, to get the better of him.This move is crucial; it is indeed of primary importance, while our inferiorityin weapons and other things is only secondary. The mobilization of the commonpeople throughout the country will create a vast sea in which to drown theenemy, create the conditions that will make up for our inferiority m armsand other things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming every difficultyin the war. To win victory, we must persevere in the War of Resistance, inthe united front and in the protracted war. But all these are inseparablefrom the mobilization of the common people. To wish for victory and yet neglectpolitical mobilization is like wishing to "go south by driving the chariotnorth", and the result would inevitably be to forfeit victory.
67. What does political mobilization mean? First, it means telling the armyand the people about the political aim of the war. It is necessary for everysoldier and civilian to see why the war must be fought and how it concernshim. The political aim of the war is "to drive out Japanese imperialism andbuild a new China of freedom and equality"; we must proclaim this aim toeverybody, to all soldiers and civilians, before we can create an anti-Japaneseupsurge and unite hundreds of millions as one man to contribute their allto the war. Secondly, it is not enough merely to explain the aim to them;the steps and policies for its attainment must also be given, that is, theremust be a political programme. We already have the Ten-Point Programme forResisting Japan and Saving the Nation and also the Programme of Armed Resistanceand National Reconstruction; we should popularize both of them in the armyand among the people and mobilize everyone to carry them out. Without aclear-cut, concrete political programme it is impossible to mobilize allthe armed forces and the whole people to carry the war against Japan throughto the end. Thirdly, how should we mobilize them? By word of mouth, by leafletsand bulletins, by newspapers, books and pamphlets, through plays and films,through schools, through the mass organizations and through our cadres. Whathas been done so far in the Kuomintang areas is only a drop in the ocean,and moreover it has been done in a manner ill-suited to the people's tastesand in a spirit uncongenial to them; this must be drastically changed. Fourthly,to mobilize once is not enough; political mobilization for the War of Resistancemust be continuous. Our job is not to recite our political programme to thepeople, for nobody will listen to such recitations; we must link the politicalmobilization for the war with developments in the war and with the life ofthe soldiers and the people, and make it a continuous movement. This is amatter of immense importance on which our victory in the war primarily depends.
68. Here we are not dealing with the political aim of war; the politicalaim of the War of Resistance Against Japan has been defined above as "todrive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom and equality".Here we are dealing with the elementary object of war, war as "politics withbloodshed", as mutual slaughter by opposing armies. The object of war isspecifically "to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy" (to destroy theenemy means to disarm him or "deprive him of the power to resist", and doesnot mean to destroy every member of his forces physically). In ancient warfare,the spear and the shield were used, the spear to attack and destroy the enemy,and the shield to defend and preserve oneself. To the present day, all weaponsare still an extension of the spear and the shield. The bomber, the machine-gun,the long-range gun and poison gas are developments of the spear, while theair-raid shelter, the steel helmet, the concrete fortification and the gasmask are developments of the shield. The tank is a new weapon combining thefunctions of both spear and shield. Attack is the chief means of destroyingthe enemy, but defence cannot be dispensed with. In attack the immediateobject is to destroy the enemy, but at the same time it is self-preservation,because if the enemy is not destroyed, you will be destroyed. In defencethe immediate object is to preserve yourself, but at the same time defenceis a means of supplementing attack or preparing to go over to the attack.Retreat is in the category of defence and is a continuation of defence, whilepursuit is a continuation of attack. It should be pointed out that destructionof the enemy is the primary object of war and self-preservation the secondary,because only by destroying the enemy in large numbers can one effectivelypreserve oneself. Therefore attack, the chief means of destroying the enemy,is primary, while defence, a supplementary means of destroying the enemyand a means of self-preservation, is secondary. In actual warfare the chiefrole is played by defence much of the time and by attack for the rest ofthe time, but if war is taken as a whole, attack remains primary.
69. How do we justify the encouragement of heroic sacrifice in war? Doesit not contradict "self-preservation"? No, it does not; sacrifice andself-preservation are both opposite and complementary to each other. Waris politics with bloodshed and exacts a price, sometimes an extremely highprice. Partial and temporary sacrifice (non-preservation) is incurred forthe sake of general and permanent preservation. This is precisely why wesay that attack, which is basically a means of destroying the enemy, alsohas the function of self-preservation. It is also the reason why defencemust be accompanied by attack and should not be defence pure and simple.
70. The object of war, namely, the preservation of oneself and the destructionof the enemy, is the essence of war and the basis of all war activities,an essence which pervades all war activities, from the technical to thestrategic. The object of war is the underlying principle of war, and notechnical, tactical, or strategic concepts or principles can in any way departfrom it. What for instance is meant by the principle of "taking cover andmaking full use of fire-power" in shooting? The purpose of the former isself-preservation, of the latter the destruction of the enemy. The formergives rise to such techniques as making use of the terrain and its features,advancing in spurts, and spreading out in dispersed formation. The lattergives rise to other techniques, such as clearing the field of fire and organizinga fire-net. As for the assault force, the containing force and the reserveforce in a tactical operation, the first is for annihilating the enemy, thesecond for preserving oneself, and the third is for either purpose accordingto circumstances--either for annihilating the enemy (in which case it reinforcesthe assault force or serves as a pursuit force), or for self-preservation(in which case it reinforces the containing force or serves as a coveringforce). Thus, no technical, tactical, or strategical principles or operationscan in any way depart from the object of war, and this object pervades thewhole of a war and runs through it from beginning to end.
71. In directing the anti-Japanese war, leaders at the various levels mustlose sight neither of the contrast between the fundamental factors on eachside nor of the object of this war. In the course of military operationsthese contrasting fundamental factors unfold themselves in the struggle byeach side to preserve itself and destroy the other. In our war we strivein every engagement to win a victory, big or small, and to disarm a partof the enemy and destroy a part of his men andmateriel.We mustaccumulate the results of these partial destructions of the enemy into majorstrategic victories and so achieve the final political aim of expelling theenemy, protecting the motherland and building a new China.
72. Now let us examine the specific strategy of the War of Resistance AgainstJapan. We have already said that our strategy for resisting Japan is thatof protracted war, and indeed this is perfectly right. But this strategyis general, not specific. Specifically, how should the protracted war beconducted? We shall now discuss this question. Our answer is as follows.In the first and second stages of the war,i.e., in the stages ofthe enemy's offensive and preservation of his gains, we should conduct tacticaloffensives within the strategic defensive, campaigns and battles of quickdecision within the strategically protracted war, and campaigns and battleson exterior lines within strategically interior lines. In the third stage,we should launch the strategic counter-offensive.
73. Since Japan is a strong imperialist power and we are a weak semi-colonialand semi-feudal country, she has adopted the policy of the strategic offensivewhile we are on the strategic defensive. Japan is trying to execute the strategyof a war of quick decision; we should consciously execute the strategy ofprotracted war. Japan is using dozens of army divisions of fairly high combateffectiveness (now numbering thirty) and part of her navy to encircle andblockade China from both land and sea, and is using her air force to bombChina. Her army has already established a long front stretching from Paotowto Hangchow and her navy has reached Fukien and Kwangtung; thus exterior-lineoperations have taken shape on a vast scale. On the other hand, we are inthe position of operating on interior lines. All this is due to the factthat the enemy is strong while we are weak. This is one aspect of the situation.
74. But there is another and exactly opposite aspect. Japan, though strong,does not have enough soldiers. China, though weak, has a vast territory,a large population and plenty of soldiers. Two important consequences follow.First, the enemy, employing his small forces against a vast country, canonly occupy some big cities and main lines of communication and part of theplains. Thus there are extensive areas in the territory under his occupationwhich he has had to leave ungarrisoned, and which provide a vast arena forour guerrilla warfare. Taking China as a whole, even if the enemy managesto occupy the line connecting Canton, Wuhan and Lanchow and its adjacentareas, he can hardly seize the regions beyond, and this gives China a generalrear and vital bases from which to carry on the protracted war to final victory.Secondly, in pitting his small forces against large forces, the enemy isencircled by our large forces. The enemy is attacking us along several routes,strategically he is on exterior lines while we are on interior lines,strategically he is on the offensive while we are on the defensive; all thislooks very much to our disadvantage. However, we can make use of our twoadvantages, namely, our vast territory and large forces, and, instead ofstubborn positional warfare, carry on flexible mobile warfare, employingseveral divisions against one enemy division, several tens of thousands ofour men against ten thousand of his, several columns against one of his columns,and suddenly encircling and attacking a single column from the exterior linesof the battlefield. In this way, while the enemy is on exterior lines andon the offensive in strategic operations, he will be forced to fight on interiorlines and on the defensive in campaigns and battles. And for us, interiorlines and the defensive in strategic operations will be transformed intoexterior lines and the offensive in campaigns and battles. This is the wayto deal with one or indeed with any advancing enemy column. Both the consequencesdiscussed above follow from the fact that the enemy is small while we arebig. Moreover, the enemy forces, though small, are strong (in arms and intraining) while our forces, though large, are weak (in arms and in trainingbut not in morale), and in campaigns and battles, therefore, we should notonly employ large forces against small and operate from exterior againstinterior lines, but also follow the policy of seeking quick decisions. Ingeneral, to achieve quick decision, we should attack a moving and not astationary enemy. We should concentrate a big force under cover beforehandalongside the route which the enemy is sure to take, and while he is on themove, advance suddenly to encircle and attack him before he knows what ishappening, and thus quickly conclude the battle. If we fight well, we maydestroy the entire enemy force or the greater part or some part of it, andeven if we do not fight so well, we may still inflict heavy casualties. Thisapplies to any and every one of our battles. If each month we could win onesizable victory like that at Pinghsingkuan or Taierhchuang, not to speakof more, it would greatly demoralize the enemy, stimulate the morale of ourown forces and evoke international support. Thus our strategically protractedwar is translated in the field into battles of quick decision. The enemy'swar of strategic quick decision is bound to change into protracted war afterhe is defeated in many campaigns and battles.
75. In a word, the above operational principle for fighting campaigns andbattles is one of "quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines". Itis the opposite of our strategic principle of "protracted defensive warfareon interior lines", and yet it is the indispensable principle for carryingout this strategy. If we should use "protracted defensive warfare on interiorlines" as the principle for campaigns and battles too, as we did at the beginningof the War of Resistance, it would be totally unsuited to the circumstancesin which the enemy is small while we are big and the enemy is strong whilewe are weak; in that case we could never achieve our strategic objectiveof a protracted war and we would be defeated by the enemy. That is why wehave always advocated the organization of the forces of the entire countryinto a number of large field armies, each counterposed to one of the enemy'sfield armies but having two, three or four times its strength, and so keepingthe enemy engaged in extensive theatres of war in accordance with the principleoutlined above. This principle of "quick-decision offensive warfare on exteriorlines" can and must be applied in guerrilla as well as in regular warfare.It is applicable not only to any one stage of the war but to its entire course.In the stage of strategic counter-offensive, when we are better equippedtechnically and are no longer in the position of the weak fighting the strong,we shall be able to capture prisoners and booty on a large scale all themore effectively if we continue to employ superior numbers in quick-decisionoffensive battles from exterior lines. For instance, if we employ two, threeor four mechanized divisions against one mechanized enemy division, we canbe all the more certain of destroying it. It is common sense that severalhefty fellows can easily beat one.
76. If we resolutely apply "quick-decision offensive warfare on exteriorlines" on a battlefield, we shall not only change the balance of forces onthat battlefield, but also gradually change the general situation. On thebattlefield we shall be on the offensive and the enemy on the defensive,we shall be employing superior numbers on exterior lines and the enemy inferiornumbers on interior lines, and we shall seek quick decisions, while the enemy,try as he may, will not be able to protract the fighting in the expectationof reinforcements; for all these reasons, the enemy's position will changefrom strong to weak, from superior to inferior, while that of our forceswill change from weak to strong, from inferior to superior. After many suchbattles have been victoriously fought, the general situation between us andthe enemy will change. That is to say, through the accumulation of victorieson many battlefields by quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines,we shall gradually strengthen ourselves and weaken the enemy, which willnecessarily affect the general balance of forces and bring about changesin it. When that happens, these changes, together with other factors on ourside and together with the changes inside the enemy camp and a favourableinternational situation, will turn the over-all situation between us andthe enemy first into one of parity and then into one of superiority for us.That will be the time for us to launch the counter-offensive and drive theenemy out of the country.
77. War is a contest of strength, but the original pattern of strength changesin the course of war. Here the decisive factor is subjective effort--winningmore victories and committing fewer errors. The objective factors providethe possibility for such change, but in order to turn this possibility intoactuality both correct policy and subjective effort are essential. It isthen that the subjective plays the decisive role.
78. In quick-decision offensive campaigns and battles on exterior lines,as discussed above, the crucial point is the "offensive"; "exterior lines"refers to the sphere of the offensive and "quick-decision" to its duration.Hence the name "quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines". It isthe best principle for waging a protracted war and it is also the principlefor what is known as mobile warfare. But it cannot be put into effect withoutinitiative, flexibility and planning. Let us now study these three questions.
79. We have already discussed man's conscious dynamic role, so why do wetalk about the initiative again? By conscious dynamic role we mean consciousaction and effort, a characteristic distinguishing man from other beings,and this human characteristic manifests itself most strongly in war; allthis has been discussed already. The initiative here means an army's freedomof action as distinguished from an enforced loss of freedom. Freedom of actionis the very life of an army and, once it is lost, the army is close to defeator destruction. The disarming of a soldier is the result of his losing freedomof action through being forced into a passive position. The same is trueof the defeat of an army. For this reason both sides in war do all they canto gain the initiative and avoid passivity. It may be said that thequick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines which we advocate andthe flexibility and planning necessary for its execution are designed togain the initiative and thus force the enemy into a passive position andachieve the object of preserving ourselves and destroying the enemy. Butinitiative or passivity is inseparable from superiority or inferiority inthe capacity to wage war. Consequently it is also inseparable from thecorrectness or incorrectness of the subjective direction of war. In addition,there is the question of exploiting the enemy's misconceptions and unpreparednessin order to gain the initiative and force the enemy into passivity. Thesepoints are analysed below.
80. Initiative is inseparable from superiority in capacity to wage war, whilepassivity is inseparable from inferiority in capacity to wage war. Suchsuperiority or inferiority is the objective basis of initiative or passivity.It is natural that the strategic initiative can be better maintained andexercised through a strategic offensive, but to maintain the initiative alwaysand everywhere, that is, to have the absolute initiative, is possible onlywhen there is absolute superiority matched against absolute inferiority.When a strong, healthy man wrestles with an invalid, he has the absoluteinitiative. If Japan were not riddled with insoluble contradictions, if,for instance, she could throw in a huge force of several million or ten millionmen all at once, if her financial resources were several times what theyare, if she had no opposition from her own people or from other countries,and if she did not pursue the barbarous policies which arouse the desperateresistance of the Chinese people, then she would be able to maintain absolutesuperiority and have the absolute initiative always and everywhere. In history,such absolute superiority rarely appears in the early stages of a war ora campaign but is to be found towards its end. For instance, on the eve ofGermany's capitulation in World War I, the Entente countries became absolutelysuperior and Germany absolutely inferior, so that Germany was defeated andthe Entente countries were victorious; this is an example of absolute superiorityand inferiority towards the end of a war. Again, on the eve of the Chinesevictory at Taierhchuang, the isolated Japanese forces there were reducedafter bitter fighting to absolute inferiority while our forces achieved absolutesuperiority, so that the enemy was defeated and we were victorious; thisis an example of absolute superiority and inferiority towards the end ofa campaign. A war or campaign may also end in a situation of relative superiorityor of parity, in which case there is compromise in the war or stalemate inthe campaign. But in most cases it is absolute superiority and inferioritythat decide victory and defeat. All this holds for the end of a war or acampaign, and not for the beginning. The outcome of the Sino-Japanese war,it can be predicted, will be that Japan will become absolutely inferior andbe defeated and that China will become absolutely superior and gain victory.But at present superiority or inferiority is not absolute on either side,but is relative. With the advantages of her military, economic andpolitical-organizational power, Japan enjoys superiority over us with ourmilitary, economic and political-organizational weakness, which creates thebasis for her initiative. But since quantitatively her military and otherpower is not great and she has many other disadvantages, her superiorityis reduced by her own contradictions. Upon her invasion of China, her superiorityhas been reduced still further because she has come up against our vastterritory, large population, great numbers of troops and resolute nation-wideresistance. Hence, Japan's general position has become one of only relativesuperiority, and her ability to exercise and maintain the initiative, whichis thereby restricted, has likewise become relative. As for China, thoughplaced in a somewhat passive position strategically because of her inferiorstrength, she is nevertheless quantitatively superior in territory, populationand troops, and also superior in the morale of her people and army and theirpatriotic hatred of the enemy; this superiority, together with other advantages,reduces the extent of her inferiority in military, economic and other power,and changes it into a relative strategic inferiority. This also reduces thedegree of China's passivity so that her strategic position is one of onlyrelative passivity. Any passivity, however, is a disadvantage, and one muststrive hard to shake it off. Militarily, the way to do so is resolutely towage quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines, to launch guerrillawarfare in the rear of the enemy and so secure overwhelming local superiorityand initiative in many campaigns of mobile and guerrilla warfare. Throughsuch local superiority and local initiative in many campaigns, we can graduallycreate strategic superiority and strategic initiative and extricate ourselvesfrom strategic inferiority and passivity. Such is the interrelation betweeninitiative and passivity, between superiority and inferiority.
81. From this we can also understand the relationship between initiativeor passivity and the subjective directing of war. As already explained, itis possible to escape from our position of relative strategic inferiorityand passivity, and the method is to create local superiority and initiativein many campaigns, so depriving the enemy of local superiority and initiativeand plunging him into inferiority and passivity. These local successes willadd up to strategic superiority and initiative for us and strategic inferiorityand passivity for the enemy. Such a change depends upon correct subjectivedirection. Why? Because while we seek superiority and the initiative, sodoes the enemy; viewed from this angle, war is a contest in subjective abilitybetween the commanders of the opposing armies in their struggle for superiorityand for the initiative on the basis of material conditions such as militaryforces and financial resources. Out of the contest there emerge a victorand a vanquished; leaving aside the contrast in objective material conditions,the victor will necessarily owe his success to correct subjective directionand the vanquished his defeat to wrong subjective direction. We admit thatthe phenomenon of war is more elusive and is characterized by greater uncertaintythan any other social phenomenon, in other words, that it is more a matterof "probability". Yet war is in no way supernatural, but a mundane processgoverned by necessity. That is why Sun Wu Tzu's axiom, "Know the enemy andknow yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat",[20] remains a scientific truth. Mistakes arisefrom ignorance about the enemy and about ourselves, and moreover the peculiarnature of war makes it impossible in many cases to have full knowledge aboutboth sides; hence the uncertainty about military conditions and operations,and hence mistakes and defeats. But whatever the situation and the movesin a war, one can know their general aspects and essential points. It ispossible for a commander to reduce errors and give generally correct direction,first through all kinds of reconnaissance and then through intelligent inferenceand judgement. Armed with the weapon of "generally correct direction", wecan win more battles and transform our inferiority into superiority and ourpassivity into initiative. This is how initiative or passivity is relatedto the correct or incorrect subjective direction of a war.
82. The thesis that incorrect subjective direction can change superiorityand initiative into inferiority and passivity, and that correct subjectivedirection can effect a reverse change, becomes all the more convincing whenwe look at the record of defeats suffered by big and powerful armies andof victories won by small and weak armies. There are many such instancesin Chinese and foreign history. Examples in China are the Battle of Chengpubetween the states of Tsin and Chu,[21] the Battleof Chengkao between the states of Chu and Han,[22] the Battle in which Han Hsin defeated the Chaoarmies,[23] the Battle of Kunyang between thestates of Hsin and Han, [24] the Battle of Kuantubetween Yuan Shao and Tsao Tsao,[25] the Battleof Chihpi between the states of Wu and Wei, [26]the Battle of Yiling between the states of Wu and Shu,[27] the Battle of Feishui between the states ofChin and Tsin,[28] etc. Among examples to be foundabroad are most of Napoleon's campaigns and the civil war in the Soviet Unionafter the October Revolution. In all these instances, victory was won bysmall forces over big and by inferior over superior forces. In every case,the weaker force, pitting local superiority and initiative against the enemy'slocal inferiority and passivity, first inflicted one sharp defeat on theenemy and then turned on the rest of his forces and smashed them one by one,thus transforming the over-all situation into one of superiority and initiative.The reverse was the case with the enemy who originally had superiority andheld the initiative; owing to subjective errors and internal contradictions,it sometimes happened that he completely lost an excellent or fairly goodposition in which he enjoyed superiority and initiative, and became a generalwithout an army or a king without a kingdom. Thus it can be seen that althoughsuperiority or inferiority in the capacity to wage war is the objective basisdetermining initiative or passivity, it is not in itself actual initiativeor passivity; it is only through a struggle, a contest of ability, that actualinitiative or passivity can emerge. In the struggle, correct subjective directioncan transform inferiority into superiority and passivity into initiative,and incorrect subjective direction can do the opposite. The fact that everyruling dynasty was defeated by revolutionary armies shows that mere superiorityin certain respects does not guarantee the initiative, much less the finalvictory. The inferior side can wrest the initiative and victory from thesuperior side by securing certain conditions through active subjective endeavourin accordance with the actual circumstances.
83. To have misconceptions and to be caught unawares may mean to lose superiorityand initiative. Hence, deliberately creating misconceptions for the enemyand then springing surprise attacks upon him are two ways--indeed two importantmeans--of achieving superiority and seizing the initiative. What aremisconceptions? "To see every bush and tree on Mount Pakung as an enemysoldier" [29] is an example of misconception.And "making a feint to the east but attacking in the west" is a way of creatingmisconceptions among the enemy. When the mass support is sufficiently goodto block the leakage of news, it is often possible by various ruses to succeedin leading the enemy into a morass of wrong judgements and actions so thathe loses his superiority and the initiative. The saying, "There can neverbe too much deception in war", means precisely this. What does "being caughtunawares" mean? It means being unprepared. Without preparedness superiorityis not real superiority and there can be no initiative either. Having graspedthis point, a force which is inferior but prepared can often defeat a superiorenemy by surprise attack. We say an enemy on the move is easy to attack preciselybecause he is then off guard, that is, unprepared. These two points--creatingmisconceptions among the enemy and springing surprise attacks on him-- meantransferring the uncertainties of war to the enemy while securing the greatestpossible certainty for ourselves and thereby gaining superiority, the initiativeand victory. Excellent organization of the masses is the prerequisite forattaining all this. Therefore it is extremely important to arouse all thepeople who are opposed to the enemy, to arm themselves to the last man, makewidespread raids on the enemy and also prevent the leakage of news and providea screen for our own forces; in this way the enemy will be kept in the darkabout where and when our forces will attack, and an objective basis willbe created for misconceptions and unpreparedness on his part. It was largelyowing to the organized, armed masses of the people that the weak and smallforce of the Chinese Red Army was able to win many battles in the periodof the Agrarian Revolutionary War. Logically, a national war should win broadermass support than an agrarian revolutionary war; however, as a result ofpast mistakes [30] the people are in an unorganizedstate, cannot be promptly drawn in to serve the cause and are sometimes evenmade use of by the enemy. The resolute rallying of the people on a broadscale is the only way to secure inexhaustible resources to meet all therequirements of the war. Moreover, it will definitely play a big part incarrying out our tactics of defeating the enemy by misleading him and catchinghim unawares. We are not Duke Hsiang of Sung and have no use for his asinineethics.[31] In order to achieve victory we mustas far as possible make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his eyes andears and drive his commanders to distraction by creating confusion in theirminds. The above concerns the way in which the initiative or passivity isrelated to the subjective direction of the war. Such subjective directionis indispensable for defeating Japan.
84. By and large, Japan has held the initiative in the stage of her offensiveby reason of her military power and her exploitation of our subjective errors,past and present. But her initiative is beginning to wane to some extentbecause of her many inherent disadvantages and of the subjective errors shetoo has committed in the course of the war (of which more later) and alsobecause of our many advantages. The enemy's defeat at Taierhchuang and hispredicament in Shansi prove this clearly. The widespread development of guerrillawarfare in the enemy's rear has placed his garrisons in the occupied areasin a completely passive position. Although he is still on the offensivestrategically and still holds the initiative, his initiative will end whenhis strategic offensive ends. The first reason why the enemy will not beable to maintain the initiative is that his shortage of troops renders itimpossible for him to carry on the offensive indefinitely. Our offensivewarfare in campaigns and our guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, togetherwith other factors, constitute the second reason why he will have to ceasehis offensive at a certain limit and will not be able to keep his initiative.The existence of the Soviet Union and changes in the international situationconstitute the third reason. Thus it can be seen that the enemy's initiativeis limited and can be shattered. If, in military operations, China can keepup offensive warfare by her main forces in campaigns and battles, vigorouslydevelop guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear and mobilize the people ona broad scale politically, we can gradually build up a position of strategicinitiative.
85. Let us now discuss flexibility. What is flexibility? It is the concreterealization of the initiative in military operations; it is the flexibleemployment of armed forces. The flexible employment of armed forces is thecentral task in directing a war, a task most difficult to perform well. Inaddition to organizing and educating the army and the people, the businessof war consists in the employment of troops in combat, and all these thingsare done to win the fight. Of course it is difficult to organize an army,etc., but it is even more difficult to employ it, particularly when the weakare fighting the strong. To do so requires subjective ability of a very highorder and requires the overcoming of the confusion, obscurity and uncertaintypeculiar to war and the discovery of order, clarity and certainty in it;only thus can flexibility in command be realized.
86. The basic principle of field operations for the War of Resistance AgainstJapan is quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines. There are varioustactics or methods for giving effect to this principle, such as dispersionand concentration of forces, diverging advance and converging attack, theoffensive and the defensive, assault and containment, encirclement andoutflanking, advance and retreat. It is easy to understand these tactics,but not at all easy to employ and vary them flexibly. Here the three cruciallinks are the time, the place and the troops. No victory can be won unlessthe time, the place and the troops are well chosen. For example, in attackingan enemy force on the move, if we strike too early, we expose ourselves andgive the enemy a chance to prepare, and if we strike too late, the enemymay have encamped and concentrated his forces, presenting us with a hardnut to crack. This is the question of the time. If we select a point of assaulton the left flank which actually turns out to be the enemy's weak point,victory will be easy; but if we select the right flank and hit a snag, nothingwill be achieved. This is the question of the place. If a particular unitof our forces is employed for a particular task, victory may be easy; butif another unit is employed for the same task, it may be hard to achieveresults. This is the question of the troops. We should know not only howto employ tactics but how to vary them. For flexibility of command the importanttask is to make changes such as from the offensive to the defensive or fromthe defensive to the offensive, from advance to retreat or from retreat toadvance, from containment to assault or from assault to containment, fromencirclement to outflanking or from outflanking to encirclement, and to makesuch changes properly and in good time according to the circumstances ofthe troops and terrain on both sides. This is true of command in campaignsand strategic command as well as of command in battles.
87. The ancients said: "Ingenuity in varying tactics depends on mother wit";this "ingenuity", which is what we mean by flexibility, is the contributionof the intelligent commander. Flexibility does not mean recklessness;recklessness must be rejected. Flexibility consists in the intelligentcommander's ability to take timely and appropriate measures on the basisof objective conditions after "judging the hour and sizing up the situation"(the "situation" includes the enemy's situation, our situation and the terrain),and this flexibility is "ingenuity in varying tactics". On the basis of thisingenuity, we can win more victories in quick-decision offensive warfareon exterior lines, change the balance of forces in our favour, gain theinitiative over the enemy, and overwhelm and crush him so that the finalvictory will be ours.
88. Let us now discuss the question of planning. Because of the uncertaintypeculiar to war, it is much more difficult to prosecute war according toplan than is the case with other activities. Yet, since "preparedness ensuressuccess and unpreparedness spells failure", there can be no victory in warwithout advance planning and preparations. There is no absolute certaintyin war, and yet it is not without some degree of relative certainty. We arecomparatively certain about our own situation. We are very uncertain aboutthe enemy's, but here too there are signs for us to read, clues to followand sequences of phenomena to ponder. These form what we call a degree ofrelative certainty, which provides an objective basis for planning in war.Modern technical developments (telegraphy, radio, airplanes, motor vehicles,railways, steamships, etc.) have added to the possibilities of planning inwar. However, complete or stable planning is difficult because there is onlyvery limited and transient certainty in war; such planning must change withthe movement (flow or change) of the war and vary in degree according tothe scale of the war. Tactical plans, such as plans for attack or defenceby small formations or units, often have to be changed several times a day.A plan of campaign, that is, of action by large formations, can generallystand till the conclusion of the campaign, in the course of which, however,it is often changed partially or sometimes even wholly. A strategic planbased on the over-all situation of both belligerents is still more stable,but it too is applicable only in a given strategic stage and has to be changedwhen the war moves towards a new stage. The making and changing of tactical,campaign and strategic plans in accordance with scope and circumstance isa key factor in directing a war; it is the concrete expression of flexibilityin war, in other words, it is also ingenuity in varying one's tactics. Commandersat all levels in the anti-Japanese war should take note.
89. Because of the fluidity of war, some people categorically deny that warplans or policies can be relatively stable, describing such plans or policiesas "mechanical". This view is wrong. In the preceding section we fully recognizedthat, because the circumstances of war are only relatively certain and theflow (movement or change) of war is rapid, war plans or policies can be onlyrelatively stable and have to be changed or revised in good time in accordancewith changing circumstances and the flow of the war; otherwise we would becomemechanists. But one must not deny the need for war plans or policies thatare relatively stable over given periods; to negate this is to negate everything,including the war itself as well as the negator himself. As both militaryconditions and operations are relatively stable, we must grant the relativestability of the war plans and policies resulting from them. For example,since both the circumstances of the war in northern China and the dispersednature of the Eighth Route Army's operations are relatively stable for aparticular stage, it is absolutely necessary during this stage to acknowledgethe relative stability of the Eighth Route Army's strategic principle ofoperation, namely "Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance for mobilewarfare under favourable conditions." The period of validity of a plan fora campaign is shorter than that of a strategic plan, and for a tactical planit is shorter still, but each is stable over a given period. Anyone denyingthis point would have no way of handling warfare and would become a relativistin war with no settled views, for whom one course is just as wrong or justas right as another. No one denies that even a plan valid for a given periodis fluid; otherwise, one plan would never be abandoned in favour of another.But it is fluid within limits, fluid within the bounds of the various waroperations undertaken for carrying it out, but not fluid as to its essence;in other words it is quantitatively but not qualitatively fluid. Within sucha given period of time, this essence is definitely not fluid, which is whatwe mean by relative stability within a given period. In the great river ofabsolute fluidity throughout the war there is relative stability at eachparticular stretch--such is our fundamental view regarding war plans or policies.
90. Having dealt with protracted defensive warfare on interior lines in strategyand with quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaignsand battles, and also with the initiative, flexibility and planning, we cannow sum up briefly. The anti-Japanese war must have a plan. War plans, whichare the concrete application of strategy and tactics, must be flexible sothat they can be adapted to the circumstances of the war. We should alwaysseek to transform our inferiority into superiority and our passivity intothe initiative so as to change the situation as between the enemy and ourselves.All these find expression in quick-decision offensive warfare on exteriorlines in campaigns and battles and protracted defensive warfare on interiorlines in strategy.
91. A war will take the form of mobile warfare when its content is quick-decisionoffensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles within the frameworkof the strategy of interior lines, protracted war and defence. Mobile warfareis the form in which regular armies wage quick-decision offensive campaignsand battles on exterior lines along extensive fronts and over big areas ofoperation. At the same time, it includes "mobile defence", which is conductedwhen necessary to facilitate such offensive battles; it also includes positionalattack and positional defence in a supplementary role. Its characteristicsare regular armies, superiority of forces in campaigns and battles, theoffensive, and fluidity.
92. China has a vast territory and an immense number of soldiers, but hertroops are inadequately equipped and trained; the enemy's forces, on theother hand, are inadequate in number, but better equipped and trained. Inthis situation, there is no doubt that we must adopt offensive mobile warfareas our primary form of warfare, supplementing it by others and integratingthem all into mobile warfare. We must oppose "only retreat, never advance",which is flightism, and at the same time oppose "only advance, never retreat"which is desperate recklessness.
93. One of the characteristics of mobile warfare is fluidity, which not onlypermits but requires a field army to advance and to withdraw in great strides.However, it has nothing in common with flightism of the Han Fu-chubrand.[32] The primary requirement of war is todestroy the enemy, and the other requirement is self-preservation. The objectof self-preservation is to destroy the enemy, and to destroy the enemy isin turn the most effective means of self-preservation. Hence mobile warfareis in no way an excuse for people like Han Pu-chu and can never mean movingonly backward, and never forward; that kind of "moving" which negates thebasic offensive character of mobile warfare would, in practice, "move" Chinaout of existence despite her vastness.
94. However, the other view, which we call the desperate recklessness of"only advance, never retreat", is also wrong. The mobile warfare we advocate,the content of which is quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior linesin campaigns and battles, includes positional warfare in a supplementaryrole, "mobile defence" and retreat, without all of which mobile warfare cannotbe fully carried out. Desperate recklessness is military short-sightedness,originating often from fear of losing territory. A man who acts with desperaterecklessness does not know that one characteristic of mobile warfare is fluidity,which not only permits but requires a field army to advance and to withdrawin great strides. On the positive side, in order to draw the enemy into afight unfavourable to him but favourable to us, it is usually necessary thathe should be on the move and that we should have a number of advantages,such as favourable terrain, a vulnerable enemy, a local population that canprevent the leakage of information, and the enemy's fatigue and unpreparedness.This requires that the enemy should advance, and we should not grudge a temporaryloss of part of our territory. For the temporary loss of part of our territoryis the price we pay for the permanent preservation of all our territory,including the recovery of lost territory. On the negative side, wheneverwe are forced into a disadvantageous position which fundamentally endangersthe preservation of our forces, we should have the courage to retreat, soas to preserve our forces and hit the enemy when new opportunities arise.In their ignorance of this principle, the advocates of desperate action willcontest a city or a piece of ground even when the position is obviously anddefinitely unfavourable; as a result, they not only lose the city or groundbut fail to preserve their forces. We have always advocated the policy of"luring the enemy in deep", precisely because it is the most effective militarypolicy for a weak army strategically on the defensive to employ against astrong army.
95. Among the forms of warfare in the anti-Japanese war mobile warfare comesfirst and guerrilla warfare second. When we say that in the entire war mobilewarfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary, we mean that theoutcome of the war depends mainly on regular warfare, especially in its mobileform, and that guerrilla warfare cannot shoulder the main responsibilityin deciding the outcome. It does not follow, however, that the role of guerrillawarfare is unimportant in the strategy of the war. Its role in the strategyof the war as a whole is second only to that of mobile warfare, for withoutits support we cannot defeat the enemy. In saying this we also have in mindthe strategic task of developing guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare. Guerrillawarfare will not remain the same throughout this long and cruel war, butwill rise to a higher level and develop into mobile warfare. Thus the strategicrole of guerrilla warfare is twofold, to support regular warfare and to transformitself into regular warfare. Considering the unprecedented extent and durationof guerrilla warfare in China's War of Resistance, it is all the more importantnot to underestimate its strategic role. Guerrilla warfare in China, therefore,has not only its tactical but also its peculiar strategic problems. I havealready discussed this in "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War AgainstJapan". As indicated above, the forms of warfare in the three strategic stagesof the War of Resistance are as follows. In the first stage mobile warfareis primary, while guerrilla and positional warfare are supplementary. Inthe second stage guerrilla warfare will advance to the first place and willbe supplemented by mobile and positional warfare. In the third stage mobilewarfare will again become the primary form and will be supplemented by positionaland guerrilla warfare. But the mobile warfare of the third stage will nolonger be undertaken solely by the original regular forces; part, possiblyquite an important part, will be undertaken by forces which were originallyguerrillas but which will have progressed from guerrilla to mobile warfare.From the viewpoint of all three stages in China's War of Resistance AgainstJapan, guerrilla warfare is definitely indispensable. Our guerrilla war willpresent a great drama unparalleled in the annals of war. For this reason,out of the millions of China's regular troops, it is absolutely necessaryto assign at least several hundred thousand to disperse through allenemy-occupied areas, arouse the masses to arm themselves, and wage guerrillawarfare in co-ordination with the masses. The regular forces so assignedshould shoulder this sacred task conscientiously, and they should not thinktheir status lowered because they fight fewer big battles and for the timebeing do not appear as national heroes. Any such thinking is wrong. Guerrillawarfare does not bring as quick results or as great renown as regular warfare,but "a long road tests a horse's strength and a long task proves a man'sheart", and in the course of this long and cruel war guerrilla warfare willdemonstrate its immense power; it is indeed no ordinary undertaking. Moreover,such regular forces can conduct guerrilla warfare when dispersed and mobilewarfare when concentrated, as the Eighth Route Army has been doing. The principleof the Eighth Route Army is, "Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chancefor mobile warfare under favourable conditions." This principle is perfectlycorrect; the views of its opponents are wrong.
96. At China's present technical level, positional warfare, defensive oroffensive, is generally impracticable, and this is where our weakness manifestsitself. Moreover, the enemy is also exploiting the vastness of our territoryto bypass our fortified positions. Hence positiona1 warfare cannot be animportant, still less the principal, means for us. But in the first and secondstages of the war, it is possible and essential, within the scope of mobilewarfare, to employ localized positional warfare in a supplementary role incampaigns. Semi-positional "mobile defence" is a still more essential partof mobile warfare undertaken for the purpose of resisting the enemy at everystep, thereby depleting his forces and gaining extra time. China must striveto increase her supplies of modern weapons so that she can fully carry outthe tasks of positional attack in the stage of the strategic counter-offensive.In this third stage positional warfare will undoubtedly play a greater role,for then the enemy will be holding fast to his positions, and we shall notbe able to recover our lost territory unless we launch powerful positionalattacks in support of mobile warfare. Nevertheless, in the third stage too,we must exert our every effort to make mobile warfare the primary form ofwarfare. For the art of directing war and the active role of man are largelynullified in positional warfare such as that fought in Western Europe inthe second half of World War I. It is only natural that the war should betaken "out of the trenches", since the war is being fought in the vast expansesof China and since our side will remain poorly equipped technically for quitea long time. Even during the third stage, when China's technical positionwill be better, she will hardly surpass her enemy in that respect, and sowill have to concentrate on highly mobile warfare, without which she cannotachieve final victory. Hence, throughout the War of Resistance China willnot adopt positional warfare as primary; the primary or important forms aremobile warfare and guerrilla warfare. These two forms of warfare will affordfull play to the art of directing war and to the active role of man-- whata piece of good fortune out of our misfortune!
97. As we have said before, the essence, or the object, of war is to preserveoneself and destroy the enemy. Since there are three forms of warfare, mobile,positional and guerrilla, for achieving this object, and since they differin degrees of effectiveness, there arises the broad distinction between warof attrition and war of annihilation.
98. To begin with, we may say that the anti-Japanese war is at once a warof attrition and a war of annihilation. Why? Because the enemy is stillexploiting his strength and retains strategic superiority and strategicinitiative, and therefore, unless we fight campaigns and battles of annihilation,we cannot effectively and speedily reduce his strength and break his superiorityand initiative. We still have our weakness and have not yet rid ourselvesof strategic inferiority and passivity; therefore, unless we fight campaignsand battles of annihilation, we cannot win time to improve our internal andinternational situation and alter our unfavourable position. Hence campaignsof annihilation are the means of attaining the objective of strategic attrition.In this sense war of annihilation is war of attrition. It is chiefly by usingthe method of attrition through annihilation that China can wage protractedwar.
99. But the objective of strategic attrition may also be achieved by campaignsof attrition. Generally speaking, mobile warfare performs the task ofannihilation, positional warfare performs the task of attrition, and guerrillawarfare performs both simultaneously; the three forms of warfare are thusdistinguished from one another. In this sense war of annihilation is differentfrom war of attrition. Campaigns of attrition are supplementary but necessaryin protracted war.
100. Speaking theoretically and in terms of China's needs, in order to achievethe strategic objective of greatly depleting the enemy's forces, China inher defensive stage should not only exploit the function of annihilation,which is fulfilled primarily by mobile warfare and partially by guerrillawarfare, but also exploit the function of attrition, which is fulfilled primarilyby positional warfare (which itself is supplementary) and partially by guerrillawarfare. In the stage of stalemate we should continue to exploit the functionsof annihilation and attrition fulfilled by guerrilla and mobile warfare forfurther large-scale depletion of the enemy's forces. All this is aimed atprotracting the war, gradually changing the general balance of forces andpreparing the conditions for our counter-offensive. During the strategiccounter-offensive, we should continue to employ the method of attrition throughannihilation so as finally to expel the enemy.
101. But as a matter of fact, it was our experience in the last ten monthsthat many or even most of the mobile warfare campaigns became campaigns ofattrition, and guerrilla warfare did not adequately fulfil its proper functionof annihilation in certain areas. The positive aspect is that at least wedepleted the enemy's forces, which is important both for the protracted warfareand for our final victory, and did not shed our blood in vain. But the drawbacksare first, that we did not sufficiently deplete the enemy, and second, thatwe were unable to avoid rather heavy losses and captured little war booty.Although we should recognize the objective cause of this situation, namely,the disparity between us and the enemy in technical equipment and in thetraining of troops, in any case it is necessary, both theoretically andpractically, to urge that our main forces should fight vigorous battles ofannihilation whenever circumstances are favourable. And although our guerrillaunits have to wage battles of pure attrition in performing specific taskssuch as sabotage and harassment, it is necessary to advocate and vigorouslycarry out campaigns and battles of annihilation whenever circumstances arefavourable, so as greatly to deplete the enemy's forces and greatly replenishour own.
102. The "exterior lines", the "quick-decision" and the "offensive" inquick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines and the "mobility" inmobile warfare find their main operational expression in the use of encirclingand outflanking tactics; hence the necessity for concentrating superior forces.Therefore concentration of forces and the use of encircling and outflankingtactics are the prerequisites for mobile warfare, that is, for quick-decisionoffensive warfare on exterior lines. All this is aimed at annihilating theenemy forces.
103. The strength of the Japanese army lies not only in its weapons but alsoin the training of its officers and men--its degree of organization, itsself-confidence arising from never having been defeated, its superstitiousbelief in the Mikado and in supernatural beings, its arrogance, its contemptfor the Chinese people and other such characteristics, all of which stemfrom long years of indoctrination by the Japanese warlords and from the Japanesenational tradition. This is the chief reason why we have taken very fewprisoners, although we have killed and wounded a great many enemy troops.It is a point that has been underestimated by many people in the past. Todestroy these enemy characteristics will be a long process. The first thingto do is to give the matter serious attention, and then patiently andsystematically to work at it in the political field and in the fields ofinternational propaganda and the Japanese people's movement; in the militarysphere war of annihilation is of course one of the means. In these enemycharacteristics pessimists may find a basis for the theory of nationalsubjugation, and passively minded military men a basis for opposition towar of annihilation. We, on the contrary, maintain that these strong pointsof the Japanese army can be destroyed and that their destruction has alreadybegun. The chief method of destroying them is to win over the Japanese soldierspolitically. We should understand, rather than hurt, their pride and channelit in the proper direction and, by treating prisoners of war leniently, leadthe Japanese soldiers to see the anti-popular character of the aggressioncommitted by the Japanese rulers. On the other hand, we should demonstrateto the Japanese soldiers the indomitable spirit and the heroic, stubbornfighting capacity of the Chinese army and the Chinese people, that is, weshould deal them blows in battles of annihilation. Our experience in thelast ten months of military operations shows that it is possible to annihilateenemy forces--witness the Pinghsingkuan and Taierhchuang campaigns. The Japanesearmy's morale is beginning to sag, its soldiers do not understand the aimof the war, they are engulfed by the Chinese armies and by the Chinese people,in assault they show far less courage than the Chinese soldiers, and so on;all these are objective factors favourable to waging battles of annihilation,and they will, moreover, steadily develop as the war becomes protracted.From the viewpoint of destroying the enemy's overweening arrogance throughbattles of annihilation, such battles are one of the prerequisites for shorteningthe war and accelerating the emancipation of the Japanese soldiers and theJapanese people. Cats make friends with cats, and nowhere in the world docats make friends with mice.
104. On the other hand, it must be admitted that for the present we are inferiorto the enemy in technical equipment and in troop training. Therefore, itis often difficult to achieve the maximum in annihilation, such as capturingthe whole or the greater part of an enemy force, especially when fightingon the plains. In this connection the excessive demands of the theoristsof quick victory are wrong. What should be demanded of our forces in theanti-Japanese war is that they should fight battles of annihilation as faras possible. In favourable circumstances, we should concentrate superiorforces in every battle and employ encircling and outflanking tactics--encirclepart if not all of the enemy forces, capture part if not all of the encircledforces, and inflict heavy casualties on part of the encircled forces if wecannot capture them. In circumstances which are unfavourable for battlesof annihilation, we should fight battles of attrition. In favourablecircumstances, we should employ the principle of concentration of forces,and in unfavourable circumstances that of their dispersion. As for therelationship of command in campaigns, we should apply the principle ofcentralized command in the former and that of decentralized command in thelatter. These are the basic principles of field operations for the War ofResistance Against Japan.
105. The enemy command itself provides a basis for the possibility of defeatingJapan. History has never known an infallible general and the enemy makesmistakes just as we ourselves can hardly avoid making them; hence, thepossibility exists of exploiting the enemy's errors. In the ten months ofhis war of aggression the enemy has already made many mistakes in strategyand tactics. There are five major ones.
First, piecemeal reinforcement. This is due to the enemy's underestimation of China and also to his shortage of troops. The enemy has always looked down on us. After grabbing the four northeastern provinces at small cost, he occupied eastern Hopei and northern Chahar, all by way of strategic reconnaissance. The conclusion the enemy came to was that the Chinese nation is a heap of loose sand. Thus, thinking that China would crumble at a single blow, he mapped out a plan of "quick decision", attempting with very small forces to send us scampering in panic. He did not expect to find such great unity and such immense powers of resistance as China has shown during the past ten months, forgetting as he did that China is already in an era of progress and already has an advanced political party, an advanced army and an advanced people. Meeting with setbacks, the enemy then increased his forces piecemeal from about a dozen to thirty divisions. If he wants to advance, he will have to augment his forces still further. But because of Japan's antagonism with the Soviet Union and her inherent shortage of manpower and finances, there are inevitable limits to the maximum number of men she can throw in and to the furthest extent of her advance.
Second, absence of a main direction of attack. Before the Taierhchuang campaign, the enemy had divided his forces more or less evenly between northern and central China and had again divided them inside each of these areas. In northern China, for instance, he divided his forces among the Tientsin-pukow, the Peiping-Hankow and the Tatung-Puchow Railways, and along each of these lines he suffered some casualties and left some garrisons in the places occupied, after which he lacked the forces for further advances. After the Taierhchuang defeat, from which he learned a lesson, the enemy concentrated his main forces in the direction of Hsuchow, and so temporarily corrected this mistake.
Third, lack of strategic co-ordination. On the whole coordination exists within the groups of enemy forces in northern China and in central China, but there is glaring lack of coordination between the two. When his forces on the southern section of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway attacked Hsiaopengpu, those on the northern section made no move, and when his forces on the northern section attacked Taierhchuang, those on the southern section made no move. After the enemy came to grief at both places, the Japanese minister of war arrived on an inspection tour and the chief of general staff turned up to take charge, and for the moment, it seemed, there was co-ordination. The landlord class, the bourgeoisie and the warlords of Japan have very serious internal contradictions, which are growing, and the lack of military co-ordination is one of the concrete manifestations of this fact.
Fourth, failure to grasp strategic opportunities. This failure was conspicuously shown in the enemy's halt after the occupation of Nanking and Taiyuan, chiefly because of his shortage of troops and his lack of a strategic pursuit force.
Fifth, encirclement of large, but annihilation of small, numbers. Before the Taierhchuang campaign, in the campaigns of Shanghai, Nanking, Tsangchow, Paoting, Nankow, Hsinkou and Linfen, many Chinese troops were routed but few were taken prisoner, which shows the stupidity of the enemy command.
These five errors--piecemeal reinforcement, absence of a main direction ofattack, lack of strategic co-ordination, failure to grasp opportunities,and encirclement of large, but annihilation of small, numbers--were all pointsof incompetence in the Japanese command before the Taierhchuang campaign.Although the enemy has since made some improvements, he cannot possibly avoidrepeating his errors because of his shortage of troops, his internalcontradictions and other factors. In addition, what he gains at one pointhe loses at another. For instance, when he concentrated his forces in northernChina on Hsuchow, he left a great vacuum in the occupied areas in northernChina, which gave us full scope for developing guerrilla warfare. These mistakeswere of the enemy's own making and not induced by us. On our part, we candeliberately make the enemy commit errors, that is, we can mislead him andmanoeuvre him into the desired position by ingenious and effective moveswith the help of a well-organized local population, for example, by "makinga feint to the east but attacking in the west". This possibility has alreadybeen discussed. All the above shows that in the enemy's command, too, wecan find some basis for victory. Of course, we should not take it as an importantbasis for our strategic planning; on the contrary, the only reliable courseis to base our planning on the assumption that the enemy will make few mistakes.Besides, the enemy can exploit our mistakes just as we can exploit his. Itis the duty of our command to allow him the minimum of opportunities fordoing so. Actually, the enemy command has committed errors, will again commiterrors in the future, and can be made to do so through our endeavours. Allthese errors we can exploit, and it is the business of our generals in theWar of Resistance to do their utmost to seize upon them. However, althoughmuch of the enemy's strategic and campaign command is incompetent,there are quite a few excellent points in his battle command, that is, inhis unit and small formation tactics, and here we should learn from him.
106. The question of decisive engagements in the anti-Japanese war shouldbe approached from three aspects: we should resolutely fight a decisiveengagement in every campaign or battle in which we are sure of victory; weshould avoid a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle in which weare not sure of victory; and we should absolutely avoid a strategically decisiveengagement on which the fate of the whole nation is staked. The characteristicsdifferentiating our War of Resistance Against Japan from many other warsare also revealed in this question of decisive engagements. In the firstand second stages of the war, which are marked by the enemy's strength andour weakness, the enemy's objective is to have us concentrate our main forcesfor a decisive engagement. Our objective is exactly the opposite. We wantto choose conditions favourable to us, concentrate superior forces and fightdecisive campaigns or battles only when we are sure of victory, as in thebattles at Pinghsingkuan, Taierhchuang and other places; we want to avoiddecisive engagements under unfavourable conditions when we are not sure ofvictory, this being the policy we adopted in the Changteh and other campaigns.As for fighting a strategically decisive engagement on which the fate ofthe whole nation is staked, we simply must not do so, as witness the recentwithdrawal from Hsuchow. The enemy's plan for a "quick decision" was thusfoiled, and now he cannot help fighting a protracted war with us. Theseprinciples are impracticable in a country with a small territory, and hardlypracticable in a country that is very backward politically. They are practicablein China because she is a big country and is in an era of progress. Ifstrategically decisive engagements are avoided, then "as long as the greenmountains are there, one need not worry about firewood", for even thoughsome of our territory may be lost, we shall still have plenty of room formanoeuvre and thus be able to promote and await domestic progress, internationalsupport and the internal disintegration of the enemy; that is the best policyfor us in the anti-Japanese war. Unable to endure the arduous trials of aprotracted war and eager for an early triumph, the impetuous theorists ofquick victory clamour for a strategically decisive engagement the momentthe situation takes a slightly favourable turn. To do what they want wouldbe to inflict incalculable damage on the entire war, spell finis to theprotracted war, and land us in the enemy's deadly trap; actually, it wouldbe the worst policy. Undoubtedly, if we are to avoid decisive engagements,we shall have to abandon territory, and we must have the courage to do sowhen (and only when) it becomes completely unavoidable. At such times weshould not feel the slightest regret, for this policy of trading space fortime is correct. History tells us how Russia made a courageous retreat toavoid a decisive engagement and then defeated Napoleon, the terror of hisage. Today China should do likewise.
107. Are we not afraid of being denounced as "non-resisters"? No, we arenot. Not to fight at all but to compromise with the enemy -- that isnon-resistance, which should not only be denounced but must never be tolerated.We must resolutely fight the War of Resistance, but in order to avoid theenemy's deadly trap, it is absolutely necessary that we should not allowour main forces to be finished off at one blow, which would make it difficultto continue the War of Resistance--in brief, it is absolutely necessary toavoid national subjugation. To have doubts on this point is to be shortsightedon the question of the war and is sure to lead one into the ranks of thesubjugationists. We have criticized the desperate recklessness of "only advance,never retreat" precisely because, if it became the fashion, this doctrinewould make it impossible to continue the War of Resistance and would leadto the danger of ultimate national subjugation.
108. We are for decisive engagements whenever circumstances are favourable,whether in battles or in major or minor campaigns, and in this respect weshould never tolerate passivity. Only through such decisive engagements canwe achieve the objective of annihilating or depleting the enemy forces, andevery soldier in the anti-Japanese war should resolutely play his part. Forthis purpose considerable partial sacrifices are necessary; to avoid anysacrifice whatsoever is the attitude of cowards and of those afflicted bythe fear of Japan and must be firmly opposed. The execution of Li Fu-ying,Han Fu-chu and other Rightists was justified. Within the scope of correctwar planning, encouraging the spirit and practice of heroic self-sacrificeand dauntless advance in battle is absolutely necessary and inseparable fromthe waging of protracted war and the achievement of final victory. We havestrongly condemned the flightism of "only retreat, never advance" and havesupported the strict enforcement of discipline, because it is only throughheroic decisive engagements, fought under a correct plan, that we can vanquishthe powerful enemy; flightism, on the contrary, gives direct support to thetheory of national subjugation.
109. Is it not self-contradictory to fight heroically first and then abandonterritory? Will not our heroic fighters have shed their blood in vain? Thatis not at all the way questions should be posed. To eat and then to emptyyour bowels--is this not to eat in vain? To sleep and then to get up--isthis not to sleep in vain? Can questions be posed in such a way? I wouldsuppose not. To keep on eating, to keep on sleeping, to keep on fightingheroically all the way to the Yalu River without a stop--these are subjectivistand formalist illusions, not realities of life. As everybody knows, althoughin fighting and shedding our blood in order to gain time and prepare thecounter-offensive we have had to abandon some territory, in fact we havegained time, we have achieved the objective of annihilating and depletingenemy forces we have acquired experience in fighting, we have aroused hithertoinactive people and improved our international standing. Has our blood beenshed in vain? Certainly not. Territory has been given up in order to preserveour military forces and indeed to preserve territory, because if we do notabandon part of our territory when conditions are unfavourable but blindlyfight decisive engagements without the least assurance of winning, we shalllose our military forces and then be unable to avoid the loss of all ourterritory; to say nothing of recovering territory already lost. A capitalistmust have capital to run his business, and if he loses it all he is no longera capitalist. Even a gambler must have money to stake, and if he risks itall on a single throw and his luck fails, he cannot gamble any more. Eventshave their twists and turns and do not follow a straight line, and war isno exception; only formalists are unable to comprehend this truth.
100. I think the same will also hold true for the decisive engagements inthe stage of strategic counter-offensive. Although by then the enemy willbe in the inferior and we in the superior position, the principle of "fightingprofitable decisive engagements and avoiding unprofitable ones" will stillapply and will continue to apply until we have fought our way to the YaluRiver. This is how we will be able to maintain our initiative from beginningto end, and as for the enemy's "challenges" and other people's "taunts",we should imperturbably brush them aside and ignore them. In the War ofResistance only those generals who show this kind of firmness can be deemedcourageous and wise. This is beyond the ken of those who "jump whenever touched".Even though we are in a more or less passive position strategically in thisfirst stage of the war, we should have the initiative in every campaign;and of course we should have the initiative throughout the later stages.We are for protracted war and final victory, we are not gamblers who riskeverything on a single throw.
111. Japanese imperialism will never relax in its aggression against andrepression of revolutionary China; this is determined by its imperialistnature. If China did not resist, Japan would easily seize all China withoutfiring a single shot, as she did the four northeastern provinces. Since Chinais resisting, it is an inexorable law that Japan will try to repress thisresistance until the force of her repression is exceeded by the force ofChina's resistance. The Japanese landlord class and bourgeoisie are veryambitious, and in order to drive south to Southeast Asia and north to Siberia,they have adopted the policy of breaking through in the centre by first attackingChina. Those who think that Japan will know where to stop and be contentwith the occupation of northern China and of Kiangsu and Chekiang Provincescompletely fail to perceive that imperialist Japan, which has developed toa new stage and is approaching extinction, differs from the Japan of thepast. When we say that there is a definite limit both to the number of menJapan can throw in and to the extent of her advance, we mean that with heravailable strength, Japan can only commit part of her forces against Chinaand only penetrate China as far as their capacity allows, for she also wantsto attack in other directions and has to defend herself against other enemies;at the same time China has given proof of progress and capacity for stubbornresistance, and it is inconceivable that there should be fierce attacks byJapan without inevitable resistance by China. Japan cannot occupy the wholeof China, but she will spare no effort to suppress China's resistance inall the areas she can reach, and will not stop until internal and externaldevelopments push Japanese imperialism to the brink of the grave. There areonly two possible outcomes to the political situation in Japan. Either thedownfall of her entire ruling class occurs rapidly, political power passesto the people and war thus comes to an end, which is impossible at the moment;or her landlord class and bourgeoisie become more and more fascist and maintainthe war until the day of their downfall, which is the very road Japan isnow travelling. There can be no other outcome. Those who hope that the moderatesamong the Japanese bourgeoisie will come forward and stop the war are onlyharbouring illusions. The reality of Japanese politics for many years hasbeen that the bourgeois moderates of Japan have fallen captive to the landlordsand the financial magnates. Now that Japan has launched war against China,so long as she does not suffer a fatal blow from Chinese resistance and stillretains sufficient strength, she is bound to attack Southeast Asia or Siberia,or even both. She will do so once war breaks out in Europe; in their wishfulcalculations' the rulers of Japan have it worked out on a grandiose scale.Of course, it is possible that Japan will have to drop her original planof invading Siberia and adopt a mainly defensive attitude towards the SovietUnion on account of Soviet strength and of the serious extent to which Japanherself has been weakened by her war against China. But in that case, sofar from relaxing her aggression against China she will intensify it, becausethen the only way left to her will be to gobble up the weak. China's taskof persevering in the War of Resistance, the united front and the protractedwar will then become all the more weighty, and it will be all the more necessarynot to slacken our efforts in the slightest.
112. Under the circumstances the main prerequisites for China's victory overJapan are nation-wide unity and all-round progress on a scale ten or evena hundred times greater than in the past. China is already in an era of progressand has achieved a splendid unity, but her progress and unity are still farfrom adequate. That Japan has occupied such an extensive area is due notonly to her strength but also to China's weakness; this weakness is entirelythe cumulative effect of the various historical errors of the last hundredyears, and especially of the last ten years, which have confined progressto its present bounds. It is impossible to vanquish so strong an enemy withoutmaking an extensive and long-term effort. There are many things we have toexert ourselves to do; here I will deal only with two fundamental aspects,the progress of the army and the progress of the people.
113. The reform of our military system requires its modernization and improvedtechnical equipment, without which we cannot drive the enemy back acrossthe Yalu River. In our employment of troops we need progressive, flexiblestrategy and tactics, without which we likewise cannot win victory. Nevertheless,soldiers are the foundation of an army; unless they are imbued with a progressivepolitical spirit, and unless such a spirit is fostered through progressivepolitical work, it will be impossible to achieve genuine unity between officersand men, impossible to arouse their enthusiasm for the War of Resistanceto the full, and impossible to provide a sound basis for the most effectiveuse of all our technical equipment and tactics. When we say that Japan willfinally be defeated despite her technical superiority, we mean that the blowswe deliver through annihilation and attrition, apart from inflicting losses,will eventually shake the morale of the enemy army whose weapons are notin the hands of politically conscious soldiers. With us, on the contrary,officers and men are at one on the political aim of the War of Resistance.This gives us the foundation for political work among all the anti-Japaneseforces. A proper measure of democracy should be put into effect in the army,chiefly by abolishing the feudal practice of bullying and beating and byhaving officers and men share weal and woe. Once this is done, unity willbe achieved between officers and men, the combat effectiveness of the armywill be greatly increased, and there will be no doubt of our ability to sustainthe long, cruel war.
114. The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people.It is mainly because of the unorganized state of the Chinese masses thatJapan dares to bully us. When this defect is remedied, then the Japaneseaggressor, like a mad bull crashing into a ring of flames, will be surroundedby hundreds of millions of our people standing upright, the mere sound oftheir voices will strike terror into him, and he will be burned to death.China's armies must have an uninterrupted flow of reinforcements, and theabuses of press-ganging and of buyingsubstitutes,[33] which now exist at the lowerlevels, must immediately be banned and replaced by widespread and enthusiasticpolitical mobilization, which will make it easy to enlist millions of men.We now have great difficulties in raising money for the war, but once thepeople are mobilized, finances too will cease to be a problem. Why shoulda country as large and populous as China suffer from lack of funds? The armymust become one with the people so that they see it as their own army. Suchan army will be invincible, and an imperialist power like Japan will be nomatch for it.
115. Many people think that it is wrong methods that make for strained relationsbetween officers and men and between the army and the people, but I alwaystell them that it is a question of basic attitude (or basic principle), ofhaving respect for the soldiers and the people. It is from this attitudethat the various policies, methods and forms ensue. If we depart from thisattitude, then the policies, methods and forms will certainly be wrong, andthe relations between officers and men and between the army and the peopleare bound to be unsatisfactory. Our three major principles for the army'spolitical work are, first, unity between officers and men; second, unitybetween the army and the people; and third, the disintegration of the enemyforces. To apply these principles effectively, we must start with this basicattitude of respect for the soldiers and the people, and of respect for thehuman dignity of prisoners of war once they have laid down their arms. Thosewho take all this as a technical matter and not one of basic attitude areindeed wrong, and they should correct their view.
116. At this moment when the defence of Wuhan and other places has becomeurgent, it is a task of the utmost importance to arouse the initiative andenthusiasm of the whole army and the whole people to the full in supportof the war. There is no doubt that the task of defending Wuhan and otherplaces must be seriously posed and seriously performed. But whether we canbe certain of holding them depends not on our subjective desires but on concreteconditions. Among the most important of these conditions is the politicalmobilization of the whole army and people for the struggle. If a strenuouseffort is not made to secure all the necessary conditions, indeed even ifone of these conditions is missing, disasters like the loss of Nanking andother places are bound to be repeated. China will have her Madrids in placeswhere the conditions are present. So far China has not had a Madrid, andfrom now on we should work hard to create several, but it all depends onthe conditions. The most fundamental of these is extensive political mobilizationof the whole army and people.
117. In all our work we must persevere in the Anti-Japanese National UnitedFront as the general policy. For only with this policy can we persevere inthe War of Resistance and in protracted warfare, bring about a widespreadand profound improvement in the relations between officers and men and betweenthe army and the people, arouse to the full the initiative and enthusiasmof the entire army and the entire people in the fight for the defence ofall the territory still in our hands and for the recovery of what we havelost, and so win final victory.
118. This question of the political mobilization of the army and the peopleis indeed of the greatest importance. We have dwelt on it at the risk ofrepetition precisely because victory is impossible without it. There are,of course, many other conditions indispensable to victory, but politicalmobilization is the most fundamental. The Anti-Japanese National United Frontis a united front of the whole army and the whole people, it is certainlynot a united front merely of the headquarters and members of a few politicalparties; our basic objective in initiating the Anti-Japanese National UnitedFront is to mobilize the whole army and the whole people to participatein it.
119. What are our conclusions? They are:
"Under what conditions do you think China can defeat and destroy the forces of Japan?" "Three conditions are required first, the establishment of an anti-Japanese united front in China second, the formation of an international anti-Japanese united front; third, the rise of the revolutionary movement of the people in Japan and the Japanese colonies. From the standpoint of the Chinese people, the unity of the people of China is the most important of the three conditions."
"How long do you think such a war would last?" "That depends on the strength of China's anti-Japanese united front and many other conditioning factors involving China and Japan."
"If these conditions are not realized quickly, the war will be prolonged. But in the end, just the same, Japan will certainly be defeated and China will certainly be victorious. Only the sacrifices will be great and there will be a very painful period."
"Our strategy should be to employ our main forces to operate over an extended and fluid front. To achieve success, the Chinese troops must conduct their warfare with a high degree of mobility on extensive battlefields."
"Besides employing trained armies to carry on mobile warfare, we must organize great numbers of guerrilla units among the peasants."
"In the course of the war, China will be able to . . . reinforce the equipment of her troops gradually. Therefore China will be able to conduct positional warfare in the latter period of the war and make positional attacks on the Japanese-occupied areas. Thus Japan's economy will crack under the strain of China's long resistance and the morale of the Japanese forces will break under the trial of innumerable battles. On the Chinese side, however, the growing latent power of resistance will be constantly brought into play and large numbers of revolutionary people will be pouring into the front lines to fight for their freedom. The combination of all these and other factors will enable us to make the final and decisive attacks on the fortifications and bases in the Japanese occupied areas and drive the Japanese forces of aggression out of China." (From an interview with Edgar Snow in July 1936.)
"Thus a new stage has opened in China's political situation.... In the present stage the central task is to mobilize all the nation's forces for victory in the War of Resistance."
"The key to victory in the war now lies in developing the resistance that has already begun into a war of total resistance by the whole nation. Only through such a war of total resistance can final victory be won."
"The existence of serious weaknesses in the War of Resistance may lead to setbacks, retreats, internal splits, betrayals, temporary and partial compromises and other such reverses. Therefore it should be realized that the war will be arduous and protracted. But we are confident that, through the efforts of our Party and the whole people, the resistance already started will sweep aside all obstacles and continue to advance and develop." ("Resolution on the Present Situation and the Tasks of the Party", adopted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, August 1937.)
These are our conclusions. In the eyes of the subjugationists the enemy aresupermen and we Chinese are worthless, while in the eyes of the theoristsof quick victory we Chinese are supermen and the enemy are worthless. Bothare wrong. We take a different view; the War of Resistance Against Japanis a protracted war, and the final victory will be China's. These are ourconclusions.
120. My lectures end here. The great War of Resistance Against Japan isunfolding, and many people are hoping for a summary of experience to facilitatethe winning of complete victory. What I have discussed is simply the generalexperience of the past ten months, and it may perhaps serve as a kind ofsummary. The problem of protracted war deserves wide attention and discussion;what I have given is only an outline, which I hope you will examine and discuss,amend and amplify.
1. This theory of national subjugation was the view heldby the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang was unwilling to resist Japan and foughtJapan only under compulsion. After the Lukouchiao Incident (July 7, 1937),the Chiang Kai-shek clique reluctantly took part in the War of Resistance,while the Wang Ching-wei clique became the representatives of the theoryof national subjugation, was ready to capitulate to Japan and in factsubsequently did so. However, the idea of national subjugation not only existedin the Kuomintang, but also affected certain sections of the middle strataof society and even certain backward elements among the labouring people.As the corrupt and impotent Kuomintang government lost one battle after anotherand the Japanese troops advanced unchecked to the vicinity of Wuhan in thefirst year of the War of Resistance, some backward people became profoundlypessimistic.
2. These views were to be found within the Communist Party.During the first six months of the War of Resistance, there was a tendencyto take the enemy lightly among some members of the Party, who held the viewthat Japan could be defeated at a single blow. It was not that they feltour own forces to be so strong, since they well knew that the troops andthe organized people's forces led by the Communist Party were still small,but that the Kuomintang had begun to resist Japan. In their opinion, theKuomintang was quite powerful, and, in co-ordination with the Communist Party,could deal Japan telling blows. They made this erroneous appraisal becausethey saw only one aspect of the Kuomintang, that it was resisting Japan,but overlooked the other aspect, that it was reactionary and corrupt.
3. Such was the view of Chiang Kai-shek and company. Thoughthey were compelled to resist Japan, Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang pinnedtheir hopes solely on prompt foreign aid and had no confidence in their ownstrength, much less in the strength of the people.
4. Taierhchuang is a town in southern Shantung where theChinese army fought a battle in March 1938 against the Japanese invaders.By pitting 400,000 men against Japan's 70,000 to 80,000, the Chinese armydefeated the Japanese.
5. This view was put forward in an editorial in theTaKing Pao,then the organ of the Political Science Group in the Kuomintang.Indulging in wishful thinking, this clique hoped that a few more victoriesof the Taierhchuang type would stop Japan's advance and that there wouldbe no need to mobilize the people for a protracted war which would threatenthe security of its own class. This wishful thinking then pervaded the Kuomintangas a whole.
6. For many decades, beginning with the end of the 18thcentury, Britain exported an increasing quantity of opium to China. Thistraffic not only subjected the Chinese people to drugging but also plunderedChina of her silver. It aroused fierce opposition in China. In 1840, underthe pretext of safeguarding its trade with China, Britain launched armedaggression against her. The Chinese troops led by Lin Tse-hsu put up resistance,and the people in Canton spontaneously organized the "Quell-the-British Corps",which dealt serious blows to the British forces of aggression. In 1842, however,the corrupt Ching regime signed the Treaty of Nanking with Britain. Thistreaty provided for the payment of indemnities and the cession of Hongkongto Britain, and stipulated that Shanghai, Foochow, Amoy, Ningpo and Cantonwere to be opened to British trade and that tariff rates for British goodsimported into China were to be jointly fixed by China and Britain.
7. The Taiping Revolution, or the Movement of the TaipingHeavenly Kingdom, was the mid-19th century revolutionary peasant movementagainst the feudal rule and national oppression of the Ching Dynasty. InJanuary 1851 Hung Hsiu-chuan, Yang Hsiu-ching and other leaders launchedan uprising in Chintien Village in Kueiping County, Kwangsi Province, andproclaimed the founding of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. Proceeding northwardfrom Kwangsi, their peasant army attacked and occupied Hunan and Hupoh in1852. In 1853 it marched through Kiangsi and Anhwei and captured Nanking.A section of the forces then continued the drive north and pushed on to thevicinity of Tientsin. However, the Taiping army failed to build stable baseareas in the places it occupied; moreover, after establishing its capitalin Nanking, its leading group committed many political and military errors.Therefore it was unable to withstand the combined onslaughts of thecounter-revolutionary forces of the Ching government and the British, U.S.and French aggressors, and was finally defeated in 1864.
8. The Reform Movement of 1898, whose leading spirits wereKang Yu-wei, Liang Chi-chao and Tan Szu-tung, represented the interests ofthe liberal bourgeoisie and the enlightened landlords. The movement was favouredand supported by Emperor Kuang Hsu, but had no mass basis. Yuan Shih-kai,who had an army behind him, betrayed the reformers to Empress Dowager TzuHsi, the leader of the die-hards, who seized power again and had EmperorKuang Hsu imprisoned and Tan Szu-tung and five others beheaded. Thus themovement ended in tragic defeat.
9. The Revolution of 1911 was the bourgeois revolutionwhich overthrew the autocratic regime of the Ching Dynasty. On October 10of that year, a section of the Ching Dynasty's New Army who were underrevolutionary influence staged an uprising in Wuchang, Hupeh Province. Theexisting bourgeois and petty-bourgeois revolutionary societies and the broadmasses of the workers, peasants and soldiers responded enthusiastically,and very soon the rule of the Ching Dynasty crumbled. In January 1912, theProvisional Government of the Republic of China was set up in Nanking, withSun Yat-sen as the Provisional President. Thus China's feudal monarchic systemwhich had lasted for more than two thousand years was brought to an end.The idea of a democratic republic had entered deep in the hearts of the people.But the bourgeoisie which led the revolution was strongly conciliationistin nature. It did not mobilize the peasant masses on an extensive scale tocrush the feudal rule of the landlord class in the countryside, but insteadhanded state power over to the Northern warlord Yuan Shih-kai under imperialistand feudal pressure. As a result, the revolution ended in defeat.
10. The Northern Expedition was the punitive war againstthe Northern warlords launched by the revolutionary army which marched northfrom Kwangtung Province in May-July 1926. The Northern Expeditionary Army,with the Communist Party of China taking part in its leadership and underthe Party's influence (the political work in the army was at that time mostlyunder the charge of Communist Party members), gained the warm support ofthe broad masses of workers and peasants. In the second half of 1926 andthe first half of 1927 it occupied most of the provinces along the Yangtseand Yellow Rivers and defeated the Northern warlords. In April 1927 thisrevolutionary war failed as a result of betrayal by the reactionary cliqueunder Chiang Kai-shek within the revolutionary army.
11. On January 16, 1938, the Japanese cabinet declaredin a policy statement that Japan would subjugate China by force. At the sametime it tried by threats and blandishments to make the Kuomintang governmentcapitulate, declaring that if the Kuomintang government "continued to planresistance", the Japanese government would foster a new puppet regime inChina and no longer accept the Kuomintang as "the other party" in negotiations.
12. The capitalists referred to here are chiefly thoseof the United States.
13. By "their governments" Comrade Mao Tse-tung is herereferring to the governments of the imperialist countries--Britain, the UnitedStates and France.
14. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's prediction that there wouldbe an upswing in China during the stage of stalemate in the War of ResistanceAgainst Japan was completely confirmed in the case of the Liberated Areasunder the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. But there was actuallya decline instead of an upswing in the Kuomintang areas, because the rulingclique headed by ChiangKai-shek was passive in resisting Japan and activein opposing the Communist Party and the people. This roused opposition amongthe broad masses of the people and raised their political consciousness
15. According to the theory that "weapons decideeverything", China which was inferior to Japan in regard to arms was boundto be defeated in the war. This view was current among all the leaders ofthe Kuomintang reaction, Chiang Kai-shek included.
16. See "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War AgainstJapan", Note 9, p. 112 of this volume.
17. Sun Wu-kung is the monkey king in the Chinese novelHsi YuChi (Pilgrimage to the West),written in the 16thcentury. He could cover 108,000liby turning a somersault. Yetonce in the palm of the Buddha, he could not escape from it, however manysomersaults he turned. With a flick of his palm Buddha transformed his fingersinto the five-peak Mountain of Five Elements, and buried Sun Wu-kung.
18."Fascism is unbridled chauvinism and predatorywar,"said Comrade Georgi Dimitrov in his report to the Seventh WorldCongress of the Communist International in August 1935, entitled "The FascistOffensive and the Tasks of the Communist International" (seeSelectedArticles and Speeches, Eng. ed., Lawrence & Wishart London, 1951,p. 44). In July 1937, Comrade Dimitrov published an article entitledFascism Is War.
19. V. I. Lenin,Socialism and War, Eng. ed.,FLPH, Moscow, 1950, p. 19.
20.Sun Tzu, Chapter 3, "The Strategy of Attack".
21. Chengpu, situated in the southwest of the presentChuancheng County in Shantung Province, was the scene of a great battle betweenthe states of Tsin and Chu in 632 BC. At the beginning of the battle theChu troops got the upper hand. The Tsin troops, after making a retreat of90li, chose the right and left flanks of the Chu troops, theirweak spots, and inflicted heavy defeats on them.
22. The ancient town of Chengkeo, in the northwest ofthe present Chengkao County, Honan Province, was of great military importance.It was the scene of battles fought in 203 B.C. between Liu Pang, King ofHan, and Hsiang Yu, King of Chu. At first Hsiang Yu captured Hsingyang andChengkao and Liu Pang's troops were almost routed. Liu Pang waited untilthe opportune moment when Hsiang Yu's troops were in midstream crossing theSzeshui River, and then crushed them and recaptured Chengkao.
23. In 204 B.C., Han Hsin, a general of the state of Han,led his men in a big battle with Chao Hsieh at Chinghsing. Chao Hsieh's army,said to be 200,000 strong, was several times that of Han. Deploying his troopswith their backs to a river, Han Hsin led them in valiant combat, and atthe same time dispatched some units to attack and occupy the enemy's weaklygarrisoned rear. Caught in a pincer, Chao Hsieh's troops were utterly defeated.
24. The ancient town of Kunyang, in the north of the presentYehhsien County, Honan Province, was the place where Liu Hsiu, founder ofthe Eastern Han Dynasty, defeated the troops of Wang Mang, Emperor of theHsin Dynasty, in A.D. 23. There was a huge numerical disparity between thetwo sides, Liu Hsiu's forces totalling 8,000 to 9,000 men as against WangMang's 400,000. But taking advantage of the negligence of Wang Mang's generals,Wang Hsun and Wang Yi, who underestimated the enemy, Liu Hsiu with only threethousand picked troops put Wang Mang's main forces to rout. He followed upthis victory by crushing the rest of the enemy troops.
25. Kuantu was in the northeast of the present ChungmouCounty, Honan Province, and the scene of the battle between the armies ofTsao Tsao and Yuan Shao in A D 200. Yuan Shao had an army of 100,000, whileTsao Tsao had only a meagre force and was short of supplies. Taking advantageof the lack of vigilance on the part of Yuan Shao's troops, who belittledthe enemy, Tsao Tsao dispatched his light-footed soldiers to spring a surpriseattack on them and set their supplies on fire. Yuan Shao's army was throwninto confusion and its main force wiped out.
26. The state of Wu was ruled by Sun Chuan, and the stateof Wei by Tsao Tsao. Chihpi is situated on the south bank of the YangtseRiver, to the northeast of Chisyu, Hupeh Province. In A.D. 208 Tsao Tsaoled an army of over 500,000 men, which he proclaimed to be 800,000 strong,to launch an attack on Sun Chuan. The latter, in alliance with Tsao Tsao'santagonist Liu Pei, mustered a force of 30,000. Knowing that Tsao Tsao'sarmy was plagued by epidemics and was unaccustomed to action afloat, theallied forces of Sun Chuan and Liu Pei set fire to Tsao Tsao's fleet andcrushed his army.
27. Yiling, to the east of the present Ichang, Hupeh Province,was the place where Lu Sun, a general of the state of Wu, defeated the armyof Liu Pei, ruler of Shu, in A D. 222. Liu Pei's troops scored successivevictories at the beginning of the war and penetrated five or six hundredli into the territory of Wu as far as Yiling. Lu Sun, who was defendingYiling, avoided battle for over seven months until Liu Pei "was at his wits'end and his troops were exhausted and demoralized". Then he crushed Liu Pei'stroops by taking advantage of a favourable wind to set fire to their tents.
28. Hsieh Hsuan, a general of Eastern Tsin Dynasty, defeatedFu Chien, ruler of the state of Chin, in AD 383 at the Feishui River in AnhweiProvince. Fu Chien had an infantry force of more than 600,000, a cavalryforce of 270,000 and a guards corps of more than 30,000, while the land andriver forces of Eastern Tsin numbered only 80,000. When the armies linedup on opposite banks of the Feishui River, Hsieh Hsuan, taking advantageof the overconfidence and conceit of the enemy troops, requested Fu Chiento move his troops back so as to leave room for the Eastern Tsin troops tocross the river and fight it out. Fu Chien complied, but when he orderedwithdrawal, his troops got into a panic and could not be stopped. Seizingthe opportunity, the Eastern Tsin troops crossed the river, launched an offensiveand crushed the enemy.
29. In A.D. 383, Fu Chien, the ruler of the state of Chin,belittled the forces of Tsin and attacked them. The Tsin troops defeatedthe enemy's advance units at Lochien, Shouyang County, Anhwei Province, andpushed forward by land and water. Ascending the city wall of Shonyang, FuChien observed the excellent alignment of the Tsin troops and, mistakingthe woods and bushes on Mount Pakung for enemy soldiers, was frightened bythe enemy's apparent strength.
30. Comrade Mao Tse-tung is here referring to the factthat Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, having betrayed the first nationaldemocratic united front of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in 1927,launched a ten-year war against the people, and thus made it impossible forthe Chinese people to be organized on a large scale. For this the Kuomintangreactionaries headed by Chiang Kai-shek must be held responsible.
31. Duke Hsiang of Sung ruled in the Spring and AutumnEra. In 638 BC, the state of Sung fought with the powerful state of Chu.The Sung forces were already deployed in battle positions when the Chu troopswere crossing the river. One of the Sung officers suggested that, as theChu troops were numerically stronger, this was the moment for attack. Butthe Duke said, "No, a gentleman should never attack one who is unprepared."When the Chu troops had crossed the river but had not yet completed theirbattle alignment, the officer again proposed an immediate aback, and onceagain the Duke said, "No, a gentleman should never attack an army which hasnot yet completed its battle alignment." The Duke gave the order for attackon after the Chu troops were fully prepared. As a result, the Sung troopsmet with disastrous defeat and the Duke himself was wounded.
32. Han Pu-chu, a Kuomintang warlord, was for severalyears governor of Shantun. When the Japanese invaders thrust southward toShantung along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway after occupying Peiping and Tientsinin 1937, Han Fu-chu fled all the was from Shantung to Honan without fightinga single battle.
33. The Kuomintang expanded its army by press-ganging.Its military and police seized people everywhere, roping them up and treatingthem like convicts. Those who had money would bribe the Kuomintang officialsor pay for substitutes.
Transcription by the Maoist Documentation Project.
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Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung