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It’s pretty obvious who Russia’s antagonists on the global stage are, but understanding which nations consider themselves allies of the Kremlin involves a more nuanced view.
[UPDATES]Updated in May 2025 to reflect the latest developments.
The question of who Russia’s enemies are may seem obvious. Clearly, Kyiv is locked in a conflict that has passed its three-year mark and is wholeheartedly backed by most NATO Western powers (though some have doubts about Hungary, Slovakia and since 2025, the US).
Follow our coverage of the war on the@Kyivpost_official.
There are countries that have allied with Russia – some who offer their full-throated backing and others, such as China and India, who have refrained from endorsing the Kremlin’s full-scale war against Ukraine, while refusing to condemn it, despite it clearly breaking international law.
A good place to start looking for who is fully behind Russia’s war in Ukraine is to examine who voted against a UN resolution on Feb. 23, 2023, which called for ending the war in Ukraine and demanded Russia’s immediate withdrawal from the country, in line with the UN Charter.
Only Russia, Belarus, Syria, rogue state North Korea, Mali, Nicaragua and Eritrea voted against the resolution.
After the collapse of the USSR, Russia shifted from leading the global communist movement to building a new anti-Western bloc based on mutual interests.
During the Soviet era, Russia – then the central republic of the USSR – was the de facto leader of communist states worldwide that included much of Eastern Europe and stretched to Cuba and parts of Asia. Some of these states have remained Russian allies.
After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, many former allies or member states gained independence and turned toward the West. The Baltic states, Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic, and many other countries that were once considered to be under Moscow’s sphere of influence joined NATO and the EU.
Post-USSR Russia viewed this as a weakening of its influence in Europe.
However, Russia has fostered new partnerships, mainly with China, Iran, North Korea, and certain countries in Africa and Latin America. These modern alliances are no longer driven by communist ideology.
Their current focus is trade, military cooperation, and opposition to Western influence – especially in light of the West’s isolation of Moscow following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Militarily, Belarus could be considered Russia’s closest ally – or some would say, its vassal – having allowed both its land and airspace to be used by the Kremlin’s forces for its 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Despite resisting pressure thus far from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to send troops into Ukraine, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has permitted Moscow to launch thousands of missiles at Ukrainian cities from Belarus.
Some political analysts say Lukashenko has little choice in the matter given he’s only still in power because Moscow helped him quash a popular uprising after a contested election in 2020.
In June 2023, Belarus began hosting Russian tactical nuclear weapons on its own territory, while the Kremlin retains full control over said weapons.
Economically, as Minsk is also impacted by sanctions via its association with Moscow, it has no choice but to further ingratiate itself with Moscow and its allies – which could be seen in 2025’s military partnerships with Iran, joint drone production with Russia, and the purchases of Chinese buses as opposed to domestic variants.
The World Bank highlighted Minsk’s reliance on Moscow in an April 2025 Macro Poverty Outlook report.
“In 2024, GDP growth reached 4%, surpassing the 3.8%... Strong demand from Russia, especially in the defense sector, supported exports and economic activity,” it says.
Iran has emerged as one of Russia’s few remaining allies, with Moscow increasingly isolated because of the 2022 invasion.
The Iranian government shares the Kremlin’s deep distrust of anything Western, and during a phone call at the outset of the full-scale invasion, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi told Putin: “NATO expansion is a serious threat to the stability and security of independent countries in different regions.”
In December of 2022, the US outlined what it said was an extensive and developing relationship between Iran and Russia involving equipment such as helicopters, fighter jets and kamikaze drones.
These drones have attacked Ukrainian cities on an almost weekly basis for months, and it was reported that they are being smuggled into Russia using boats and Iran’s state airline. Reports began to surface in August 2023 that Russia might be producing Iranian drones on its own territory, with assistance from the Islamic enclave.
Iran’s economic and military ties with Russia have only increased and there are also fears Iran could supply Russia with ballistic missiles – a fear that was realized in September 2024 when Tehran supplied more than 200 short-range missiles to Russia.
In 2025, Russia and Iran signed a “comprehensive strategic partnership” – a military pact – where both sides vowed to assist each other in the face of “security threats” but stopped short at providing mutual defense when attacked – a clause included in Moscow’s pact with another ally, North Korea.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, consistent with its historical opposition to the international order, North Korea is a staunch supporter of Moscow.
As of November 2024, North Korea is the only country that has officially deployed troops to aid Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, likely as a result of a mutual defense pact signed in June of the same year.
Moscow and Pyongyang confirmed the troop deployments in late April 2025.
In early October, the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence (HUR) claimed that Pyongyang had deployed troops to reinforce Moscow’s troops in Ukraine. In addition, media, citing HUR, reported that six North Korean officers had been killed in a missile strike, with 18 more Pyongyang troops having allegedly deserted their positions near Ukraine.
HUR Chief Kyrylo Budanov said Oct. 18 that Pyongyang was preparing to send 11,000 troops to aid Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, a claim that was later also substantiated by the Pentagon and South Korean intelligence.
The troops were deployed to Russia’s Kursk region in Russian uniforms and insignias to help reclaim the areas controlled by Ukraine after Kyiv’s Kursk incursion in August 2024.
Kyiv subsequently captured at least three North Korean prisoners of war (POWs) fighting alongside Moscow troops.
Pyongyang has also supplied weapons to Russia.
Russia‘s use of North Korean artillery shells and rockets could be traced back as early as 2023, with subsequent reports indicating that they were actively used against Ukraine.
Ironically, before Pyongyang started deploying troops to aid Russia, it condemned Washington for escalating the war by providing weapons to Ukraine.
Kim Yo-jong, sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, said the US was “crossing the red line” with its decision to send Abrams tanks to Ukraine.
She added: “I express serious concern over the US escalating the war situation by providing Ukraine with military hardware for ground offensive, and strongly denounce it.
“The US is the arch-criminal which poses serious threat and challenge to the strategic security of Russia and pushed the regional situation to the present grave phase.”
Syrian rebels’ ousting of Moscow-backed dictator Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 might simply signal a new phase in Syria’s relationship with Moscow.
Assad has subsequently fled to Moscow after his ousting, leaving Russian military interests in the country, including two major bases, in question.
While there was widespread speculation that the rebels would kick the Russians out now that Assad has been ousted and fled to Russia, Syria’s interim leader confirmed that a discussion was held with Moscow in which Syria offered the preservation of Russian military interests in the country in exchange for Assad’s extradition to Damascus.
Meanwhile, the new Syrian leader acknowledged that he does not rule out future ties with Russia as “Syria’s weapons are entirely Russian.”
When in office, Al-Assad had praised the full-scale invasion as a “correction of history” and accused Western nations of using “dirty methods to support terrorists in Syria and Nazis in Ukraine.”
Assad had been entirely dependent on Russian military support to suppress a popular uprising in his own nation, one that escalated into a civil war lasting more than a decade.
The closest thing Moscow has to global superpower support since Russia invaded Ukraine is China, though it is far from definitive or unconditional. China has never condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine, nor has it endorsed it, though Beijing and Moscow remain on friendly diplomatic terms.
China has walked a delicate and slightly ambiguous line that has at times echoed the Kremlin’s line, referring to the invasion as a “special military operation,” for instance, and abstaining from United Nations votes condemning it.
In 2022, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi said his country would help Russia “overcome difficulties, eliminate disturbances, realize the strategic goals of development, and further establish Russia on the international stage.”
Yet this contrasted sharply with comments from Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning, who called for de-escalation, adding, “all countries deserve respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity,” and that “support should be given to all efforts that are conducive to peacefully resolving the crisis.”
Russia has repeatedly requested arms from China, but as far as is known, Beijing has not provided them directly. China has, however, provided non-lethal equipment such as flak jackets and helmets, according to US intelligence sources. In October 2023, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov admitted “basically all” civilian drones came from China.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has accused China of supplying arms to Russia in a April 2025 comment, but there have been no updates at the time of publication.
One way in which China is undoubtedly supporting Moscow is by increasing imports of Russian oil and gas. The two countries also share close economic ties, reaffirmed by Putin’s attendance at China’s Belt and Road Forum in October 2023, with the Russian president calling his counterpart Xi a “dear friend.”
But China remains wary of doing more, perhaps seeking to steer clear of debilitating Western sanctions.
India is another country that has walked an ambiguous line and the closest it has come to criticizing Russia was during an awkward televised meeting in September of 2022, when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi told Putin, “I know that today’s era is not an era of war, and I have spoken to you on the phone about this.”
And yet, just like China, India has increased imports of Russian gas and oil since February of 2022, indirectly helping finance the Kremlin’s military.
India has also abstained from voting on nearly every resolution condemning Russian aggression at the UN.
The general public in India appears to have strong support for Russia, which may be a result of both India’s current reliance on Russian military hardware and recollections of the Soviet Union assisting India in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War.
Of note is also the development of Russia’s Su-57 stealth fighter, of which India played a role initially but later backed out due to Moscow’s apparent lack of progress.
Mali has recently swung sharply into the Kremlin’s orbit after the French ended and withdrew Operation Barkhane, its military mission to save the capital from being sacked by jihadists.
Currently ruled by military putschists who have denounced France, the authorities have enlisted the help of Russian Wagner mercenaries to solidify their power – but the Russian mercenaries suffered one of their worst defeats to date in July when they were ambushed by local separatists, potentially aided by Ukraine.
Commenting on the development, former US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said: “Everywhere Wagner goes, bad things tend to follow.
“Where we have seen it act, it hasn’t improved security. On the contrary, we’ve actually seen things get worse, and the exploitation of resources, the corruption, the violence that it brings are a plague on people in the countries that have chosen to work with it.”
While most African nations, such as South Africa led by President Cyril Ramaphosa, refrained overtly from picking a side in Russia’s war in Ukraine, Moscow’s propaganda proved to be effective in swaying the local population, a phenomenon which can also be seen in Latin America.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Eritrea in January 2023. The visit was part of an African tour designed to firm up support in countries that could be persuaded to stand with the Kremlin against the West. The continent has seen heightened geopolitical maneuvering since the Ukraine war began.
Eritrea is one of the most closed-off countries in the world and has been ruled by the iron fist of President Isaias Afwerki since the country gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993. The country’s army has been accused of numerous atrocities against civilians during a brutal two-year war in Ethiopia’s northernmost region of Tigray.
The Moscow-led CSTO is a military alliance in Central Asia made up of six post-Soviet states: Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, but not all of them have played ball over the last year.
Analysts say Russia – distracted by its protracted war in Ukraine – is losing influence in the Southern Caucasus after decades of playing the role of power broker. For instance, the fall of Armenian-controlled Nagorno-Karabakh has prompted its prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, to call Moscow’s security guarantee “ineffective.”
Despite being a member of CSTO, Kazakhstan reportedly denied a Russian request to take part in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
And while the country’s government has avoided directly criticizing Russia, it has also not officially recognized the Russian-backed Luhansk and Donetsk Republics in eastern Ukraine.
Armenia similarly refused to host CSTO military drills; Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have been wary of supporting Russia “in ways Moscow may find irritating,” according to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Elsewhere in the world, Myanmar’s military junta, which overthrew a democratically elected government in 2021, supports Russia, which it has said was “acting to protect its sovereignty,” and praised Russia’s role in “balancing global power.”
Russia is a major arms supplier to Myanmar.
The CSTO, according to its charter, is meant to secure the “safety, sovereignty and territorial integrity” of its member states – likely Moscow’s answer to NATO following the fall of the USSR.
However, it is unlikely to come to Moscow’s defense in the event of a major conflict, as seen in its lack of support for Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.
That said, Russia’s official defense pact with Iran and North Korea could become the basis of a new military alliance – while incomparable to NATO in terms of influence and weaponry, what the potential alliance lacks in technology is made up for in numbers, with North Korea boasting an estimated 1.3 million active personnel.
To put that into perspective, according to The Times, the West has failed to put together a 25,000-strong contingent proposed for Ukraine to enforce a potential peace deal.
Article updated May 5, 2025
