China is a troubled land. In the 20thcentury its people have known little ofpeace and much of war and internalstrife. By the date of Japan's surrender,China needed a breather--time to recoverits strength, to rebuild its economy,and to stabilize its government.Instead, a smoldering civil war flaredup with increased intensity. Chapter V-1
Background for Military AssistanceThe mutual distrust and hatred ofthe Chinese Communists and Nationalistshad its foundation in two decadesof vicious infighting and campaigns ofsuppression. In retrospect, it seems thatthere was no real chance of bringingthe two sides together in peace. Yet theUnited States attempted the impossiblerole of mediator--impossible because itwas not the equal friend of both sides.The presence of American forces inChina, particularly North China, can beexplained only in terms of the peculiarsituation created by the National Government'sconcurrent fight against theCommunists and the Japanese.
HISTORICAL SITUATION REPORT
The first treaty signed by the UnitedStates with China in 1844 contained amost favored nation clause which gaveto the United States any right givenanother power by the Chinese Government.The intent of this agreement andothers like it negotiated by Westernnations was to ensure equality of commercialopportunity; the practicaleffect was to saddle China with a legacyof foreign extraterritorial rights. Thefact that the Manchu Emperor ofChina did not share the enthusiasm ofoccidentals for opening his country totrade, or their penchant for seekingconverts to Christianity, really madelittle difference. The major Europeanpowers, sparked by Great Britain andFrance, forced the establishment offoreign concessions ruled by foreignlaw and police in China's major cities.Although the United States popularlyis supposed to have been blameless inthis period of unbridled expansion, itnevertheless got a share of many concessionsand was not unwilling to useforce whenever it appeared necessary.The first Marines to serve ashore inChina, the ship's detachment of thesloop of warSt. Louis, landed at Cantonin 1844 with bluejacket support to protectthe American trade station there
from mob violence.(SeeMap 32.)In the years immediately following, ships'landing parties were often in action attrouble spots along the China coastwhen American businessmen or missionariesrequired protection. Armedintervention to enforce the terms oftreaties and to protect lives and propertywas the order of the day for everynation strong enough to maintain ashare of the Chinese market. Small warswith limited objectives were fought inwhich the Imperial troops were soundlythrashed by British and French expeditionaryforces; and each Westernsuccess diminished China's sovereigntyas the victors demanded further concessionsto enhance their already privileged positions.Japan bought into the favored nationcategory by an easy victory in war withChina in 1894, and acquired Formosaand the Pescadores as part of its booty.The appalling weakness of the Manchudynasty, its inability to hold onto itsterritory or to resist foreign pressures,encouraged the more rapacious powersto improve their own positions by forcingthe grant of leaseholds and exclusivespheres of economic influence. To theChinese, it appeared that "the rest ofmankind is the carving knife and dish,while we are the fish and meat."The aptness of this characterization wasamply demonstrated in the five yearsfollowing the end of the Sino-Japanese War.
In North China, Russia acquired theright to build a railroad across Manchuriato its port of Vladivostok, and,after forcing Japan to withdraw itsclaim, leased the Kwantung Peninsulawith its all-weather harbors of PortArthur and Talienwan ( Dairen). Tocounter the Russian move, Britain developeda naval station at Weihaiweion Shantung Peninsula directly acrossthe Gulf of Chihli from Kwantung.Germany, moving in all haste to jointhe land grab, forced the lease of aholding centered on Tsingtao with exploitationrights in Shantung Province.Britain pressured an acknowledgementof its extensive investments and interestsin the Yangtze River Valley by obtainingan agreement giving it paramountrights in this area. In SouthChina, the Imperial Government signeda promise to Japan that no other nationwould exploit Fukien Province oppositeFormosa; Britain acquired KowloonPeninsula to guard its colony of Hongkong;and France added substantiallyto the area under its thumb along theborders of its Tongking-Annam protectorate.
By 1899, the United States faced thepossibility that it might be squeezedout of an influential position in Chinaand moved to prevent this happening.The American Secretary of State, JohnHay, obtained agreement of the otherpowers to the "Open Door" principle--that in their spheres of influence theywould maintain the equality of rightsof other foreign nationals. The followingyear an anti-foreign uprising withopen Imperial support, the Boxer Rebellion,
Map 32: China, 1945
broke out in North China. Bydint of hard fighting, an internationalrelief force which included several battalionsof American Marines brokethrough to the besieged foreign legationsat Peking. Secretary Hay acted quicklyto forestall a further parceling ofChina's territory by the victoriouspowers, and circulated a statement ofpolicy which said that the United States would:. . . seek a solution that would bringabout permanent safety and peace inChina, preserve Chinese territorial andadministrative entity, protect all rightsguaranteed to friendly powers by treatyand international law, and safeguard forthe world the principle of equal and impartialtrade with all parts of the ChineseEmpire.
The stand of the United States, aidedin large part by the wary regard of theinterested governments in maintaininga balance of power, won China a respitefrom dismemberment. Consistentlymaintained through the 20th century,the American advocacy of China's integrityalso won the United States adeserved reputation as a "friend ofChina." This title came to signify amoral and emotional commitment farmore powerful than the original acknowledgementof enlightened self-interest.
By Western standards, the China ofthe era of foreign intervention was abackward country, a land with littlenational spirit whose people werewholly concerned with a hand-to-mouthstruggle to exist. Most Chinese wereprovincial in outlook, caring and knowinglittle of those things outside theirimmediate experience. Significant geographicalbarriers had helped foster thedevelopment of a number of semiautonomousregions, each with its ownspeech, dress, and customs. China wasin fact a nation of separate states, butone with no federal tradition. A strongcentral government was needed to weldtogether the varying elements, but theManchu Dynasty had long since ceasedto fill that need. The Manchus heldpower, such as it was, by default.
The opposition to Peking's rule waswidespread but ineffectual until thedecade following the Boxer uprisingwhen Imperial officials belatedly attemptedto institute government reforms.The sands had run out for theManchus, however, and the try at modernizingthe Imperial structure merelygave impetus to those who advocated itsoverthrow. One man became the symbolof the diverse forces which sought to wincontrol of China--Sun Yat-sen. UnderSun's inspirational leadership, a revolutionaryparty dedicated to republicanprinciples was formed which drew itsstrength primarily from the merchants,students, and factory workers of thecities of South China where Western influencehad been greatest. Associatedwith Sun's following were a number ofgroups whose primary aim was toachieve provincial self-rule, men who didnot want a strong government inPeking. After a series of abortive attempts,the Chinese Revolution was successfullylaunched at Hankow on10 October 1911. The revolt spreadquickly and with little bloodshed; by theyear's end the Manchu regent had resigned.
Sun Yat-sen was installed as ProvisionalPresident of the Republic ofChina on 1 January 1912 and an attemptwas made to set up a parliamentarydemocracy. It was soon obvious thata strong man, backed by military power,was needed to force the provinces toadhere to the new government. Sunstepped aside for such a man, YuanShih-k'ai, a northern military leaderwho tried by increasingly undemocraticmethods to rule China. When Yuan diedin 1916, the Peking government retainedonly nominal strength. Regional warlords,relying on conscript coolie armiesfor their power, seized control throughoutthe country. The experiment inWestern-style democracy had failed.The system of government which finallyevolved after a decade of turmoil wastailored closer to China's tradition ofone-man rule.During World War I, Japan, takingadvantage of the deep involvement ofthe Western powers in Europe to forcecompliance with its demands for theprivileged foreign position, tried to setup a protectorate over China. Althoughthe United States was instrumental inpartially blocking this power grab, theJapanese were able to improve theirpolitical and economic hold on Manchuria,a presence which stemmed fromtheir defeat of Russia in 1904-1905.Japan's blatant attempt to subjugatetheir country aroused in many Chinesea long-dormant spirit of nationalism.
The principal beneficiary of this newawareness was the Kuomintang (NationalPeople's Party) whose leader wasSun Yat-sen. Disillusioned in his attemptto establish a republic in theWestern pattern, Sun had next tried towork through the warlords to achievenational unity. Turning from this fruitlesseffort, he devoted himself to theKuomintang which became the vehicleby which he spread his political philosophyfor the new China. Essentially, hewanted to ensure the people an adequatelivelihood, to develop nationalism, and toinstitute a guided democracy compatiblewith Chinese tradition which in "fourthousand years, through periods of orderand disorder, [had] been nothing butautocracy."The mission of the Kuomintangwas to achieve Sun's goalsthrough a revolutionary process--firstwould come the unification of China bymilitary power, then a period of politicaltutelage, and finally a constitutional democracyshaped to Chinese needs.
A disciplined political structure andan efficient and powerful army were elementsessential to Kuomintang success.Soviet Russia, realizing the potentialfor its own ends in Sun's party, beganto provide needed organizational andmilitary advisors. Members of the infantChinese Communist Party, organized in1921, were encouraged to join theKuomintang and lend their zeal to therevolutionary movement. A trusted lieutenantof Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek,was sent to Russia to secure extensiveaid and to observe Russian military organization.Early in 1924, at Whampoaoutside Canton, a military academy wasorganized in the Russian pattern withChiang as superintendent to train andindoctrinate officers for the RevolutionaryArmy. The Whampoa graduates andcadets, fiercely loyal to China, to theKuomintang, and to Chiang, were the
men who were to lead the Nationalistforces for the next quarter century.In 1925 Sun Yat-sen died, leaving twoclaimants to his political estate, the Communist-dominated faction in the Kuomintangand the anti-leftist majoritywho looked to Chiang for leadership.The rift between the two factionswidened steadily while Chiang led theRevolutionary Army in a successfulcampaign against the northern warlordsin 1926-27. Finally in April 1927, anopen break occurred and Chiang beganto root the Communists out of the Kuomintangand the army. His purge wasbloody and bitterly contested, but successful.By the year's end the militantremnants of the Communist Party hadfled for refuge to the mountains ofKiangsi Province.(SeeMap 32.)
The northern campaign ended in 1928after the fall of Peking, renamed Peiping(Northern Peace ) to celebrate thevictory. The new National Governmentof the Republic of China was establishedat Nanking, and the various foreignpowers, including the U.S.S.R., recognizedits legitimacy. Although the governmentwas the strongest that hadheld sway in China during a century ofdisorder, the unification of the countrywas far from complete, Warlord armieshad been incorporated in the Nationalistforces for expediency's sake, but theirleaders still held tremendous local powerand their men were unreliable whencompared with the Whampoa-led troopsof South China. The Communists holedup in Kiangsi under the leadership ofMao Tse-tung posed a cancerous threatthat could not be ignored. And eventhough the warlords of Manchuria acknowledgedthe rule of Nanking, theJapanese had their own ambitious plansfor that rich territory. Altogether thesituation called for strong measures andan authoritative leader not afraid toapply them. Chiang Kai-shek was that man.
Under a variety of titles, Chiang heldthe real power in the Chinese Governmentin the 1930s and '40s. He controlledthe Kuomintang, and in short order theparty apparatus became almost indistinguishablefrom the government itself.The deep animosity between the Communistsand the Kuomintang festered,erupting repeatedly as Chiang strove towipe out the Kiangsi stronghold. In1934, under pressure of an annihilationdrive against them, the Communistsabandoned their mountain fastness andset out on a 6,000-mile trek to a newhome at Yenan in north central China.Only the most dedicated Communistssurvived the hardships and runningbattles of this legendary "Long March,"and these veteran troops formed thehard core around which Mao began toorganize a new base of operations. Heneeded time to develop his position andthe Japanese gave it to him.
Japan's steady encroachment on Chineseterritory had first call on Chiang'sattention. In 1931 Japan established aprotectorate over Manchuria and set upa puppet regime despite the protests ofthe United States and the League ofNations. Undisturbed by vocal opposition,Japan in the next year used itstroops to drive the Shanghai garrisonfrom the city after a boycott of Japanesegoods led to furious fighting. When the
Japanese withdrew from Shanghai aftercapturing it, they transferred their attentionsto North China and increasedeconomic and military pressure on theborder regions. Chiang, who was remodelingthe National Army with Germanassistance and advice, held off fromfull-scale conflict as long as possible togive his troops training and equipmentthat would make them a better matchfor the Japanese. During 1936 an intermittentseries of clashes between ChineseGovernment forces and invadingManchuria puppet troops of Japan'sKwantung Army were handily won bythe Chinese. A Government spokesmanin Nanking promptly warned that "thetime has ended when foreign nationscould safely nibble away at Chineseterritorial fringes."The stage was set for the full-blownwar which broke out on 7 July 1937when Japanese troops attacked the defendersof Peiping. Almost immediately,leaders of all Chinese military factions,whether Government, warlord, or Communist,aligned themselves behindChiang Kai-shek's leadership as Generalissimoand pledged resistance to theJapanese invasion. Mao's troops weredesignated the Eighth Route Army ofthe Central Government's forces andsupposedly came under Chiang's control.Actually, the Communists played theirown game, as Chiang had been sure theywould when he was forced into a reluctantalliance with them by public andprivate pressure. During eight years ofwar with Japan, Nationalist troops borethe brunt of the heavy fighting and sufferedby far the greatest proportionalcasualties as they were committed todefend the prize cities and rice bowlfarmlands of South and Central China.In North China, the Communists usedthe war as a means to increase theirstrength and expand the area under controlof Yenan, the Red capital.
In effect, the Communists gained astandoff by not contesting possessionof the important strategic objectivesthat Japan wanted. Rather than dissipatehis strength in set-piece battles forcities, mines, and railroads that he didnot need, Mao concentrated on developinghis followers into an effective guerrillaforce which eventually controlledthe countryside around the Japanesepositions. The Communists' most effeetiverecruiting aid was their policy offorced land redistribution in favor of thepeasantry. The hundreds of thousandsof peasants who directly benefited, orwho saw at least the possibility of betteringan ageless cycle of impoverishedand debt-ridden tenantry, were willingand militant converts to Communism.This ability of Mao's party to effectlong-sought economic reforms by fiatwas perhaps the greatest factorin its favor in the contest with the Kuomintang.
Reform proposals were sidetracked orgiven little attention by Chiang's governmentwhich was wholly concernedwith a desperate struggle to maintainChina's identity as a nation. Chinesetroops were driven slowly from the importantcoastal cities and the major
communication centers of the interior.The national capital was moved deepinland to Chungking, in the mountainsof Szechwan Province on the upperreaches of the Yangtze. A wearying andcostly war of attrition was fought duringwhich dogged Chinese resistance andthe vast and rugged expanse of Chinaitself combined to limit but not haltJapanese expansion.During the early years of its fightChina received trickles of aid from variousforeign powers, notably Germanyand the U.S.S.R., until the outbreak ofwar in Europe shut off help. After 1939,the United States became the principalsupporter of China's war effort. Men,trucks, and materiel from the Stateswere furnished to keep open the BurmaRoad, the sole supply route to NationalistChina after Japan blockaded thecoastline. American fighter pilots andground crewmen, some of them volunteersfrom the armed forces, were allowedto serve in the Chinese Air Forceagainst Japan. Military and economicmissions were sent to Chungking to initiateaid programs, and President Rooseveltmade China eligible for Lend-Leasesupplies by declaring that "the defenseof China was vital to the defense of theUnited States."All this effort was justgetting into full swing when Japan attackedPearl Harbor on 7 December1941. One of the priority targets ofJapanese troops in Asia was the BurmaRoad, and with the fall of its southernterminus, China was cut off from allsupplies except those brought in by air.
At this juncture, the United Statessent a veteran of service in China, LieutenantGeneral Joseph W. Stilwell, tocommand American troops in the newlycreated China-Burma-India Theater. Hehad a parallel duty as Chief of Staff toChiang Kai-shek for a projected jointAllied staff that never materialized anda mission of training and building theChinese Army into a more effectivefighting force with the aid of Americanequipment and instruction. Stilwell wasalso made responsible for the effort toreopen overland supply routes to Chinaand to step up the pace of aerial supply.The tasks given the American generalwere bewildering in their complexity,but he had a single-minded tenacity ofpurpose which drove him to carry outhis orders despite any obstacles. Thisvery drive was his undoing, as he wasunable to appreciate Chiang's positionas head of state in many military matters.Since Stilwell's actions were characterizedby what one Chinese officercalled "a monumental lack of tact,"friction between the two strong-willedmen was inevitable. The Generalissimoforced Stilwell's recall in September1944.The largest rock on which theirstormy relationship foundered was thedifference in attitude toward the ChineseCommunists whom Stilwell wanted
to arm, train, and equip to fight againstJapan.To replace Stilwell in China, and toharvest the ripe fruits of his labors intraining and logistical fields, PresidentRoosevelt sent Major General Albert C.Wedemeyer to become commandinggeneral of what was now to be theChina Theater. In addition to a far--reaching and able military training andadvisory organization, Wedemeyer astheater commander had control of theprincipal American combat unit inChina, the Fourteenth Air Force. TheFourteenth was the full-grown child ofthe early American Volunteer Group of1941-1942 raised by Major GeneralClaire Chennault, who was still its commander.Where Stilwell had stronglyquestioned the practicality of Chennault'sconcept of air war against theJapanese home islands, a concept thatfound favor with Chiang Kai-shek andPresident Roosevelt, Wedemeyer had afirm directive to carry out air operationsfrom China.In this respect, as well asothers, the personable American leaderwas armed with instructions thatsmoothed the way for a restoration ofcordial relations in Chungking, AtChiang's invitation, and with JCS approval,Wedemeyer served as his Chiefof Staff in directing operations againstthe Japanese and in coordinating theorganization, equipment, and trainingof Chinese forces during the closingmonths of the war.Japan's fortuneswere on the downgrade in China as wellas in the Pacific, and the prospect inspring and early summer of 1945 wasfor mounting Chinese military success.
WAR'S END IN CHINA
In late May 1945, JapaneseImperialGeneral Headquarters issued orders toits area commander in China, GeneralYasuji Okamura, to contract his battlelines in the southwest and withdraw themain body of his troops to the centraland northern provinces. At the sametime, Okamura'sChina ExpeditionaryArmy was directed to concert its movementswith theKwantung Army in
Manchuria and theSeventeenth AreaArmy in Korea. Japanese intelligencepredicted that a large-scale Americanamphibious assault was probable in theShanghai-Hangchow area, with otherpossible landings on the ShantungPeninsula and in South Korea. Loomingeven larger in Japanese defense planswas the clear and ominous threat thatthe U.S.S.R. would at last enter thewar against their country.The enemy prediction of U.S. landingsin China was now incorrect, althoughsuch operations had once beenplanned; the Japanese estimate, however,was based on logical assumptionsof American intentions. In the case ofSoviet moves, the Japanese were ableto read the signs without difficulty andall too correctly. Even before the end ofthe war in Europe, a buildup of troops inSiberia was evident. Within weeks ofGermany's surrender, the border areafairly bristled with Soviet soldiers andtheir weapons and equipment. EarlySeptember was the expected date foran attack, but Soviet armor-led columnscracked the Japanese defenses on 9August, three days after the dropping ofthe first atomic bomb. Within a week thewar was over.
TheKwantung Army which met theSoviet attack was only a shadow of whatonce was Japan's military showpieceunit. Its first-line divisions had beencommitted to bolster defenses in Burma,China, and especially in the Pacificislands. In their place, much weakergarrison divisions, largely composed ofnew conscripts, had been raised. Strongborder defenses which barred the avenuesof approach from Siberia to theindustrial heartland of Eastern Manchuriahad been skeletonized to obtainheavy weapons for more active fronts.Significantly, the Japanese themselvesrated the effective strength of the tendivisions and one brigade which heldEastern Manchuria at just 2 first-linedivisions. The combat efficiency of othermajorKwantung units was equally low.
When the Soviet Far East GeneralArmy struck, its tanks and motorizedinfantry poured over the border on threewidely separated fronts. Japanese outpostresistance was brushed aside andstronger defenses were contained oroverwhelmed as the multi-pronged attacksconverged on the Changchun- Mukden area. Although theKwantungArmy reeled back from Soviet blows,most of its units were still intact and itwas hardly ready to be counted out ofthe fight. The Japanese Emperor's ImperialRescript which ordered his troopsto lay down their arms was the onlything which prevented a protracted andcostly battle.
Before the end of August theKwantung Army was no more, and Soviettroops controlled most of Manchuria andNorth Korea. Dispensing with formalsurrender ceremonies, the Sovietsswiftly disarmed the Japanese, broke upexisting military formations, separatedofficers from enlisted men, and organizedhundreds of labor battalions. Inshort order, a complex military organizationwas reduced to pieces, its onlyvisible remnants columns of weaponlesssoldiers trudging north and east toSiberian labor camps.
The asking price of the U.S.S.R.'sentry into the Pacific War was high. AtYalta in February 1945, Marshal Stalinagreed to attack Japan in two to three
month's time after the surrender of Germany.In return for this promise, Stalinwanted all former rights of ImperialRussia in Manchuria, rights which hadbeen lost in the Russo-Japanese War of1904-05. In addition to the virtual controlof Manchuria railroads and theKwantung Peninsula that this demandmeant, Stalin insisted that China writeoff its claim to Outer Mongolia by recognizingthe status quo in that Sovietdominatedcountry. All of Sakhalin andthe Kuril Islands were to be turned overto the U.S.S.R. as war booty. PresidentRoosevelt and Prime Minister Churchillboth agreed "that these claims of theSoviet Union shall be unquestionablyfulfilled after Japan is defeated."Despite its deep concern, China was nota participant in the Yalta Conferencenor a signatory power to the YaltaAgreement, because it was believed thatthe secret of Soviet entry into the waragainst Japan could not be kept in thelax security situation then prevailingin Chungking.President Roosevelt undertook thetask of persuading GeneralissimoChiang to accept the Yalta terms bysigning a treaty of friendship and alliancewith the Soviet Union. As the onenation, next to China, most deeply involvedin fighting Japan, the UnitedStates was extremely anxious that theU.S.S.R. add its power to the final battles.The Joint Chiefs of Staff hadadvised the President before he left forYalta to insure "Russia's entry at asearly a date as possible consistent withher ability to engage in offensive operationsNo Allied leader knew in February or even in the first days of Augustthat the war with Japan would end assuddenly as it did, and that the expectedheavy toll of Allied lives would not haveto be paid.
The Generalissimo accepted the profferedtreaty, despite its unfavorablebent, in hope that the Soviet Unionwould honor its written guarantee ofChina's "sovereignty and territorialintegrity" and its recognition of "theNational Government as the centralgovernment of China."Chiang wastoo much of a realist not to appreciatethe fact that Stalin might take all thathe wanted without Chinese sanction. Ifthe Soviet Union violated the letter orspirit of its treaty, however, worldmoral condemnation would become apractical asset to Nationalist China insoliciting aid.
The Chungking Government was sorelyin need of any support that it couldmuster at home or abroad at the war'send. The Kuomintang had been unable toeffect significant political or economicreforms during eight years of fighting.Stripped of the shield and purpose of apopular anti-foreign war, it drew theblame for continued poverty, rampantinflation, and corruption. The majorityof the Chinese people were war-wearyand eager for a better chance in life; asevents were to prove, they would notcontinue to support a government thatpostponed or was unable to effect necessary reforms.
The Chinese Communists, who hadnone of the obligations and few of theproblems of an internationally recognizedgovernment emerging from a disastrouswar, were able to pursue theirend of dominating China with fanaticalsingleness of purpose. While Chungkinghad devoted most of its resources tothe defeat of Japan, Yenan had expandedits hold on North China andWestern Manchuria. The Communistsconcentrated on economic reforms whichwould expand their base of popular support.In the summer of 1945, Americanmilitary intelligence agents could truthfully report:. . . since the Chinese Communists provideindividuals, especially laborers andpeasants, with greater economic opportunitythan the Kuomintang Nationalistsprovide, the Communists enjoy widey popularsupport in the area held by their ownarmies than do the Nationalists in theirareas of control. This is the Communists'greatest source of strength in China.Chiang Kai-shek had no intention ofletting a rival government exist inChina, and Mao Tse-tung showed nosigns of turning over the territory hecontrolled to Chungking. Into this situationof a nation divided, of a civil warready to flame anew, the United Statescommitted its troops to help repatriatethe Japanese and, in a limited manner,to aid the Nationalists in regaining possessionof North China. The resultantentanglement with the cause of the NationalGovernment was to have an incalculabeleffect on United States Foreignpolicy for the next decade.
U.S. COMMITMENT
After the publication of the JapaneseImperial Rescript, theChina ExpeditionaryArmy reversed its wartime roleand became a quasi-ally of the NationalGovernment. In North China, the Japanesegarrison was the only force thatcould prevent the Communists fromseizing the major cities and the communicationroutes that linked them. TheNorth China Area Army, with headquartersin Peiping, complied with aChungking directive that its troops surrenderonly to properly designatedrepresentatives of Chiang Kai-shek. AlthoughMao Tse-tung's men were ableto pick off outlying Japanese detachmentsand force the defection of largenumbers of puppet troops, the bulk ofJapanese soldiers held their disciplineand complied with the orders passed tothem from above. They continued tomount guard as they had in years pastand to fend off Communist attacks, whilethey waited for relief by Nationalist troops.The decision to use the Japanese tohold North China was seconded in Washingtonwhere President Truman approvedplans to use American troops,ships, and planes to aid the Nationalistrecovery of the area.Chiang Kai-shek's
armies had no organic transportationcapable of moving large bodies ofmen for long distances, and the country'sroad, rail, and shipping facilitieswere totally inadequate for the job athand. Following a JCS directive of 10August 1945, General Wedemeyer issuedorders to the American units under hiscommand to assist the National Governmentin occupying key areas, in receivingthe enemy surrender and repatriatingJapanese troops, and in liberatingand rehabilitating Allied internees andprisoners of war. While furnishing thisassistance, theater forces were admonishedto make every effort "to avoidparticipation in any fratricidal conflictin China."This warning to steer clearof involvement in civil strife followedthe consistent pattern of Americanpolicy instructions carried through fromthe earliest days of the Stilwell mission.Alarmed by the possibility of U.S.S.R.encroachment in North China and Manchuria,General Wedemeyer asked thatseven American divisions be sent to hiscommand to create a barrier force whichwould discourage further Soviet expansion.In reply, the JCS indicated thatthe absolute priority of occupation operationsin the Japanese home islandswould use up all immediately availabletroops and shipping. In furtherance ofplans then being laid at Admiral Nimitz'headquarters, however, General Wedemeyerwas offered the Marine III AmphibiousCorps to assist the NationalGovernment in reoccupying North Chinaand repatriating the Japanese.
The preliminary concept of operationsinvolving IIIAC units called forthe use of Marine divisions to occupyShanghai and gain control of theYangtze's mouth, but the revised CinCPac plan for occupation operations,published on 14 August, covered landingsin the Taku-Tientsin and Tsingtao areasinstead.(SeeMap 33.)China Theaterhad advised that Nationalist troopswould be airlifted to Shanghai and Nankingby American planes; the Marineswould not be needed there. A considerabletime gap would occur, however, beforeNational Government forces instrength could reach North China, andthe presence of American occupationforces as stand-ins for the Nationalistswould help to stabilize the situation.
On 19 August, at Manila, representativesof CinCPac, Seventh Fleet, andChina Theater met to coordinate plansfor China operations. The assignmentof IIIAC to General Wedemeyer's commandwas confirmed and 30 Septemberset as the earliest practical date forlanding the Marines without undueinterference with the occupation ofJapan and Korea.
IIIAC PLANS
In order to keep abreast of therapidly changing situation in the
Pacific and to have a planning edge forfuture operations, III AmphibiousCorps monitored the radio traffic ofhigher headquarters. As a result, thecorps commander, Major General KellerE. Rockey, and his staff were awareof the impending China commitment ofIIIAC several days before any wordwas received from CinCPac.Even prior to this alert, however, the majorunits of the corps were readying themselvesfor occupation duty. The swiftmounting out of Task Group Able forthe occupation of Japan was sufficientwarning of a probable role for otherMarine units.The presence of CinCPac and FMFPacAdvance Headquarters on Guamhelped speed preparations for the comingoperations and allowed changes inplans to be made with a minimum ofdisruption. Before the switch of targetsfor IIIAC to the Tsingtao and Tientsinareas was effected, Rear Admiral ForrestP. Sherman, the operations otlicerfor CinCPac, held a briefing on the proposedlanding at Shanghai for GeneralsGeiger and Moore of FMFPac andRockey and his chief of staff, BrigadierGeneral William A. Worton.By thetime the North China objectives wereconfirmed, with Shanghai as an alternativeoperation. the coordination ofnaval plans with those of the landingforce at the corps level was well underway.A formal warning order wasissued by CinCPac on 21 August; IIIACalerted its subordinate units the following day.
The Seventh Fleet, under AdmiralThomas C. Kinkaid, was assigned themission of conducting naval operationsoff the coast of China and westernKorea in Admiral Nimitz' operationplan of 14 August. On the 26th, Kinkaidpublished his own plan which coveredthe landings of the Army XXIV Corpsin South Korea and the III AmphibiousCorps in North China.
Kinkaid's concept of operations calledfor a Fast Carrier Force (TF 72) anda task grouping of cruisers, destroyers,minesweepers, and close fire supportlanding craft, North China Force (TF71), to arrive in the Yellow Sea priorto Japan's surrender. By means of extensiveair and sea sweeps, the U.S.ships and planes would exercise controlof the Yellow Sea and the Gulf ofChihli. Simultaneously, other taskforces of the fleet would move in on theSouth and Central China coasts, and, asNationalist troops advanced to take theports, set up patrol bases at Canton and Shanghai.
Amphibious operations were to be conductedby Task Force 78, led by ViceAdmiral Daniel E. Barbey, Commander,VII Amphibious Force. Barbey's taskwas to land and establish the XXIVCorps ashore in the Seoul area of Korea,and then to lift and land IIIAC atTsingtao and at Tientsin's ports, Taku-Tangku
and Chinwangtao. After theinitial III Corps landings, some turnaroundshipping was scheduled to bringon the follow-up echelons of the corpswhile other transports moved to SouthChina to pick up Nationalist forcesscheduled to relieve the Marines.In order to facilitate joint planningfor the operation, Admiral Barbey senta liaison party from the VII AmphibiousForce to Guam to live and work directlywith IIIAC staff officers. The men hepicked were empowered to make majordecisions without constant referral tothe admiral.Although Barbey's operationplan was not issued until 19September, its essential elements werewell known to IIIAC as they developed.The corps itself was able to send out atentative schedule of operations on 29August and follow it up three days laterwith its basic plan.
General Rockey, as Commander,Naval Occupation Forces (TF 79), wasassigned his own corps as the Chinalanding force. In addition, the 3d MarineDivision on Guam and the 4thMarine Division on Maui reported forplanning purposes as CinCPac areareserve. III Corps Artillery was giventhe role of corps reserve, and was tomove from Okinawa to China when andif needed. The heavy artillerymen wereordered to be prepared to operate asinf antry.To augment IIIAC groundforces and to give it a substantial aircapability, CinCPac added the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing to Rockey's command.The fighter groups of the wingwere released from operational controlof MacArthur's Far East Air Forces on27 August, shortly after the wing commandpost had shifted from Bougainvilleato Zamboanga on Mindanao.The wing's transport group, MAG-25, remainedbased at Bougainvillea temporarily,although its planes were continuallyin the forward area.
In all, with the normal reinforcementsfor a major amphibious operation,the initial troop list of GeneralRockey's command included approximately65,000 men. Many of the unitsattached for planning were those thatwould have been needed if extensivecombat or base construction activitieswere expected. But, in North China itappeared that there would be little needfor additional Seabee battalions or hospitals.Once General Rockey had achance to confer with Admiral Kinkaidand with General George C. Stratemeyer,General Wedemeyer's deputy,IIIAC strength was reduced by the deletionof a number of supporting units.The paring process went on as the operationdeveloped, and the peak strengthof III Corps in China stayed close to50,000 men.
As it first evolved, the IIIAC conceptof operations included landings aboutten days apart at two widely separatedobjectives. Rockey's headquarters andcorps troops would mount out at Guam,move to Okinawa, be joined there by thereinforced 1st Marine Division, andthen sail for Tientsin. The 6th MarineDivision (less the 4th Marines, which
had been committed in the occupationof Japan) would follow from Guam onlater shipping and make Tsingtao itsdestination. Elements of 1st MAW,loading at Mindanao and Bougainvillea,would move to China as soon as airfieldsat Tientsin and Tsingtao were ready.In the main, command relationshipsfor this operation were similar to thosefor combat landings in the later stagesof the war. The transport squadroncommanders who moved and landed thetwo assault echelons were charged withthe responsibility for the success ofoperations ashore until the respectivedivision commanders notified them thatthey were ready to take over. AdmiralBarbey was to continue in command ofamphibious forces afloat and ashoreuntil General Rockey had landed andestablished his headquarters. Once theIIIAC commander was ready to assumecontrol of his forces, he would report tothe China Theater commander foroperational control.
The nature of the proposed operationsat each objective varied so sharplyas a result of differing geographical,political, and military factors that inmany respects the further history of theMarines in North China became twodifferent accounts. One, told at Tsingtao,has an aura of routine garrison dutythrough all but the last days of its telling.The other, based on activities alongthe rail line and roads connecting Peiping,Tientsin, and Chinwangtao, bristleswith the constant threat and sometimereality of Communist attacks.
Table of Contents **Previous Chapter (IV-3) *Next Chapter (V-2)
1.Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:John King Fairbank,The United States and China (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1958, rev. ed.),hereafter Fairbank,U.S. and China;Herbert Feis,The China Tangle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953),hereafter Feis,China Tangle;F.F. Liu,A Military History of Modern China 1924-1949(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956),hereafter Liu,Military History of China;U.S. Department of State,United States Relations with China (Washington, 1949),hereafterU.S. Relations with China. Footnotes
2.Clyde H. Metcalf,A History of the UnitedStates Marine Corps (New York: G.P. Putnam'sSons, 1939), pp. 91-92.
3.Sun Yat-sen,San Min Chu I--The ThreePrinciples of the People (Chungking: Ministryof Information of the Republic of China, 1943), p. 12.
4.U.S. Relations with China, p. 417.
5.Sun Yat-sen,op. cit., p. 169.
6.The Central Daily News (Nanking), dtd28 Nov36, quoted in Liu,Military History ofChina, p. 114.
7.U.S. Relations with China, p. 26.
8.Liu,Military History of China, p. 178.
9.A lucid and detailed examination of thecomplex situation which led to Stilwell's recallcan be found in the official Army history byCharles F. Romanus and Riley Sutherland.Stilwell's CommandProblems--China-Burma: India Theater--United States Army in World War II (Washington: OCMH, DA, 1956).
10.The commander of the Marine occupationforces in China recalled that at a meeting inSeptember 1945, General Stilwell describedthe Chinese Communists as being primarily"agrarian reformers." LtGen Keller E. Rockeyinterviews by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd14-15 Apr59, 29 Apr59, and 9Jul59, hereafterRockey interview with appropriate date. GeneralWedemeyer commented that the Generalissimo"was confident the Communists wouldnot fight the Japanese but would simply preparefor postwar takeover." Gen Albert C.Wedemeyer ltr to ACofS, G-3, HQMC, dtd 26Aug61.
11.Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer,WedemeyerReports! (New York: Henry Holt & Company,1958), p. 271, hereafter Wedemeyer,Reports.
12.Wedemeyer ltr,op. cit.
13.Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:MilHistSec, HqAFFE,Japanese Monograph No. 129, ChinaArOpsRecCored of the China ExpeditionaryA, dtd13 Feb52 (OCMH 8-5.1 AC 121), JapaneseMonograph No. 154, Rec of Ops Against SovietRussia, Eastern Front (Aug45), dtd 6Apr54(OCMH 8-5.1 AC 179), and Japanese MonographNo. 155, Rec of Ops Against SovietRussia on Northern and Western fronts ofManchuria and in Northern Korea (Aug45),dtd Sep54 (OCMH 8-5.1 AC 180);Senate Committees on Armed Services and ForeignRelations,Hearings on the Military Situationin the Far East, 3 May--17 August 1951(Washington, 1951), hereafterMilitary Situationin the Far East;U.S. Relations with China.
14.Quoted inU.S. Relations with China, p. 114.
15.Quoted inMilitary Situation in the Far East, p. 3332.
16.Quoted inU.S. Relations with China, pp.586, 587; Chiang Kai-shek,Soviet Russia inChina (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy,1957), p. 227, hereafter Chiang,Soviet Russia.
17.MIS, WD, "The Chinese Communist Movement,"ca. Jul45, inCongressional Record, 81stCongress, Ist Session (Washington, 1949), v.95, pt 15, p. A5501.
18.Unless otherwise noted, the material inthis section is derived from:CinCPac-CinCPOA JStfStudy B, dtd 13Aug45;CinCPac WarD, Aug45 (OAB, NHD);Military Situation in the Far East;Wedemeyer,Reports.
19.Harry S. Truman,Years of Trial andHope--Memoirs, v. II (Garden City: Doubledayand Company, 1956), p. 62,
20.USForChinaThtr OpDirective No. 25, dtd20Aug45 (Wedemeyer File, TAGO, KCRC).
21.CinCPac-CinCPOA OPlan 12-45 (Revised),C-B, dtd 14Aug45(OAB, NHD).
22.Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from:CinCPac WarD, Aug45;ComSeventhFlt OPlan No. 13-45, dtd 26Aug45, corrected through Change 10, dtd 18Sep45;ComVIIPhibFor OPlan No. A1703-45, dtd 19Sep45, hereafterVIIPhibFor OPlan 1703-45;IIIAC WarD, Aug45;IIIAC OPlan No. 26-45, dtd 1Sep45, corrected through Change 4, dtd 27Sep45, hereafterIIIAC OPlan 26-45.
23.MajGen William A. Worton ltr to Hd,HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 12Jan59 andinterview by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd10Feb59, hereafterWorton ltr andWortoninterview, respectively. General Rockey recalledthat Marine officers on the CinCPacstaff also had passed the word of the Chinacommitment of IIIAC before the official notificationwas received. LtGen Keller E. Rockeycomments on draft ms, dtd 6Feb62, hereafterRockey comments.
24.Seept IV, "The Occupation of Japan,"supra.
25.Worton interview.
26.Rockey interview, 14-15Apr59.
27.III CorpsArty OPlan No. 11-45 (Tentative),dtd 4Sep45, p. 2.
28.1st MAW WarD, Aug45.
29.MAG-25 WarD, Sep45.
30.Rockey comments.
