Movatterモバイル変換

Chapter XII
Coordination With Britain

The secret American-British Conversations (ABC) between military Staff representativesof the two nations, which took place in Washington from 29 January to 27 March1941,were a rational development in the drift of the United States toward activeparticipation in World War II. The drift was marked by well-defined stages.Great Britain's purchase of airplanes and other munitionshad started as a series of normal business transactions with privatemanufacturers in the American open market. By developing in 1938 to a grand-scaleenterprise it had affected the American military program itself by reason ofopen-market competition with Army and Navy procurement activities. In the followingyear this competition became so real a concern of the American military establishmentthat on 6 July 1939 President Roosevelt assigned to the Army and Navy MunitionsBoard the task of coordinating such purchases. On 6 December 1939 he designatedan informal interdepartmental committee (made up of the Treasury Department'sDirector of Procurement, the Army's Quartermaster General, and the Navy's PaymasterGeneral) to take over this function and to "serve as the exclusive liaisonwith reference to procurement matters between this Government and the interestedforeign Government." By mid-1940, when the importance of exact coordinationof purchases had grown still greater, the liaison mechanism was given formalstatus as the Interdepartmental Committee For Coordination of Foreign and DomesticMilitary Purchases, with Col. James H. Burns as Army representative; the liaisonwith the White House was, as before, via the Secretary ofthe Treasury.In 1940, it will be recalled, there was a formal division of Americanplane production schedules so that Great Britain would get a stated part ofthe whole output even when the residue was insufficient to meet the existingschedule of American

rearming.The direct shipment from U.S. Army stores of weaponsand ammunition to Britain in the great emergency of June 1940involved the military establishment still more deeply, and wasin no sense an open-market transaction. The subsequent exchange of the fifty U.S. Navy destroyers in September 1940 for leases ofBritain's west Atlantic bases, however profitable for both nations, cannot bepresented as an act of unquestionable neutrality as between Britain andGermany.Cordell Hull in later years remarked that in November1940 "three days after the Presidential election Mr. Rooseveltannounced that henceforth half of all the planes and other implements of warproduced in the United States would go to Britain."At a press conference on 17 December 1940 the Presidentannounced his plan for Lend-Lease (enacted into law in March 1941), under whichthe now immense flow of munitions to Great Britain and other nations at war withthe Axis would be determined by the Allies' need for such supplies (andAmerica's ability to supply them) rather than by the current or prospectiveability of the beneficiaries to pay for them as normal purchases. Theannouncement came at a time when British ship losses had mounted to theunprecedented rate of 4.6 million ship tons a year (it would reach 5.4 millionsin April 1940 against a British shipbuilding rate of 1.5 million tons, andbringing from Admiral Stark a forecast that Britain could not at this rateoutlast another six months. The Lend-Lease announcement was clearly intended tocommit the United States to further, and purposely unlimited, aid to Britain,and thus to help overcome the discouragement of the shipping losses. It was apublic and official declaration of the principle which the Army's War PlansDivision in that same month was enunciating when it recommended a major nationalpolicy of maximum "aid to Britain, short of war."

These increasingly wide departures from a strict neutralityas between two warring nations were, with one exception (the contemplatedmanning of the west Atlantic bases), concerned wholly with matériel. Theplanning activities of Army and Navy had necessarily been concerned also withpersonnel, to be sure, but up to then had involved only such informal contactwith the British as the Ghormley-Strong-Emmons visit to London in August 1940and similar exchanges of information between military representatives. Yet ithad now become apparent that no reliable planning for possible military actionin either hemisphere, anticipating an ultimate conflict with Germany and Italy,or with Japan, or with all three, could be carried on without a fairly definiteunderstanding of what could be expected from Britain in such an event. The U.S. Navy at this time still was manifestly a one-ocean navy incapable of engagingenemies simultaneously in both seas, and its chiefs were increasingly aware thatagainst an energetic Japan it could not at the moment be responsible forpolicing the whole of even the Pacific Ocean. It was accordingly Admiral Starkwho took the lead in pointing to the necessity of knowing what could be expectedfrom the British in an emergency, and hence in suggesting a conference withresponsible British Staff officers. The suggestion, welcomed by GeneralMarshall, was accordingly pursued and on 2 December 1940 it became known in theWar Department that a British delegation would come to Washington for theawaited "exchange of ideas."

Rationally such a high-level discussion would not, likeearlier conferences, be for consideration merely of further purchases orlend-lease of matériel; the aim clearly was for consideration of a contingentemployment of American personnel and American combat units in a theater ortheaters of war. The discussion could not avoid some degree of joint planning ofU.S.-British strategy, contingent though it would be by advance stipulation, andnegative though it would be, for the same reason, in political commitment of theUnited States to any war agreement whatever. Cautious as these stipulationswould be, and scrupulous as "political" (as distinguished from "military")members of the United States Government would be in abstaining from officialattendance, the very subject matter of the discussions and the two-nationparticipation in them alike marked an epochal change in the war policy of theUnited States. The conferring Staff members were to be of high level, but notthe highest in the case of either nation, and this supported the politeassurance that the conference decisions would not

be actually binding upon anyone. Constitutionally of coursethey could not be. Yet examination of the list of conference delegates shows howinstantly responsive each American participant would be to the chief of theservice he represented and hence to the government itself. The Navy members wereRear Adm. (later Vice Adm.) Robert L. Ghormley, Special Naval Observer inLondon, Capt. (later Admiral) R.K. Turner, director of the Navy's WPD, hisassistant, Capt. (later Commodore) Oscar Smith, and Capt. (later Admiral) AlanG. Kirk, former naval attaché in London lately become Director of NavalIntelligence in Washington. Captain Smith was replaced by Capt. (later Admiral)DeWitt C. Ramsey, and Lt. Col. O.T. Pfeiffer, USMC, was added. Mentioning theseappointments in a 26 December memorandum to the Chief ofStaff,General Gerow recommended the Army's naming General Embick (thenengaged in organizing hemisphere defense), General Gerow and Col. (later Gen.)J.T. McNarney, both of WPD, and Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Sherman Miles,Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, who were so named shortly.Lt. Col. W.S. Scobey and Commander L.C. McDowell were the American secretariesof the meeting.

Establishing the American Position Prior to the British Parley

The mounting anxieties of late 1940 had so convinced bothChief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations of the need for a unified Americanmilitary policy, accepted by the President in advance of any meeting with theBritish, that in their capacities as joint Board members they had already, inmid-December, directed the Joint Planning Committee to prepare recommendationsfor the agenda of the coming meeting.Inevitably preparation called forconsultations with the Chiefs themselves, and the committee's resultantmemorandum to the Joint Board, signed by Colonel McNarney and Captain Turner,presumably struck an attitude which it was known would be acceptable to higherauthority. Significant passages in this critically worded document follow:

Recent British political and military leadership has not beenoutstanding with the exception of Prime Minister Churchill's leadership, AdmiralCunningham's command

of the Mediterranean fleet, and General Wavell's command ofthe British forces in Egypt. It is believed that we cannot afford, nor do weneed, to entrust our national future to British direction, because the UnitedStates can safeguard the North American continent and probably the western hemisphere,whether allied with Britain or not.

United States Army and Naval officials are in rather generalagreement that Great Britain cannot encompass the defeat of Germany unless theUnited States provides that nation with direct military assistance, plus a fargreater degree of material aid than is being given now; and that, even then,success against the Axis is not assured.

It is to be expected that proposals of the British representativeswill have been drawn up with chief regard for the support of the British Commonwealth.Never absent from British minds are their post-war interests, commercial andmilitary. We should likewise safeguard our own eventual interests. . . .

In order to avoid commitment by the President, neither he norany of his Cabinet should officially receive the British officers; thereforethe Joint Planning Committee recommends that the British representatives beinformally received by the Under Secretary of State, the Chief of Naval Operations,and the Chief of Staff. . . .

Something of this same suspicion of British intentions wasbeing exhibited by the military attaché, Brig. Gen. Raymond E. Lee. On 7 Januaryhe informed his superior in Washington that the British Chiefs of Staff hadprepared for the use of their delegates in the coming Staff Conversations dataso secret that they did not see fit to discuss them with him at the time. Heproceeded: "It seems to me that proposals which have taken them a month or moreto draw up justify most careful scrutiny and analysis by our own authorities. . . .The United States might find itself being urged to conclude far-reaching andbinding agreements without sufficient examination."

It must be remembered that at this season the Britishsituation was none too secure. The shipping losses were still mounting anddestined to continue mounting. The end of 1940 had seen a lull in the bombingof London, but there was no certainty that the lull would last long. On thecontrary, in late January one of the Army's most trusted military observers waspredicting freely that the Germans would make a new air-and-land onslaught inthe spring or early summer. "I am certain they are going to England . . ." hesaid. "Last fall there was a doubt as to what they might do. However, now thereis none in my mind. . . ."The observer spoke lightly of a Nazi invasion ofSouth America, which he was confident Germany, a land power, would not attemptin the certainty of being opposed by the United States Navy. He remarked that the

Germans were less interested in South America than in the Soviet Union, inwhich midyear developments would prove his judgment correct. To this soundestimate he added, in discussing invasion of the USSR, that "if they [theGermans] massed their forces, it would be as easy as ABC," an estimate not borneout by events.

Accompanying the Joint Planning Committee's memorandum wereproposals of procedure and agenda and a statement of the United States'national position that was approved verbatim by the two senior members of thejoint Board.By 26 January this statement apparently hadbeen seen by the Secretaries of War and Navy and certainly examined in detailby the President, as on that day Mr. Roosevelt returned it to the Secretary ofthe Navy with revisions.The statement was intended, in line with the PlanningCommittee's admonitions, to discourage the British visitors at the outset fromenterprises unacceptable to the United States, and to channel the conversationsinto areas of usefulness for the planners of both nations. As finally deliveredby the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, the statement containedthese significant passages:

2. As understood by these two officers the purpose of thesestaff conversations is to determine the best methods by which the armed forcesof the United States and the British Commonwealth can defeat Germany and thepowers allied with her, should the United States be compelled to resort to war.

3. The American people as a whole desire now to remain outof war, and to provide only material and economic aid to Great Britain. So longas this attitude is maintained it must be supported by their responsible militaryand naval authorities. Therefore no specific commitments can now be made exceptas to technical methods of cooperation. Military plans which may be envisagedmust for the present remain contingent upon the future political action of bothnations. All such plans are subject to eventual official approval by both governments. . . .

4. If the U.S. Government decides to make war in common withthe British Commonwealth, it is the present view of the Chief of Naval Operationsand the Chief of Staff: that

   1. The broad military objective of the United States operationswill be the defeat of Germany and her allies, but the United States necessarilymust also maintain dispositions which under all eventualities will preventthe extensions in the western hemisphere of European or Asiatic politicaland military power.

   2. The objective of the war will be most effectively attained by the UnitedStates exerting its principal military effort in the Atlantic or navally inthe Mediterranean regions.

3. The United States and British Commonwealth should endeavorto keep Japan from entering the war or attacking the Dutch.

4. Should Japan enter the war, United States operations in the mid-Pacificand the Far East would be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate theexertion of its principal military effort in the Atlantic or navally in theMediterranean.

5. As a general rule United States forces should operate in their own areasof responsibility, under their own commanders, and in accordance with plansderived from the United States-British joint plans.

6. The United States will continue to furnish material aid to Great Britainbut will retain for building up its own forces material in such proportionsas to provide for future security and best to effectuate United States-Britishjoint plans for defeating Germany.
6. The scope of the staff conversations should preferably coverthe examination of those military efforts which will contribute most directlyto the defeat of Germany. As a preliminary to military cooperation tentativeagreements should be reached concerning the allocation of the principal areasof responsibility, the major lines of the military strategy to be pursued byboth nations, the strength of the forces which each may be able to commit, andthe determination of satisfactory command arrangements, both as to supreme controland as to unity of field command in cases of tactical joint operations. Staffconversations should also include an examination into the present military situationsof the United States and the British Commonwealth, and also into the probablesituations that might result from the loss of the British Isles.

7. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff wouldappreciate it if the British Staff representatives could furnish the UnitedStates Staff representatives with an estimate of the military situation of theBritish Commonwealth as a preliminary to the staffdiscussions.

It was in paragraph 2 of the originaldraft that the President, politically vigilant, had spotted a verbal serpent.The military advisers had written ". . . should the United States desire toresort to war." The President made it read "should the United States becompelled to resort to war," and his wording was of courseadopted.Other revisions of slight concern were made (the President substituted "Associates"for "Allies" and suggested that aid in the Mediterranean would be given "navally"),and the initial statement of United States views, almost exactly as the twomilitary chiefs had drawn it up, was presented accordingly on 29January when the two delegations met in a Navy Building roomvacated for the purpose of the conference.

The American-British Conversations of January 1941

Although the plan had been for the British visitors to bewelcomed officially by the Under Secretary of State as well as by the militarychiefs of Army and Navy, Mr. Welles was absentNo official on the Cabinet levelwas present to confess political knowledge of this meeting of militarytechnicians and, having made welcoming speeches, neither Admiral Stark norGeneral Marshall took part in ensuing discussions. That both were kept currentlyinformed was well understood,but the warnings contained in their openingstatement were, with one notable exception, enough to prevent the raising ofissues beyond the intended scope of the American delegates' authority. Thatexception was the British effort on 12 February to exactan agreement upon American aid to Singapore, an issue so important that itcalled for consideration--but not at these Washington conversations. Theresultant proposals for Singapore and the Far East in general will be discussed later.

By 5 March the United States Chiefs of Staff Committee,directing its energies to the more promising cooperative prospect of theAtlantic, had reached tentative agreement upon the proposed mission of groundand air forces in the British Isles. The following proposal, with General Gerow'srecommendation, was submitted to the Chief of Staff:

1. The primary role of the land forces of the Associated Powerswill be to hold the British Isles against invasion; to defend the western hemisphere,and to protect naval bases and islands of strategic importance against land,air, or seaborne attack. Forces will be built up for an eventual offensive ina manner to be agreed upon at a later date.

2. The primary objective of the air forces, subject to therequirements of the security of the United States and an unimpaired pursuitcover in the British Isles, will be to reduce as quickly as possible the disparitybetween the Associated and enemy air strength particularly with respect to long-rangestriking forces operating from and against theBritish Isles

The memorandum covering the recommendation bears General Marshall's OK of 6March 1941.In the next two weeks agreements were reached on several items andon 19 March General Gerow was able to give to the Chief of Staff for his scrutiny,and presentation to the Secretary of War, drafts of all the conference "serials"to date. They included the report of the Staff Conversations themselves

thus far, the report on Strategic Direction of Military Forces, that onCommunications, that on Control of Shipping, and that on Estimates of Time forU.S. Naval Forces to Be on Station.

Ten days later the conversations ended with a detailed reportof agreement on basic policies, primary objectives, and the plans for attainingthem--all on a contingent basis as scheduled.The agreements were "subject toconfirmation by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, and theChiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet in the United Kingdom," and by "theGovernments of the United States and . . . United Kingdom." The governmentalconfirmation, which could come only from President Roosevelt and Prime MinisterChurchill, was not given, either for the ABC report or for the later JointR Plan 5 that was based upon the unconfirmed ABC compact. Even so, theStaff views were so clearly expressed and accepted by both sides that, while theapproval of higher authority was being awaited, planning could proceed. TheStaff Conversations served to put into written form the views which already wereheld and on which there was general agreement, to make a few significantadditions to those views, and to permit declarations of a highly particularizednature on the division of responsibility, the actual areas in which troops wouldbe used, the probable number of Army units, planes, and ships, and the characterof command.

The Agreements Reached at ABC

The stated and obvious purpose of the Staff ConversationsReport, made in two installments, ABC-1 and ABC-2, was "to determine the bestmethod by which the armed forces of the United States and British Commonwealth,with its present Allies, could defeat Germany and the Powers allied with her,should the United States be compelled to resort to war." This made it desirable"to coordinate, on broad lines, plans for the employment of the forces of theAssociated Powers" and encouraged the conference

. . . to reach agreements concerning the methods and natureof Military Cooperation between the two nations, including the allocation ofthe principal areas of responsibility, the

major lines of the Military strategy to be pursued by bothnations, the strength of the forces which each may be able to commit, and thedetermination of satisfactory command arrangements, both as to supreme Militarycontrol and as to unity of field command in cases of strategic and tacticaljoint operations.

One of the contingent commitments provided that "the High Command of theUnited States and United Kingdom will collaborate continuously in the formulationand execution of strategic policies and plans which will govern the conductof the war."It is a memorable statement, for events immediately following theconference dictated that it become partially operative, and in this pledge isdiscernible the genesis of the fully cooperative Combined Chiefs of Staff organizationwhich in less than a year came into being as agreed upon. The report proceeds:"The Staff Conference assumes that when the United States becomes involvedin war with Germany it will at the same time engage in war with Italy. In thesecircumstances, the possibility of a state of war arising . . . [with Japan]must be taken into account."This was a considerable element in the decision that

. . . the United States will continue to furnish material aidto the United Kingdom but . . . will retain matériel in such quantities as toprovide for security and best to effectuate United States-British joint plansfor defeating Germany and her allies. It is recognized that the amount and natureof the material aid which the United States affords the British Commonwealthwill influence the size and character of the Military forces which will be availableto the United States for use in the war. The broad strategic objective of theAssociated Powers will be the defeat of Germany andher allies.

The strategic defense policies of the two nations were three:

(1) that America's paramount territorial interest was in theWestern Hemisphere, (2) that the security of the United Kingdom must be maintainedin all circumstances and that dispositions must provide "for the ultimatesecurity of the British Commonwealth of Nations," a cardinal policy beingretention of a Far East position "such as will assure the cohesion andsecurity of the British Commonwealth," (3) that security of sea communicationsof the Associated Powers was essential.

The accepted offensive policies were seven:

1. To maintain an economic blockade of the Axis by sea, land,air, and by commodity control through diplomatic and financial means.

2. To conduct a sustained air offensive to destroy Axis military power.

3. To effect "early elimination" of Italy as an Axis partner (of whichmuch more, of a less harmonious nature, would be heard in 1943).

4. To conduct raids and minor offensives.

5. To support neutrals and underground groups in resisting the Axis.

6. To build up the necessary forces for the eventual offensive against Germany.

7. To capture positions from which to launch that offensive. (On this, too,there would be controversy in 1942 and 1943.)

In pursuit of these basic policies it was agreed that "theAtlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theater" and that init accordingly would be exerted the chief American effort, although the "greatimportance" of the Mediterranean and North African areas was noted. Theprincipal activity contemplated for United States Navy forces in the Atlanticwould be in the protection of the shipping of the AssociatedPowers.Theemphasis on this, in early 1941, when the new ground and air forces of the Armywere still largely in incubation and deficient in training and equipment, marksa recognition of the Navy's existing resources as America's most usefulcontribution in immediate prospect, and already needed for coping withBritain's dismal situation at sea where sinkings by U-boats continued to mount.During the Staff Conferences, in fact, a U.S. Navy group headed by Capt.(later Admiral) Louis A. Denfeld was sent to Northern Ireland and westernScotland to inspect base sites for U.S. Navy surface and air forces "which atsome date in the future might be employed on escortof convoys."The message which was originally sent mentioned that the War Department contemplatedassigning two Army officers to the party sailing on 21February, but on reconsideration the mission was decided to besolely one for naval personnel.

It was agreed further that if Japan should enter the war,military strategy in the Far East would be defensive, the United States makingno promise of adding to its military strength in the Orient but agreeing to"employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner bestcalculated to weaken Japanese economic power . . . by diverting Japanesestrength away from Malaysia."It was pointedly observedin the report (and was to be sharply emphasized later in the year) thatAmerica's augmentations of forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean

would enable the British Commonwealth "to release the necessary forces forthe Far East."

As to the land forces of the Associated Powers, the principal defensive roleswould be to hold the British Isles against invasion, to defend the WesternHemisphere, and to protect outlying military bases and islands of strategicimportance. The land forces of the United States, in particular, would "supportthe United States' naval and air forces maintaining the security of the WesternHemisphere or operating in the areas bordering on the Atlantic. . . . [They]will, as a general rule, provide ground and anti-aircraft defenses of naval andair bases used primarily by United States forces."

Subject to requirements of security for the bases and forland and sea communications, the agreed air policy was to be "directed towardachieving as quickly as possible superiority of air strength." The American airresources in particular would be used to support the United States' land andnaval forces, and to defend their bases. Offensively, they would be used incollaboration with the Royal Air Force against German militarypower.This was the general statement; the particulars of air force employment were enumeratedin the ABC-2 annex, dated 29 March, which was prepared bythe three aviation authorities of the conference, Vice-Marshal J. C. Slessor,Captain Ramsey and Colonel McNarney, and approved by theircolleagues.

There obviously was a great deal of detail which the annexesto the main document could not encompass, and this, plus a continuing liaison,was left to military missions which the British and American parties to theconversations agreed to exchange. (The United States agreed also to exchangewith Canada, Australia, and New Zealand such liaison officers as would benecessary).These essential missions were in fact designated with littledelay, regardless of the fact that the conversations that created them neverwere given the formal approval which had been termed necessary. The principlesof future cooperation, the areas of sea responsibility, and the specific numberof combat units that would be available were laid down in the document itself--ofnecessity, if the United States planning establishment was to proceed with thenewest and much the most important of the R Plans, No. 5. It was thisobjective which, months before, had made

the conversations necessary.Further, it now was anticipated that, even in advance of a declared war,there might be need for deploying American naval vessels in the Atlantic ina more intensive manner, and this anticipation was borne out in the closingdays of the Staff Conversations. (On 25 March 1941 Germany announced that U-boatwarfare, hitherto conducted for the most part in waters immediately surroundingthe British Isles, now would be extended to the eastern coast of Greenland.)In Annex II therefore, the ABC planners assigned to the U.S. Navy in the eventof war the waters of the Atlantic west of long. 30° W and north of lat. 25°N, excepting the Canadian defense area and a zone southwest of the Azores. Inthe Pacific the U.S. Navy responsibility was much more extended, the BritishNavy agreeing to patrol only the south and southwest areas. The responsibilityfor strategic direction of the Associated Powers' naval forces in the Far East(except those which were retained by the Commander in Chief of the US AsiaticFleet for Philippines defense) was without argument assigned tothe British.

Annex III of the conversations made a formal designation ofnaval, land, and air tasks, and in doing so listed the forces of both nationswhich should be available. In the naval tasks (for performing which eachnation's naval contributions were listed by ship classes) were included thework of ocean escort, of striking force, patrol force, fleet marine force, andof the coastal frontier defense. For the land tasks to be assigned to the U.S.Army it was noted that 2 cavalry, 6 armored, and 27 infantry divisions were intraining, but that of these only 2 armored and 4 infantry divisions could beready by September 1941. The U.S. Army air forces then being organized werenumbered at 41 groups. This was recognized as a start in the 54-group program,from which an expansion to 100 groups was already envisaged. The numberimmediately available was not stated.A warning of American intentions withregard to the output of the new airplane factories was presented in ABC-2:

Allocation of output from new capacity for production of militaryaircraft beyond that envisaged [in the stated commitment] should, in principle,and subject to periodical review, be based on the following:

1. Until such time as the United States may enter the war,the entire output from such new capacity should be made available to the British.

2. If the United States enters the war . . . for planning purposesthe United Kingdom should assume that such capacity will be divided on approximatelya 50/50 basis between the United States and the BritishCommonwealth.

This applied chiefly to Army air equipment, the need for which would beswift. U.S. Navy aviation progress, it was stated, would "reach maturityconcurrently with completion of the authorized shipbuilding program in thefiscal year 1946," the need for carrier-based planes obviously having arelationship to the completion of carriers.

American Interpretations of the Agreement

The importance of an agreement being not only in what it saysbut in what it is meant to emphasize, there is interest in two contemporarycomments upon it. One is a quick digest of the recommendations that wasprepared, it would seem, in WPD and filed with other basic documents of theperiod. It summarizes the findings thus:

That the paramount interest of the United States lies in theWestern Hemisphere.
That the security of the British Isles must be maintained.
That full economic pressure will be maintained against the totalitarian powers.
That military (including air and naval) measures will be maintained againstthe totalitarian powers.

In order to accomplish . . . [this, assign] strategic areasof responsibility . . . Pacific area . . .[and] Western Atlantic area to theUnited States. The Far East area, including China and Malaysia . . . the EasternAtlantic and Middle East to Great Britain. . . .

Initial United States naval operations will be to maintaina strategic naval reserve in the Pacific, in order to influence Japan againstfurther aggression; and to relieve Great Britain of responsibility for securityof shipping in the Western Atlantic, including the North Atlantic route to theBritish Isles.

United States Army operations initially are limited to providingcombat aviation in support of the British Isles, including offensive operationsagainst Germany, relieving certain British garrisons in the Western Hemisphere(Curacao and Aruba), protecting such bases as may be established by the Navy,and building up a strategic reserve to be used in future decisiveoperations.

The other document is Colonel McNarney's summary of what heregarded as the important points of ABC-2 on which he and his aviation colleagueshad done most of the work. This summary he prepared for General Arnold's use on

a forthcoming trip to England for examination of basefacilities in the British Isles. Colonel McNarney suggested that the Air Deputyshould note the following points:

1. ABC-2, in listing the allocations of equipment, had plannedfactory delivery to the United States of a certain number of planes and "solong as we are not at war" release of all others six months earlier thanscheduled. But, again, this was to "hold good only while not at war."

2. The United States therefore was deferring the 54-group planat the expense of American security, in order to get planes into the combatzone. In view of this, requests which were not closely coordinated with actualmilitary needs, or which ignored the possible effect on the American program,might delay rather than advance superiority in the combat zone. The Britishrequest for four B-18 cargo planes was cited as an example of minor aid to theBritish and injury to the American training program. All British requests, itwas advised, should come through military channels, preferably with concurrenceof the Mission.

Colonel McNarney reminded General Arnold that the UnitedStates planning for air activities contemplated the use, when ready, of threegroups of pursuit planes in Northern Ireland, to protect two near-by navalbases. Pursuit groups were to be "broken in" there and then were to pass on tomore active sectors in England. Three heavy and two medium bomber groups werecontemplated for duty in England, operating under American commanders in theBritish Bomber Command, and there was a suggestion that it "might be well toinsist that they be not scattered" in small units--survival of the abidingAmerican insistence upon American command of American forces. "We propose toestablish a bomber command to control operations; strategic tasks to be assignedby the British."The tentative troop tables of the R 5 Plan then beingworked out in line with ABC, as affecting the ground force assignment to theBritish Isles--inclusion in this memorandum demonstrating how closely tuned theABC Staff Conversations were to current war-planning of the United Statesforces--were summarized thus by Colonel McNarney:

1. Reinforced division for Ireland.

2. Ten antiaircraft regiments for protection of U.S. naval bases and airdromesin the British Isles, to be sent as bases are completed.

3. Ten battalions of National Guard troops for protection of the bases.

4. One reinforced regiment, a token force.

Although commitments for the Middle East were avoidedaltogether in the discussion, the fact that in 1942-43 it would be"probably impossible to crowd any more operating units into the British Isles"induced the Staff to consider a plan for supporting large air forces "in Egypt,Asiatic Turkey, and Syria, via the Red Sea, with an airway via Takoradi, BritishGold Coast to Cairo." At the same time it was stated "we are dead set againstany commitments" in the Far East.

In a significant declaration suggestive of the comingtransfer (in May) of three U.S. battleships from the Pacific to the Atlantic,the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff united, on 4 April 1941,in informing the British Chiefs of Staff that, having approved theABC report conditionally, they would "at an appropriate time" lay it before thePresident. Their message continued:

It is their opinion that the present grave threat to the seacommunications of the United Kingdom may require a much stronger reinforcementof the United States Atlantic Fleet, by forces drawn from the Pacific, thanis contemplated by the Report. In such circumstances, offensive action by theUnited States Pacific Fleet other than in connection with enemy trade, wouldnecessarily become less influential.

The last sentence quoted is particularly worthy of note, asan official recognition, eight months before Pearl Harbor, that the U.S. Fleetin the Pacific would be "less influential" than in the past. This consciousnessof its limited powers was a factor in Navy planning (under R 5) in theensuing months. The fleet's unreadiness for long-range offensive operations wasdue in part to its need for a much larger supply "train" than was then on hand.

Rapid Developments in the Atlantic War

Events in the Atlantic were pressing rapidly at just thistime. On the night of 3-4 April--a month after Hitler had declared Icelandto be in the war zone--a wolfpack attack of German submarines was directedagainst a convoy of ships in mid-ocean, south of Iceland, and ten of themerchantmen were sunk. As an immediate result the British Admiralty recognizedthe need of establishing a

convoy escort base on Iceland, where British Army elementshad been on guard since May 1940. At President Roosevelt'sdirection Admiral Stark dispatched the destroyerNiblack to makereconnaissance of Iceland for American information, and on 7 April Admiral Starkissued the order by which during the next month the Navy shifted from Pacific toAtlantic waters the three battleshipsIdaho,Mississippi, andNewMexico, the carrierYorktown, four light cruisers, and two squadronsof destroyers. Within that same week, however,Niblack engaged in whatappears to have been the first World War II action, a very minor one, betweenarmed forces of Germany and the United States. The destroyer was quittingIceland when it paused to pick up survivors from a newly torpedoed Dutchmerchantman. Detection devices revealed that the German submarine was not onlystill in the vicinity but was apparently maneuvering for another attack.Niblack took the initiative by moving in and dropping depth charges in theapparent vicinity of the raider, without recorded results save to drive thesubmarine away. On 18 April Admiral Ernest J. King, then commander of theAtlantic Fleet, issued Operations Plan No. 3, fixing at long. 26° W the easternborder of the Western Hemisphere.

In the following month the concept of defending actively theWestern Hemisphere rather than the American mainland alone, laid down inR 1 (August 1939) and R 4 (June 1940),was developed to the point of including not only Navy, but Armyactivities at three of the newly acquired bases. On 12 May1941, under direction of the Secretary of War who in sograve a matter must have been acting with the knowledge and approval of thePresident, General Marshall sent to Admiral Stark this letter:

Orders were issued today to the Commanding General First Army,and the Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, to instruct Army BaseCommanders in British possessions as follows:

"In case any force of belligerent powers, other than thosepowers which have sovereignty over Western Hemisphere territory, attacks orthreatens to attack any British possessions on which any U.S. air or navalbase is located, the commanding officer of the Army Base Force shall resistsuch attack, using all the means at his disposal."

This modifies the information contained in my memorandum ofMay 1, 1941 on the same subject.

Filed with the copy of this letter is General Marshall'smemorandum of the same day to WPD, quite clearly prepared for the record inorder to show that this important step was not taken on his own responsibility:

Reference instructions to Army Base Commanders in British possessions,please note on the amended copy that the alterations are in the handwritingof the Secretary of War, that he directed the issuance of the instructions toBase Commanders, and that he further directed that a copy be sent to the StateDepartment with a note informing them he had made the changes.

The 12 May 1941 directive to eachcommander on the newly leased bases to use all means at his disposal inresisting a force which threatened to attack one of the British islands on whichthere was an American base--is the first recorded explicit authorization to U.S.Army forces to engage in action not immediately related to the defense of anAmerican installation.

As to the ABC-1 agreement, its final approval at the Cabinetlevel came some weeks after the end of the conversations. The report itself wassigned only by the delegates, but upon the cover of a copy that was introducedin evidence at the Congressional Pearl Harbor Inquiry in 1946is a penciled notation, itself unsigned and undated, reading:"Approved by Sec. Navy 28 May 1941. Approved by Sec. War 3 June 1941. Not approved byPresident." To that extent it was made clear by the Chief of State in the UnitedStates (and this was true of Great Britain as well) that the conversations werenot those of the highest civil authority. The test specifically mentioned thatagreements were subject to confirmation by the military chiefs (which was given)and also by the governments. These last confirmatory signatures were neveraffixed.

The Start of Formal Military Cooperation of Britain and America

Significant as had been the August 1940 meetings in London "for standardizationof arms," the Staff Conversations of January to March 1941 must be recognizedas the true opening of formal permanent relations between American and BritishStaffs. The progress of this relationship was rapid. The importance of the contingentdecisions that had been made, and the necessity of continuing exchange of informationon which to make plans conforming to those decisions, was apparent. This madeit desirable to establish a formal mechanism for making the exchange. Withina week of the close of conversations there was active discussion of the compositionof a mission to be sent to London, the successful recommendation being thatof WPD to the Chief of

Staff, with which the Navy was in apparent agreement. Itprovided not for a united mission but for two "observer" groups, whose Armymembers would be wholly separated from the establishment of the military attachéat the Embassy, the purpose being to keep the attaché as a separate source ofinformation: the Navy members assigned to London would also report to their ownchief in Washington; there would be a "British Military Mission" in Washingtonrepresenting Army, Navy, and Air, later formally designated the "British JointStaff Mission in Washington."There was contemplated, eventually, a CommandingGeneral U.S. Troops in Great Britain, his relations to the observers not statedin the recommendation. The primary function of the Army observers was torepresent the War Department in the formulation of broad policies for theconduct of the war and for the planning and execution of joint tasks that mightor might not be a direct concern of the United States forces in the BritishIsles. If the United States should enter the war, decision as to who wouldcommand the troops would then be made.

The recommendation was approved by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary, withnotification that the chief of the Army's delegation would be known as a "SpecialArmy Observer, London," and his colleagues as "Special Assistant ArmyObservers, London." Even the word "mission" was avoided. Thechief, it now was determined, was to be a "major general qualified andintended for the command of a United States force that may be sent to England,or as Chief of Staff for any other commander that may be designated." Hewould communicate directly with the Chief of Staff, and pointedly not via themilitary attaché. The nucleus Army group would have 16 members in its staff,plus 10 clerks; the full group would have 40 members and 20 clerks. As the largestinitial combat force then contemplated for Britain was from the air establishment,the appointment as chief of mission was given to an air officer, Maj. Gen. JamesE. Chaney. His 24 April letter of instructions from the Chief of Staff, besidesenjoining him to secrecy on his functions other than as observer, continued:

Nevertheless it is essential that all channels for effectuatingcooperation between the United States and British Commonwealth be establishedas soon as practicable. You will not

enter into political commitments. However, in conjunction withthe special Naval Observer in London you will negotiate with the British Chiefsof Staff on military affairs of common interest relating to joint United States-Britishcooperation in British areas of responsibility. Such negotiations will be subjectto the approval of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. Itis intended that military matters pertaining to the British Chief of Staff Committeewhich require joint decision will be taken up through you or through the BritishMilitary Mission in Washington, as may be appropriate, and not through diplomaticor other channels. You will endeavor to have American representatives in Londonto handle all matters of a military nature through your group, and to avoidpresenting such matters direct to British militaryofficials.

On 23 May General Chaney reported by cable that the SpecialObservers Group had been established in London on 19 May, and that he personallyhad reported his presence to the American ambassador and to the British Chiefsof Staff Committee.In Washington the U.S. Navy had already providedoffice space for the British Mission, made up of 3 members and 28 staffassistants, and WPD was arranging for a committee room in which group meetingscould be held, and for appropriate staff liaison with theBritish.

American Involvement Causes Anxiety

Meantime the Staff planners were grappling with the specialproblems inherent in the existing status of a nation at peace but increasinglyinvolved in the processes of war. The recently concluded American-British StaffConversations were only a part of the involvement. Shipping was being sunk withincreasing frequency and, with Vichy France being slowly bent to totalcompliance with Hitler's demands, there was a prospect that French bases on bothsides of the Atlantic would soon be made available to German sea raiders to thestill greater imperilment of American munitions-carrying merchantmen. TheBritish in the Middle East were doing so badly that Hitler had boldly declared ablockade of the Red Sea. In this complex situation wide differences in Americanopinion were manifest, isolationists calling for a cessation of munitionsshipments and interventionists urging, rather, use of the Navy for moving moresupplies to England.The immediate issues affected the Navy almost entirely,but the ultimate involvement of the Army, in the event that expeditionary forces were

employed for the occupation of overseas bases, was so likelyas to arouse the concern of the Chief of Staff. His advice appears to have beensought by a troubled Harry Hopkins, the President's principal adviser at thetime, dubious about the commitments which Mr. Roosevelt was contemplating. Theprincipal issues--the extent to which U.S. Navy vessels should be employed inthe war in the Atlantic and the manner in which the order for this employmentshould be issued--came to discussion at the White House on 15 April when thePresident brought to hearing a Navy proposal, made by Admiral Stark to theSecretary of the Navy, for establishing a neutrality patrol in the westAtlantic.It advocated the delineation of a restricted zone west of long.26° W. (including Greenland and part of the Azores), entryinto which by belligerent vessels would be interpreted as marking theirintention to attack. This was a way of saying that the United States shouldestablish convoy protection in that zone. The discussion as guided by Mr.Roosevelt was less upon the basic decision than upon the question of whetherconvoying should be ordered secretly or by proclamation. Secretary of theTreasury Morgenthau opposed secrecy, it would appear, because he felt that itcould not be maintained and that eventual disclosure would embarrass thePresident. Secretary of War Stimson opposed secrecy but on another basis: hefelt strongly that a public declaration of active American naval effort wascalled for because it would strengthen the standing of the British Governmentat that moment and shatter whatever appeasement sentiment was still existent inEngland. The President wished more advice and more time for consideration, andMr. Hopkins, still troubled over possibilities whose gravity he felt thePresident did not recognize, apparently asked assistance from the War Departmentin clarifying the issues. The assistance especially sought was that of GeneralEmbick as an experienced authority, at the moment on leave after hisparticipation in the prolonged American-British Staff Conversations. Thatofficer's judgments, considered, direct, and sometimes extremely blunt, hadimpressed the President in the past and now he was looked upon as qualified forthe difficult task of persuading Mr. Roosevelt to examine certain distastefulfacts about the Army's unreadiness for a large combat mission.

Soon after he reached his office on the morning after theWhite House meeting General Marshall discussed the situation with his twodeputies, Generals

Bryden and Moore, and three WPD officers, General Gerowand Colonels McNarney and Anderson. His summary of prospects, as recorded inunrevised notes of the conference, reported:

It is being arranged for General Embick to fly to Washingtonfor the purpose of conferring with the President in a series of discussionswhich will inform him as Commander in Chief of national strategy for the futurewithout regard to politics. . . . Mr. Hopkins hopes that by a series of talksthe President will become aware of the fundamental problems which face thisnation. Mr. Hopkins feels . . . that we are frittering away matériel withouttangible results, that the influence and accomplishments of the State Departmenthave been unfortunate . . . and that the President must be protected againstthe importunities of those who are not fully aware of the seriousness of thepresent situation. . . . If we have gotten to the point where we can no longeroperate on a peacetime status should we recommend a war status? Or is it ofimportance to do something immediately? . . . What I must be prepared to suggestis what should the President do? What do we think should be done? Of coursethe President is also governed by public opinion. There are two things we mustdo: begin the education of the President as to the true strategic situation--thiscoming after a period of being influenced by the State Department. The otherthing is, does he have to make a decision now. We must tell him what he hasto work with.

The WPD representatives were asked to make theirrecommendations promptly, and later in the forenoon the group reassembled, thistime with the addition of Lt. Col. Charles W. Bundy and Lt. Col. (later Brig.Gen.) Paul McD. Robinett; they apparently had assisted in preparation of twobrief unsigned statements that Colonel Anderson now presented to GeneralMarshall, (1) a memorandum entitled "Strategic Considerations, Peace or WarStatus" and (2) "Digest of United States-British Staff Conversations." Theformer follows:

1. A war status for the United States at the present time offersthe following advantages:

   1. The United States would be awakened to the gravity ofthe current situation and brought together in a cohesive effort that doesnot today prevail. Production of equipment and preparation in general shouldbe materially speeded up.

   2. The Churchill Government would be strengthened.

   3. Axis Powers would be weakened.

2. Opposed to these advantages:

   1. The United States Army is not now prepared to undertakeactive military operations on other than an extremely minor scale, due primarilyto shortages in equipment and ammunition.

2. Active participation in the war would have to be limitedfor the time being to the Navy and to commitments of Army forces essentiallyas indicated in the recent Chiefs of Staffs agreement [ABC].
3. In the Atlantic there appears to be no serious counteractionthat Axis Powers could take immediately upon our entry into the war.
   In the Pacific if Japan joins the Axis Powers in a declaration of war againstus we will probably lose the Philippines and the effect on Singapore and theDutch East Indies is open to question.

4. We are prepared to defend our possessions in the WesternHemisphere and the North American Continent against any possible threat thatcan be foreseen. Subject to the availability of shipping we can promptly relieveBritish forces in Iceland and relieve Naval forces that may undertake the occupationof the Azores or the Cape Verde Islands. We can undertake, likewise subjectto the limitations of shipping, any operations that may reasonably be requiredin the Caribbean or in Northeast Brazil.

Conclusion.

Upon the assumption, which appears reasonable, that the UnitedStates will enter the present war sooner or later, it appears to the War PlansDivision highly desirable that our entry be made sufficiently soon to avoideither the loss of the British Isles or a material change in the attitude ofthe British Government directed toward appeasement.

In contrast to this view, it must be recognized that the Armycan, at the present time, accomplish extremely limited military support to awar effort, and from this point of view it is highly desirable that we withholdactive participation as long as possible.

General Marshall thereupon questioned Colonel Anderson onwhether his judgment had been influenced by what was said earlier in theforenoon. The WPD officer said it had been influenced only with respect topossible consequences of a change of government in England. The discussion thenproceeded, largely upon the involvements that a war status would bring, thecommitments of the ABC plan should it be accepted, and the means by which thosecommitments could be undertaken. The 1st Division was reported available;the 2d and 5th would be by1 May; ammunition, however, would be short until 1942.

In the course of discussion General Embick was admitted tothe room. The Chief of Staff reviewed what had been said and done, read aloudthe WPD memorandum, and asked the newcomer's views. General Embick remarkedthat WPD proposed stronger action than the Navy itself had asked. He questionedthe appraisal upon which the conclusion was based, observed that British NearEast reverses might at least simplify defense of the British Isles, and clearly startled

his hearers with the opinion that the British position wouldnot be weakened by Churchill's withdrawal from the premiership. General Marshalldid not discuss the concluding opinion but began a catechising on the severalitems of the WPD memorandum, paragraph by paragraph. General Embick agreed withthe substance of the first, that a war status should increase production andreduce ship-sinkings, which was vital, and with the second, which emphasized theArmy's unreadiness for major action. Entering the war voluntarily under suchconditions he said would be wrong from military and naval viewpoints, and wouldbe a wrong to the American people, who by a war status would be committed tounpredictable happenings. As to paragraph 3, he recognized that war would leadto a loss of Pacific positions. His earlier remark on Army unreadiness for anysave minor action may have covered his views upon the WPD optimism of paragraph4; in any case he gave no recorded indication of agreement or disagreement.Colonel McNarney's oral remarks, as presented in the conference notes,resolutely supported the WPD document, arguing:

. . . that anything that would tend to cause the fall of theBritish Isles would tend to put the whole load on the United States; that itis important that we start reducing the war making ability of Germany. We dohave a Navy in being and can do something. If we wait, we will end up standingalone, and internal disturbances may bring on communism. I may be called a fire-eater,but something must be done.

General Gerow and Colonel Bundy agreed with their WPDcolleague and Colonel Anderson made only small reservation. Their advice given,the conference closed without General Marshall indicating his own view.Somewhat strangely, at his ensuing conference with the President there was noreference to convoys.The decision of the President, however it may have beeninfluenced by General Embick, was for a west Atlantic patrol, but for astatement of purpose so cautious as to postpone a war declaration. Stimulated bythe U.S.S.Niblack episode, the decision was implemented on 18April with the issuance by Admiral King of Operation Plan No. 3,which stated:

The Western Hemisphere extends from approximately 26° W, westwardto the International Date Line and, in the Atlantic, includes all of Greenland,all of the islands of the Azores, the whole of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, theBahama Islands, the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico.

Entrance into the Western Hemisphere by naval ships or aircraftof belligerents other than those powers having sovereignty over territory inthe Western Hemisphere is to be viewed as possibly actuated by an unfriendlyinterest toward shipping or territory in the WesternHemisphere.

Three days later he issued Operation Plan No. 4, whichrepeated these stipulations and organized the fleet for patrol purposes. Thatthe decision of April 1940 called for a "neutrality patrol" rather than foroutright convoys evidenced the caution which the United States had to exerciseat this time. Because of Axis submarine successes American naval authorityregarded the Atlantic situation as "obviously critical." Also Japan and Russiahad agreed on their treaty, seemingly strengthening Japan's position in thePacific, and Japan promptly gave warning of intervention if America shouldactively engage in the war on the Axis.

In such particularized matters as fleet movements the adviceof the new British Mission in Washington was sought. An instance is afforded byanaide-mémoire from the British Admiral V. H. Danckwerts in reply to "anAmerican inquiry." His opinion, in which Australia and New Zealand wererepresented as concurring (and to which the American 14 April radiogram toLondon, supporting the ABC report, had given encouragement) was to thefollowing effect:

. . . a marked advance by the US Navy in or into the Atlanticcould be on the whole more likely to deter Japan from going to war than themaintenance of the present very large fleet at Hawaii, and further it mightexercise a profound influence on the present critical situation in Spain, Turkeyand Vichy France. . . . The problem for the United States authorities is so nicelyto judge the degree of the transfer that, while still retaining the deterrenteffect of a strong US fleet in the Pacific there will also be the deterrenteffect of an increased US fleet in the Atlantic. . . . In our view the necessaryeffect will not remain unless the fleet in the Pacific consisted of not lessthan 6 capital ships and 2 aircraft carriers. Inclusion of the latter is consideredof the greatest importance.

Proposals for Cooperation in the Pacific

For months there had been differences between the nationsupon Pacific strategy, chiefly springing from a British view that the naval baseat Singapore

must by all means be maintained as an Allied strongholddominating southeast Asia. In numerous British quarters it was felt that themeans of maintenance should be to a considerable extent American, particularlyAmerican naval units, and on occasion this view found support in the UnitedStates as well until the firm recognition of America's priority of concern overthe war in the Atlantic. The purely naval aspects of planning for the defense ofthe Netherlands East Indies, necessarily with British sea and air powerproviding support, were under scrutiny by the U.S. Navy. Japan's interest inthe oil and other rich resources of the islands was unconcealed, and theNetherlands' own powers of defense were manifestly weak, with the homelandoccupied by Germany and with the royal government in temporary exile. In January1941 on instruction from WashingtonAdmiral Thomas Hart, commanding the U.S.Asiatic Fleet, sent his chief of staff, Capt. W.R. Purnell, to Java to discussdefense plans with Vice Adm. C.E.L. Helfrich, commanding the Dutch sea forcesin the Pacific. (The assistant chief of staff, Commander F.P. Thomas, had goneto Singapore in October 19 for preliminary talks and Captain Purnell visitedSingapore in December 1940.) The resultant report, forwarded to Washington, wasof course shared with the Army, which Captain Purnell understood would itselfprovide information about such Army Air Force elements as might be available foroperations, corresponding to his own oral estimates of available Navyelements.Captain Purnell's report of the "exploratory conversations lookingtoward possible future combined operations," as Admiral Helfrich put it, showedthe fullness both of Dutch expectations of attack and of Dutch desire forsupport. A Dutch committeeman referred "caustically" to previous conversationswith British authorities at Singapore in which, he remarked, British interest indefense of the islands dwindled as the scene moved eastward from Singapore. TheNetherlands authorities laid before the American consultant copious data on suchmatters as their own sea and air strength, facilities, ports, bases, andstorage. They received from Captain Purnell an assurance that the Philippines'neutrality was guaranteed "to the extent of attacking with all forces available"but a prediction that America would maintain only a benevolent neutrality withregard to British and Dutch possessions. The naval officer reminded his hearersthat these views were personal only. Admiral Helfrich approved a number

of tentative suggestions such as those for continuing exchange ofinformation and for joint use of facilities in the eventof war.

American Objections to Helping Reinforce Singapore

On 12 February, as mentioned earlier, the British desire forAmerica's active participation in the defense of Singapore was brought up in theAmerican-British Conversations in Washington. The British delegation, admittingthat in case of Japanese attacks upon that area Singapore would need largerforces than the Admiralty was then planning to provide, proposed that the UnitedStates Navy detach four cruisers from its Pacific Fleet and station them atSingapore. This suggestion the American delegation opposed, partly because theStark-Marshall statement at the opening of the conversations had discouraged anysuch project, partly because they felt unanimously--and so wrote the Chief ofStaff--that a four-cruiser addition to the local defenses would not suffice tosave Singapore. Hence the United States would later be compelled either (1) toabandon these vessels to their fate and thereafter face Japan in the Pacificwith a weakened fleet, or (2) to reinforce the four vessels to the extent ofapplying the Navy's principal strength in the Far East rather than elsewhere,with resultant risk, among other things, to the security of theBritish Isles.

Instead of acceding to the British view the Americandelegation recommended holding to the American strategic plan and limiting aid,both for Singapore and for the Netherlands East Indies, to what the U.S. Fleetmight accomplish while operating from its base at Pearl Harbor and while stillfree to detach vessels as needed to the Atlantic. "The ultimate fate ofSingapore will depend upon the outcome of the struggle in the European theater"they concluded.The Chief of Staff presumably supported the Armyrepresentatives in these expressions which echoed his own of previous months,for nothing of the dispute appears in the record of ensuing days. The Britishpressure for American aid in protecting Singapore was simply transferred to thesubsequent ADB (American-Dutch-British) meeting inSingapore.

The need for joint consideration of Singapore's situation, asfor the whole Far East problem, was unquestioned. Admiral Stark's Plan Dog Memorandum

of 12 November 1940 had specificallyrecommended not only Staff Conversations with British and Canadians on theAtlantic but talks with the Dutch in Batavia (which Admiral Hart's chief ofstaff conducted two months thereafter) and with the British in Singapore. On2 April 1941 therefore, shortly after ABC closed andbefore General Marshall and Admiral Stark had signified their acceptance of eventhe limited responsibility specified in those conversations, General Marshallsent to the commanding general of the Philippines Department, then Maj. Gen.George Grunert, a full copy of ABC-1 plus five of its annexes. He informedGeneral Grunert that he had not yet formally approved the report and that itsprovisions would not become directives until such approval was given. Hispurpose in sending a copy this early was to permit advance planning by AmericanArmy authority in the Philippines in concert with the Commander in Chief AsiaticFleet and the Commander Sixteenth Naval District (at Manila). This planningGeneral Grunert was directed to "initiate without delay" but "not discuss withthe British or Dutch" until he should receive specific authority from the WarDepartment.The bases of General Grunert's planning were listed thus: ThePhilippine Coastal Frontier would be composed of "such areas as are necessaryfor defense of the entrance to Manila Bay," and for the means of establishingthis defense the recipient was referred to the accepted Joint Planof 1935.Jointly, the American forces were to hold the entrance to Manila Bay; the Armywas to "delay the enemy at Subic Bay and elsewhere as may be practicable,without jeopardizing the timely withdrawal of mobile ground forces to Bataan Peninsula."

Two days later a cablegram informed General Grunert that a2 April communication was on its way by courier, toarrive 14 April, but that the situation prevailing when the message wasdispatched was now altered. In the interim it had been determined that theBritish Commander-in-Chief Far East (in Singapore) would conduct a conference towhich were invited representatives of Australia, New Zealand, Netherlands EastIndies, the British Commander-in-Chief China, the British Commander-in-ChiefEast Indies, and the United States. The 4 April dispatch accordingly revoked the2 April instructions against conferring with British andDutch and, while the new Staff Conversations were not yet officially approved,the Philippines commander was "authorized to

designate a well-informed officer of sound judgment" to represent him at theSingapore meeting.

Somewhat in advance of the Singapore meeting the BritishMission in Washington provided the Army with its proposal for the agenda. Oncemore WPD, to which General Marshall referred the proposal, exhibited uneasinessabout a British tendency to press the United States toward undesiredcommitments. A 15 April memorandum from Colonel Andersonto the Chief of Staff recommended limiting the agenda to the subjects listed inthe ABC-1 agreement and to plans specifically for the Far East area, Australia,and New Zealand.The recommendations were approved by the Chief of Staff and bySecretary of War Stimson as well, and on the following day were transmitted toGeneral Grunert for his guidance.Col. Allan C. McBride, slated at the time tobecome General Grunert's departmental chief of staff, proceeded to Singapore ashis representative at the Singapore conference of 21-27 April.

At the close of the conference Colonel McBride returned toManila with a report of the American-Dutch-British conference recommendationsthat troubled General Grunert and brought from him, in a letter to WPD, anextended recital of the points of disagreement. In general he concurred, but hetook exception to numerous particulars and to basic British conclusions withwhich "our present mission and restrictions as to means are notin accord."He stated that Colonel McBride had discouraged British expectations (1) that theAmerican forces in the Philippines would be strengthened; (2)that there was likelihood of American planning of a determineddefense of the archipelago, beyond Manila; (3) that Luzon would serve as a basefor offensive operations by increased U.S. forces. General Grunert felt thatthe British were already regarding the U.S. Asiatic Fleet units as being atSingapore's disposal and that, on the whole, British thinking was directedalmost wholly to the defense of British Singapore rather than to the Americaninterest in the Philippines. His long, considered criticism of the Singaporeconversations was dispatched to Washington by naval courier on the clipper-planethat departed from Manila on 8 May, two days after a more expeditious Britishservice, via cable to London

and the British Military Mission in Washington, had providedthe Navy and Army with three copies of the British summary of theconversations.By a grotesque delay General Grunert's message had not reachedWashington on 3 June and on that day General Gerow recommended a cable ofinquiry to Manila. General Grunert's prompt reply was followed on 7 June by theWar Department's admission of an obviously painful discovery: upon arrival atSan Francisco air base General Grunert's message, hurried thus far by the Navy'sflying courier, then had been put aboard a Navy vessel bound for Norfolk, Va.,for leisurely transmission to Washington. A message to Panama intercepted thevessel and the long-awaited report, placed upon another plane, eventuallyreached Washington on 9 June.

Staff consideration in Washington, therefore, was of theBritish summary without immediate benefit of General Grunert's unfortunatelydelayed massage. The long British text was summarized in an unsigned and undatedcondensation prepared within WPD for the Chief of Staff, as follows:

Our object is to defeat Germany and her allies and hence inthe Far East to maintain the position of the Associated powers against Japaneseattack, in order to sustain a long term economic pressure against Japan untilwe are in a position to take the offensive.

Our most important interests in the Far East are security ofsea communications and security of Singapore, the latter largely dependent ondenial to the enemy of bases in the Netherlands East Indies. An important subsidiaryinterest is the security of Luzon in the Philippines, since so long as submarinesand air forces can be operated from Luzon, Japanese expeditions to threatenMalaya or the Netherlands East Indies from the East, other than those proceedingvia the protected line of the Pelews [Palaus], can be outflanked.

Japan can attack the Philippines or Hong Kong; Malaya, director via Thailand and bases in Indo-China; Burma via Thailand and those bases;Borneo or the northern line of the Netherlands East Indies; sea communicationsin all areas.

Until the Philippines are reduced, Japan would be taking agreat chance elsewhere.

The main strategy in the Far East must be defensive, but certainmeasures are possible: organize air operations against Japanese territory; inaddition to Luzon's defensive value, it is useful for an eventual offensive;support the Chinese by financial and material aid; support guerrillas in China;organize subversive activities in Japan; conduct an economicblockade.

While the two summaries were under study by Staff officers,who saw in this final paragraph the extent to which ABD had soared beyondAmerican desires, further pressure for American aid to Singapore was beingapplied. A paper prepared by Stanley K. Hornbeck of the State Department andforwarded to the War Department suggested that the United States furtherSingapore's security by keeping three-quarters of the fleet based in Hawaii,sending more planes and submarines to the Philippines, and equipment to China,the Netherlands East Indies, and Singapore. To these suggestions GeneralMarshall announced his opposition. He found nothing new in the facts cited, andno satisfaction in the conclusions. His own view was that "Collapse in theAtlantic would be fatal; collapse in the Far East would be serious but notfatal."

Stark and Marshall Reject the Singapore Proposals

On 7 June Army and Navy chiefs--undoubtedly with Presidentialapproval--sent to the British Military Mission a strongly worded rejection ofthe views expressed at Singapore. The message mentioned that no final approvalwould be given until after examination of the official text of the report, butproceeded in unmistakable terms:

The United States intends to adhere to the decision not toreinforce the Philippines except in minor particulars. . . .

The principal value of the position and present strength ofthe forces in the Philippines lies in the fact that to defeat them will requirea considerable effort by Japan and may well entail a delay in the developmentof an attack against Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. A Japanese attackin the Philippines might thus offer opportunities to the Associated Powers toinflict important losses on Japanese naval forces and to improve their own dispositionsfor the defense of the Malay Barrier.

How violently the intention stated in the first paragraphquoted was to be upset in a matter of weeks is related at length in Chapter XIIIof this volume, but there was no hint of it in early June. The 7 June 1941 noteoffered no comment on British proposals for United States air aid in the FarEast and preparations

for support to China. It rejected altogether Britishsuggestions for dealing with naval command arrangements, on the ground that theywere beyond the proper scope of the discussion.More than a month later theBritish views were rejected in the still more conclusive terms of a letterdrafted on 3 July in which the American Chiefs of Staff regretted that "they areunable to approve the ADB report because in several major, and numerous minorparticulars, it is at variance" with the restrictions stated in ABC-1.Specifically, in the language of a brief of that document:

1. It contains political matters beyond scope of a militaryagreement . . . [such as] necessity for concerted action by Associated Powersand undertaking of subversive activities and sabotage in Japan.

2. It commits U.S. Asiatic Fleet to operate under Britishstrategic direction in "Eastern Theater" which is more extensive thanthe Far Eastern Area prescribed in ABC-1. U.S. cannot agree.

3. Inadequate provisions are made for the security of the NetherlandsEast Indies and the Malay Barrier. Naval defense of this position entrustedsolely to U.S. and Dutch forces while British naval forces operate on escortand patrol duty at great distances from this vital area. Until a plan providingthat British naval forces take predominant part in defending British positionin Far East Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff must withdraw agreementto permit U.S. Asiatic Fleet to operate under British strategic direction inthat area.

4. It commits U.S. Naval aviation to operate under commandother than Naval, in violation of ABC-1.

5. It does not provide a practical operating plan for the cooperativeeffort of the Associated Powers in the Far East Area.

6. It sets up an Eastern Theater and provides for a new commandertermed "Commander in Chief, Far Eastern Fleet," neither of which appearsto be advantageous.

The letter gave polite assurance that the Chief of Staff andChief of Naval Operations would "be glad to consider suggestions as to an agendafor any further conferences in Singapore" but added a suggestion that such aconference

"should be guided by agenda agreed upon in advance among theUnited States, United Kingdom, and the Dutch."

The controversy that had reached this stage was halted for atime by considerations more pressing for both groups of disputants, since bothwere shortly to be summoned to the historic Atlantic Conference at sea betweenMr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. There the discussions were resumed moregenially, and on 1 September the Special Army Observer in London sent word thatthe British Chiefs of Staff Committee were engaged upon redraft of the ADBrequirements, in line with agreements made at theAtlantic Conference.Even the redraft was found in Washington to beunsatisfactory,however, and two monthslater, by which time Japanese behavior was much more indicative of war and theUnited States was hastily strengthening its Philippines defenses, the Britishmade radical revisions in their arrangements for the Pacific. Sir Dudley Pound,First Sea Lord, informed Admiral Stark that after reviewing the naval situationthe Admiralty was able to start forming a new capital ship force for theOrient. Admiral Sir Tom Phillips was already en route aboard H. M. S. Princeof Wales, and two other battleships would proceed in November and anotherin December. Sir Dudley continued:

I do not consider that either ADB-1 or ADB-2 meets the newconditions [caused by the recent change of government in Japan] and I wouldsuggest that the need for a conference to draw up strategic operating plansfor the Far East area based afresh on ABC-1 has now become urgent. . . .If youagree in principle to abandoning further discussions on ADB-1 and ADB-2 andto holding of a fresh conference on the basis of ABC-1 we can then proceed todiscuss the agenda. Perhaps you would care to make proposalsfor this.

The British desire to come to agreement was not to begratified immediately, although Admiral Stark promptly agreed that there wasneed for early action by both the United Kingdom and the United States, inpursuance of which the Army was already "reinforcing both its land and airforces as rapidly as practicable, and training the Philippine Armyintensively."It was nearly a week later that a more studied and moreinsistent communication was sent

in Admiral Stark's behalf by the American Secretary forCollaboration to the British Joint Staff Mission, for transmission to London. Itacknowledged the 5 November and other messages, expressed concurrence in theBritish decision to send more vessels to Singapore, and suggested that stillothers be sent. It mentioned air reinforcements that the United States hadlately sent to the Pacific and suggested that the British air strength in Malayaalso be increased. It expressed a belief that the tasks which the Britishproposed to assign to land and air forces in the Far East, Australia, and NewZealand should be enlarged to include protection of Rabaul and other bases thatwould be needed by the United States Fleet for operations against the Japanesemandates, for protection of Torres Strait, and other purposes. It postponeddecision on the proposals to assign greater strength to the Asiatic Fleet andto base the British Fleet in the Philippines, on the ground that repairfacilities were insufficient and badly exposed to attack. It suggested newconferences at which Admiral Phillips might discuss the situation with AdmiralHart and Lt. Gen. (later General of the Army) Douglas MacArthur, who now wascommanding the U.S. Army in the Philippines, but it urged that the conferencesbe held in Manila rather than in Singapore.Admiral Phillips visited Manila on4-6 December 1941 but no definite operating plans were agreed upon. The nexthigh-level discussions of arrangements for defense of the Malay barrier, toolate and of necessity with too little, would be occasioned by the arrival of thewar itself. It so happened that the operating plan on which the Allies then hadto rely for better or for worse was the so-called PLENAPSwhich in default of an accepted plan the British command had drawn up foremergency use. This was based upon the rejected ADB-1.

The Atlantic Conference, August 1941

The event which in midsummer had interrupted for a time theflow of American criticisms of the ABD Conversations at Singapore was the summoning

of another Anglo-American conference, this timeprincipally political although the military chiefs were present. This was theAtlantic Conference of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt, held, with highappreciation for dramatic effect, aboard a man-of-war lying offshore in Argentiaharbor. The circumstance of the meeting, with whatever it might connote onfreedom of the seas and the antitotalitarian purposes that were boldly announcedby the two Chiefs of Government, carried their own implications at home andabroad.For the political aspects of that historic meeting, which were the mainaspects, the reader must seek detailed information in other narratives. Themilitary discussions carried no commitments and, despite the presence of Chiefsof Staff of both nations, led to little in the way of immediate results,because of the wide gap between British views as expressed in a prepareddocument and the American responses to these views.

The initial meeting of all members of the conference, civilian and military,took place on 9 August aboard the cruiserAugusta of the U.S. AtlanticFleet, where President Roosevelt was quartered. For the daily conferences thePrime Minister moved over from the nearby British battleshipPrince of Wales,which had brought the British party to the high seas rendezvous. The notesof the first meeting, set down from memory one week later, attempt only to summarizeMr. Churchill's speech to the conference, which was largely a review of theworld situation. The recorder, Colonel Bundy, felt that the Premier's chiefaims were (1) to win support for his program for developing a strong Alliedforce in the Middle East, particularly in Egypt, for which he clearly lookedto America for assistance; (2) to bring about a joint warning to Japan; (3)to move some 52 vessels out of the western Atlantic in order to use them forantisubmarine operations nearer Britain; (4) to revive the idea of a leagueto enforce peace (which may in fact be thought of as the inception of the UnitedNations). Mr. Churchill offered some thoughts about methods of warfare, expressingthe view that smaller numbers of men than in 1918 would be used in the eventualwestern theater (Russian successes with massed troops notwithstanding) and thatmore would be done with machines. "By inference [he] advocated early Americanaction to join Britain and Russia."

In preparation for the military conference the British Chiefsof Staff--at that time Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, General Sir John G.Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and Air Chief Marshal Sir CharlesPortal, Chief of the Air Staff--had prepared under date of 31July 1941 their review of the war situation. It opened with adeclaration that "The vital consideration is to ensure the security of theUnited Kingdom and of our sea communications, while we build up and deploy theforces necessary for the offensive described in Part 2."It contained these conclusions on strategy:

A German shift to Spain would make Gibraltar unusable as abase, and force occupation of the Canaries.

Need for establishing forces in French Morocco and French WestAfrica might have to be faced but, while there remained a threat of invadingBritain, the United Kingdom would have no forces available for the African tasks.

Loss of the Middle East would be disastrous, through loss ofcommunications and also of Iranian oil. For retention of the Middle East muchwould depend upon American assistance.

Security of the Singapore base was essential for Far Eastoperations.

"The intervention of the United States would revolutionizethe whole situation," the strategy review continued.

At sea the situation would immediately be relieved, and thisshould be reflected in reduced shipping losses. Even if Japan intervened, thebalance of advantage would still be with us. American forces might be able toprevent enemy penetration in Morocco and West Africa, and could take over potentialcommitments in the Atlantic Islands.

It is clear, however, that if intervention is to come, thelonger it is delayed the greater will be the leeway to be made up in every direction.

In contrast with the pessimism with which the existingsituation was portrayed, the review was extremely hopeful for the future,noting that "We must first destroy the foundation upon which the [German] warmachine rests--the economy which feeds it, the morale which sustains it, thesupplies which nourish it . . . and the hopes of victory which inspire it." Themethods to be employed were blockade, bombing, subversive activity, andpropaganda. "The bombing offensive must be on the heaviest possible scale" and,after security needs were met, "we give to the heavy bomber first priority inproduction." Bombing of Germany's transportation system would have its owneffect upon

civilian morale, and to this last mentioned objective wereother references that the critical American readers thought to beunsatisfactorily vague. The emphasis of the review was upon the scheduledcombination of blockade, bombing, and subversive activities, the British Chiefs'conviction being that:

. . . if these methods are applied on a vast scale, the wholestructure upon which the German forces are based . . . will be destroyed, andthat, whatever their present strength, the armed forces of Germany would suffersuch a radical decline in fighting value and mobility that a direct attack wouldonce more become possible.

When that time will come . . . will depend largely on how wellwe are able, with American assistance, to keep to our program of Air Force expansionand to obtain and protect the necessary shipping.

It may be that the methods described above will by themselvesbe enough to make Germany sue for peace. . . . We must, however, be preparedto accelerate victory by landing forces on the Continent to . . . strike intoGermany itself.

They proceeded, on the theme that Mr. Churchill had touched:"We do not foresee vast armies of infantry as in 1914-18. The forces weemploy will be armored divisions with the most modern equipment. . . . When ourarmored forces had dominated an area, it would be handed over to the patriotforce to garrison. . . ." They concluded with the view that "United Statesintervention would not only make victory certain, but might alsomake it swift."

On 10 August this document was sent in triplicate to GeneralMarshall, Admiral Stark, and General Arnold, who were then aboard U.S.S.Augusta with Mr. Roosevelt and his group of civilian and othermilitary advisers.It was dispatched by Col. C. C. Hollis of theBritish secretariat who was then aboard H.M.S.Prince of Wales with Mr.Churchill and his military and civil advisers. Colonel Hollis's accompanyingletter, proposing in the British Chiefs' behalf that the review be discussedaboard thePrince of Wales next day, suggested also that major points ofcriticism by the American Chiefs be communicated to him that same day so thatthe British Chiefs would be in a position to discuss them on11 August.It would appear that the only immediate response was to agree upon the time for thenext day's meeting, for the notes available on the Staff conferences indicatethat the strategy review was first discussed on11 August.

The meeting aboard the British battleship was attended only by military personnel.The British were Admiral Pound, General Dill, Air Chief Marshal Sir WilfridR. Freeman, Vice-Chief of the Air Staff (his superior, Chief Marshal Portal,having remained in England), Col. C.C. Hollis, and Lt. Col. E.J.C. Jacobsfrom the office of the Minister of Defense, five officers representing the Admiralty,two the War Office, and one the Air Ministry. The Americans were Admiral Stark,General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold, Admiral Turner and Commander(later Admiral) Forrest Sherman of the Navy's War Plans Division and Lt. Col.C.W. Bundy of the War Department WPD. Admiral Stark, the principal Americanspokesman, said that he and his colleagues would ask time for analyzing theBritish Chiefs' review (which the First Lord read aloud) and for reconcilingthe eventual reply of the United States Chiefs with Army and Navy requirements.He expressed his colleagues' willingness to go the limit (in the words of ColonelBundy's notes) in cooperation under existing United States policies, but madeclear at the outset that these policies would constitute definite limits. Heasked that the present conference be restricted to discussionsonly.Colonel Bundy's notes present little evidence of a hearty cooperation,but rather, a critical attitude on the part of the Americans with regard tothe British Chiefs' review (the criticism was even sharper in the eventual formalresponse) in painful contrast with the harmonious chorus from the Chiefs ofState on theAugusta. Admiral Stark discussed several points of difference withthe review, objecting to its paragraphs on bomber priority, shipping needs,distribution of sea-patrol planes, and proposed occupation of the Azores. GeneralMarshall interrupted with a reminder that the peaceful occupation of necessaryfacilities in the Azores was already in sight, indicated by a Portuguese letterto which Mr. Roosevelt had referred the previous day. General Marshall revealedhis concern over the prospective need to replace the Marine garrison on Icelandwith 10,000 Army troops. There was a request that the British supply more informationon Dakar, which the British Chiefs apparently were expecting the United Statesto occupy eventually. General Marshall introduced a further discussion of thesituation in the Middle East, to which area the United States was sending equipment,whose unsatisfactory maintenance by the British was already acause for anxiety.General

Marshall also reminded the British Chiefs of the mounting pressure upon theUnited States for munitions now that Lend-Lease supplies for Russia constituteda large additional drain, and intimated that arms shipments would be determinedby priorities in Washington rather than solely by Middle East developments. Heexplained the difficulties encountered thus far in strengthening the Philippinesas a protection for Singapore and the NetherlandsEast Indies.

The 11 August session covered only 15of the strategy review's 39 paragraphs, the rest being left for attention in aformal study. The 12 August session was given overentirely to a review of the matériel situation in the United States, in thecourse of which there was plain speaking about the lack of coordination amongthe British purchasing authorities in Washington, and about failures toappreciate the exactions of the priority system. It brought from the BritishChiefs an admission of ignorance of the confusion and an indication that theywould reorganize their Washington services so as to make them conform tostrategic needs. Admiral Stark read a draft of his plan for making the U.S.Joint Board, under the President, the agency to determine the distribution ofdefense equipment in accordance with the principles ofABC-1.(The plan was to prove unsuccessful, the determination being given insteadto the civilian War Production Board).

In brief, the Atlantic Conference, eventful enough as a political meeting,owed little of its result to the military Staff's participation, other thanan agreement between the Navy Chiefs upon the basis of cooperation in convoyescort, effective in September 1941. The large influence was that of the civilianChiefs of State in arriving at the terms of the proposed "bases for worldpeace" jointly signed by Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, which were madepublic in London and Washington at the close of the conference, while theAugusta

and thePrince of Wales with their distinguishedpassengers were still at sea.The political effect of this enunciation, withits reference to aims "following destruction of the Nazi tyranny" leaving smalldoubt of the rapid American drift toward war, was so great as to conceal fromthe public the disagreements of the military that thePrince of Wales discussions, like the recent ABD discussions in Singapore, had disclosed.

U.S. Staff Criticisms of the British Suggestions

Upon the return of the Chiefs of Staff to Washington GeneralMarshall laid the British review before his own WPD for examination and report.There resulted a series of memoranda from several members of the divisionaddressed to General Gerow or to Col. Thomas T. Handy of WPD (later General andDeputy Chief of Staff). They were unanimous in their opposition to the Britishexpressions, for varying reasons.They all opposed the concluding Britishsuggestions that "United States intervention would not only make the victorycertain but might also make it swift." One (Kibler) found "no cause for optimismas to a British victory" and criticized a British tendency to assign to theUnited States the protection of the British Empire: "We ought to retain ourfreedom of action until we have forces to undertake worth-while operations inthe war." Another (Allen) denied that the United States' strength wassufficiently developed to make an impression on military operations andasserted that, rather, Germany should be engaged with economic force and that"the position as a nonbelligerent seems most suited to our existing situation."A third (Wedemeyer), noting a defeatist attitude in the British paper andholding that more of the British Commonwealth's resources should be employed,suggested also that there should be assurance of an American determination toassist in every possible way short of war: he pressed for recognition that "wemust not become an active belligerent until we have created the means by whichwe can accomplish our national objectives." The realistic attitude of thisofficer with regard to the Army's potentialities was founded on intensivestudies of

previous weeks which led to the monumental Victory Plan of which he was the principal author.

The WPD staff, using these memoranda, developed a draft studyto be presented over General Gerow's signature to the Chief of Staff. Accordingto this study, General Gerow felt that, contrary to the British idea thatAmerican entry into the war would help, the United States would be of moreassistance as a neutral able to supply munitions in large quantities, thenation's potential combat strength not being sufficiently developed to permitmore than a moral effect in land or air operations, and the Navy being stillincapable of offensive operations against Germany. He summarized the strategicconceptions which had been approved in ABC-1, and held them to bestill valid.

These recommendations were not formally presented to theChief of Staff but were combined with recommendations of the Navy's WPD to forma joint Planning Committee report which the Joint Board accepted as its own. Thestrategic concept of ABC-1 was accepted as still sound. Military operations wereheld to be in need of specific direction, not aimed at "destruction of morale,"and a bombing offensive against civilian morale was opposed. (It is necessary torecognize the American distinction--that the industrial and economic structureof Germany, as well as the purely military, should be bombed intensively, butthat the effect on morale was secondary.)The vagueness of the British Chiefs' proposal for a land offensive, save after navaland air offensives should have beaten down German resistance, was unacceptable.The Joint Board felt the need of strong bases in Port Sudan, Massawa, Baghdad,and Basra, in case the Middle East's other positions should be lost. Singaporewas important, but it could not be held unless the Netherlands East Indies wereheld, and the joint Board felt that aid to Singapore should be accompanied byaid to the Dutch, and also to the Chinese, in order to help Singapore. It waspremature to count the Soviet Union out of the war, for chances favored aRussian resistance that would continue for several months at least, andeffective arming of Russia would help to provide it. The Joint Board discernedin the British Chief's review only minor attention to preparations for landoperations, and remonstrated: "Naval and air power may prevent wars from beinglost and, by weakening enemy strength, may contribute greatly to victory. . . .It should be recognized as

an almost invariable rule that wars cannot be finally won without the use ofland armies." In accordance with this view the Joint Board proposed toequip and train land task forces for offensive use "wherever land offensivesmay ultimately appear to be profitable." (This expression suggests howfar from Staff thinking at this time was the President's sudden desire of thatweek to reduce the Army's forces in training.SeeChapter XI.)Patrol bombers should be stationed at Freetown in West Africa. Taking up that ill-timed lastparagraph of the British Chief's review, and supporting General Gerow's oppositionto present intervention, the Joint Board continued: "Involvement of UnitedStates Army forces in the near future would at best involve a piecemeal andindecisive commitment of forces against a superior enemy under unfavorable logisticconditions." In sum: "The major strategic concept, and the principalmilitary operations set forth . . . [in ABC-1] are still sound, and should formthe general guide for the conduct of a war against the Axis Powers, in whichthe United States is associated with the BritishCommonwealth."This "Final Action" of Army and Navy, signed by theChief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, was dispatched to London on25 September for transmission to the British Chiefs.

Efforts to Harmonize Views on a Bombing Policy

Meantime pressure for the air offensive was being appliedelsewhere. British advocates of the idea were convinced that it should bepushed, whatever might be the plans for other operations. At the time of theAtlantic Conference Maj. H. S. Hansell, an Air Corps officer then on duty inEngland, was informing General Arnold of the hopes that were being expressed tohim in London. The British consensus, he reported on 11 August, was that "it isprobably possible" to cause a German breakdown by means of prolonged bombing,and "it is highly improbable that a land invasion can be carried out againstGermany proper, at least within the next three years. If the air offensive issuccessful, a land offensive probably will not be necessary." The air bases andsea communications must be made secure, the letter continued, and disrupting ofGermany's electric power, transportation, and petroleum systems should bepursued; also the "undermining of German morale by air attack on civilianconcentrations." It would first be necessary to neutralize the German Air Forceand continue attacks on submarines

and surface craft as well as the Channel "invasion"bases.A week later General Chaney supported the view of a sustained air offensiveagainst Germany as "fully warranted" and held that it "should be planned andexecuted at the earliest possible time."

The exchanges of secret code information, agreed upon at the Atlantic Conference,were made without reference to the sharp disagreements in otherrespects,nevertheless the disagreements remained so acute that in Londonthe War Cabinet's planning staff eventually met with the resident observer groupsfrom the US Army and Navy in an effort for reconciliation of views. It is difficultto see why this step was postponed until November and equally difficult to determinewhy a report of the meeting and the much more tactful expression of Britishviews there offered failed to reach Washington promptly. The British Chiefs'reconsidered statements, which the American Special Observers eventually reportedby radio, were:

(a) In attacking "morale" British mean disruptionof transportation, living, and industrial facilities of German population ratherthan more restricted meaning. . . .

(c) British give assurance of ultimate intention to land forceson continent.

This statement came much closer to the views of the AmericanChiefs of Staff. Oddly, although the British planners' meeting referred to tookplace on 21 November, the radiogram reporting it was received in Washington on10 December 1941. By that time the United States was at war.

The disagreements between the British and the American Chiefsof Staff during and after both ABD and the Atlantic Conference had served oneconstructive purpose almost as useful as the points of agreement. They hadwarned the British of certain strong views held in Washington, and had providedunmistakable evidence that the United States was likely to be the controllingpartner in any coming alliance. Yet neither at the Atlantic Conference nor atother meetings, where the likely course of many coming developments wasaccurately discerned, was there even suspicion of an event already being plannedin Tokyo, which would come to pass at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, with immediate consequences

upsetting most of the planning for the Far East,and delaying some of the projects in mind for the Atlantic. The aim at the ABDdiscussion had been to insure the security of Allied sea communications in theFar East and the security of Singapore, both of which were due to be lost withappalling celerity. The planning of R 5 was based on sober estimates ofAmerican capabilities and deficiencies in the Pacific. Sound as much of thatplanning was in theory, none of it allowed for the wholesale reduction ofAmerican offensive powers--and consequent wreck of the plans--that would bebrought about in one disastrous early morning raid upon the principal Americaninstallation in mid-ocean.

Table of Contents **Previous Chapter (11) *Next Chapter (13)

Footnotes

1.SeeChapter IV.

2.SeeChapter V.

3.For information about the organization for co-ordination of foreign sales see:(1) Memo, ASW and ASN for President, 30 Jun 39, SW 572;(2) Ltr, President to SW, 6 Dec 39, SW 676;(3) Memo, President for SW, 13 Dec 39, SW 681(it was in this memo that the President overruled the objections of theSecretaries of War and Navy to removing the coordination from ANMB);(4)U.S. Government Manual, March 1941 (Washington: GPO, 1941), p. 87.

4.SeeChapter VI.

5.For criticism of this transaction as a breach of international law seeEdwin Borchard, "The Attorney General's Opinion on the Exchange of Destroyers for Naval Bases,"The American Journal of International Law (Washington, D. C., October 1940),Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 690-97.Other aspects of the Attorney General's opinion are challenged in thesame publication (pp. 569ff.) by Herbert W. Briggs, "Neglected Aspects of theDestroyer Deal." Quincy Wright, commenting editorially on the above articles(pp. 680-89), arrives at opposite conclusions.For text of the President's message to Congress on the destroyer transactionand accompanying papers, including the opinion of Attorney General Robert H. Jackson,seeCong Rec, 76th Cong, 3d sess, for September 3, 1940, pp. 17276-17279 (daily edition);also H Doc No. 943, 76th Cong.Note also Robert Sherwood's belief (in hisRoosevelt and Hopkins(New York: Harper, 1948), especially p. 274) that Mr.Roosevelt was conscious of the possibility of impeachment for exceeding hisConstitutional authority.Events leading up to the destroyers-for-bases transaction arc discussed in draft MS,Kittredge, U.S. Defense Policies, Ch. X, Sec. B.

6.Hull,Memoirs, I, 870.

7.Unused Memo, Actg ACofS J.W.A. (Col Anderson), WPD, for CofS, 13 Nov 40,sub: National Policy of the United States, WPD 4175-15.

8.SeeChapter IV,latter part, for the events leading up to ABC.

9.This memorandum also listed the six designated British visitors,Maj. Gen. E.L. Morris,Rear Admirals R.M. Bellairs, former chief of plans,and V.H. Danckwerts,Air Commodore (later Vice-Marshal) J.C. Slessor,Capt. A.W. Clark, RN, and Maj. A.T. Cornwall-Jones.Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 26 Dec 40,sub: Army Representatives for Staff Conferences with Great Britain, WPD 4402.Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were represented atmeetings of the British section but not in the joint meetings.

10.TAG Ltr to Maj Gen S. D. Embick, 30 Dec 40,sub: Army Representatives for Staff Conferences with Great Britain, WPD 4402.

11.Memo, Secy JB for JPC, 14 Dec 40, JB 325, ser 674.

12.Memo, JPC for JB, 13 Jan 41,sub: Joint Instructions for Holding Staff Conversations, WPD 4402-1.

13.Rad, Military Attaché (Lee), London, to MilitaryIntelligence Division, War Dept, 7 Jan 41, WPD 4402-1.

14.Notes of remarks by Col Truman Smith in office of CofS, 27 Jan 41,CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 8.

15.Ibid.

16.Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 14 Jan 41,sub: Staff Conversations with the British, WPD 4402-1.

17.Memo, President for SN, 26 Jan 41, WPD 4402-2.

18.Statement by CNO and CofS, 27 Jan 41.Copies in WPD 4402-94 and WPD 4402-89 (Gen Embick's set of Conference papers).Though dated 27 January there is evidence in accompanying papers to show that thiswas the statement actually presented two days later.

19.(1) Memo, President for SN, 26 Jan 41, WPD 4402-2.(2) Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 27 Jan 41, WPD 4402-2.

20.Minutes of Plenary Meeting, British-United States Staff Conversations, 29 Jan 41,in Gen Gerow's papers relating to the Conference, WPD EX File, item 11 No. 4.

21.See Memos for CofS from Army representatives, 12 Feb, 20 Feb, 5 Mar 41, WPD 4402 to 4420.

22.Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 5 Mar 41,sub: U.S. British Staff Conversations, WPD 4402-3.The quotation, above, is from the untitled accompanying enclosure.

23.Ibid.

24.(1) Memo, Secy Army Section (Lt Col W.P. Scobey) for members of the Army Section, 17 Mar 41,WPD 4402-3.(2) Memo, Secy Army Section for CofS, 19 Mar 41,sub: Staff Conversations, WPD 4402-3.

25.The United States-British Staff Conversations report (Short title ABC-1)with annexes, 27 Mar 41,and the air collaboration report (ABC-2), 29 Mar 41,are published as Exhibit 49, pages 1485-1550 of Part 15, theHearings of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack,79th Cong, 1st sess.

26.Ibid., p. 1488.

27.Ibid., p. 1489.

28.Ibid.

29.Ibid.

30.Summarized from text of ABC-1, paragraph 11, which is given in full onpp. 1489-90 ofPearl Harbor Attack, Hearings, Pt. 15.

31.Summarized from ABC-1, paragraph 12, given in full on pp. 1490-91 ofPearl Harbor Attack, Hearings, Pt. 15.

32.SeePearl Harbor Attack, Hearings, Pt. 15, p. 1491.

33.Msg, CNO to U.S. Naval Attaché at London, 20 Feb 41.Copy for information at CofS, U.S. Army, filed in WPD 4402-1.Also Memo of correction, ACof5 WPD to CofS, same date.

34.Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings, p. 1491-92.

35.Ibid., p. 1492.

36.Ibid.

37.Ibid.

38.See n. 25.

39.Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings, pp. 1494-95 and 1497-1500.

40.SeeChapter IV.

41.Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings, Pt. 15, pp. 1501-02.

42.Ibid., pp. 1504-10.Note that on 1 October 1941 WPD was to report only one infantry division andno armored division ready (see Chapter XI,p. 358).

43.Pearl Harbor Attack, Hearings, Pt. 15, p. 1548 (ABC-2).

44. Ibid., p. 1548 (ABC-2).

45.Undated and unsigned memo prepared in WPD for use in connection withconferences of 16 April, WPD 4402-9.

46.Summarized, not quoted, from Memo, Col J.T. McNarney for Gen H.H. Arnold, 7 Apr 41,sub: Staff Conversations, WPD 4402-7.

47.Ibid.

48.Ibid., summarized, not quoted.

49.Ibid.

50.Draft of Ltr, CNO and CofS to Special Naval and Army Observers in London, 4 Apr 41,sub: Tentative Approval of the Report of the United States-British Staff Conversations(ABC-1), WPD 4402-18.The substance of this letter, evidently drawn up at the time theappointment of observers was under consideraion, was subsequently delivered tothe British Chiefs of Staffs Committee in London.Ltr, Special Naval (Ghormley) and Army (Lee) Observers to the Chiefs of Staffs Committee,21 Apr 41, WPD 4402-14.A copy of the letter was handed General Chancy when he departed for London early in May.See notation on copy in WPD 4402-89, Part V.

51.Admiral King's order, in its relationship to larger aspects of strategy,will be referred to later in the chapter.This sequence of events at sea is recited by Samuel Eliot Morison,The Battle of the Atlantic (Boston: Little, Brown, 1947),pp. 56-58.

52.Ltr, CofS to CNO, 12 May 41,sub: Directive to Army Base Commanders, Newfoundland, Bermuda, and Trinidad,WPD 4351-98, copy in OCS 21160-67.Attached is the memorandum to WPD next referred to, signed "G.C.M."The 1 May memorandum is not on hand.

53.Ltr, Joint Secretaries Br JSM in Washington to U.S. Secretary for Collaboration, 9 Jul 41,sub: British Military Mission: Proposed Change in Nomenclature, WPD 4402-28.

54.Discussion of action leading to the establishment of the observers group is in:(1) Memo, Actg ACofS for CofS, 7 Apr 41,sub: United States Military Mission in London, WPD 4402-5.(2) Memo, Actg ACofS G-2 for CofS, 7 Apr 41,sub: United States Military Mission in London, WPD 4402-5.(3) Memo, Maj Gen S. D. Embick for Actg ACofS WPD, 5 Apr 41,sub: Military Mission, WPD 4402-5.

55.Ltr, CofS to Special Army Observer in London, 24 Apr 41,sub: Letter of Instructions, WPD 4402-5.

56.Cable, Special Observer, London, to TAG, 23 May 41, WPD 4402-5.

57.Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 13 May 41,sub: Liaison with British Mission, WPD 4402-10.

58.For recital of this background see Morison,The Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 56-64.See also contemporary newspapers.

59.Documents used for this summary narration are:(1) Notes of conference in office of CofS, 16 Apr 41 (early forenoon), CofS files,Notes on Conf, bndr 13;(2) Notes on later conference (11:25 A.M.) same day, place and file location.(3) Memo, CofS for SW, 16 Apr 41, same file;(4) Memo, J.W.A. (Col Anderson of WPD) for CofS, 16 Apr 41,sub: Strategic Considerations-Peace or War Status, WPD 4402-9.

60.Notes of conference in office of CofS, 16 Apr 41 (early forenoon),CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 13.

61.Memo initialed J. W. A. (Col. Anderson) for CofS, 16 Apr 41,sub: Strategic Considerations, WPD 4402-9.The "Digest of United States-British Staff Conversations" presented at thesame time is the one recorded onp. 380 above.

62.From previously mentioned discussion of 11:25 A.M. conference in office of CofS, 16 Apr 44,CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 13.

63.Memo, CofS for SW, 16 Apr 41, CofS files, Notes on Conf, bndr 13.

64.See Morison,Battle of the Atlantic, p. 61.Operation Plan No. 3 was mentioned earlier in this chapter in its relationshipto the action of U.S.S.Niblack.

65.See Kittredge, U.S. Defense Policies, Ch. XIII, Pt. C, pp. 29-33.

66.Aide-mémoire, Rear Adm Danckwerts, 8 May 41, unaddressed,but bearing Gen Marshall's initials, WPD 4402-15.The inquiry to which it replied came from Admiral Turner, dated 25 April 41,President Roosevelt having previously asked the Navy Department for the information.

67.See personal Ltr, Admiral Stark to Admiral Hart, 22 Oct 40(inPearl Harbor Attack, Hearings, Pt. 16, p. 2448),and same to same, 12 Nov 40 (p. 2449).

68.Summarized Rpt of Conversations Held by Chief of Staff, U.S. Asiatic Fleet,with Netherlands East Indies Naval Authorities at Batavia, 10-14 Jan 41, WPD 4402-3.

69.Ibid.

70.Memo, U.S. Army Section for the CofS, 12 Feb 41,sub: Dispatch of U.S. Forces to Singapore, WPD 4402-1.

71.Ibid.

72.Later known as ABD.

73.Ltr, CofS to CG Philippines Dept, 2 Apr 41,sub: U.S.-British Staff Conversations.This letter is Tab B to Memo, Acts; ACofS WPD for CofS, 15 Apr 41,sub: Staff Conversations in the Far East, WPD 4402-8.

74.For an extended examination of this and other plans for the PhilippineIslands see Louis Morton,The Fall of the Philippines,a volume now in preparation for this series.

75.Rad, CofS to CG Philippines Dept, 4 Apr 41. This is Tab C to Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS,15 Apr 41,sub: Staff Conversations in the Far East, WPD 4402-8.

76.See n. 75.

77.Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for TAG, 16 Apr 41,sub: Staff Conversations, WPD 4402-8.

78.Ltr, CG Philippines Dept to ACofS WPD, 2 May 41,sub: American-Dutch-British Conversations of April 21-27 1941, held in Singapore.This is incl B to Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 8 Jul 41,sub: Report of American-Dutch-British Conversations, Short Title--"A. D. B"; WPD 4402-18.

79.Incl with Ltr, Secy British Military Mission, without attached address, 3 May 41, WPD 4402-18.

80.(1) Memo, Gen Gerow, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 3 Jun 41,sub: U.S.-Dutch-British Staff Conversations.(2) Grunert dispatch 1058 to TAG, 5 Jun 41.(3) Msg 993 WD AGO to CG Phil Dept, 7 Jun 41.(4) Msg 995 WD AGO to CG Phil Dept, 9 Jun 41.All filed in AG 380.3 (4-4-41).

81.This summary originally accompanied a 10 MayMemo from Brig Gen Harry J. Malony, Actg ACofS WPD, to CofS, WPD 4402-18.It is a condensation of various points in the British telegraphed summary previously noted.

82.Memo, CofS (prepared in WPD by Col Bundy) for SW, 20 May 41,sub: Paper Presented by S.K. Hornbeck, Department of State, WPD 4402-18.

83.Ltr, Secy for Collaboration (Comdr L.R. McDowell)to Secy British Military Mission (Capt A.W. Clarke), 7 Jun 41,sub: Report of the Singapore United States-British-Dutch Conference April 1941. WPD 4402-18.

84.These British Chiefs of Staff suggestions appear as inclosures A and B attached to anote of the Secretary to the British Military Mission in Washington, 20 May 41,sub: Report of the Singapore American-Dutch-British Conference April 1941, WPD 4402-18.

85.This brief, filed in AG 380.3(4-4-41), is attached tocopy of a Ltr, CofS and CNO to Special Army and Navy Observers, London, 3 Jul 41,sub: Comment on the Report of the American-Dutch-British Conversations, WPD 4402-28.While this letter was drawn up 3 July, it was not actually dispatched until 26 July.See notations on copies of Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 21 Jul 41,sub: Report of American-Dutch-British Conversations,original in AG 380.3 (4-4-41) and copy in WPD 4402-18.The letter was six pages long.On 8 July General Gerow, WPD, forwarded to the Chief of Staff a letter from GeneralGrunert, with which he agreed in opposing the Singapore report.See Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS. 8 Jul 41,sub: Report of American-Dutch-British Conversations, WPD 4402-18.

86.Ltr of 3 Jul 41, cited in n. 85.

87.Ltr, Special Army Observer, London, to CofS, 1 Sep 41,sub: Draft Agreement ADB (Revised), WPD 4402-18.

88.Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 17 Nov 41,sub: Draft Agreement ADB (Revised), WPD 4402-18.

89.Cable from Admiralty, London, to B.A.D. (British Admiralty Delegation),Washington, 5 Nov 41, WPD 4402-18 and AG 380.3 (4-4-41).

90.Cable, CNO to SPENAVO. London, 6 Nov 41. WPD 4402-18.

91.Ltr, U.S. Secy for Collaboration to the Joint Secretaries to British Joint Staff Mission,Washington, 11 Nov 41,sub: United States-British Commonwealth Cooperation in the Far East Area,WPD 4402-18 and AG 380.3 (4-4-41).

92.Acually the Admiralty set in train the necessary arrangements for producing detailedjoint operating plans, but the action came too late.See Ltr, Joint Secretaries to British Joint Staff Mission in Washingtonto U.S. Secy for Collaboration, 26 Nov 41,sub: U.S.-British Commonwealth Cooperation in the Far East Area, AG 380.3 (4-4-41).For the development of PLENAPS see Louis Morton,The Fall of the Philippines,Ch. 1.

93.Eight bases for world peace following "destruction of the Nazi tyranny"were stated by Roosevelt and Churchill.SeeThe New York Times, 15 Aug 41, p. 1.

94.Memo, Lt Col C.W. Bundy for CofS, 16 Aug 41,sub: Notes on Speech by the Prime Minister on USS Augusta, 9 Aug 41, WPD 4402-62.

95.General Strategy Review by the British Chiefs of Staff, 31 Jul 41.This was an inclosure to a letter from Col C. C. Hollis, Secy Chiefs of Staff Committee,to CofS, 10 Aug 41, WPD 4402-62, revised copy in JB 325, ser 729, in ABC 381 (9-25-42 [42?]) Section I.

96.Summary of selected parts of Strategy Review cited in n. 95.

97.Quotation from same Strategy Review.

98.The group included Harry Hopkins, W. Averell Harriman, Admiral King, and General Burns.SeeThe New York Times, 17 Aug, p. 3.

99.Ltr, Col C. C. Hollis, Secy Chiefs of Staff Committee, to CofS, 10 Aug 41, WPD 4402-62.Duplicates were sent to Admiral Stark and General Arnold.

100.The notes referred to arc in a Memo of Lt Col C.W. Bundy for CofS, 20 Aug 41,sub: Notes on Staff Conferences, August 11-12, 1941, on BoardPrince of Wales,WPD 4402-62.

101.Ibid.

102.On 9 August General Gerow had sent a radiogram to General Chaney inLondon informing him that the War Department was considering establishing groupsin the British Isles and the Near East to administer Lend-Lease aid and toobserve the use of American equipment.Chaney agreed it would be useful and Maj. Gen. George H. Brett of the Air Corpswas sent to discuss the matters with General Chaney and thereafter to proceed to Egypt.See (1) Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for TAG, 9 Aug 41,sub: Proposed Administrative Mission in Great Britain and the Middle East, WPD 4402-51;(2) Paraphrase of cable from Special Army Observer, London, 26 Aug 41, WPD 4402-51;(3) Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for TAG, 2 Sep 41, sub as in (1), WPD 4402-51;(4) Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 4 Sep 41, sub as in (1), WPD 4402-51;(5) Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for Maj Gen Chas. M. Wesson, 2 Sep 41, as in (1), WPD 4402-54.At about this same time General Burns, Lend-Lease Executive Officer, was urgingthat Lend Lease representatives be sent to England and the Middle East to superviseand assist in the handling of defense aid supplies.See (1) Memo. Gen Burns for SW, 8 Sep 41;(2) Memo, Gen Burns for SW, 13 Sep 41.Both in WPD 4402-72.Thereafter there came from representatives of the State Department, the Army,and the Air Forces a series of reports on wasteful British methods in Egypt.These (notably from Kirk, Fellers, and Gerow) were assembled as Tabs A to I accompanyingMemo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, 10 Oct 41,sub: Unity of Command, British Forces in Middle East, WPD 4402-84.

103.Col Bundy's notes on Staff Conferences of Aug 11-12, as cited in n. 100.

104.Ibid. The 12 August notes, however, were based on Commander Sherman's recollection.

105.The New York Times, 15 Aug 41, p. 1.

106.The memoranda, undated, informally prepared, and in someinstances unsigned, appear, along with General Gerow's recommendations, asinclosures to accompany a note for record by Col. Clayton Bissell, 31 Oct 41,sub: General Strategy Review by British Chiefs of Staff, WPD 4402-64.Included in the binder is a copy of the approved joint PlanningCommittee report directing final action on the Strategy Review, 25 Sep 41.The report was forwarded to the Special Naval and Army Observers withappropriate instructions for presenting its substance to the British Chiefs of Staff.See JB 325, ser 729.

107.Draft Memo, Actg ACofS WPD for CofS, Sep 41,sub: General Strategy-Review by British Chiefs of Staff, WPD 4402-64.

108.See paragraph 3d of Tab 2, Sec. II, p. III, Appendix II(Ultimate Requirements Air Forces Supporting Study)to Army and Navy Estimate of United States Overall Production Acquirements,11 Sep 41, JB 355, ser 707.Copy in AAG 381 (Bulky).

109.Memo, JB to Special Naval and Army Observers, London, approved 25 Sep 41,sub: Comment on "General Strategy Review by the British Chiefs of Staff,"JR 325, ser 729, copy in WPD 4402- 64.

110.Memo, Maj H. S. Hansell, AC, for Gen Arnold, through Gen Chaney, 11 Aug 41,sub: An Air Estimate of the Situation for the Employment of the Air Striking Forcein Europe (ABC-1), WPD 4402-61.

111.1st ind on 11 Aug 41 Memo of Maj Hansell (cited in preceding note) to CofS, 19 Aug 41, WPD 4402-61.

112.See Instructions from CofS and CNO to Observers in London, 12 Sep 41, WPD 4402-88.For history of negotiations on the use of code words seeMemo, ACofS WPD for CofS, 23 Feb 42,sub: Code Name Index-Agreement with Great Britain, WPD 4402-88.

113.Rad, Special Naval and Army Observers to CofS and CNO, 10 Dec 41, WPD 4402-64.