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Addendum
Luftwaffe Air Intelligence During the Battle of Britain

INTRODUCTION

The performance of Luftwaffe airintelligence prior to and during the Battleof Britain was seriously flawed andperhaps doomed it to failure from theoutset. British air intelligence was equallyguilty of serious miscalculations duringthis period, but by comparison theLuftwaffe was ill prepared for the task athand. As will be seen, poor organizationand staffing, low esteem of the Luftwaffe'sintelligence corps, and the Nazi "system"itself (a system that resulted in an almostcomplete absence of coordinationamongst the various intelligence agencies)all combined to help ensure defeat.

ORGANIZATION

Air intelligence was subordinated tothe operations staff at the major levels ofthe Luftwaffe. (See Appendices6 and7.)At the General Staff level, the 5thAbteilung (Detachment) served as thesenior intelligence agency. A similarposition was retained at the air fleet(luftflotte) level. It is also significant tonote that no intelligence organizationswere stationed below the fliegerkorps until 1944.

Because of the organizationalsubordination of intelligence to theoperations staff, it was very often theoperations staff officers themselves whowould prepare intelligence assessments ofthe situation. Their reports sometimesincluded inputs from the intelligencedepartments but most frequently they didnot. This was apparently not consideredunreasonable because these "intelligenceassessments" also reflected theLuftwaffe's future "operational intentions,objectives or missions."

In effect, intelligence officers wereperceived as "maids of all work," and weremanned with low-quality personnel whoseinputs were considered of limitedusefulness to the conduct of futureoperations.

Knowledge is power. Nowhere is thisaxiom more prevalent than within the wartimeGerman state, within the Wehrmacht and ofparticular importance here, within theLuftwaffe. More than a dozen intelligencecollection agencies existed outside the realmof the armed forces.All of these agenciescompeted with one another; none fullycooperated with the others and only at thevery highest level--Hitler--did the potential fora true picture exist. The result wasinformation passed "largely vertically, andseldom horizontally." Even within theLuftwaffe's own intelligence agencies therivalry and mistrust was so great that the 3dAbteilung (signal intelligence; also under theoperations staff) rarely coordinated with the5th Abteilung. The "friction and rivalrybetween [the two detachments] led directly toerroneous assessments."

Chastise the bearer of unhappytidings. If not the motto of the Naziregime, certainly this was the apparentattitude of many individuals, includingHitler, Goering and even Jeschonnek. Allthree demonstrated a dislike ofintelligence reports that did not fit theirown personal visions. Intelligenceanalysis was often watered down to reachconclusions more acceptable to theintended reader. Thus the reputation ofthe 5th Abteilung's chief, Col "Beppo"Schmid, evolved as one renown "within theLuftwaffe for garnishing his reports tomake them more palatable to Goering."

Generally speaking, it was the natureof the German organizations assigned thetasks of collecting information, analysisand the subsequent dissemination ofintelligence that proved the fatal flaw.Jealously guarded, intelligence meantpower to the chiefs of the variousagencies. Intelligence, when made

available to military commanders, wasoften looked upon with distrust anddeemed of limited usefulness. Or,conversely, the reports were selectivelybelieved to their fullest extent. The failingsof the system "were so intimately boundup with the political structure of the ThirdReich that only a change in regime couldhave made any fundamental difference . . .the failings of German intelligence cannearly all be traced to the nature of theintelligence organization that had beencreated."

SIGNALS TRAFFIC AND RADIO DISCIPLINE

In addition to the much toutedEnigma (U) intercepts, Britishintelligence gained considerableinformation from other, low-grade Sigintsources. The German communications"were of four types: high-grade ciphersencrypted by Enigma; low-grade W/Ttraffic, usually to and from aircraft; low-grade radio telephone traffic; and othersignals traffic such as navigationalbeacons."The problem for the Luftwaffewas that radio discipline of the Germanbomber and fighter units was relativelypoor. Before the war, the bomber andtransport aircraft used standard unit callsigns. This allowed the RAF to develop afairly accurate picture of the German airorder of battle. After the war began,although the codes were changed, theprevious intelligence already amassed bythe RAF allowed most operational units tobe reidentified by the end of 1939.

By the summer of 1940, RAFexploitation of low-grade sources hadincreased in efficiency. Intercepts oftransmissions by "the German air trafficcontrol service gave early warning of thedeparture of aircraft, and direction-findingoften revealed the bases involved." Inaddition, combining this information withthe low radio discipline of the flying unitsenabled "frequent early and accurateguesses of the units taking part in araid."This later proved operationallysignificant because the RAF signalsinterception units "could, on occasion,determine where enemy aircraft wereforming up for a raid outside radar'sdetection range, give the altitude of theaircraft, and indicate the type of aircraft inthe formation."More importantly, theBritish signals intercept units establisheddirect telephone links with RAF FighterCommand's Group and Sector headquarters.

EARLY STUDIES

The first major study and analysis of British"air power and economic capabilities" wasproduced by the 5th Abteilung from Januaryto June of 1939.The study was initiatedby Goering and code-named "Studie Blau"(Blue Study). Although the study wasconducted and directed by Colonel Schmid,Goering also appointed Milch, Udet andJeschonnek as permanent members of thestudy group. Civilian experts from fieldssuch as industry, economics, foreign trade,technology, politics,etcetera, were alsoenlisted to provide specialized inputs fromtheir areas of expertise. This groupoperated with relative efficiency andcooperation when compared to studiesconducted later in the war. Meetings wereheld once or twice weekly and wereconducted in the form of "lectures,discussions, and interrogations."

On 2 May 1939, Colonel Schmidissued a report (presumably this was basedon knowledge gained during the thenongoing development of Studie Blau) thatconcluded France and Britain would not"catch up with the major advance in theexpansion of the air forces achieved byGermany during the next 1-2 years."Schmid also believed the Western powerscould only match Germany's lead in the"technical development of fighters." In otherwords, they could design, but not produce asuperior fighter capable of effecting theoutcome of a war in 1939-1940. Hebelieved the lead time required forproduction placed Germany two to threeyears ahead in fighters and even more inbombers! Furthermore, Schmid thought theBritish defenses were inadequate to defendanything more than the general areas

around London. This would leave the rest ofEngland open to attack.

Schmid's report gave no credit to theBritish radar systems even though they hadalready been detected by General Martini's3d Abteilung. This omission presumablyled to the further conclusion that the Britishdefense of their island would pose a greaterproblem than that facing the Luftwaffe in theoffense. The British were being forced torely on ground observation, by the observercorps, to detect incoming German raids.Similar conclusions were reached in thereport of 16 July 1940.

The 94-page Studie Blau addressedtoo favorably the chances of Germansuccess and as such portrayed "a mixtureof truth and falsehood."The Britishguarantee, in March 1939, to defend Polanddid not prevent Schmid from concluding thatit was "quite possible" that in spite of thesepromises from the West, a war arising ineastern Europe could be localized. As withlater reports, the study overestimated thecapabilities of German air strength; the finalconclusion stating "the German Luftwaffe isat present superior to any single Europeanair force, and this applies not only to thenumbers and quality of the equipment andarmament of troops, but also to theorganization, training, and especially thetactical and command side of thepreparation for war in the air."

England was considered veryvulnerable from the air while at the sametime the report stated that even a combinedair attack by the British and French uponGermany "had only a small chance ofreaching its targets." These conclusionswere reached despite the fact that theGerman bombers would be forced tooperate without fighter cover and, moreimportantly, could not reach most of the"critical" targets because of the circuitousroutes they would have to take aroundBelgium and the Netherlands! The studyidentified the "weakest points in the overallBritish economy [as] its dependence onimports from abroad and on sea routes."Therefore the British naval and merchantshipping ports would be especiallysusceptible to air attack.

Coincident with the development ofStudie Blau, operational exercisesconducted by General Felmy's Luftflotte 2reached an opposite conclusion. Theexercises, conducted in May 1939, werecarried out in the presence of Jeschonnek,Milch and the chiefs of staff fromLuftflotten 1 and 3. The Germanarmament, training, tactics andorganization described as "superior" bythe 5th Abteilung were found to beinadequate in Felmy's exercises. Aircraftranges were found to be too short, therewere not enough bombers available andcrew training, especially instrument flying,was inadequate.

Felmy's conclusions formed thebasis of a follow-up Luftwaffe General Staffappraisal "of the 'operational objectives ofthe Luftwaffe in the event of a war againstBritain in 1939' dated 22 May 1939. Itwas also pointed out that an air waragainst British imports could not besuccessful because the western andsouthern ports lay beyond the range of theAir Fleet Two concerned, and furthermorethat terror attacks on London as thestronghold of the enemy air defense wouldhardly have a catastrophic effect orcontribute significantly to a war decision.They would only strengthen the British willto resist."

Colonel Schmid presented the finalresults of Studie Blau in a briefing toGoering only a month after GeneralFelmy's sobering exercises. Inattendance for the July briefing were "theChief of Staff [Jeschonnek], an UnderSecretary of State, the CommandingGeneral of the Second Air Fleet [Felmy]and his Chief of Staff."Goering wasapparently impressed with the optimism ofthe Schmid report; a report that both heand Jeschonnek had played a significantrole in developing. Perhaps notsurprisingly, opposing views were not wellreceived, and even condemned. It wasalso no coincidence that General Felmyand his chief of staff were present for the

briefing (as it would be the responsibility ofLuftflotte 2 to carry out any early offensiveagainst England).

At the outset of hostilities, inSeptember 1939, General Felmy producedanother report outlining many of theLuftwaffe's weaknesses that would provedecisive in the coming Battle of Britain.He was subsequently relieved ascommander of Luftflotte 2 "on Hitler'sorders."

CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE

By the late summer of 1940, withFrance, the lowlands and also Polandhaving already been overrun, the moodwithin the Wehrmacht and that of thepolitical leadership was one of optimism.For the Luftwaffe, no task was too great.Ominous indicators existed however, (lossrates against the British during the airbattles above Dunkirk for example) butthese were either ignored or overwhelmedby the positive optimism resulting fromearlier military successes. And the"weaknesses in intelligence both mirroredand contributed to a fatal overconfidencethroughout the German High Command.Hitler's own conviction that the Britishwere weak and would capitulate andaccept overtures for peace, either beforeor after a short air offensive, was bound toaffect Luftwaffethinking. . . ."

The air of optimism remainedthroughout the conduct of the Battle ofBritain. Assessments of raid results werealmost always overstated. For example,following the raids on 17 August, Luftwaffeintelligence claimed 11 airfieldspermanently destroyed with another 12severely damaged. All of these airfieldswere in fact operational. In a similarmanner, estimates of British loss rateswere grossly in error. Three and fourtimes the actual loss rates were claimedby German intelligence during the crucialAugust-September time period. Germanlosses were also high. Considerableconfusion developed between the twoprimaryLuftflotten involved in thebattle--Luftflotten 2 and 3. "Kesselring claimedthat Fighter Command had beendestroyed, while Sperrle claimed it had1,000 aircraft."The optimistic viewprevailed, supported by Goering, and theinaccurate intelligence estimates, and theGerman emphasis was soon switched to London.

Radar. Perhaps the greatest failurewas the German conclusions about theeffectiveness of the British radar stations.As already mentioned, General Martini's3d Abteilung had detected the Britishradar before the outbreak of hostilities. Togain additional information, signalsintelligence even flew collection missionsusing the airship Graf Zeppelin. EitherGeneral Martini initially failed to pass thisinformation to Colonel Schmid, or Schmidand his team failed to grasp thesignificance of radar's potential. In anyevent, little emphasis was placed onsustained attacks against the British earlywarning system. As the battleprogressed, however, Schmid did becomeaware that Martini's monitoring service haddetected that radar information was beingpassed to RAF fighters by radio. ForSchmid, this served to confirm his earlierconclusions and he remained convincedthat the mass attacks being conducted bythe Luftwaffe would overload what heconsidered to be an "inflexible" commandand control system. In truth, massedformations of German aircraft proved fareasier to detect and track.

Further supporting Colonel Schmid'sflawed conclusions about radar was theeffectiveness of an undetected deceptionplan derived from a British policy tocontinue transmitting from damaged radarsites. Thus, radar sites that wereincapable of receiving information continued to transmit signals. The Germansignals intelligence was "deceived intothinking that the bombing of radar stationswhich was undertaken early in thecampaign wasineffective. . . ."In concert with pilot reports that "led theGermans to believe that the vitals of theradar stations were located in bombproofbunkers," the decision was finally made to

discontinue attacks against the radarsites altogether.

Target Selection. The analysis ofGreat Britain as established by StudieBlau formed the foundation of the bomberoffensive conducted during the Battle ofBritain.In addition, an "EnglandCommittee" was established to providespecialized guidance on target selectionto the 5th Abteilung. The membership ofthe committee was similar to thatestablished for the development of StudieBlau. Included were scientists,politicians, and also the former air attachéin London. Curiously, no engineers oreconomists were included on thecommittee. Although target lists wereprepared by the 5th Abteilung, the finaldecisions seem to have been made on thespot by Goering and Jeschonnek.

Needless to say, considerableconfusion existed within the Intelligenceand Leadership communities of theLuftwaffe over the choice of targets for astrategic campaign. Intelligenceweaknesses had earlier been identifiedwhen, in 1936, the director of operations ofthe Luftwaffe General Staff identified thelack of good intelligence as having "verygreat significance in a bombing war."This director further established that thecurrent knowledge and experience withinthe military was inadequate to properlyidentify the relative vulnerability of"technical-industrial" systems.Thus, the selection of key centers of gravitywithin the British industrial, economic andmilitary systems would be difficult, if notimpossible, without the inclusion of advicefrom outside civilian expertise.

Throughout the Battle of Britain, acontinued omission of expert advice led to"a preference for the choice of a largenumber of targets for simultaneous attackas a precaution, lest one important targetbe left out, rather than concentrating onthe most important targets. . . ."

One point appears to have receivedsingular agreement. The common beliefrose from the experiences of World WarOne; civilian populations could be driven topanic, even revolution, as the direct resultof aerial bombing. Goering andJeschonnek obviously shared this view, asdid the England Committee.Hitler andthe England Committee believed that thepoorer working classes could "be incitedagainst the rich ruling class to bring abouta revolution. . . ."This ideological andsociological viewpoint pervaded theEngland Committee and would remainingrained in the Luftwaffe leadership'sthinking until the end of the war.

Within the 5th Abteilung, Group IIIwas responsible for Great Britain. Thegroup advocated "the destruction of theaircraft industry."It was believed thatthe industry could be destroyed byfocusing on "individual places ofconcentration of the sub-contractors'works."Presumably this also includedthe suppliers of raw materials as thetarget types discussed included steelworks, the aluminum and magnesiumextraction of raw materials, glassfactories, engine works and portinstallations. However, vacillation overcenters of gravity and the specific targetsets persisted. Somewhere between 31and 51 target types were finally identified.

Apparently no specific priority for thedestruction of the identified target typeswas established. By September 1940,Jeschonnek had ordered that only small-scale attacks would be allowed on thesetargets using just a few select crews. Thefocus was to be on those targets havingthe greatest effects upon the population.Again the dominant influence of theGerman belief in the "fear of aerialbombardment" is evident. Furthermore, bymid-October Goering would personallyorder "frequent changes of targets . . . inorder to achieve the necessary effect onthe population of London and to confrontthe enemy's defenses with a newsituation."

CONCLUSIONS

Both sides suffered from intelligencefaults. The British learned from their

failures and improved. The Germans,generally did not. Vacillation over targets,and specifically the determination ofcenters of gravity (the key components ofthe British system), persisted throughoutthe campaign.

The efficiency of the Germanintelligence network was constrained byits very substance. There were perhapstoo many agencies, each with their ownpower base, their own "secrets," and theirown conclusions. The system furtherstifled the transfer of information fromagency to agency. More important,however, the system stifled the transfer oftimely and accurate intelligence to thewar-fighting units. The major leaders,Hitler, Goering and Jeschonnek, and to alesser degree Kesselring and Sperrle,continued in their ideological attempts tobreak the will of the British people throughso-called terror bombing.

But, perhaps above all else, it wasrampant optimism, the product ofprevious battlefield successes thatclouded the vision of the senior leaders.It was a handful of leaders who made thekey decisions. It was these sameleaders who were either unwilling orincapable of synthesizing any reportsthat did not fit with their preconceivednotions. And that's what ultimatelyspelled defeat.

Notes

1.Michael I. Handel,Intelligence andMilitary Operations (Portland, Ore.:International Specialized Book Service,1973), 352.

2.Ibid., 426.

3.Ibid., 350-51, for a complete listing ofthe major intelligence agencies.

4.Ibid., 426-27.

5.Ibid., 427.

6.Ibid., 440-41.

7.Ibid., 429.

8.Ibid., 433.

9.Ibid.

10.Paul Deichmann, General derFlieger,The System of Target SelectionApplied by the German Air Force in WorldWar II (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF HistoricalDivision, Monograph Series, 1955), 50.

11.Ibid.

12.Handel, 435.

13.SeeAppendix 4 ofThe Battle ofBritain, A German Perspective; and Handel,435-37.

14.Handel, 357.

15.Ibid., 356.

16.Deichmann, 52. (An extensivelisting of the economic analysis is available inDeichmann's paper on pages 53-58.)

17.Handel, 357.

18.Deichmann, 51.

19.Handel, 435.

20.Ibid., 438.

21.Ibid., 439.

22.Ibid., 437.

23.Ibid.

24.Handel, 366.

25.Ibid., 367.

26.Ibid., 368.

27.Ibid.

28.Ibid.

29.Handel, 368-69.

30.Ibid., 368.

31.Ibid., 369.

32.Ibid.

33.Ibid.

APPENDIX 1. Directive No. 16

The Fuhrer and CINC of the WehrmachtOKW/WFA/L #33 160/4O g. Kdos.

Fuhrer HQ, 16 July 1940 Fourth of seven copies Geheime Geheime Kommandosache Chefsache! Officer Courier only!

DIRECTIVE No. 16

Concerning preparations for an amphibious operation against England.

Since Britain still shows no sign of willingness to come to an agreement in spite of her hopelessmilitary situation, I have decided to prepare and if necessary carry out an amphibious operationagainst England.

The purpose of this operation will be to eliminate the English mother country as abase for continuation of the war against Germany and, if it should become necessary, to occupy theentire island.

To this end I order as follows:

1. The amphibious operation must be carried out as a surprise crossing on a broad frontextending approximately from Ramsgate to the region of the Isle of Wight, with Luftwaffe elementsassuming the role of artillery, and naval units assuming the role of engineers.

Each individual branch of the Wehrmacht will examine from its own viewpointwhether it appears practicable to carry out subsidiary operations, for example to occupy the Isle ofWight or Cornwall County, prior to the general crossing, and will report its findings to me. I reservethe decision to myself.Preparations for the overall operations must be completed by mid-August.

2. These preparations will include the creation of conditions which will make a landing inEngland possible:

a. The British air force must be so far neutralized, both actually and in morale,that it will offer no appreciable resistance to the German crossing operation;

b. Lanes must be cleared of mines;

c. Both outlets of the Straits of Dover, and the west entrance to the EnglishChannel in a line approximately from Alderney to Portland, must be sealed off by a dense belt ofmines;

d. The coastal areas must be commanded and covered by the fire of heavycoastal artillery;

e. It is desirable that all British naval forces should be tied down in action, both inthe North Sea and in the Mediterranean--here by the Italians--shortly before the crossing; effortsmust be made now already by means of air and torpedo attacks to weaken as far as possible theBritish naval forces presently in those waters.

3.Organization of Command and Preparations. Under my command and inaccordance with my general directives the commanders in chief of the three branches of theWehrmacht will direct the operations of their forces employed in the operation.

From 1 August on, the operations staffs of the commanders in chief of the Army,the Navy, and the Luftwaffe must be within the area with a maximum radius of 30 miles from myheadquarters at Ziegenberg.

To me it appears advisable for the most vital elements of the operations staffs ofthe commanders in chief of the Army and the Navy to occupy mutual premises in Giessen.

The commander in chief of the Army will thus have to establish an army groupheadquarters to conduct the operations of the landing armies.

The operation will be given the designation Sea Lion. During preparations and in the execution ofthe operation the missions of the three branches of the Wehrmacht will be as follows:

a.Army. Preparation of plans of operations and of a crossing plan initiallyfor all units to be shipped in the first wave. The units accompanying the first wave will remain underArmy control (under the individual landing groupments) until it is possible to subdivide their missioninto responsibility for (1) support and protection for the ground forces, (2) protection of the ports ofdebarkation, and (3) protection for the air bases to be occupied.

The Army will also allocate shipping space to the individual landing groupmentsand will define the points of embarkation and debarkation in agreement with the Navy.

b.Navy. Procurement and assembly of the required shipping space at thepoints of embarkation designated by the Army and in accordance with nautical requirements. Asfar as possible use will be made of ships from defeated hostile countries.

The necessary naval advisory staff, escort ships, and other protective naval unitswill be provided by the Navy at each crossing area.

In addition to the protection afforded by the air units employed, naval forces willprotect the flanks of the entire movement across the Channel. Orders will be issued regulating thechain of command during the actual crossing.

Another mission of the Navy is to direct the uniform disposition of coastal artillery,namely, of all naval and Army batteries which can be used against naval targets and to generallyorganize the control of fire.

The largest possible number of the heaviest artillery units will be so placed thatthey can be brought into effective action as speedily as possible to protect the flanks of themovements against hostile naval attack. For this purpose all railway artillery, reinforced by allavailable captured guns but minus the K-5 and K-12 batteries earmarked for counterbattery fireagainst shore-based hostile artillery in England, will be withdrawn from present positions andemplaced on railway turntable mounts.

In addition to the above, all platform guns of the heaviest types will be so emplacedunder concrete protection opposite the Straits of Dover that they will be proof against even theheaviest air attacks. They will be so sited that they will command the Straits under all circumstancesas far as their ranges permit.

The technical work involved will be carried out by Organization Todt (a paramilitarylabor organization auxiliary to the military forces).

c.Luftwaffe. The mission of the Luftwaffe will be to prevent interference byhostile air forces. In addition airpower will be employed to neutralize coastal fortifications whichcould deliver fire in the landing areas, to break the initial resistance offered by the hostile groundforces, and to destroy reserves during their forward movement. These missions will require extremelyclose contact between the individual air units and the landing forces of the Army.

It will also be important for air units to destroy roads which could be used by theenemy to move reserves forward, and to attack naval units approaching the areas of operations whilestill far distant from the crossing routes.

I request recommendations on the use of paratrooper and glider and other airborneforces. The question must be examined together with the Army whether it would be wise to withholdparatrooper and other airborne forces during the initial stages as a reserve force which could bemoved quickly to critical areas in the event of an emergency.

4. The Wehrmacht chief signal officer will ensure that all necessary preparations aremade to establish communications between France and England.Preparations will be made in cooperation with the Navy to lay what is still available ofthe 48 miles of marine cable taken up from the East Prussian canal.

5. I request the commanders in chief to submit to me as early as possible:

a. The measures planned by the Navy and the Luftwaffe to create theconditions necessary for the Channel crossing operation (Item 2, above);

b. Details on the disposition of the coastal artillery batteries (Navy);

c. A survey of the shipping to be employed and of the methods of concentrationand equipment. All civilian agencies participate? (Navy);

d. Plans for the organization of air defense in the areas of concentration fortroops and for equipment to be used in the crossing operation (Luftwaffe);

e. Channel-crossing schedule and plan of operations of the Army, andorganization and equipment of the first attack wave;

f. Organization and action planned by the Navy and the Luftwaffe for thedefense of the crossing movement itself, for reconnaissance, and for support during the landing;

g. Recommendations concerning the commitment of paratrooper and otherairborne forces and concerning the command of forces after an adequately large area has beenbrought under control in England (Luftwaffe);

h. Recommendations for the location of headquarters for the command echelons ofthe commander in chief of the Army and the commander in chief of the Navy;

i. Comments by the Army, the Navy, and the Luftwaffe as to whether and whatpartial operations are considered practicable prior to the general amphibious operation;

k. Recommendations by the Army and the Navy concerning the chain ofcommand during the crossing, while seaborne.

[Hand-initialed]
J[odl]
K[eitel]
s/ Adolf Hitler

Distribution:

Commander in Chief, Army		Ribbon Copy
Commander in Chief, Navy		Second Copy
Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe		Third Copy
Wehrmacht Operations, Office		Fourth Copy
National Defense Branch		Fifth to Seventh Copies

SOURCE: Karl Klee,Operation "Sea Lion" and the Role Planned for the Luftwaffe,Monograph 8-115-5 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF Historical Division, 1955), 66-73.

APPENDIX 2. Directive No. 17

THE FUHRER & CINCFUHRER HQ1 Aug 1940
OF THE WEHRMACHT

OKW/WFL/L # 33 210/40 G. Kdos., Chefs.

Geheime Kommandosache. Fourth of ten Copies. Chef Sache. Officer Courier Only.

DIRECTIVE NO. 17

FOR THE CONDUCT OF AIR AND NAVAL WARFARE AGAINST ENGLAND

For the purpose of creating conditions for the final defeat of Britain, I intend continuing air and navalwarfare against the English motherland in a more severe form than hitherto.For this purpose I order as follows:

1. The Luftwaffe will employ all forces available to eliminate the British air force as soon as possible.In the initial stages, attacks will be directed primarily against the hostile air forces and their ground serviceorganization and supply installations, and against air armament industries, including factories producingAAA equipment.

2. Once temporary or local air superiority is achieved, operations will continue against ports,particularly against installations for the storage of food, and against food storage installations fartherinland. In view of intended future German operations, attacks against ports on the south coast ofEngland will be restricted to a minimum.

3. Air operations against hostile naval and merchant ships will be considered a secondary missionduring this phase unless particularly lucrative fleeting opportunities offer or unless such action willachieve increased effects in the operations prescribed under Item 2, above, or in the case of operationsserving to train aircraft crews for the continued conduct of air warfare.

4. The intensified air offensive will be so conducted that adequately strong air forces can be madeavailable whenever required to support naval operations against favorable fleeting targets. In addition,the Luftwaffe will remain prepared to render effective support for Operation Sea Lion.

5. Terrorization attacks as retaliatory measures will be carried out only on orders from me.

6. Intensified air warfare can commence at any time from 5 August on. The Luftwaffe will itselfdetermine the deadline after completion of its preparations and in accordance with weather conditions.

s/ Adolf Hitler

Initialed: K[eitel]

Distribution:

CINC, Luftwaffe		First Copy
CINC, Navy		Second Copy
CINC, Army		Third Copy
Wehrmacht High Command, Chief WFA Fourth copy

Initialed: W[arlimont]

SOURCE: Karl Klee,Operation "Sea Lion" and the Role Planned for the Luftwaffe,Monograph 8-1115-5 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF Historical Division, 1955), 66-73.

APPENDIX 3. Operational Orders of I Air Corps

Operational Orders of I Air Corps for the first attack onLondon, September 7, 1940 From G.O.C. I Air Corps Corps HQ6.9.40Ia Br.B.Nr. 10285 g.Kdos. N.f.K.

1. In the eveningof 7.9. Luftflotte 2 will conduct major strike against target: Loge.* To this endthe following units will operate in succession: For the Initial Attack:at 18.00 one KGof II Air Corps For the Main Attack:at 18.40 II Air Corpsat 18.45 I Air Corps, reinforced by KG 30
   *Code name for London.

2. Disposition of I Air Corps Units:

   KG 30 (plus II/KG 76):	on right
   KG 1	: central
   KG 76 (less II/KG 76):	on left
   For target see general Appendix.

3. Fighter Cover

   1. Purpose of Initial Attack is to force English fighters intothe air so that they will have reached end of endurance at timeof Main Attack.

   2. Fighter escort will be provided by Jafu 2 in the proportionof one fighter Geschwader for each bomber Geschwader.

   3. ZG 76 (for this operation under I Air Corps command) will asfrom 18.40 clear the air of enemy fighters over I Air Corpstargets, thereby covering attack and retreat of bomberformations.

   4. Jafu 2 guarantees two Fighter Geschwader to cover I and IIAir Corps.

4. Execution

   1. Rendezvous:
      To be made with Fighter Escort before crossing coast.Bombers will proceed in direct flight.

   2. Courses:
      KG 30: St Omer--just south of Cap Gris Nez--railway forknorth of "Seveneae"--target.
      KG I: St. Pol--"mouth of la Slack"--Riverhead--target.
      KG 76: Hedin--north perimeter of Boulogne--Westerham--target.

   3. Fighter escort:JG 26 for KG 30
      JG 54 for KG 1
      JG 27 for KG 76

      In view of the fact that the fighters will be operating atthe limit of their endurance, it is essential that direct

courses be flown and the attack completed in minimum time.
4. Flying altitudes after RV with fighters:
   KG 30: 15,000-17,000 feet
   KG 1: 18,000-20,000 feet
   KG 76: 15,000-17,000 feet
   To stagger heights as above will provide maximumconcentration of attacking force. On return flight someloss of altitude is permissible, in order to cross Englishcoast at approximately 12,500 feet.

5. The intention is to complete the operation by a singleattack. In the event of units failing to arrive directlyover target, other suitable objectives in Loge may bebombed from altitude of approach.

6. Return flight:
   After releasing bombs formations will turn to starboard.KG 76 will do so with care after first establishing thatstarboard units have already attacked. Return course willthen be Maidstone--Dymchurch--escort fighter bases.

7. Bomb loads:

   He111 and Ju88:	No 100-pound bombs 20 percent incendiaries30 percent delayed-action bombs of 2-4hours and 10-14 hours (the latter with-out concussion fuses)
   Do17:	25 percent disintegrating containerswith BI EL and no SD 50. Load only tobe limited by security of aircraftagainst enemy flak. Fuel sufficientfor completion of operation andmarginal safety to be carried only.

5. To achieve the necessary maximum effect it is essential thatunits fly as a highly concentrated force--during approach, attackand especially on return. The main objective of the operation isto prove that the Luftwaffe can achieve this.

6. I Air Corps Operational Order No. 10285/40 is hereby superseded.

By order of the G.O.C.
(signed) Grauert

SOURCE: Cajus Bekker,The Luftwaffe War Diaries (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co.,1968), Appendix 6.

APPENDIX 4. Intelligence Appreciation of the RAF

GERMAN INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION OF THE RAF
AND COMPARISON WITH CURRENT LUFTWAFFE STRENGTH

Oberkommando der Luftwaffe 16 July 1940

Operations Staff IC

I. THE MILITARY VALUE OF THE RAF

a. Strength and Equipment

1. Fighter Formations
With 50 fighter squadrons each having about 18 aircraft, there are 900 first line fightersavailable, of which about 675 (75 percent) may be regarded as serviceable.

About 40 percent of the fighters are Spitfires and about 60 percent are Hurricanes. Ofthese types the Spitfire is regarded as the better.

In view of the combat performance and the fact that they are not yet equipped with cannonguns both types are inferior to the Me109, while the individual Me110 is inferiorto skillfully handled Spitfires.

In addition to the above formations Blenheim squadrons are available for night fighter tasksas auxiliary heavy fighters and operated in cohesion with particularly intense searchlight defense.

2. Bombing Formations
Assuming the average squadron strength to be 20 aircraft, the 55 or 60 bomber squadronscontain about 1,150 first line bombers, of which about 860 (75 percent) may be regarded asserviceable.

This strength is divided among four types of aircraft of various series, approximately asfollows:

Hampden	400
Wellington	350
Whitley	300
Lockheed Hudson	100

Comparison of these types shows that the Hampden has the best qualities as a bomber.

In addition, there is a large number of Blenheim bombers available. Most of these are intraining schools but there are also some in operational units. However, in view of its performance,this type can no longer be considered a first line aircraft.

In comparison with German bombers, all these types have inadequate armor, and poorbomb-aiming equipment. However, they usually have strong defensive armament.

3.Other Formations
These include coastal formations equipped with Lockheed Hudsons (reconnaissance) andflying boats and various obsolescent types of aircraft--close reconnaissance and low-level attackaircraft designed for cooperation with the army.

These need not be taken into consideration in this report.

4. Antiaircraft Artillery (AA)
In view of the island's extreme vulnerability to air attack and the comparatively limitedamount of modern equipment the number of heavy and light AA guns available (1,194 plus 1,114) isby no means adequate to ensure the protection of the island ground defenses.

The large number of efficient searchlights available (3,200) constitutes an advantageousfactor in defense at night.

Only limited importance should be attributed to the numerous barrage balloons, as thesecan be used only at low altitudes (1,000 to 2,000 meters) owing to the medium wind velocitiesprevailing over the island. The balloons cannot be raised at all at appreciable wind velocities.

B. Personnel and Training

At present there are no difficulties regarding the number of men available.

From the outset the training is concentrated on the production of good pilots, and the greatmajority of the officers in particular are trained solely as such. By comparison tactical training isleft far in the background. For this reason the RAF has comparatively well-trained fighter pilotswhile the bomber crews are not up to modern tactical standards. This applies to the bomb-aimersin particular, most of whom are NCOs and men with little service experience. Although there aredeficiencies in equipment, the comparatively low standard in bombing accuracy may be attributed tothis factor.

C. Airfields

In the ground organization there is a considerable number of airstrips in the southern part of theisland and in some areas in the north. However, only a limited number can be considered asoperational airfields with modern maintenance and supply installations.

In general, the well-equipped operational airfields are used as take-off and landing bases,while the numerous smaller airfields located in the vicinity serve as alternative landing grounds andrest bases.

There is little strategic flexibility in operations as ground personnel are usually permanentlystationed at home bases.

D. Supply Situation

1. As regards aircraft, the RAF is at present almost entirely dependent on home production.American deliveries will not make any important contribution before the beginning of 1941.

If deliveries arriving in Britain in the immediate future are supplemented by French ordersthese aircraft may be ready for operations by the autumn.

At present the British aircraft industry produces about 180 to 300 first line fighters and 140first line bombers a month. In view of the present conditions relating to production (the appearanceof raw material difficulties, the disruption or breakdown of production at factories owing to airattacks, the increased vulnerability to air attack owing to the fundamental reorganization of theaircraft industry now in progress), it is believed that for the time being output will decrease ratherthan increase.

In the event of an intensification of air warfare it is expected that the present strength of theRAF will fall, and this decline will be aggravated by the continued decrease in production.

2. Unless an appreciable proportion of present stocks is destroyed, the fuel situation can beregarded as secure.

3. Bombs. Bomb production is limited by the method of manufacture (cast casings).However, there will be no difficulty in the supplies of bombs so long as present stocks are not usedand operations continue on a moderate scale. It is believed that these stocks will be adequate forintensive operations lasting several weeks.

Most of the bombs available are of medium caliber (112 and 224 kilogram), of which a largeproportion are of an obsolete pattern with unfavorable ballistic qualities (bombs with fins).

E. Command

Command at high level is inflexible in its organization and strategy. As formations are rigidlyattached to their home bases, command at medium level suffers mainly from operations beingcontrolled in most cases by officers no longer accustomed to flying (station commanders).Command at low level is generally energetic but lacks tactical skill.

II. THE OPERATIONAL SCOPE OF THE RAF

(a) For its operations the RAF has at its disposal an area of only 200 to 300 kilometers in-depth.This corresponds approximately to an area the size of the Netherlands and Belgium.

There is little possibility of Ireland being used in the system of depth owing to the lack ofground organization and the fact that once RAF units have been transferred there they cannotrestore their serviceability.

In contrast the Luftwaffe has at its disposal an area extending from Trondheim, acrossHeligoland Bay and along the North Sea and Channel coasts to Brest with a practically unlimitedzone in-depth.

(b) In view of the inferiority of British fighters to German fighters, enemy bomber formations,even with fighter escort, are not capable of carrying out effective daylight attacks regularly,particularly as escort operations are in any case limited by the lack of long-range single-engine orheavy fighters.

The RAF will therefore be obliged to limit its activity to night operations even in the event ofintensified air warfare. These operations will undoubtedly achieve a nuisance value but will in noway be decisive.

In contrast, the Luftwaffe is in a position to go over to decisive daylight operations owing tothe inadequate air defenses of the island.

CONCLUSION

The Luftwaffe is clearly superior to the RAF as reqards strength, training, command and location ofbases. In the event of an intensification of air warfare the Luftwaffe, unlike the RAF, will be in aposition in every respect to achieve a decisive effect this year if the time for the start of large-scaleoperations is set early enough to allow advantage to be taken of the months with relatively favorableweather conditions (July to the beginning of October).

SOURCE: Francis K. Mason,Battle Over Britain (Bucks, UK: Bourne End, 1990), Appendix H,507-8.

APPENDIX 5 Operational Chain of Command in the Luftwaffe

Operational Chain of Command in the Luftwaffe

APPENDIX 6 Luftwaffe High Command Staff Organization Chart

APPENDIX 7 Air Fleet Organization Chart

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