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The Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson
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This pioneering assessment of all significant aspects of the Johnson presidency is the first book-length appraisal by a professional historian to cover all issues, decisions, and developments of consequence--from foreign affairs, Vietnam, and the space race to the Great Society, civil rights, and the war on poverty--during the span of Johnson's five years in office. At a time when unflattering portraits of Johnson's distinctive personal and governmental style prevail, this volume presents a full, thoughtful, and balanced evaluation of the administration's achievements and failures.
Vaughn Bornet draws a compelling picture of the dramatic period from late 1963 to early 1969 based on a close examination of memoirs, scholarly books and articles, manuscript materials in the central White House files, and key oral histories. Many of the sources of information have not been used before; only a few of those who worked closely with Johnson during his 1,886 days in office will be familiar with all the details of this comprehensive account.
Bornet documents that, at the very outset, Johnson ignored or dismissed information from key advisors showing that our Vietnam war efforts would fail without a major commitment. In his chapter on the hostile relations between Johnson and the media, Bornet blames both the President and the press for the so-called credibility gap. He credits Johnson, rather than Kennedy, with the moon landing. He shifts the focus from Johnson as a consummate politician to give full attention and credit to the Presidents important and talented team-- a group that included Bill Moyers, Joseph Califano, Douglass Cater, Horace Busby, Walt Rostow, McGeorge Bundy, Lawrence O'Brien, Dean Rusk, George Reedy, and Jack Valenti. And Bornet is the first to argue that it was poor health, not political pressure, that caused Johnson to decide against seeking reelection in 1968.
Vaughn Bornet draws a compelling picture of the dramatic period from late 1963 to early 1969 based on a close examination of memoirs, scholarly books and articles, manuscript materials in the central White House files, and key oral histories. Many of the sources of information have not been used before; only a few of those who worked closely with Johnson during his 1,886 days in office will be familiar with all the details of this comprehensive account.
Bornet documents that, at the very outset, Johnson ignored or dismissed information from key advisors showing that our Vietnam war efforts would fail without a major commitment. In his chapter on the hostile relations between Johnson and the media, Bornet blames both the President and the press for the so-called credibility gap. He credits Johnson, rather than Kennedy, with the moon landing. He shifts the focus from Johnson as a consummate politician to give full attention and credit to the Presidents important and talented team-- a group that included Bill Moyers, Joseph Califano, Douglass Cater, Horace Busby, Walt Rostow, McGeorge Bundy, Lawrence O'Brien, Dean Rusk, George Reedy, and Jack Valenti. And Bornet is the first to argue that it was poor health, not political pressure, that caused Johnson to decide against seeking reelection in 1968.
432 pages, Paperback
First published January 15, 1984
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
September 17, 2015
While Lyndon Johnson was only president for 5 years he did a great many things--using his experience as a senator to pass more legislation than one might have thought would be possible.
Bornet paint a picture of Johnson as being an aggressive, ambitious determined man whose idealism drove him as president to use the government as a tool for social change...furthermore Kennedy's death and Johnson's desire to uphold the legacy of Kennedy (along with his landslide reelection as president) most likely contributed to his desire to effect change immediately. His heavy-handed policies, "Gun and Butter" which focused on internal problems like poverty and civil rights and healthcare and his external problems like Vietnam strained the US economy and social fabric. While the 60s were already set up to be a tumultuous time, Johnson's radical widesweeping changes eventually backfired on him, as the US wasn't ready for such change. As Bornet points out, much of the white middle class felt left behind and threatened (their interests ignored) as Johnson concentrated on the poor and non-whites. This head to two things, 1) the election of Nixon and a changing of the administration and legislation from Democrat to Republican and 2) economic problems in the 70s as government spending reeled out of control to fund these new programs (without increased taxation).
So while Johnson did great things because of his experience and skill, he failed on many fronts. The first was that he didn't communicate to the American public that Vietnam was going to be a long and hard fight. He relied too much on historic precedents where American soldiers in foreign lands win wars (even though there is often a military presence for much longer after the fighting). So in that sense, he set himself up for problems when the reality of Vietnam popped up. The second failure it seems, is that Johnson didn't understand the national scene. He defunded the Democratic leadership and shuffled unwanted people from the White House and government into positions within the party, leaving a void in funding and planning. This presented much last minute scrambling come the election of 1968.
In some ways, this book, in its current edition, is already outdated, as recently news of Nixon's backhanded dealings in Vietnam as a candidate for presidency messed up Johnson's negotiations for peace has become public. Johnson also seems to have bumbled Humphrey's candidacy at times, which seemed like an incomplete picture which Bornet didn't really explain too well. He kind of didn't really talk about the vice-presidency much either.
Over all, this book is concise and well written. At times I wasn't sure where Bornet was going, but history is often less a coherency than it is a list of events that are chained together through some arbitrary time period or effective event. Bornet paints a picture of Johnson as a man really who stepped up to the plate when Kennedy was unexpectedly assassinated. Johnson did the best he could and was quick to capitalize on change. There were some evident character flaws, but Bornet sides with Johnson as an idealizing hard working man, one who didn't run for a second term for health reasons but nonetheless sought to leave the country a better place than he left it.
Bornet paint a picture of Johnson as being an aggressive, ambitious determined man whose idealism drove him as president to use the government as a tool for social change...furthermore Kennedy's death and Johnson's desire to uphold the legacy of Kennedy (along with his landslide reelection as president) most likely contributed to his desire to effect change immediately. His heavy-handed policies, "Gun and Butter" which focused on internal problems like poverty and civil rights and healthcare and his external problems like Vietnam strained the US economy and social fabric. While the 60s were already set up to be a tumultuous time, Johnson's radical widesweeping changes eventually backfired on him, as the US wasn't ready for such change. As Bornet points out, much of the white middle class felt left behind and threatened (their interests ignored) as Johnson concentrated on the poor and non-whites. This head to two things, 1) the election of Nixon and a changing of the administration and legislation from Democrat to Republican and 2) economic problems in the 70s as government spending reeled out of control to fund these new programs (without increased taxation).
So while Johnson did great things because of his experience and skill, he failed on many fronts. The first was that he didn't communicate to the American public that Vietnam was going to be a long and hard fight. He relied too much on historic precedents where American soldiers in foreign lands win wars (even though there is often a military presence for much longer after the fighting). So in that sense, he set himself up for problems when the reality of Vietnam popped up. The second failure it seems, is that Johnson didn't understand the national scene. He defunded the Democratic leadership and shuffled unwanted people from the White House and government into positions within the party, leaving a void in funding and planning. This presented much last minute scrambling come the election of 1968.
In some ways, this book, in its current edition, is already outdated, as recently news of Nixon's backhanded dealings in Vietnam as a candidate for presidency messed up Johnson's negotiations for peace has become public. Johnson also seems to have bumbled Humphrey's candidacy at times, which seemed like an incomplete picture which Bornet didn't really explain too well. He kind of didn't really talk about the vice-presidency much either.
Over all, this book is concise and well written. At times I wasn't sure where Bornet was going, but history is often less a coherency than it is a list of events that are chained together through some arbitrary time period or effective event. Bornet paints a picture of Johnson as a man really who stepped up to the plate when Kennedy was unexpectedly assassinated. Johnson did the best he could and was quick to capitalize on change. There were some evident character flaws, but Bornet sides with Johnson as an idealizing hard working man, one who didn't run for a second term for health reasons but nonetheless sought to leave the country a better place than he left it.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews