Speech acts

Theidea thatlanguage is used for many purposes—and that straightforward, literal assertion is only one of them—was a principal theme of Wittgenstein’s later work, and it was forcibly stressed byAustin in his posthumously published lecturesHow to Do Things with Words (1962). Austin distinguished between various kinds of “speech act”: the “locutionary” act of uttering a sentence, the “illocutionary” act performed in or by the act of uttering, and the “perlocutionary” act or effect the act of uttering results in. Uttering the sentenceIt’s cold in here, for example, mayconstitute a request or a command for more heat (though the sentence does not have the conventional form of either illocution), and it may cause the hearer to turn the heat up. Austin placed great emphasis on the ways in which illocutionary force is determined by the institutional setting in which an utterance is made; an utterance such as “I name this ship theQueen Elizabeth,” for example, counts as a christening only in a specialset of circumstances. Austin’s theory ofspeech acts was considerably extended and refined by his American studentJohn Searle (born 1932) and others.

Implicatures

Austin’s Oxford colleagueH.P. Grice (1913–88) developed a sophisticated theory of how nonliteral aspects of meaning are generated and recovered through the exploitation of general principles of rational cooperation as adapted to conversationalcontexts. An utterance such asShe got married and raised a family, for example, would ordinarily convey that she got married before she raised a family. But this “implicature,” as Grice called it, is not part of the literal meaning of the utterance (“what is said”). It is inferred by the hearer on the basis of his knowledge of what is said and his presumption that the speaker is observing a set of conversational maxims, one of which prescribes that events be mentioned in thetemporal order in which they occurred.

The largest and most important class of implicatures consists of those that are generated not by observing the maxims but by openly and obviously violating them. For example, if the author of a letter ostensibly recommending an applicant for a job says only thatMr. Jones is very punctual and his penmanship is excellent, he thereby flouts the maxim enjoining the speaker (or author) to be as informative as necessary; he may also flout the maxim enjoining relevance. Since both the author and the reader know that more information is wanted and that the author could have provided it, the author implicates that he is prevented from doing so by other considerations, such as politeness. Additionally, therefore, he implicates that the applicant is not qualified for the job.

Metaphor and other figures

Related studies inpragmatics concern the nature ofmetaphor and other figurative language. Indeed,metaphor is of particular interest to philosophers, since its relation to literal meaning is quite problematic. Some philosophers and linguists have held that all speech is at bottom metaphorical.Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), for example, claimed that “literal” truths are simplymetaphors that have become worn out and drained of sensuous force. Furthermore, according to this view, metaphor is not merely the classification of familiar things under novel concepts. It is a reflection of the way human beings directly engage their world, the result of a bare humanpropensity to see some things as naturally grouped with others or as usefully conceived in comparison with others. It is most importantly not a product of reason or calculation, conscious or otherwise. Evidently, this idea bears strongaffinities to Wittgenstein’s work on rule following.

Figurative language is crucial to thecommunication of states of mind other than straightforward belief, as well as to the performance of speech acts other than assertion. Poetry, for example, conveys moods and emotions, andmoral language is used more often tocajole or prescribe, or to express esteem ordisdain, than simply to state one’sethical beliefs.

In all these activities the representative power of words is subservient to their practical import. Since the mid-20th century these practical and expressive uses of language have received increasing attention in the philosophy of language and a host of otherdisciplines, reflecting a growing recognition of their important role in thecognitive, emotional, and social lives of human beings.