Our editors will review what you’ve submitted and determine whether to revise the article.
Wittgenstein’s laterphilosophy represents a complete repudiation of the notion of anideal language. Nothing can be achieved by the attempt to construct one, he believed. There is no direct or infallible foundation of meaning for an ideal language to make transparent. There is no definitiveset ofconceptual categories for an ideallanguage to employ. Ultimately, there can be no separation between language and life and no single standard for how living is to be done.
One consequence of this view—that ordinary language must be in good order as it is—was drawn most enthusiastically by Wittgenstein’s followers in Oxford. Their work gave rise to a school known as ordinary language philosophy, whose most influential member wasJ.L. Austin (1911–60). Rather as politicalconservatives such asEdmund Burke (1729–97) supposed that inherited traditions and forms of government were much more trustworthy than revolutionary blueprints for change, so Austin and his followers believed that the inherited categories and distinctions embedded in ordinary language were the best guide to philosophicaltruth. The movement was marked by a schoolmasterly insistence on punctilious attention to what one says, which proved more enduring than any result the movement claimed to have achieved. The fundamental problem faced by ordinary language philosophy was that ordinary language is not self-interpreting. To assert, for example, that it already embodies a solution to themind-body problem (seemind-body dualism) presupposes that it is possible to determine what that solution is; yet there does not seem to be a method of doing so that does not entangle one in all the familiar difficulties associated with that debate.
Ordinary language philosophy was charged with reducing philosophy to a self-contained game of words, thus preventing it from real engagement with the world of things. Thiscriticism, however, underestimated the depth of the linguistic turn. The whole point of Frege’s revolution was that the best—and indeed the only—access to things is through language, so there can be no principled distinction between reflection on things such as numbers, values, minds, freedom, and God and reflection on the language in which such things are talked about. Nevertheless, it is generally acknowledged that the approach taken by ordinary language philosophy tended to discourage philosophical engagement with new developments in otherintellectual fields, especially those related to science.
Later work onmeaning
Indeterminacy and hermeneutics
Quine
The American philosopherW.V.O. Quine (1908–2000) was the most influential member of a new generation of philosophers who, though still scientific in their worldview, were dissatisfied withlogical positivism. In hisseminal paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951), Quine rejected, as what he considered the firstdogma, theidea that there is a sharp division betweenlogic andempirical science. He argued, in a vein reminiscent of the later Wittgenstein, that there is nothing in the logical structure of a language that is inherently immune to change, given appropriateempirical circumstances. Just as the theory of specialrelativity undermines the fundamental idea that events simultaneous to one observer are simultaneous to all observers, so other changes in what human beings know can alter even their most basic and ingrained inferential habits.
The other dogma of empiricism, according to Quine, is that associated with each scientific or empirical sentence is a determinate set of circumstances whose experience by an observer would count as disconfirming evidence for the sentence in question. Quine argued that the evidentiary links between science and experience are not, in this sense, “one to one.” The true structure of science is better compared to a web, in which there are interlinking chains of support for any single part. Thus, it is never clear what sentences are disconfirmed by “recalcitrant experience”; any given sentence may be retained, providedappropriate adjustments are made elsewhere. Similar views were expressed by the American philosopherWilfrid Sellars (1912–89), who rejected what he called the “myth of the given”: the idea that in observation, whether of the world or of the mind, any truths or facts are transparently present. The same idea figured prominently in thedeconstruction of the “metaphysics of presence” undertaken by the French philosopher and literary theoristJacques Derrida (1930–2004).
If language has no fixed logical properties and no simple relationship to experience, it may seem close to having no determinate meaning at all. This was in fact the conclusion Quine drew. He argued that, since there are nocoherentcriteria for determining when two words have the same meaning, the very notion of meaning is philosophically suspect. He further justified this pessimism by means of athought experiment concerning “radical translation”: a linguist is faced with the task of translating a completely alien language without relying oncollateral information from bilinguals or other informants. The method of the translator must be to correlatedispositions to verbal behaviour with events in the alien’senvironment, until eventually enough structure can be discerned to impose agrammar and a lexicon. But the inevitable upshot of the exercise is indeterminacy. Any two such linguists may construct “translation manuals” that account for all the evidence equally well but that “stand in no sort of equivalence, however loose.” This is not because there is some determinate meaning—a unique content belonging to the words—that one or the other or both translators failed to discover. It is because the notion of determinate meaning simply does not apply. There is, as Quine said, no “fact of the matter” regarding what the words mean.