The path of conquest and territorial growth was far from orderly. It was frequently diverted by the renewal or intensification of rivalry between, notably, England,France,Spain, and theLow Countries in colonial areas and on the European continent. The most severe blow to GreatBritain’s 18th-century dreams ofempire, however, came from the revolt of the 13American colonies. Thesecontiguous colonies were at the heart of the old, or what is often referred to as the first,British Empire, which consisted primarily of Ireland, the North American colonies, and the plantation colonies of theWest Indies. Ironically, the elimination of this core of the first British Empire was to a large extent influenced by the upsurge of empire building after theSeven Years’ War. Great Britain harvested from its victory in that war a new expanse of territory about equal to its prewar possessions on the North American continent:French Canada, the Floridas, and the territory between the Alleghenies and theMississippi River. The assimilation of the French Canadians, control of theIndigenous peoples, and settlement of the trans-Allegheny region, and the opening of new trade channels created a host of problems for the British government. Not the least of these were the burdensome costs to carry out this program on top of a huge national debt accumulated during the war. To cope with these problems, new imperial policies were adopted by the mother country: raising (for the first time) revenue from the colonies; tightening mercantile restrictions,imposing firm measures against smuggling (an important source of income for colonial merchants), and putting obstacles in the way ofNew England’s substantial trade with the West Indies. The strains generated by these policies created or intensified the hardships of large sections of the colonial population and, in addition, disrupted the relative harmony of interests that had been built up between the mother country and important elite groups in the colonies. Two additional factors, not unrelated to the enlargement of the British Empire, fed the onset and success of the American War of Independence (1775–83): first, a lessening need for military support from the mother country once the menacing French were removed from the continent and, second, support for the American Revolutionary forces from the French and Spanish, who had much to fear from theenhancedsea power and expansionism of the British.

The shock of defeat inNorth America was not the only problem confronting British society. Ireland—in effect, a colonial dependency—also experienced a revolutionary upsurge, giving added significance to attacks by leading British free traders against existing colonial policies and even at times against colonialism itself. But suchcriticism had little effect except as it may have hastened colonial administrative reforms to counteract real and potential independence movements in dependencies such asCanada and Ireland.

Conquest of India

Apart from reforms of this nature, the aftermath of American independence was a diversion of British imperial interests to other areas—the beginning of the settlement ofAustralia being a case in point. In terms of amount of effort and significance of results, however, the pursuit of conquest inIndia took first place. Starting with the assumption of control over the province of Bengal (after theBattle of Plassey, 1757) and especially after the virtual removal of French influence from theIndian Ocean, the British waged more or less continuous warfare against theIndian people and took over more and more of the interior. The Marāthās, the main source of resistance to foreign intrusion, were decisively defeated in 1803, but military resistance of one sort or another continued until the middle of the 19th century. The financing and even the military manpower for this prolonged undertaking came mainly from India itself. As Britishsovereignty spread, new land-revenue devices were soon instituted, which resulted in raising the revenue to finance the consolidation of power in India and the conquest of other regions, breaking up the old system of self-sufficient and self-perpetuating villages and supporting an elite whose self-interests would harmonize with British rule.

Global expansion

Except for the acquisition of additional territory in India and colonies inSierra Leone andNew South Wales, the important additions to British overseas possessions between the Seven Years’ War and the end of the Napoleonic era came as prizes of victory in wars withrival European colonial powers. In 1763 the first British Empire primarily centred on North America. By 1815, despite the loss of the 13 colonies, Britain had a second empire, one that straddled the globe from Canada and the Caribbean in theWestern Hemisphere around theCape of Good Hope to India and Australia. This empire was sustained by and in turn was supported by maritime power that far exceeded that of any of Britain’s European rivals.

Policy changes

The half century of global expansion is only one aspect of the transition to the second British Empire. The operations of the new empire in the longer run also reflected decisive changes in British society. The replacement of mercantile by industrial enterprise as the main source of national wealth entailed changes to make national and colonial policy more consistent with the newhierarchy of interests. The restrictive trade practices and monopolistic privileges that sustained the commercial explosion of the 16th and most of the 17th centuries—built around theslave trade, colonial plantations, and monopolistic trading companies—did not provide the most effectiveenvironment for a nation on its way to becoming the workshop of the world.

The desired restructuring of policies occurred over decades of intense political conflict: the issues were not always clearlydelineated, interest groups frequently overlapped, and thebalance of power between competing vested interests shifted from time to time. The issues were clearly drawn in some cases, as for example over the continuation of theBritish East India Company’s trade monopoly. The company’s export of Indian silk, muslins, and other cotton goods was seen by all who were involved in any way in the production of British textiles to be an obstacle to the development of markets for competing British manufactures. Political opposition to this monopoly was strong at the end of the 18th century, but the giant step on the road tofree trade was not taken until the early decades of the 19th century (termination of the Indian trademonopoly, 1813; of the Chinese trade monopoly, 1833).

In contrast, the issues surrounding the strategic slave trade were much more complicated. The West Indies plantations relied on a steady flow of slaves from Africa. British merchants and ships profited not only from supplying these slaves but also from the slave trade with other colonies in the Western Hemisphere. The British were the leading slave traders, controlling at least half of thetransatlantic slave trade by the end of the 18th century. But the influential planter and slave-trade interests had come under vigorous and unrelenting attack by religious and humanitarian leaders and organizations, whopropelled the issue of abolition to the forefront of British politics around the turn of the 19th century. Historians are still unravelling the threads of conflicting arguments about the priority of causes in the final abolition of the slave trade and, later, of slavery itself, because economic as well as political issues were at play: glutted sugar markets (to which low-cost producers in competing colonies contributed) stimulated thoughts about controlling future output by limiting the supply of fresh slaves; the compensation paid to plantation owners by the British government at the time of the abolition of slavery rescued many planters from bankruptcy during a sugar crisis, with a substantial part of the compensation money being used to pay off planters’ debts to London bankers. Moreover, the battle between proslavery and antislavery forces was fought in an environment in which free-trade interests were challenging established mercantilist practices and the West Indies sugar economy was in asecular decline.

The British were not the first to abolish the slave trade. Denmark had ended it earlier, and the U.S. Constitution, written in 1787, had already provided for its termination in 1808. But the British Act of 1807 formally forbidding the slave trade was followed up by diplomatic and naval pressure to suppress the trade. By the 1820s Holland, Sweden, and France had also passed anti-slave-trade laws. Such laws and attempts toenforce them by no means stopped the trade, so long as there was buoyant demand for this commodity and good profit from dealing in it. Some decline in the demand for slaves did follow the final emancipation in 1833 of slaves in British possessions. On the other hand, the demand for slaves elsewhere in the Americas took on new life—e.g., to work the virgin soils of Cuba and Brazil and to pick the rapidly expanding U.S. cotton crops to feed the voracious appetite of the British textile industry. Accordingly, the number of slaves shipped across the Atlanticaccelerated at the same time Britain and other maritime powers outlawed this form of commerce.