Islamism, broad set of politicalideologies that utilize and draw inspiration fromIslamic symbols and traditions in pursuit of a sociopolitical objective. The aims and objectives of these movements vary widely, as do their interpretations of Islamic tradition and practice, and, as such, the precise scope and definition of the term remain debated. Among the manydisparate groups considered Islamist are reformist movements such as theMuslim Brotherhood as well as transnational jihadist movements such asal-Qaeda and theIslamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL; also called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria [ISIS]). The term is sometimes applied toIran’svelāyat-e faqīh system of government that arose out of theIranian Revolution, theSaud dynasty’s strand ofWahhābism inSaudi Arabia, and theTaliban inAfghanistan, though these are often considered separate fundamentalist movements altogether.

The adjectiveIslamist, denoting someone or something in pursuit of a sociopolitical objective using the symbols and traditions of Islam, is distinguished from the termIslamic, which refers directly to aspects of Islam as a religion.

Historical background and theoretical foundations

Although many Islamist theoreticians drew upon the work of early theologians such asIbn Taymiyyah, the theoretical foundations underpinning Islamist movements were rooted in the late 19th century, a transformative period in which theIslamic world grappled simultaneously with increased engagement withmodernity and the ideas ofEnlightenment, on the one hand, and with its own decline in the face ofWestern colonialism, on the other. This period was accompanied by the expansion ofprint technology and massliteracy, which not onlyfacilitated the spread of new ideas but also offered greater access to Islamic materials, including, most especially, theQurʾān. The increased ability of the general population to read the Qurʾān undermined the authority of trained religious scholars, known as theʿulamāʾ, as interpretative gatekeepers and enabled nonspecialists to engage in their own individual interpretations of the scripture (ijtihād), in turn leading to increased scriptural literalism.

Modernist thinkers attempted toreconcile decay in the Islamic world (which had once been a leader in scientific achievement andintellectual endeavour) with the success of the West.Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, perhaps the most influential of his time, argued that therationalist thought then prevalent in European society lay also at the unadulterated core ofIslam, which, he believed, charged humankind with the responsibility to manage the created world using mind and reason. His studentMuḥammad ʿAbduh put much of Afghānī’s thought into action, leading an intellectual movement to effect reforms in Islamic institutions. He equated Islam and modernism to such an extent that hisdisciples were variously able to privilege one or the other in their own work. Some of his followers, such asAḥmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid for instance, developed his ideas into effectivelysecular ideologies by highlighting his modernist arguments. Others, such asRashīd Riḍā, emphasized the need for a return to Islam’s unadulterated core in order to rejuvenate Islamic society, idealizing the practices of thesalaf (forebears) of Islam.

A parallel development took place among Indian Muslimintellectuals under theBritish raj. The work ofSayyid Ahmad Khan demonstrated the compatibility of Islam with rationalist thought and modern science, andMuhammad Iqbal actively sought toimplement reform in Muslim society.Abū al-Aʿlā al-Mawdūdī prioritized a return to an idealized form of Islam and formulated arobust political theory for Islamic government in theIndian subcontinent (focused in particular onPakistan after partition).

Local sociopolitical movements

While these reformist ideas were permeating the public discourse as a solution to escape decay and colonialism, organized Islamist movements received their watershed moment in the 1928 founding of theMuslim Brotherhood byHassan al-Banna in Egypt. Inspired by the idea that Islam promotes modernity and prosperity, the organization built grassroots networks throughoutEgypt to promote social welfare, development, and education in populations that Egypt’s newly independent government had failed to reach. Although it was not directly involved in the political sphere at first, it quickly transformed into a vehicle for popular mobilization against the rulingWafd Party, KingFarouk I, and British influence in Egypt.

InIndia, meanwhile, as theMuslim League pushed for the creation of a secular Muslim-majority state in what is now Pakistan, Mawdūdī and his followers resisted. According to Mawdūdī, the role of any state was to implement God’ssovereignty (ḥākimiyyah) and apply his law, thereby attainingutopia, and only in doing so could Muslims return to their former prosperity. A secular state, even under Muslim rule, would unduly undermine such a system of perfection and would necessarily return society to a state of negligence and decay (jāhiliyyah). As such, Mawdūdī established theJamaʿat-i Islami in 1941 to be a vanguard for an Islamicpolitical system against the successes of the Muslim League.

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Although the Muslim Brotherhood had been morepopulist and apolitical in its origin than the top-down political idealism of the Jamaʿat, members of the Brotherhood came to embrace Mawdūdī’sbinary between those who upheldḥākimiyyah and those who were stuck injāhiliyyah. Despite cooperating withGamal Abdel Nasser and the Free Officers movement to effect Egypt’s revolution in 1952, the Brotherhood fell out with the new regime, leading to a cycle of suppression and violence. The ideological justification for violence was soon provided for in the works ofSayyid Quṭb, which advanced the notion that much of Muslim society was only nominally so and that those Muslims who stood in the way of God’s sovereignty werelegitimate targets ofjihād al-sayf (jihad through physical combat). Violence was renounced by the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s, but Quṭb’s conceptualization of jihad proved influential in later transnational Islamist movements.

Islamist movements proliferated in theArab world after many Arabs became disillusioned by the failure ofPan-Arabism to effectuate prosperity and were seeking an ideologicalalternative. Existing branches of the Muslim Brotherhood grew throughout theMiddle East, including in Syria,Jordan,Iraq,Sudan, and thePalestinian territories. A similar movement,Ennahda, was established inTunisia byRached Ghannouchi and Abdelfattah Mourou. These groups had in common their acceptance of the existing nation-state, a general willingness to participate within the existing legal framework, a dedication todemocratic principles, and the acceptance of apluralistic society that includes non-Muslims.

Some ideologically similar groups took up arms in less stable politicalenvironments.Hezbollah was formed in 1982 duringLebanon’s civil war (1975–90) and remained the country’s most powerful militia thereafter.Hamas emerged from the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1987, amid a Palestinian uprising known as the firstintifada. In the 1990s, after theAlgerian government cracked down on thenascentIslamic Salvation Front—which had won a majority of local and national elections—several splinter groups took up arms in the country’s civil war. Despite the armed nature of these groups, their use of force remained contained to their localcontexts, with theirrhetoric couched in terms of national liberation rather than chauvinistic display of Islamicfundamentalism.

Transnational jihad movements

As a period of rapprochement between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government led the former to renounce violence under the presidency ofAnwar Sadat, those Islamists still sympathetic to the ideas of Quṭb remained dissatisfied with government policies. Smaller groups unassociated with the Brotherhood were formed throughout the country and called for the militant overthrow of the government. Many of these groups coalesced into theEgyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), whose leader,Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, circulated a pamphlet in 1981 entitledThe Neglected Duty (Al-Farīḍah al-ghāʾibah), referring to the Qutbistjihād al-sayf. That same year, Faraj and four other members of the EIJ were implicated in the assassination of Sadat.

Meanwhile, theAfghan War (1978–92) raged on between Afghanistan’s unpopular communist government and themujahideen, disparate groups of Afghan guerrilla fighters who drew inspiration from Islam as a uniting factor. Thousands of Muslims from around the world poured in to join the fight, many of them already involved in Islamist movements back home, including EIJ memberAyman al-Zawahiri. A network to organize the foreign fighters was formed through the patronage andcharisma of the wealthyOsama bin Laden and was calledal-Qaeda (Arabic: al-Qāʿidah, “the Base”); Zawahiri would become a key leader of the organization, especially after bin Laden’s death in 2011. As the government continued to be propped up by the intervention of theSoviet military, many Islamists involved in the fight concluded that the jihad against national governments could only succeed by first targeting theglobal powers that back them. Thus, after the withdrawal of the Soviets and the toppling of the Afghan government, al-Qaeda took on a transnational jihad in the 1990s.

In the following decades, the idea of a transnationaljihad attracted some existing Islamist groups, such as the EIJ, and inspired the formation of several small terror cells around the world. They often operated under the “franchise” of the al-Qaeda brand—includingal-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI),al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), andal-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM)—but their organizational connection to one another was typically minimal, if not isolated. Thus, theIslamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL; also called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria [ISIS]), AQI’s successor, was easily able to snub the leader of al-Qaeda in 2014 and act independently. Likewise, many individuals who carried out terrorist attacks on behalf of ISIL had little or no direct contact with the organization at all.

Other groups claiming affiliation with al-Qaeda and ISIL includedal-Shabaab inSomalia andBoko Haram inNigeria, respectively. TheTaliban in Afghanistan, despite its early dependence on funding from al-Qaeda and its continued ties with it and other like-minded groups, did not espouse anideology of transnational jihad.

Post-Islamism

As seen in the ideological shifts of some of the Islamist organizations described above, Islamist movements are oftendynamic, responding and adapting to theircontext. In many cases, movements rooted in Islamism came to privilege modernity and development over Islamic identity, a shift apparent in both their activities and their discourse. Among the examples of this phenomenon is Tunisia’sEnnahda Party, which worked pragmatically with secularists in the aftermath of the 2011Jasmine Revolution. In 2016 the party formally announced that it would focus its activities on ensuring a stabledemocracy in Tunisia and that it would no longer participate in the edification or mobilization of Islamic institutions. Its leaders said that its support for Islamic institutions was no longer necessary, due to the ability of religious institutions and devout individuals to practice freely under Tunisia’s new government.

A similar shift occurred in Turkey. Out of the IslamistWelfare Party, which was banned in 1998, arose theJustice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; AKP). Though its membership incorporated formerWelfare Party members and the party continued to push for the desecularization of Turkey—for instance, reversing a ban on headscarves in public places—the new party was both nonconfessional and liberalizing. It rose to power in 2002 and at first sought the support of Islamic scholarFethullah Gülen and his Hizmet movement to upend secularists and ultranationalists. In the 2010s, however, the AKP began using its authority to suppress the Hizmet movement. By the end of the decade, the party was more notable for its economic policies and nationalist rhetoric than for its social stances, even forming an alliance with an ultranationalist party in the 2018 elections.